DEEPENING DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA?

Direct Elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada)



Edited by Maribeth Erb and Priyambudi Sulistiyanto

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DEEPENING DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA?

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Edited by
Maribeth Erb and
Priyambudi Sulistiyanto

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INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES
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THE CONTRIBUTORS

Wilhelmus Anggal is the Director of the Manggaraian Institute in Ruteng, Flores, and runs his own radio station, Be Smart Radio, in Ruteng.

Graham Brown is Senior Lecturer at the Department of Economics and International Development, University of Bath, U.K.

Michael Buehler is the Postdoctoral Fellow in Modern Southeast Asian Studies 08–09 at The Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University, New York.

Nankyung Choi is a Research Fellow at the Southeast Asia Research Centre, City University of Hong Kong.

Rachael Diprose is affiliated with the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, University of Oxford.

Maribeth Erb is an Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore.

Syarif Hidayat is a researcher at the Centre for Economic Research, the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) in Jakarta.

David T. Hill is Professor of Southeast Asian Studies and Research Fellow in the Asia Research Centre at Murdoch University, Western Australia.

Jennifer Lindsay is Visiting Fellow at the Southeast Asia Centre, Australian National University, and was previously Senior Research Fellow at the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore.

Aloysius Benedictus Mboi was Governor of Nusa Tenggara Timur Province from 1978–88, and won the prestigious Ramon Magsaysay Award in 1986.

Marcus Mietzner is Lecturer in Indonesian Studies at the Faculty of Asian Studies, Australian National University.

Pratikno is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Government, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Gadjah Mada University and Director of the Postgraduate Program on Local Politics and Regional Autonomy.

Jim Schiller is Senior Lecturer at Flinders Asia Centre, School of Political and International Studies, Flinders University, Adelaide, Australia.

Claire Q. Smith is a fellow at the London School of Economics. She is completing a PhD in Development Studies, focusing on political transition and post-conflict reconstruction in Eastern Indonesia.

Benny Subianto works for the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD); he did his master's degree in Southeast Asian History at Cornell University.

Priyambudi Sulistiyanto is Lecturer at Flinders Asia Centre, School of Political and International Studies, Flinders University, Adelaide, Australia, and was previously Assistant Professor at the Southeast Asian Studies Programme, National University of Singapore, Singapore.

Tri Ratnawati is a researcher at the Research Center of Political Studies, the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) in Jakarta.

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GLOSSARY

Abangan	"Nominal" or "syncretic" Muslims
Adat	tradition, custom
AMPUH	Aliansi Masyarakat Pendukung Ulama
APDN	Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri (Academy of Local Government)
ATVLI	Asosiasi Telivisi Lokal Indonesia (Indonesian Association of Local Television Stations)
Bappeda	Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah (Regional Body for Planning and Development
BIDA	Batam Industrial Development Authority
BIN	Badan Intelijen Negara (National Intelligence Agency)
BPD	Badan Pemerintahan Daerah (Council of Local Government)
BPH	Badan Pemerintah Harian (Local Council of Daily Affairs)
Bupati	Regent or District Head
Camat	Sub-District Head
DAK	Dana Alokasi Khusus (Special Allocation Fund)
DAP	Dewan Adat Papua (Council of Papuan Customary Leaders)
DAU	Dana Anggaran Umum (General Allocation Fund)
Desa	Village
DPAC	Dewan Pengurus Anak Cabang (Assembly of Sub-district Party Leaders)
DPC	Dewan Cabang (Assembly of Provincial Party Leaders)
DPD	Dewan Daerah (Assembly of District Party Leaders)
DPP	Dewan Pusat (Assembly of National Party Leaders)

DPR	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (People's Representative Assembly, or the National Legislature)
DPRD	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Regional People's Representative Assembly, or Regional Legislature)
GAM	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement)
Gapensi	Gabungan Pelaksana Konstruksi Nasional Indonesia (National Board for Building Construction and Maintenance)
GBHN	Garis Besar Haluan Negara (Broad Guidelines of National Strategy)
Golkar	Golongan Karya (Functional Group-secular nationalist party)
IDPs	internally-displaced persons
Jamppi	Jaringan Masyrakat Pemantau Pemilu Indonesia (Monitors' Network Foundation)
Jawara	strongman
JPPR	Jaringan Pendidikan Pemilih untuk Rakyat (People's Voter Education Network)
Jurdil	*jujur dan adil* (Honest and Fair)
Kabupaten	District government
Kecamatan	Sub-district
KKN	Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotism (Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism)
Kotamadya	Municipality
KTP	Kartu Tanda Penduduk (Identity Card)
KPU	Komisi Pemilihan Umum (National Election Commission)
KPUD	Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah (Regional Election Commission)
LP3ES	Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial (Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education & Information)
MPR	Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People's Consultative Assembly)
NDI	National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
NTT	Nusa Tenggara Timur
NU	Nadhlatul Ulama (Islamic Scholars Association)
OPM	Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Organization)
PAD	Pendapatan Asli Daerah (locally derived revenue)

PAN	Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party-secular party with Muhammadiyah link)
Pancasila	Five principles of the Indonesian State
Panwaslu	Pengawas Pemilihan Umum (Election Supervisory Body)
Panwasda	Pengawas Pemilihan Umum Daerah (Regional Election Supervisory Body)
Partai Marhaenisme	Marhaenism Party (secular nationalist party)
Partai Patriot Pancasila	Pancasila Patriot's Party (secular nationalist party)
Partai Pelopor	Vanguard Party (secular nationalist party)
Partindo	Partai Indonesia
PBB	Partai Bulan Bintang (Islamic party)
PBR	Partai Bintang Reformasi (Reform Star Party-Islamic party)
PBSD	Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat (Socialist Democratic Labour Party secular party)
PD	Partai Demokrat (Democratic Party-secular nationalist party)
PDI	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party-secular nationalist party)
PDI-P	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party Struggle-secular nationalist party)
PDK	Partai Demokrat Kebangsaan (National Democratic Party)
PDS	Partai Damai Sejahtera (Prosperous Peace Party-Christian party)
Pemda	*pemerintahan daerah* (local government)
Pemulu	*pemilihan umum* (general election)
Peraturan Pemerintah	government regulation
PGRS	Pasukan Gerakan Rakyat Sarawak
Pilkada	*pemilihan kepala daerah langsung* (direct elections of regional heads)
PIB	Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru (New Indonesian Association Party)
PKB	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party-secular party with NU link)
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party-defunct communist party)
PKNU	Partai Kebangikitan Nasional Ulama (National Ulama Awakening Party)

PKPB	Partai Karya Perduli Bangsa (Nationhood and Caring Party-secular nationalist party)
PKPI	Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia (Indonesian Justice and Unity Party-secular nationalist party)
PKS	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party-Islamic party)
PM	Partai Merdeka (Freedom Party-secular nationalist party)
PNBK	Partai Nasional Banteng Kemerdekaan (Freedom Bull National Party-secular nationalist party)
PNI	Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party)
PNKB	Partai Nasional Banteng Kemerdekaan (Freedom Ball National Party)
PNU	Partai Nadhlatul Ulama
PPD	Partai Persatuan Daerah (Regional Unity Party)
PPDI	Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Vanguard Party-secular nationalist party)
PPDK	Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan (United Democratic Nationhood Party-secular nationalist party)
PPIB	Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru (New Indonesia Alliance Party-secular party)
PPNUI	Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia (Indonesian Nahdlatul Community Party-Islamic party)
PPP	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party-Islamic party)
PPP	Partai Persatuan Daerah (Regional Unity Party)
Preman	Gangsters
PSI	Partai Sarikat Indonesia (Indonesian Unity Party-secular nationalist party)
Putra daerah	local inhabitants (literally "native sons", "sons of the soil"
PWI	Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia (Indonesian Journalists Association)
Reformasi	Reform (movement)
Rp	Rupiah (Indonesian currency)
Santri	"Pious" or devout Muslims

Sekwilda	Sekretaris Wilayah Daerah (Regional Secretary)
SPD	Sekolah Pemerintahan Desa (School for Village Government)
STDN	Sekolah Tinggi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri (College of Local Government)
Tim sukses	Victory team, core campaign team
TNI	Tentara Negara Indonesia (Polisi Republik Indonesia)
Undang-undang (UU)	Laws
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
Walikota	Mayor
Yappika	Aliansi Masyarakat Sipil untuk Demokrasi (Civil Society Alliance for Democracy)

1

INDONESIA AND THE QUEST FOR "DEMOCRACY"

Priyambudi Sulistiyanto and Maribeth Erb[1]

DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS: WHAT ROLE DOES THE VOTE HAVE IN DEMOCRACY?

> *"The voting issue…is the only issue that addresses questions of power and power relationships…. It's the one right you have to have to protect all your other rights — to choose who's going to lead, [who are] going to be policy makers … who's going to run things, and how they're going to run things."* (Abramsky 2006)

> *"There is not a single regime in the world of the second half of the 20th century which openly repudiates democracy."* (Sato 1997, p. 82)

The question of the vote, and its relationship to democracy, became especially pertinent in the opening years of the twenty-first century, when in the United States 2000 elections the popular vote was won by one person, and yet the election was won by someone else. This unlocked considerable discussion about the meaning of the vote, different systems of voting, and their relationship to democracy. Is the will of the majority democratic? Or is it the "rule of law" that determines democracy (Emmerson 2001, p. 26)? In the smaller country of Singapore, two elections in the twenty-first century have seen an increase in discontent that many election districts have no candidates to oppose the dominant party, so a majority of citizens never vote. Is voting

then actually essential to a democracy? The largest country in Southeast Asia, Indonesia, has seen tremendous electoral activity in the first years of the twenty-first century, including constitutional and institutional reforms that have allowed very different types of electoral systems to emerge, and allowed Indonesians to directly vote in their national and local leaders.

In Abramsky's new book (2006), which discusses the massive disenfranchisement of prisoners and ex-prisoners in many American states, suffrage is presented as a fundamentally important right in a democracy, and yet in many regimes that call themselves democracies leaders have never been directly voted in by the people. In this introduction we want to reflect on the question of democracy and the introduction of the recent direct vote in Indonesia, in this time of "democratic transitions" in Asia (Johannen and Gomez 2001). Has this introduction of direct voting rights to the people of Indonesia been a move towards "consolidating" democracy? Does the direct vote guarantee that democracy will flourish? The recent local elections, which have seen Indonesians being given not only the right to elect their president but also their local leaders, have opened up space for more political participation both nationally and locally. Has the move towards regional autonomy and the continuing modification of decentralization laws helped to further the process of democratization in Indonesia? Indeed, what is democracy, since every regime, no matter how authoritarian, has at various times claimed to be a democracy (Sato 1997, p. 82; O'Donnell 2007)? These are matters that will be explored in this volume, within the context of examining the introduction of a system of direct elections in Indonesia in the twenty-first century and, most particularly, the further moves towards democratization and decentralization signalled by the new system of direct elections of regional heads introduced in 2005.

DECENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL ELECTIONS

The end of the twentieth century saw Indonesia emerging from an authoritarian system of government, known as the "New Order", headed by General Soeharto; he gave up his presidential position under considerable duress only several months after having been re-elected for his seventh term. The legitimacy which Soeharto had erected during the New Order was built on regular elections, appearing scrupulously fair, but structured in such a way as to ensure his continued position (Haris 2004), and the ability to "develop" the country, and keep the economy growing even though many recognized the "fiction" of the electoral system (Liddle 1997). The long-term regime ended due to the massive dissatisfaction stemming from deteriorating civil liberties

in the 1990s and the crumbling Indonesian economy, sparked by the Asian economic crisis of 1997.[2] Despite the continued control of many elites nurtured under Soeharto's New Order, massive structural, institutional, and constitutional reforms were rapidly implemented in order to appease the widespread calls for reform. The first "free and fair elections" since before the New Order were held in 1999; these were to elect new members of the local and national legislatures, and to install a new president and new regional heads. Despite the success of these elections, they were assessed as being only a "half-hearted reform" (King 2003), since the military was still guaranteed seats in the national assembly, and the participation of the populace in the election of their leaders was still not direct. In the same year, laws were crafted to give more power to the regions, which had chafed under the centralized control of the New Order; in 2001, Law no. 22/1999 on local governance and Law no. 25/1999 on fiscal balance between the central government and the regions were inaugurated, giving greater regional autonomy (*otonomi daerah*) to the regions to run their own affairs, something that had been impossible during the Soeharto government period. The direct elections for local district heads — a process known as *pilkada* (or *pilkadal* or *pilkadasung* — *pemilihan kepala daerah langsung* — "direct electons for regional heads") represent a further step in the decentralization process. This process will continue until 2008 when more than 400 districts throughout Indonesia will have completed this nationwide political transformation. The justification for the introduction of the direct vote to local voters was what were seen as abuses in the previous system of choosing district heads introduced in 1999; the direct vote was also thought to open more space to nurture the emergence of local democracy, which was denied during the Soeharto period.

The scholarship on decentralization and the emergence of local democracy in post-Soeharto Indonesia ranges from optimistic through cautious to pessimistic.[3] Those in the optimist camp argue that decentralization and democratization will emerge together, and have been part of the reform agendas pushed for and contested through the succession of post-Soeharto presidencies — B.J. Habibie (1998–99), Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2001), Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001–04), to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–present). They are represented by international and national organizations such as UNDP, World Bank, Asia Foundation, Ford Foundation, and the Smeru Institute (Schulte Nordholt 2004). By allowing the regions (especially at the district level) to have more say in running their own affairs, it was hoped that local people would benefit from local government policies; in this sense, decentralization is a major and necessary step towards nurturing a flourishing local democracy because it opens up spaces for local political

participation. However, those in the pessimist camp argue that decentralization has been accompanied by the rise of *preman* (gangsters), as well as the spread of money politics and corruption into the regions (Antlov 2003; Hadiz 2005; Malley 2003; Mietzner, 2007; Sidel 2004). Competition, squabbles, and fights to control these decentralized powers and resources have occurred, leading sometimes to a compromise where elites share a "piece of the pie" together. On the other hand, others see that decentralization has allowed the flourishing of local civil society and the (re)emerging of old local elites such as ethnic leaders in the regions (Faucher 2005; Schiller 2002; van Klinken 2002). Decentralization has opened up the possibility for grass-roots participation in the local political context and direct political participation or lobbying to the local leaders.

Decentralization has had diverse implications for the political changes desired by the Indonesian people; at the very least it has allowed the discussion and debate on the idea of "democracy" to flourish. The latest development, the re-structuring of the election of leaders, is considered by many to be the culmination of this process of developing a "grass-roots" democracy, and good governance. However, there is the danger of assuming a direct positive correlation between decentralization and democracy. In their comparative study of South Asian and West African countries, Crook and Manor (1998) suggest that decentralization does not always improve the local governance and accountability of local leaders. They argue that decentralization must be implemented together with democratization and institutional reforms at the national level (Crook and Manor 1998, p. 304). These reflections can be used as a point of departure for examining decentralization in Indonesia and to argue further whether the processes and outcomes of the direct elections of district heads will eventually lead to the emergence of local democracy.

DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION AND ELECTIONS

> *"Democracy is based ultimately not on voters, but on* ***citizens.****"* (O'Donnell 2007, p. 7)

What is Democracy?

The issues of "democracy" and "democratization" have become of particular interest in the past fifteen years; this was due to the collapse of the Eastern European "communist bloc" beginning in 1989, and then the rise of multiple "*reformasi*" movements in Asia on the heels of the 1997 Asian economic crisis, calling for changes in systems claiming to be "democracies" based on

traditional "Asian values". This more recent development has lead to a sense of "triumphalism" on the part of some champions of more "liberal democracies", and an increase in interest over whether or not there is one "type" of universal democracy (Ahn and Fort 2006). This recent re-look at democracy is most relevant to Indonesia, which some observers have suggested is the only country in the region which has really emerged from the economic and political crises of the late twentieth century substantially changed (Engberg and Ensson 2001, p. 37). Certainly a major focus of this change has been the development of Indonesia as an "electoral democracy" (Antlov and Cederroth 2004; Elklit 2001; King 2003; Suryadinata 2002). In this respect, it is important to note that Indonesia started out as a "presidential" system, but experienced a brief period of parliamentarism in the 1950s, after which the country returned to a presidential system in the late 1950s and has been so ever since. The current direct elections mechanism was adopted as a consequence of constitutional amendments introduced after the fall of Soeharto in 1998. Presidential systems are noted for allocating considerable power to leaders, as opposed to parliamentary systems. The introduction of the direct vote is one check on this power, which clearly was not in place during the Soeharto era. Hence the extending of the direct vote to the local level is meant to improve the presidential system, seen to have been abused for so long, and consequently furthering the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia.[4]

Two related issues in the debates over "democracy" and the process of "democratization" are important for our purposes in this volume. The first has to do with the question of "types" of democracy, there being much debate over whether there are different types, how many, and what the differences are. The second issue is that of "consolidation" of democracy; many scholars have noted that what has looked like a move towards democratization in many "Third World" countries has in the long run resulted in a "failed" democracy. Our purpose in looking at these two issues is to examine how important the question of voting and elections has been in assessing types of democracy and its "deepening" or consolidation, before we turn our attention to a closer look at changes in Indonesia.

According to Haynes, scholars have offered so many sub-types of democracy that Collier and Levitsky (1997, cited in Haynes 2001, p. 5) counted 550 different sub-types. Haynes vastly simplifies these sub-types, by suggesting a rather straightforward tripartite typology: "façade" democracy, "electoral democracy", and "full democracy" (ibid., p. 6). A similar typology was used by Elklit (2001, p. 63) in the same volume (following Diamond 1996), using the terms "pseudo", "electoral", and "liberal" democracy. "Façade" or "pseudo" democracy is where although there may be regular elections, they

are heavily controlled. In "façade" democracies the military has an important role in the control of "law and order" generally, and civil and human rights are not considered to be important features for rulers in managing the populace (Haynes 2001, pp. 6–7).[5] In electoral democracies, on the other hand, there are "meaningful rules and regulations" (Haynes 2001, p. 8) and "some concern for the processes of law" (ibid.). What differentiates "electoral democracy" from "full democracy" is the extent to which the day-to-day affairs of the country, and not just electoral procedures, are focused on guaranteeing the rights of individuals and their participation in all public and political processes (Haynes 2001, p. 10). The question of accountability of officials to the public is also highly important and in a "full democracy" should be transparent; at the same time, traditionally marginalized groups should "have a say in the direction of the nation" (ibid.).[6]

The issue of "consolidation" is closely related to the question of "types" of democracy because, when concerned about processes of democratization, one would naturally ask, how does one move from type to type? Is it in fact possible to do so? When a regime takes the step of introducing full participation and representation through elections, how does it move beyond this point to establishing a more "fully" democratic polity? These are indeed questions that puzzle political scientists and policy makers and are not easy to answer, for certainly there is no one global answer to this problem, nor can there be one perfect model of democracy. Consolidated democracy is defined by a number of observers as being achieved when both leaders and the masses agree that a democratic system is better than any other alternative (Haynes 2001, p. 11). For the elites in society this means being willing to share power and decision-making, and to subordinate their own goals and conflicts for the common good, thus being willing to check a return to authoritarianism (ibid., p. 12). Haynes and his colleagues argue that consolidating democracy has proven to be no easy task, and a very complex process. It cannot be assumed to occur naturally out of developing a system of "free and fair" elections; these are no guarantee of a satisfactory development of democratization, which needs also "the creation of an internal dynamic in the political process which gradually will engender more contestation, more participation, and more rights and liberties" (Haynes 2001, p. 13). However, Elklit (2001, p. 64) emphasizes that attention to producing a good electoral system will go a long way in helping to consolidate democracy, since inadequate attention to the preparations and processes of elections is often a central factor in truncated democratic development.

Our purpose in the present volume is to examine democratic consolidation in Indonesia by looking at the further development of the electoral system,

which began in 2004 with the direct elections of the president, and has continued apace with the introduction of direct elections for local leaders. According to the classifications of Haynes and his colleagues in 2001, Indonesia had by then already moved into the category of "electoral democracy", after the reform movement and fall of the New Order regime in 1998, and the introduction of a "free and fair" election to elect a new legislature, who chose a new president in 1999. A second legislative election and, for the first time, a direct presidential election in 2004, which saw a different set of opposition parties winning the presidency, would seem to have gone some way to fulfilling the simple "two-turnover test" that Huntington proposed as an assessment of democratic consolidation often cited by political scientists (Huntington 1991, cited in Haynes 2001, p. 11).[7] With the additional expansion of the electoral system to include direct elections of local leaders, this would then point to an optimistic assessment of Indonesia's move in the direction of "consolidated" democracy. Or would it?

Haynes, in assessing the difficulty of consolidating democracy in the "Third World", cites several factors that inhibit the progress of "democratization" (2001, p. 12). These factors are: (1) excessive executive domination, (2) neo-patrimonial socio-political system, (3) serious state-level corruption, (4) weak and unstable political parties, (5) the undermining or coopting of civil society (6) serious ethnic/religious divisions, (7) widespread poverty, and (8) an unfavourable international climate (ibid.).[8] In our assessment of the development of democratization in the context of the direct elections in Indonesia, we find at the present moment, the factors of corruption, patrimonialism, weak parties, and ethnic/religious conflict are the most likely to cause problems for Indonesia's further democratization.

The excessive domination of the executive branch has been given considerable attention in Indonesia, with the introduction of regional autonomy laws that have attempted to balance the executive powers of the centre and those in the regions. However, it can be argued that too much power was transferred to the executive branch at the local level, and for four years (2001, with the implementation of regional autonomy, to 2005 with the implementation of elections for new district heads) this became a major problem, which is still being addressed and adjusted (see, for example, papers in Erb, Sulistiyanto and Faucher 2005). Haynes' fifth factor, the undermining or co-optation of civil society appears to be one area in which Indonesia has made considerable progress in recent years, since civil society has developed considerably in Indonesia since the end of the New Order (see Antlov 2005; Hadiwinata 2002). One can include within this category the question of the freedom of the media; since the end of the New Order there has been a vast

opening of public spaces for debate, discussion, and protest; this includes liberalization of the press to the extent that Indonesia may now have the freest press in Asia (see McCargo 2003). Equally, the international climate has moved from one of tolerance of Indonesia's authoritarian regime, while economic growth continued, to one of considerable positive pressure towards "good governance" once it faltered (Robison and Hadiz 2004, p. 35). In fact, since the economic crisis and end of the New Order regime there has been considerable international attention given to the economic collapse and the widespread poverty that followed. The complexity of Indonesia's economic system, which has allowed the continuation of rampant "predatory capitalism" (ibid., pp. 3–13) has been, it can be argued, the reason why poverty persists, and will quite likely be a hindrance to the further consolidation of democracy.

This brings us to perhaps the most severe matter that plagues Indonesia's democratization process, Haynes' third factor: serious state-level corruption and clientelism. Schwarz, using various factors to assess issues of global "governance" (citing Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzin 2003), shows that Indonesia is perceived as the most serious offender when it comes to control of corruption, and following a "rule of law", in comparison to most of its Asian neighbours (Schwarz 2004, p. 18; see also Antlov 2005, pp. 236–37). The spread of corruption has indeed been identified as a major concern in the era of decentralization (Aspinall and Fealy 2004; Erb, Sulistiyanto, and Faucher 2005; Sakai 2002), and has become even more of a problem in the direct elections, as is discussed in several of the chapters of this volume. This is related, as we will discuss further below, to the fourth of Haynes' factors, the weakness and instability of political parties. The weakness of Indonesian political parties can be seen in the proliferation of parties that have similar ideological bases (Suryadinata 2002) and in what some have suggested to be the rather irrelevant nature of these ideological foundations (Hadiz 2005). For this reason, party affiliation and loyalty are very tenuous, and party endorsement becomes a saleable commodity (see also Mietzner 2007).

The question of a neo-patrimonial social political system is an interesting one to consider, given the attempted return to traditional political-social systems since the end of the New Order (Davidson and Henley 2007). This has often meant a re-layering of what is considered to be traditional values of patriarchy, kinship, and "custom" on the political functions of modern bureaucracy (see Hutchcroft, 1997). Coupled with the patron–client networks which knit Indonesia together during the New Order, a system of collusion, nepotism, and neo-traditional moral hierarchy vies in complex ways with ideas of individual autonomy and freedom. This is related to Haynes' sixth factor of ethnic, cultural or religious divisions, which not only have been

utilized in various ways to identify networks of connection and action, but have often surfaced as the veneer, if not the real reason, for conflict and violence in Indonesia ever since the end of the Soeharto era. Indeed, political theories argue that "full democracy" based on free and fair elections is supposed to guarantee peaceful coexistence and peaceful transitions of power; this is one issue that has been of interest to some of the authors in this volume, who have looked at the local elections in areas where there has been conflict after the unravelling of New Order control. The factors, then, that are most directly dealt with in this volume that address the matter of potential democratic failure are those of patrimonialism, corruption, weak parties, and ethnic/religious conflict. These weaknesses, as will be seen, emerge repeatedly in the analyses and arguments about the first direction elections for local heads in Indonesia in the chapters of this volume.

The Meaning of Elections

In the opening of the book *The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia*, Taylor offers two contrasting views of the nature of elections and their relationship to a political system (1996, p. 1). The first is that elections are an essential institution at the heart of a democratic system; they legitimize the leadership as the choice of the people, and make leaders accountable for their actions. Contenders must convince the voters that they will do what they say, or else they will not be chosen. The second view posits that elections are merely a game, a show. Nothing really changes by having different people chosen as leaders; the real power to make decisions or make choices about leadership has nothing to do with the voters, who are really just spectators. Only a small group of elites hold power, and rotate that power among themselves; the voters do not win or lose leaders who will champion their cause; instead, the "winners" or "losers" are those who sponsor the contenders behind the scenes. These contrasting views of the function of elections are held variously by different authors in this volume.

In an interesting paper in the Taylor volume, Benedict Anderson gives some reflections on this "Janus-faced" characteristic of elections. He argues that no matter how uncompetitive or unrepresentative elections might be, they are highly symbolic as "emblems of full citizenship in the modern age" (1997, p. 13). This is one of the reasons elections have become an important stage for presenting a face of democracy, no matter how undemocratic a regime may actually be (see also O'Donnell 2007). The promise of hope to the disadvantaged to change their situation via legislation, a more certain and peaceful means than demonstrations and the like, is also an important

positive attraction of electoral politics (ibid.). However, Anderson also points out elections are highly peculiar events. Voting, though hailed as an act of political participation, is done in complete solitude (ibid., p. 14). Taylor also comments that the emphasis on the atomization of the individual and her/his individual choice in this political act contradicts peoples' normal everyday experiences of political participation, where they act as members of families, as employees, and are influenced by various other statuses and concerns that shape their political choices (Taylor 1996, p. 9). Indeed, as Anderson suggests, this act of voting itself does a lot to shape the idea of "the individual", upon which Western political and moral philosophy is based (Dumont 1980, 1986). The "logic of electoralism is in the direction of domestication: distancing, punctuating isolating" (Anderson 1996, p. 14); thus this participation in voting "domesticates" the individual person into a citizen who is isolated from other citizens, and distanced from the source of power. This, then, Anderson continues, raises the question of "representation"; are the congeries of individuals whose votes only matter in "mathematical aggregation" actually represented by the people who they vote in to make important decisions for them? This is where the other side of the electoral system points to a striking continuation of "elite rule" supposedly abolished with the end of monarchies; hence Anderson argues that "one effect of electoralism is in the direction of confining active and regular political participation to specialists… who not only have a strong interest in their institutionalized oligopoly, but who are largely drawn from particular social strata" (ibid.).

It is interesting to reflect further on Anderson's and Taylor's musings on the perhaps unintended consequences of elections: that of shaping an electorate that thinks in a particular manner about their relationship with the polity and society at large, and their participation in it. Although elections were a regular part of the political landscape of Indonesia over the period of the New Order, the phenomenon of the direct vote for individual leaders, at either national level or local level, is very new. The emphasis on the individual is not only at the level of the voter, but also the level of the candidates. This emphasizing of the individual in modern democracies is supposed to point to the equality of all individuals, in terms of their rights and duties to the greater polity. The vote is supposed to be a symbol *par excellence* of this equality. With the greater emphasis on the individual's right to vote in the unfolding political transformation in Indonesia, it certainly becomes interesting to reflect on whether this will result in a move towards seeing the individual and her/his relationship to society in a distinctive manner. This was remarked on by de Tocqueville in his interesting reflections on "democracy in America" as he saw

it contrasted to the *ancient regime* in Europe. In "aristocratic communities all the citizens occupy fixed positions, one above the other, the result is that each of them always see a man above himself whose patronage is necessary to him, and below himself another man whose cooperation he may claim" (1875, p. 91, cited in Dumont 1980, p. 18). This is true not only of a person's place in a living community, but also across time. "…all generations become as it were contemporaneous. A man almost always knows his forefathers and respects them; he thinks he already sees his remote descendents, and he loves them" (1875, p. 90, cited in Dumont 1980, p. 17). This is very different from "democratic nations", where "new families are constantly springing up, others are constantly falling away, and all that remain change their conditions: the woof of time is every instant broke, and the track of generations effaced…." (op. cit.). In this earlier "democratic transition" the ties that bound people to earlier generations, and the inherited social differences that separated individuals from one another, were swept away, and people looked on the members of their society as their equals. Aristocracy, kinship, and wealth became insignificant in differentiating people in terms of the equal rights they had as citizens of the modern state under the law. Hence, "one of the most fundamental trends of modern society is a move toward ever greater equality" (Sato 1997, p. 81).

Whether this will be the case in Indonesia as political changes unfold will be worth observing;[9] there are already signs that the individual right to vote has had an impact on the way people conceptualize their relationships with others. As discussed by Erb and Anggal in this volume, in Western Flores candidates campaigning in villages during the 2004 legislative elections would visit the graveyards to make offerings to the ancestors to coerce kin groups to vote for them; but when people realized that different family members were making offerings to support different candidates, some asked whether "Maybe the ancestors are also splitting into parties." What was this doing to the long-held idea of consensus among kin? The idea that everyone in one clan and lineage wouldn't be supporting the same person was a novel and potentially disconcerting matter (see also Erb 2005). It is certainly true that with the intensification of political activity in Indonesia, candidates and their teams will try to win votes across kinship relationships and alliances, and this will potentially reconfigure how people view their relationship to their kin and their neighbours versus their relationship to the polity and the nation. In this way, certainly, one can see how voting does have an impact on the "imagining" of a community. Results from the direct elections, particularly from those cases covered in this volume from areas where there has been inter-ethnic/religious conflict, show that voting behaviour still tends to support what are

seen as more "traditional" loyalties of kin and community; however, it is clear that parties tend to manipulate this to their advantage, at the same time as neutralizing it, by putting on the same ticket candidates who will cross-cut various ethnic/religious loyalties.

At the same time, the change to voting directly for candidates in the most recent elections in Indonesia has meant that the candidate him/herself stands out as the choice, instead of voting specifically, and more "anonymously", for a party. This means that individual personalities of the candidates become highly important to the voters, who may be swayed by how entertaining they are (as mentioned by a number of authors, as well as specifically by Jennifer Lindsay in this volume), or how nice their personalities are, and how they come across personally, either in terms of the policies they promise or have delivered, the gifts they distribute to the potential voters or the way they connect with the "grass-roots" (as mentioned specifically by Michael Buehler in this volume). Interestingly, as discussed specifically by Jim Schiller in this volume, the emphasis on personalities and "money politics" is a vicious cycle and self-fulfilling prophecy. Elites see voters as easily swayed by these things, instead of by concrete issues, so they utilize entertainment and various kinds of "gifts" in order to woo voters. Voters are seen not only to accept these things, but increasingly to demand them, further forcing politicians to offer them. However, the negative by-product of this cycle is that voters become cynical about politicians and the political processes fuelling the growth of "democratic institutions". This can result in low voter turnout, but has also resulted in voters actually weighing the issues more carefully than the politicians give them credit for, and kicking out incumbents, or not voting for candidates who are seen only to throw wealth around (see also the chapter by Erb and Anggal in this volume).

Generally we would agree with Antlov, who argues that no matter what type of election we look at — or one could say, no matter what one's view might be of the amount of real power that an electorate has in decision-making — elections are important symbolically as a commitment to the modern ideals of nationhood, and can both challenge as well as legitimize the existing political orders (2004, pp. 1–2). No matter how much elections in Indonesia's history have been manipulated and engineered, and perhaps still continue to be under the privileged control of the elite, it is still important to examine how they work, what they mean to people and how they reflect (or not) the perception that people have of their leaders (ibid., pp. 2–3). In this respect Antlov called for considerable attention to the details of the local elections. In this volume, we have had the opportunity most particularly to look at the details of the local elections, and authors have tried to place the

elections for local leaders within their own specific context, at the same time searching for national patterns and problems that have emerged in this newest experiment with democracy.

EXAMINING ELECTIONS IN INDONESIA

Ananta et al. (2005, p. 1) divide Indonesian political history into four periods: the Constitutional or Liberal Democracy Period (1949–58), the Guided Democracy Period (1959–65), the Pancasila Democracy Period or the New Order (1966–98), and the Reform Period (1998–present). These four periods were characterized by different relationships of the government to the people, and different ways of determining leadership. During the Constitutional Democracy Period, the first election took place in 1955, and was considered largely free and fair (Feith 1957; Suryadinata 2002, p. 21; Weatherbee 2001, p. 257), but after what appeared to be squabbling, fragmentation, and stalemate in the multiparty parliament, as well as rebellions in some of the regions, Sukarno proclaimed martial law, and the end of parliamentary democracy, in 1957. During the following period of "Guided Democracy" no elections were held, but the compromises that Sukarno tried to wield with the various fragmented segments of Indonesian society — nationalists, Islamic groups, and communists — led to further tensions; eventually, growing hostility towards the strengthening communist party on the part of the military led to an aborted (and possibly staged) coup attempt, the end of Sukarno's rule, and the beginning of the reign of Soeharto (see Cribb 1990; Heryanto 2005; Ricklefs 2001). "Pancasila Democracy", shaped by Soeharto, established Pancasila, the five principles of the nation,[10] as the "sole principle" of every political party, raising Pancasila to an almost sacred status, and similarly transforming communism to a total, dreaded evil, while neutralizing Islam as a political ideology. Seven elections took place, structurally engineered in such a way that political parties had no ability to be political (particularly at the grass-roots level, among the "floating masses"),[11] while "functional groups", gathered under one banner as "Golkar", were the only real political force. The end of the New Order and the Reform Period have seen politics and political parties reborn with a vengeance, and major changes to the electoral system. Already there have been two general elections, in 1999 and 2004, the second one giving the Indonesian people the opportunity to directly elect their national leader for the first time. All of this was possible with the amendments to the 1945 Constitution which gave more individual rights in the political and legal arenas.

Several analyses of the recent general elections during the Reform Period compare them with earlier elections that took place during the period of Parliamentary Democracy as well as those during the New Order.[12] There have been several continuities, as well as several major changes, that can be traced over these different periods. Suryadinata (2002), in a concise account, identifies what he sees as several important sociological features that continue to shape Indonesian politics and electoral behaviour: the multi-ethnic (including multi-religious) nature of Indonesian society, the regional differences between Java and the "Outer Islands", and the existence of pious versus nominal Muslims (2002, p. 1). The multi-ethnic nature of Indonesian society has become more apparent after the policies of the New Order that shifted many from more "overcrowded" islands, particularly Java, to the less populated Outer Islands. This not only led to more heterogeneous communities throughout the archipelago, but also underscored what many perceived as the privileged status of the Javanese, both in Java, and outside it, in terms of access to programmes, positions, aid and wealth.[13] The different styles of adherence to Islam were identified originally by Clifford Geertz (1960), as *abangan* ("nominal" — red) and *santri* ("pious" — white) Muslims, and later linked by him to different political "*aliran*" ("currents"), or "ideologically defined political action animated by rather far-reaching moral ambitions" (1965, p. 127); the *abangan* tended to be more associated with secular nationalist ideologies, or communism/socialism, while the *santri* were associated with more religious-based ideologies, either modernist or traditional. The four *aliran* recognized by Geertz in the 1950s were associated with the four major parties that won seats in the 1955 General Elections: the Nationalist party (PNI), the Communist party (PKI), the modernist Muslim party (Masyumi) and the traditionalist Muslim party (Nadhlatul Ulama (NU)) (Suryadinata 2002, pp. 22–24). A reworking of this idea of *aliran*, as it was conceived by Geertz, and later modified by Feith and Castles (1970), has been done by Dhakidae (cited in Suryadinata 2002, pp. 205–206) to show the continuity and changes in the political clusters and ideological associations of the parties that have emerged in the Post-Soeharto era. Dhakidae recognized not only the "*aliran*" of religious versus nationalist affiliation in the parties that have been formed in the reform era, but also a more class-based division, of socialist oriented vs. developmentalist- (or capitalist-) oriented parties (see Pratikno in this volume for a further discussion of *aliran* in the modern context).

In the 1955 elections, twenty-eight political parties contested, though the above-mentioned four won the majority of the votes. Their ideological differences made it difficult for the resulting parliament to make effective

decisions, and was a major reason for the dissolution of the parliament by Sukarno and his reducing the number of political parties. In the New Order, Soeharto reduced the number of political parties even further by merging them and leaving only two, an Islamic party, the PPP (United Development Party), and the PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party); he also neutered them ideologically, since Pancasila became the only ideological principle allowed (Weatherbee 2001, p. 261). He then formed his own party to represent the military interests out of a fusion of anti-communist organizations and an assemblage of functional groups which came to be known as Golkar (Golongan Karya) (Ananta et al. 2005, p. 2; Suraydinata 2002, p. 27; Weatherbee 2001, p. 259). Golkar was the only party allowed to penetrate to the grass roots, so that structurally it was always set up to win (Haris 2004). The "opposition" parties were controlled by Soeharto's government, interfering in their party congresses and filtering out people who were too critical of the government (Haris 2004, p. 24); so when Megawati took over the leadership of PDI and was considered too strong as a PDI candidate for the 1997 elections, she was removed as head of her party by Soeharto (Haris 2004, p. 33; Suryadinata 2002, p. 33). The total control of elections and the representatives who were elected to the legislatures during the New Order led to the entrenching of a system in which the "people's representatives" (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat — the National Assembly/Legislature) did not represent the people, but instead found it to their advantage "to collaborate with the government, rather than partner the voters" (Haris 2004, p. 33).

The end of the New Order saw the re-emergence of massive numbers of political parties eager to contest the 1999 general elections, similar to the 1955 elections; out of the estimated 145 parties that mushroomed after Soeharto's fall, forty-eight parties emerged as eligible to contend. These elections were subsequently deemed the freest and fairest since those of 1955. What made these elections distinctive from those of the New Order was indeed the opening up of space for multi-party contests and the real freedom to campaign and oppose the ruling party. Some commentators suggest that multi-party systems have an inherent weakness, in that the number of supporters needed for any party is relatively small. This means that each party does not need to work at getting broad-based support, and is more inclined to be involved in cronyism, collusion, and nepotism (Reilly 2007, pp. 63–64). Suryadinata assesses the major parties that have emerged since the end of the New Order as ideologically weak; apart from a general claim to being either secular or religious, they do not really have distinct identities that differentiate them from one another, or associate them clearly with different classes (2002, p. 206), a point also made by Hadiz (2005). For instance, in

comparison to the 1955 elections, the Islamic-based political parties gained fewer seats and votes from the 1999 elections as well as the 2004 elections, while the secular parties gained more. The ideological irrelevance of parties became even clearer in the elections for regional heads, where party coalitions were formed in many different ways across the country, for purely pragmatic purposes (as discussed in more detail by Pratikno, this volume). The relationship between a candidate, his/her programme, and the ideological base of the party or parties which supported him/her was often completely absent. However, it could be queried whether or not a re-emergence of the "*aliran*" basis to political parties is actually a detrimental thing for Indonesian politics at the present time, or whether the apparent ideological weakness of the parties in these "currents" is also a bad thing. One important thing to keep in mind is that in this period of transition, basic security or development issues might be of more concern to voters than the ideological differences between parties. So it is not surprising that many of our participants found that many voters were choosing people based more on personal characteristics, perception of competence, accusations of corruption, and the like, instead of their party affiliations. Also, the varied party coalitions that resulted from this basic pragmatic approach extant in Indonesia during these elections could in fact form more inclusive and stable relations between parties in the local legislature. It is not possible to judge at present the outcomes of these pragmatic tactics; this is something that will need to be re-examined in the years ahead.[14]

Despite the tumultuousness of the post-Soeharto years, some see signs that the electoral and party systems are stabilizing. The often rapid turnover of executives which takes place during an initial reform period is starting to slow down; the administration of each successive president appears to be getting longer, and there is a good chance the present one will last the full term (Reilly 2007, p. 68). The regulations have stipulated that parties need to be represented in increasingly broader parts of the country, and receive greater numbers of the vote as reform continues, so that by the 2009 legislative elections, parties will need to win at least 20 per cent of all votes cast, or 15 per cent of the seats in the National Assembly before they can put up a candidate for the presidential elections (King 2003, p. 51; Reilly 2007, pp. 65, 69); this will effectively whittle down the number of active parties and consolidate the political landscape. On the other hand, the national level and centralized party system, although ostensibly putting a curb on fragmentation and favouritism in political party manoeuvrings, has also led in the local elections to some major problems of corruption, the buying and selling of party support, and rampant money politics, as the papers in this volume amply illustrate.

LOCAL ELECTIONS IN INDONESIA: PROBLEMS WITH DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

In 2004, the Indonesian people experienced the first opportunity to really choose their national leader. This was seen as a major breakthrough in the democratization process (see Kartomi 2005; Sulistiyanto 2004). The local elections, *pilkada*, are the most recent aspect of this "transition to democracy", as well as an important furthering of decentralization — that is the power of the local people to make decisions locally and choose their own leaders. *Pilkada*, the direct elections of regional heads, began in Indonesia in June 2005, and occurred in more than half of the regions of Indonesia in that year. These elections will continue until 2008, when all the district heads and governors will then have been elected by their prospective local constituents. Because of the very recent nature of these direct local elections there are many issues that have not yet been examined or debated. It was for this reason that we organized a workshop on *pilkada* in Singapore in May 2006, bringing together many scholars from Indonesia, Singapore, England, and Australia to share their findings and views on *pilkada* in various places throughout Indonesia. The former governor of Eastern Nusa Tenggara province, Aloysius Benedictus Mboi, was also invited to share his insights and thoughts on his experience in local government during the Soeharto period and on the issues related to *pilkada*. Many interesting topics were raised and debated during this workshop; overall, the participants had mixed views about the new direct elections, some of them seeing them as a positive step towards democratization, while others held pessimistic views.

The legal basis for *pilkada* is the Law on Local Government No. 32/2004 (Undang-Undang Pemerintahan Daerah No. 32/2004) enacted by the National Assembly in late 2004. It replaced the previous Law on Local Government No. 22/1999, which had many weaknesses due to its hurried enactment during the Wahid period (1999–2001). At the implementation level, Law No. 22/1999 hindered efforts to harmonize the working relationship between the district, provincial, and national levels of government. What was worse, different regions interpreted the law differently, leading to confusion as regions issued local regulations that contradicted each other and the national regulations. An important provision in Law No. 22/1999 was that it allowed local legislatures (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD) to appoint and dismiss district heads in the regions. Although ostensibly local heads had been elected and appointed by the local legislatures all throughout the New Order period, in reality they had been chosen by the Ministry of Home Affairs, with local legislatures basically approving the choices that had been

made by the central government. The 1999 elections were the first elections where the local legislatures actually had the real power to choose the regional leaders. This was meant to be a positive development; however, in reality it gave the DPRD a tremendous amount of power, and many saw this as an impediment to the emergence of local democracy. The power of the DPRD was most tellingly felt in the demands they made towards potential candidates for district heads in 1999; this is when people first started frequently referring to the spread of "money politics". Candidates for the district head positions tried to "outbid" each other in the amounts of money that they paid to Local Assembly members so that they would be chosen as head.

One of the intentions, then, of Law No. 32/2004 was to improve the ways that the local government and local legislature could work together to improve the well-being of the local people in the regions, and to stop the unchecked power of the local legislatures. It also aimed to put in place checks and balances by strengthening other institutions at the regional level. One of these mechanisms is the direct election of local district leaders. If the leaders were to be directly elected by the populace, it was reasoned that candidates would have to be recognized as true leaders, and acceptable to the people. It was thought to be impossible for money to play the role it had in the 1999 elections, because it would be impossible to pay every voter, or ensure that they would actually vote in any particular way.

The election of regional leaders followed the earlier move to directly elect the president and vice-president at the national level in 2004. The idea is that having both national and local leaders directly elected by the Indonesian people would help enhance the democratization process in Indonesia. These direct elections then can be seen as a new avenue for local leadership contestation as well as the emergence of an active citizenship in the development of local democracy. The first regional head elections saw the emergence of local leaders of various backgrounds, including politicians, former bureaucrats, former military officers, business persons, religious leaders, community leaders, academics, NGO activists, and also media personalities. In this sense, the *pilkada* opened up more opportunities for various personages to participate in the local leadership contest in the regions. This contrasts markedly with the period of the Soeharto government, when most of the local leaders were appointed by Jakarta, and they were drawn almost without exception from the military, the bureaucracy, and the ruling party Golkar (Golongan Karya or the Functional Group). One thing that varies across regions, and has become a bone of contention at the local level, is how far members of these groups, who were so powerful during the New Order, still dominate local political arenas.

To oversee the national elections an Election Commission, the KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum), was created as an independent body to ensure a fair election. According to Law No. 32/2004, local commissions, the KPUD (Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah or the Regional Election Commission), were set up to play a similar role in running *pilkada* at the local level. This role starts from the registering and selection processes of the candidates up to the counting and reporting of the votes. The readiness and capacity of this body to organize *pilkada* were questioned from the beginning. Concerns over the viability of funding and logistics in the regions were also raised in the media and among the general public. The funding for *pilkada* comes from the local budget and this has to be approved by the local legislature. Indeed, the question of the impartiality and independence of the KPUD was also raised, and was one of the most important issues in the lead up to the first *pilkada* in 2005.[15]

The various *pilkada* so far, in 2005, 2006, and 2007, have seen a considerable amount of diversity in terms of process and results, as was revealed in the workshop presentations and discussions. In 2007, we saw the emergence of a local political party in Aceh's local elections which enriched the dynamics of local elections in Indonesia. The diversity across Indonesia was shaped by different regional characters in terms of political affiliations, loyalties, ethnicities, and religious backgrounds. There had been fears expressed nationally that the *pilkada* would create political crises in the regions, especially in those areas which had been wracked by violence in the post-Soeharto period, such as Maluku, West Kalimantan, and Poso, Central Sulawesi, but this did not materialize. Several of our presenters had followed the elections in precisely these regions and discussed their thoughts as to why the elections ran smoothly in these previously troubled areas. Doubts had also been raised at the national level over whether local communities were ready and willing to participate in *pilkada*. Were local communities "ready" for democracy and could they choose their leaders wisely and "rationally", or would nepotism and "primordial ties" influence people's choices? These questions were also a source of lively debate at the workshop. Some participants commented upon the high incidence of *golput* (*golongan putih* — "white votes"), that is people who did not vote. Traditionally in Indonesia this was seen as a sign of protest as well as a symbol of apathy on behalf of voters. Some people suggested, though, that this was merely "election fatigue", because the local elections followed so closely on the national elections for president, and the legislative elections, which both took place in 2004.

Another very important issue was the dominance of political parties in the *pilkada*. There was a great deal of discussion on what relevance parties

actually had in the electoral process, despite their very dominant position. In the direct elections instituted by Law No. 32/2004, candidates must be selected and endorsed by one of the major political parties or a coalition of small political parties which gained a minimum of 15 per cent of the votes/seats in the local assemblies; as the law stands at the moment, independent candidates are not allowed to contest in *pilkada*.[16] As participants discussed, this put the parties into a similar position to the assembly members in the 1999 election, that is the parties could demand payment in order to become the "vehicle" for the candidate. Because party nominations were, in essence, bought and sold, this in many respects nullified any ideological considerations in the nomination process. It also meant, as many of the presenters showed, that so-called "coalitions" between parties became very *ad hoc*, and locally specific, depending on the needs and payments of local candidates.

In the papers in this volume we can see that the overall results of the *pilkada* so far have varied between the regions. In some regions where incumbent leaders were re-elected, they usually had done very well in their first term in office and they were also supported by a coalition of major political parties. They won because they had organized campaign teams and grass-roots supportive groups during the campaign period. They also offered the best programmes and visions to the voters. The incumbents who won received different percentages of votes, which illustrated their levels of popularity and of trust in the eyes of the local people. Meanwhile, the incumbent leaders who lost their positions were punished by voters for failing to deliver in their first term. This was an indication, as some presenters argued, that the voters were indeed voting in a "rational" manner. The support of major political parties, however, did not guarantee a large number of votes for contenders. Voters did not follow party lines or ideologies; instead, they looked to the leadership personality and quality of the candidate. Local people tended to vote for local leaders whom they knew best and who had delivered something back to society. Several candidates who were supported by coalitions of small political parties were able to defeat the incumbents and to win the votes.

The issues regarding dispute resolution are also worth mentioning as there were several cases involving disagreements over the results of the vote counting. The use of the High Court (Mahkamah Agung) to settle the disputes was welcomed by the conflicting parties and this was a good sign, since those who were involved in the disputes looked to legal mechanisms to settle them. However, in some instances the conflicting parties mobilized their respective supporters or loyalists to put pressure on the local legislature to intervene in the disputes although this was legally beyond its mandate. There have been many lessons learned by everyone involved in these *pilkada*

about the need to conduct the local elections democratically and professionally in order to avoid disputes arising after the vote counting is done. One important lesson was to respect the principle of law and order and of constitutionalism.

The papers included in this volume offer perspectives on the problems with democratic consolidation in Indonesia through the lens of these first direct elections for local heads (*kepala daerah*) in Indonesia. Most of the papers are situated in various local contexts in Indonesia, based on the authors' first-hand experiences and knowledge of local politics, culture and history in particular areas, offering insights into the specific issues surrounding the campaigns and contests for local leaders that took place in 2005 and 2006. What do these first local direct elections for district heads tell us about the changes in the system, about voters' choices, about the way that candidates perceived the power of the electorate? What kinds of power struggles emerged, given the specific circumstances of each region? What were some of the problems associated with these first elections for local leaders that were shared across the whole nation? These are a number of the questions that the authors here examine in their papers.

The papers have been divided into three sections associated with some of the key issues that were identified at the workshop. The first section covers a number of interrelated issues to do with parties, money politics, and the realigning and repositioning of elites in the new electoral system. The second section focuses on the question of the media in the campaigning process, and examines the differences between the national and local elections from the lens of media coverage and campaign performances. The third section covers areas where there had been major conflicts before the elections, and examines how the elections unfolded, given the expectation of further eruptions of violence in these areas. The subjects of ethnicity and religion, as they figured in campaigns, and candidates' strategies, are also discussed by many of the papers in that section, given that the pre-election conflicts were often centred on those issues.

The paper directly following the introduction offers the ruminations and reminiscings of an ex-governor, who gives insights into the role of regional heads (*kepala daerah*) during various periods of Indonesian history. Mboi has many questions about where the country is coming from and where it is going to summing this up in the idea of a "dualism", which is different from the way the country was run for the previous sixty years. Who will the directly elected regional heads be more responsible to — the central government or the electorate? This question of responsibility is a new issue that needs to be contemplated with this radical transformation that is being introduced in Indonesia. Mboi also points out that even with the same laws in place,

different individuals in power interpreted and used these laws in different ways. This also points to the potentiality for legal disputes arising from different interpretations of the laws. In this respect it is perhaps possible to understand his scepticism. Do the architects of reform really have a clear vision of what it is they are trying to construct? What was the rationale for the changes that are being implemented, most particularly the direct elections of *kepala daerah*? Will this system bring into existence a democracy that is consultative and respects the rights of the minorities and heterogeneous groupings that make up this archipelagic nation? Mboi is hopeful, but not entirely optimistic, and sees a long road ahead before Indonesia can build a democratic system that is suitable for its unique situation.

The papers in the first section deal with some of the issues raised by Mboi. What was the role of the political parties in the direct election for regional heads? What is the role of money in this new system? Mboi fears the emergence of a "plutocratic 'quasi-democratic' government, where there is no place for the 'have-nots'", and indeed this is what the papers in this section also query. What is happening in this new system to the role of parties, the power of elites, and the spread of money politics? The first paper by Pratikno opens with a query about consolidation of democracy in the new Indonesian electoral system. With direct elections, the legislature no longer has the role of picking the regional heads, but instead the vote is in the hands of the people. However, he queries whether or not this is really an empowerment of the voters, since the ultimate choice of who the candidates will be rests in the hands of the political parties. Unlike the decentralization of power represented by the regional autonomy laws, and the direct election systems, the party system is still centralized, and the ultimate choice of candidate rests with the party headquarters in the provincial and national capitals. Is this really full democratization if decentralization takes place only at the level of the government but not within the political parties? This opens up the question not only of empowerment but also responsibility, as Mboi had also queried. Are the heads who are elected responsible to the central government, to their electorate, or instead to the political parties which supported their election? Since each candidate must have a party vehicle (or "boat") to carry them through the election process, in this respect party affiliation has become something that is sold to the highest bidder, and this has exacerbated the question of "money politics". Additionally, Pratikno shows that given the rule that a party must have a number of seats in the local parliaments before they can field a candidate, many small parties end up having to form coalitions to be able to sponsor a candidate. This leads to the formation of all kinds of coalitions that often have nothing at all to do with the ideological basis of

the parties, and hence puts into question "*aliran*" politics, and the strength of the political parties. In this situation the local elections also often become a contest of personalities rather than parties' platforms or programmes; this is more obvious in places where loyalties and patronages dominate the local politics.

The next two papers focus more on the weakness of the parties that has become apparent in the *pilkada*. Nankyung Choi in her paper examining the mayoral elections in Batam in 2006 argues that this new direct electoral system actually ends up weakening the parties, not empowering them, not only at the local level, but also in general. Locally, a number of the parties in Batam fielded candidates who were not supported by the national party headquarters. The in-fighting between different levels of the party resulted in PAN, a fairly large party in Batam, actually missing the deadline and not fielding a candidate. This has also happened elsewhere in Indonesia.[17] In other cases, where national and local levels did not agree, the candidates who were eventually supported by the parties were those sponsored by national headquarters. Often this resulted in candidates who did not have a strong base locally and undermined different parties' chances of winning. Choi shows that the candidate who did win was supported by a party which had a much more democratic procedure for choosing candidates, having the cadres at all levels agree together, instead of following a hierarchical system. Choi also illustrates the point Pratikno makes, that coalitions were often formed across ideological lines, weakening what a party is and what it stands for. What is often left is the personality of the candidate. In the next paper, Michael Buehler gives a detailed comparison of two elections for district head (*bupati*) in South Sulawesi and provides further insights into the role of parties in the local elections. Buehler, similar to Choi, suggests that ultimately the political parties are irrelevant. What is important are the personal networks of the candidate. Those candidates who were "close to the ground" were much more likely to get the number of votes required to win than those who had strong parties to back them, or who were wealthy. Though Buehler suggests wealth is a necessary feature of becoming a candidate, it does not guarantee victory. Parties ended up playing the role of first gatekeeper, since the demands they made for money to field a candidate ended up eliminating many possible candidates. But being a vehicle for a candidate often does not do anything for her/him, beyond making it possible for them to run. The party machinery, at various levels, does very little, Buehler suggests, to shape the outcome of the elections; instead, the personal networks and connections of the candidates make all the difference. Some popular candidates even lured away grass-roots members from other parties to support them in their

campaigns. Ultimately, Buehler is optimistic that there is real change visible in these local elections in Indonesia, because entrenched party machines, such as Golkar, lost many local elections in Indonesia, finding they could not "rest on their laurels". Candidates have had to pay attention to their relationship to the people, as the voters, instead of just a small group of elites as in the past. So he is optimistic that the introduction of these local elections has truly "brought the government closer to the people", and has forced all the candidates, even at the provincial levels, to be more "downward oriented", that is looking to the voters and their needs.

A less optimistic view of the benefits of the new election system is offered in the next paper by Syarif Hidayat, who looks critically at the question of money politics and its long-term effect on good governance, examining the issue of spreading corruption and the various kinds of elite entrenchment in the localized settings of the direct elections for heads. Hidayat argues that corruption and money politics are major inhibitors of democratization and the consolidation of democracy. Hidayat separates two types of "money politics": direct and indirect. Direct is that given by candidates to parties or other institutions to guarantee their support, while indirect is that which is given to the voters, most frequently in the form of "gifts", which may include "entertainment", necessities, and services. In order to pay such large amounts, candidates need "sponsors" for their campaigns. In this respect he also explores further the question of responsibility, raised by Mboi. What happens when entrepreneurs who donate the increasingly large sums of money needed by candidates during their election and campaign periods demand some kind of pay-back? Will the elected leaders feel more responsibility to those who funded their campaigns, rather than to the voters who elected them? Hidayat sees this as a major problem of the present system, as indeed mentioned by Haynes (2001, p. 12) above, and something that will need to be changed before democratization can be furthered in contemporary Indonesia.

The next three papers explore various issues to do with money politics, populism, and elite manoeuvrings, coincidentally all cases from Central Java. The authors deal with cases of very popular incumbents, the way the voters viewed them, and the way opponents tried to "blacken" their names, despite their popularity. Jim Schiller, focusing on Jepara, holds a cynical view of elections, and gives an overview of not only the role that elections play, but the "vicious cycle" of elite perception of voters, and voter perception of elites. The continuing tendency of elites to see voters as a "floating mass" (as mentioned above), easily manipulated at election time by gifts, helps to fuel voters' perception that these gifts are their right, and perhaps the only benefit they may get from corrupt politicians. In the end, a low voter turnout and

demands for the signing of political contracts indicated that voters are attempting to find their own ways to negotiate the changing political system. Looking at Kebumen district, Tri Ratnawati also examines an incumbent who was very popular with the masses, but also cynically received by certain segments of the population because of her change from a clean politician, who was anti-corruption, to one who took advantage of her political position to accumulate wealth. She also introduces another important issue to do with empowerment in the local elections, the question of the participation of women in positions of local leadership in Indonesia. Despite calls for a quota, few women actually ran for local leadership positions, and the case of Rustriningsih in Kebumen is one interesting example. Ratnawati shows how she took considerable advantage of her position as a woman political leader to get support and fame internationally as a model for other women. Many international pro-democracy and gender reform NGOs spotlighted her position, and aided her programmes to help the poor. In this way she benefited herself, but also her constituency. Priyambudi Sulistiyanto in his look at the district of Bantul, in the Yogyakarta special province, also examines a popular incumbent and the criticisms that he, also, was attempting to use populist policies to benefit himself. What was interesting in this election is that this incumbent was opposed by a member of the royal family, the Sultan's younger brother, in the name of "democracy", and the offering of a choice to the people. The Sultan himself, however, was very close to the incumbent, and indirectly made known his support for him. Against the background of this election, Sulistiyanto questions the position of the royal family in politics in this new emerging era of democracy.

The next section looks at the relationship between the local and national elections through the lens of the media and the campaign performances that were mounted during the local elections of 2005. We have argued that the media is one area in Indonesia's transition that has shown considerable "progress" towards a "liberal democracy", though recently there have been moves in reaction to this, with the mooting of an "anti-pornography" bill, ostensibly against pornography in the media.[18] This tension, between those who want to see the media landscapes of Indonesia harbouring a free press and those who argue for its inappropriateness in a country with a majority Muslim population, is something that is highlighted in Jennifer Lindsay's paper on the campaigns in Yogyakarta in the 2005 *pilkada*. Lindsay makes a number of observations about the similarities and the differences between the national and local elections, in terms of the campaign styles utilized by candidates. The focus on voting for individuals, instead of party representatives, has meant that the candidates, as opposed to the parties, are highlighted in

the campaigns. One can speculate, as we have above, that this will go some way to re-aligning the way Indonesians think about themselves as participants and as citizens.

The question of local versus national-level media coverage of elections is continued in David Hill's paper. He compares a number of the first *pilkada* elections in June 2005 monitored by the National Democratic Institute for Internal Affairs, and what the exit polls tell about the effect different mediums of communication have on voter choices. Voters were asked which type of communication with the candidates most influenced their vote, and then the candidates were also assessed based on which means were most effective in securing votes. Hill examined four elections of varying sizes, and found that the size of the contest made a difference in terms of the means of communication that was most effective. What was interesting to note was that the winning teams were almost invariably clever in using multiple means of connecting with the masses, by traditional more direct means as well as the newer electronic means; these multiple "investments" into communications could be quite expensive, and often included numerous types of "gifts" or "money politics". Hill predicts that as regional areas become increasingly urban, and more and more local TV stations emerge, the amount that parties and candidates "invest" in television campaigning will become increasingly large. This then raises the question of whether the media is helping to liberalize the democratic process, or further entrenching elites and those who can afford to use it to their benefit.

The third part of the book examines some case studies of *pilkada* in areas that were troubled by conflict and often widespread violence at the end of the Soeharto period, or in the early Reform period. Three of the case studies deal with areas where there was widespread violence due to ethnic and religious clashes, while the other two deal with areas where there has been conflict between the people and the local or national government. In all of the cases in this section questions of identity, be it ethnic, "sub-ethnic", or religious, figured in the strategies of candidates in the local elections. As we have stated above, one theory in political science is that elections reduce the risk of violence and allow for peaceful coexistence and transitions of power (Taylor 1996). Hence there was considerable attention paid to some of these troubled areas to see whether or not this would be the case.

The first paper in this section is by Marcus Mietzner, who looks at West Papua, an important case because of the rising demands, since the end of the New Order, for independence from Indonesia by some of the indigenous inhabitants. A status of "special autonomy" was granted to pacify these demands and to attempt to rectify what many felt were years of unfair control over resources during the New Order. The right Papuans won to restrict the

governorship to a native Papuan was particularly unique, and ended up giving a specific colour to the manoeuvrings there to field election candidates. However, despite the rallying around various ethnic groups in pairings and the campaigning, and the "patrimonial divisions", Mietzner suggests that "a modern electoral paradigm ultimately prevailed". He also feels that in the case of Papua and other marginal parts of the nation which have felt neglected and exploited, a furthering of democratization will keep separatist tendencies down. Top-down decisions made about administrative divisions in Papua by the centre increased Papuan hostility towards Jakarta, while if the agreement of special autonomy had been honoured and the Papuan People's Council had been left to make their own decisions even further administrative divisions would have resulted. Hence Mietzner concludes that furthering democracy and the rights of local decision-making in West Papua is crucial to ensure the unity of the nation. The second paper by Maribeth Erb and Wilhelmus Anggal looks at a regency where there has also been conflict with the government, but not of the long duration nor fame of West Papua. Instead, policies set in place by the post-Soeharto local government, supposedly more sensitive to local concerns, created much hardship and anger in the Western Flores district of Manggarai. Voters angered by the government of the incumbent voted for a leader who they felt would ensure democracy and also further the aspirations of residents for further administrative divisions in the regency. The twist in the Manggaraian case is that accusations of irregularities in the electoral process made many of the civil society organizations, which had fought with the incumbent when he was *bupati*, side with him in attempting to overturn the results of the *pilkada*. They query what further democratization would mean in the Manggaraian case, since some interpret democracy as the choice of the people, while others see it as following electoral procedures and a rule of law, even if this goes against the people's choice.

The second group of papers look at the situation of the *pilkada* in three of the areas in Indonesia which experienced the most widespread violence in the past ten years: Ternate in Northern Maluku, Poso in Central Sulawesi, and West Kalimantan on the island of Borneo. The fragility of the peace in these areas which had experienced ethnic and religious conflicts made candidates highly sensitive to these issues in their campaigns and in their pairings. Claire Smith, in her look at the elections in North Maluku, examines the attempt of the family of the Sultan of Ternate to "return" to former power in the Sultanate, with the nomination of one of the Sultan's wives as a candidate. Ultimately the Sultan's perceived role in the violence in Ternate, however, damaged his wife's campaign. The winner, a Golkar incumbent who was very popular but also very corrupt, leads Smith to be sceptical about the

"deepening of democracy" in that regency against the background of inter-ethnic/inter-religious violence. She argues that as the aftermath of the conflict is still very recent it has made voters look to the "devil they know". Similarly, Benny Subianto's paper on West Kalimantan, also an area of earlier massive violence and conflict, shows that New Order elites managed to keep their positions of power. He also shows that "ethnicity and religion matter", in an area where these were the key causes of conflict. Being "indigenous" is complex in West Kalimantan, since quite different groups can claim to be "indigenous" — "*putra daerah*" (sons of the region). Dayak-Christians and Malay-Muslims both have valid claims to this status, and hence pairs of candidates often had one of each in order to ensure being acceptable to a wide range of voters. A similar situation unfolded in Poso, in Central Sulawesi, where religious conflict has also resulted in massive violence in recent years. Again, people in the region are very sensitive to the possibility of the recurrence of violent outbreaks, and, as Graham Brown and Rachel Diprose suggest, one of the most important interventions in ensuring continued peace, and a peaceful election, was the pairing of Christian and Muslim candidates for all the party slates. Brown and Diprose use the notions of "positive" (trusting) vs. "negative" (suspicious) peace to analyse the situation in Poso and the results of the elections, concluding that though the situation is at the moment peaceful, the results show that people are still distrustful of one another.

All in all, these papers show the complexity of the issues involved in looking at the question of democratization in Indonesia from the perspective of the introduction of this newest institution, the direct elections of local leaders. Indeed, the question of rights in democracy also brings into question the issue of responsibilities. Many different actors had been empowered in different ways in this new election system: the directly elected heads gain stronger legitimacy, the parties have been placed in unique positions as the necessary vehicles of the candidates, the wealthy and elites found opportunities emerging, but also receding in this new system, and ultimately the voters themselves, the previously "floating masses" under the old regime, have now come into their own and have been given the greatest responsibility and right of all, to directly make decisions about their own leaders.

TRANSITIONS AND CONSOLIDATIONS

> *"Democracy always projects a horizon of both hope and dissatisfaction."*
> (O'Donnell 2007, p. 9)

The first two presidents of Indonesia insisted that they ran a democracy, and were proud of the fact that their democratic polity was different from

other parliamentary democracies. The masses in Indonesia were "servile and obedient … [and] should not be bothered with ideological matters" (Antlov 2004, p. 6). They were "not yet ready" to participate in politics, which was to be left to the state; instead, the people were conceived of as a "floating mass" (ibid.). The New Order, in particular, entrenched a political system which shaped "people's representatives" to be more an assembly representing the central government to the people than a group that represented the people's needs to the government. The reform of the Indonesian political system over the almost ten years since the end of the New Order has seen the basic principle of the political system change. Increasingly, power for participating and making decisions has moved away from the central government and closer to the people. The institutionalization of an electoral system where the people directly vote for their leaders, and hence the leaders are directly responsible to them as much, if not more, than to the central government, means the institutional shape of Indonesian democracy has radically changed.

We show in various ways in these papers scepticism about how far democracy has been consolidated in Indonesia, and how far these local elections will continue, or not, this quest for democracy. We have suggested that certain factors, figuring quite broadly across Indonesia as illustrated in the chapters in this book, could become major obstacles in inhibiting the consolidation of democracy; these are some of the factors that Haynes and his colleagues highlight in their look at democratic consolidation in the Third World: patrimonialism, corruption, weak parties, and ethnic and religious conflict. These are all related to the attempts of elites to entrench their control both nationally as well as locally; additionally, many of these elites have been those who have continued from the time of the New Order, calling into question whether any reform has actually taken place (Hadiz 2005; Robison and Hadiz 2004). However, it is worthwhile keeping in mind, as Ziblatt (2006), in a review of several new works on democratization in Europe reminds us, democracy in its "first wave" was a very gradual process. A peaceful transition to democracy in Europe was only possible because pre-democratic elites were ensured that some residue of their former power would remain intact; this made "repression less attractive" (Tilly 2005, p. 181, as cited in Ziblatt 2006, p. 331). In this respect, democratization entails "a balancing act of sorts" (Ziblatt 2006, p. 332), granting concessions to non-democratic elites so as not to stall the entire process. In this respect, we can read the introduction of local elections as part of this balancing act. Voters are indeed empowered; while at the same time elites continue to manoeuvre by using patrimonial ties, money politics, and weak parties to further their own agendas.

While there is much to be critical of, therefore, there is also much cause for hope. Guillermo O'Donnell suggests that this is what democracy is all about (2007, p. 9, see quote above). But he also reminds us that: "Democracy is based ultimately not on voters, but on *citizens*" (2007, p. 7), and hence while the emergence of "new" local leaders is an important part of the phenomenon of *pilkada*, the active participation of local people is also crucial. Electing local leaders is the first step in the emergence of local democracy in the regions but, of course, elections are held only once every five years. Therefore, it is important that local communities can participate at every level of local political processes between elections, and through this kind of active citizenship, so that local democracy can be nurtured in the regions. A range of locally based organizations, including political, professional, religious, and social, can play an important role at the local level. This can be done through the establishment of a grand coalition of citizens' organizations at the local level with the main mandate to monitor and to scrutinize the works of local leaders in both the local governments and the local assemblies. The support of the media and the academic community at the local level is also important in terms of widening the scope and the size of the coalition of active citizenship.

One arguably positive development of the local election process that has been unfolding since 2005, which underscores the dynamic nature of the political transitions in Indonesia at this time, and the "deepening of democracy", is the recent ruling by the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi) to allow independent candidates to run for political office. It can be argued that the opportunities for pluralism and diversity, which have been growing since the end of the New Order, will expand even further with this new development. The verdict, announced on 23 July 2007, was a response to the judicial review submitted by a member of the local legislature in Lombok, who argued that the Law on Local Government No. 32/2004 was against the 1945 Constitution. The Constitution, he argued, recognized the rights of any Indonesian citizen to contest in the elections. It is also a response to the fact that independent candidates were allowed to contest (and they won) in Aceh (a special, yet integral, part of Indonesia). This allowed others to argue that if this political process was allowed in Aceh it should be allowed in other parts of Indonesia. The real impact of this verdict is to end the monopoly political parties have had in these past few years on the selection and nomination of candidates in the elections. Hence, starting from 2008 anyone who has "visions and missions", as well as the capabilities and the resources required to contest in the elections, will be allowed to do so. It is too early to tell what Indonesia's elections will be like in years to come, but it can

be suggested here that the presence of independent candidates will certainly add to the political dynamics at both the local and national levels.

Finally, we can say that so far the *pilkada* have generally taken place without serious crises that might have undermined the whole process. This is quite commendable, considering that these elections have occurred in a country as large as Indonesia with millions of voters involved, and that since the end of the New Order, Indonesia has experienced a considerable amount of conflict and violence due to ethnic and religious rivalry over political power. It has therefore proven that the Indonesian people learned a lot from the legislative and direct presidential elections in 2004, and that perhaps they are beginning to realize that the fears which had been constantly proliferated during the Soeharto era, that elections were "dangerous", were in fact unfounded and were meant to create a pliant, obedient, and silent public. We end here, optimistically suggesting that the "floating masses" have finally found their voice, and that though ultimately the results of this new system in Indonesia will have to continue to be assessed in the years to come, the steps that have been taken are steps that will help to deepen democracy.

Notes

[1] The authors would like to thank the anonymous referees for their critical comments.

[2] Much has been written on the causes and results of Soeharto's fall; they include Aspinall, Feith, and van Klinken (1999); Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury (1999); Erb and Adams (2000); and Forrester and May (1998).

[3] The growing literature on decentralization and regional autonomy includes Aspinall and Fealy (2003); Erb, Sulistiyanto, and Faucher (2005); Hofman and Kaiser (2006); Kingsbury and Aveling (2003); Sakai (2002); Turner et al. (2003).

[4] On the political history of Indonesia's presidentialism, see Sulistiyanto (2004).

[5] This is close to, but perhaps a bit more "undemocratic", than what some scholars have called "illiberal democracy" (Engberg and Ensson 2001, p. 37, following Zakaria 1997), where more rudimentary democracy is in place, and it is not entirely a 'façade'.

[6] This, it seems to us, is definitely an "ideal" type, and begs the question of how many countries worldwide actually partake in this type of "full" democracy. As Baker discusses in a chapter in the Haynes volume assessing the quality of democracy, the "Democratic Audit" designed to assess the quality of democracy in the U.K. has found the U.K. very far from reaching this ideal (2001, p. 33). Thus it is important to query the implied idea that there is some "holy grail" of "democracy" that is actually attainable. We thank one of the reviewers for bringing to our attention the need to stress this point.

[7] "A ruling party loses an election, an opposition party, or coalition wins it and next time loses" (Haynes 2001, p. 11).

[8] The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) introduced the idea of a "democracy assessment "where citizens themselves can participate openly in evaluating the quality of democracy in their own countries. This can be done through addressing a range of issues such as civil and political rights, rule of law, democratic role of political parties, government accountability, civilian-military relations, corruption, role of media and civil society, and international support, a number of the same issues that Haynes identified for external analysis. On IDEA's model, see www.idea.int. We thank one of our reviewers for bringing our attention to this information.

[9] The debates over the amendment to the 1945 Constitution directly addressed the redefining of the role of the individual *vis-à-vis* the state and society. The original 1945 Constitution placed the individual in subordination to the state and the greater good of the society, while the amended one adopts the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as its basis for the defining of the individual. This has elevated the role of the individual as a distinct bearer of rights in the face of society and the state. We thank one of the reviewers for reminding us that this was an important part of the debates over the amendments to the Constitution.

[10] Belief in one God, just and civilized humanity, unity of the nation, consensus and deliberation, social justice (see Suryadinata 2002, p. 10).

[11] An expression used refer to the masses who were generally thought of as "servile and obedient…[and] should not be bothered with ideological matters" (Antlov 2004, p. 6).

[12] Among others, Ananta, Arifin, and Suryadinata (2004, 2005); Antlov and Cederroth (2004); Kartomi (2005); King (2003); Suryadinata (2002), and a more general look at elections in Asia edited by Hsieh and Newman (2001), with a good chapter by Donald Weatherbee (2001) on Indonesia.

[13] This resentment towards Javanese domination erupted after the end of the New Order and was the impetus for the reorganization of the political geography of Indonesia.

[14] We would like to thank one of the reviewers for the comments on the possible positive aspects of pragmatic coalition building.

[15] The result was that several non-government organizations (NGOs) in Indonesia demanded the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi) to review and change articles regarding the role and existence of KPUD.

[16] This will change in 2008. The Constitutional Court has decided that it is unconstitutional to deny individual citizens the right to run for political office.

[17] PDIP, one of the more powerful parties in Eastern Indonesia, did not have a candidate in Ruteng district, precisely for the same reason; different hierarchical levels of the party wanted different candidates. This is mentioned in Erb and Anggal's paper in this volume.

[18] Though many NGO groups argue that it is a back-handed way of introducing Syariah law to Indonesia, see Herdi Sahrasad (2006).

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2

PILKADA LANGSUNG
The First Step on the Long Road to a Dualistic Provincial and District Government

Aloysius Benedictus Mboi

"Toute Nation a le Gouvernement qu'elle merite" — "Every Nation has the Government it deserves". (Joseph le Maistre: *Considerations sur la France*)

HISTORICAL SETTING

One of the central characters in the Indonesian system of provincial and district (*kabupaten*) governments is the *kepala daerah* (head of an area/region). The recent Law on Regional Government (No. 32/2004) stipulates that the *kepala daerah* be directly elected, a fundamental change in the Indonesian local political culture which will have many consequences, both in local settings as well in the context of local–central relationships. The election of the *kepala daerah* has been an important issue ever since the independence period.[1] In the 1950s, with the experiment with parliamentary democracy, the relationship between *kepala daerah* and local parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD) was confidence-based. The *kepala daerah* depended on the support of the majority of members of the DPRD and, consequently, the *kepala daerah* was responsible to the DPRD, which had the power of a vote of "no confidence" against the *kepala daerah*.

This kind of political relationship was maintained in the context of the Parliamentary Democracy period in the 1950s.

During this period the *kepala daerah* was simultaneously also the chairman of the Council of Local Government (Dewan Pemerintahan Daerah, DPD) which consisted of political elites elected by and from the DPRD. By the end of the 1950s, the DPD was replaced by the Local Council of Daily Affairs (Badan Pemerintah Harian, BPH) to oversee the day-to-day running of local government activities. This council was also known as the "Government by the People" which implied that the DPRD was involved in the day-to-day activities of the local government through coordinating the government services.

During the New Order period the existence of the *pemerintah daerah* (local government, also known as *pemda*), which comprised the *kepala daerah* and Local Assembly (DPRD), was very important at both provincial and district levels. There are two important aspects that deserve attention here: the relationship between the *kepala daerah* and the DPRD, and the relationship between the local government and the central government. The Law on Local Government No. 5/1974 recognized the so-called consultative relationship in which the *kepala daerah* could not dissolve the DPRD and vice versa, the DPRD could not vote "no confidence" against the *kepala daerah*. In order to harmonize the relationship between the two sides on a daily basis, the *kepala daerah* and the DPRD established the "Consultative Body", which consisted of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the DPRD, and leaders of the various factions in the DPRD. The implementation of the Law on Local Government No. 5/1974 shows us some of the logic of consultative democracy; this can be found in the importance of maintaining the spirit of a consultative relationship not based on majority rule. This was possible since there were no opposition parties. The appearance of a single majority party of Golongan Karya (Golkar) was different from the chaotic period of a multi-party system adopted during the Old Order period, when the loose and weak political coalitions created political instability. Even though there were no opposition parties, the *kepala daerah* had to present his/her annual accountability report (*laporan pertanggung jawaban*) to the DPRD, but without running the risk of getting a "no confidence vote". The *kepala daerah* was also responsible to the president (in the case of a governor), and to the Minister of Home Affairs (in the case of a *bupati*). This kind of vertical relationship with the central government was also a fused one, since both the governor and the *bupati* had deconcentrated power, which ultimately was an extension of the power of the central government.

In sum, it can be suggested that over the past decades the local–central government relationship was characterized by the fact that both the provincial and *kabupaten* governments had a "unipolar legitimacy" in which the *kepala daerah* was elected by the DPRD, but also (or actually) appointed by the central government. Although the relationship between *kepala daerah* and DPRD evolved from time to time, the relationship between the *kepala daerah* and the central government has always been a vertical one. That means that the *kepala daerah* was simultaneously also a *kepala wilayah* (regional head) who acted on behalf of the central government.

CRITICISM OF THE NEW ORDER GOVERNMENT

The *reformasi* movement brought a new atmosphere to the political culture in Indonesia.[2] Much criticism was thrown at the New Order government. It was accused of being overly centralized and authoritarian. The central government was accused of not allowing local government enough autonomy in political and administrative affairs, and the DPRD was accused of being only a "rubber stamp" institution.

In my experience, the strong centralistic character of the central government could be explained from the fiscal and monetary point of view. The resources for local taxes and retributions were limited, particularly outside Java, where the economy was predominantly agricultural. This situation created a strong dependence of local governments on grants, subsidies, and co-administrative financing from the central government. In a survey by the ISEI (Indonesian Association of Economists) at the end of the 1990s, only 40 out of 360 *kabupaten* and municipalities, and 9 out of 27 provinces were really financially autonomous. In this respect, the budgetary dependence on the central government was very logical, as was likewise political dependence. On the other hand, most of the governors and *bupati* did not make use of the lee-way stipulated by "Power of Freies Ermessen", a *carte blanche* to solve problems not previously regulated by any stratum of government. There was a certain degree of mistrust from the central government, which had doubts over the managerial capacities at the local level.

Criticism towards the decentralization politics of the past can be understood, but on the other hand, being aware of the heterogeneity of the political, social, and economic conditions of the *daerahs*, one could not imagine a homogeneous, or a flat rate theory of, decentralization for the whole country. Therefore, the local–central relationship should be based on local particularities of problems and carrying capacities. That is why in the past there were always areas which were content with certain policies, and there were others which felt discontented and discriminated against.

It is true that if we look at the maldistribution of human resources in terms of local elites and the concentration of elites in the provincial capital, the effectiveness of the decentralization politics had a different effect at the provincial or *kabupaten* level. That is why the distribution of power to the province and to the *kabupaten* should be separated. Looking back at the Law on Local Government No. 5/1974, one could discern that unclear distribution of power originated from the fact that until 1998, the *peraturan pemerintah* (government regulation) regulating the separation of power and tasks between province and *kabupaten* had never been promulgated, let alone for every individual province or *kabupaten*.

The basic foundation of the local–central government relationship according to the Law on Local Government No. 5/1974 was the so-called "three circles theory" derived from the Netherlands Indies period where the "citizen as the centre of governance" was simultaneously the subject of the *desa*, of the *kabupaten*, of the province, and of the state. That was the rationale of the vertical fused (monistic) system. There was always the possibility of pendulum movement, between extreme centralization, deconcentration, co-administration, and devolution, depending on the extent and magnitude of the social problems to be solved on the one side, and the carrying capacity of the local government on the other side. But much also depended on the creativity, initiative, and carrying capacity of the local government, which demanded a certain degree of trust from the central government. In this respect, political sincerity between the "levels of government" was the key.

PERSONAL INFLUENCE OF THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS

In Indonesian political culture, personal relationships have a very strong influence. As such, the local–central government relationship depends largely on the character and personality of the Minister of Home Affairs, as well as his professional background and the political environment. Coincidentally or not, all the Ministers during the New Order period were from the military, but with very different backgrounds, experiences, and attitudes towards local autonomy.

During the early part of the New Order period, the Minister of Home Affairs Basuki Rachmat (an army general with a background as *wedana* or sub-district head) adopted the Law on Local Government No. 18/1965 and presided over the limited role of the central government in the regions through allowing autonomous departments to run programmes which were financed by the central government. When General Basuki Rachmat died in 1969, he was succeeded by General Amir Machmud, whose first task was to

make the ruling party Golkar win as the single majority party in the 1971 general elections. Amir Machmud was a strong exponent of a centralistic government. He was also supported by the fact that the New Order government adopted the Broad Guidelines of National Strategy or Garis Besar Haluan Negara (GBHN), which consisted of stability, economic development, and equity; in this context, "stability" also meant "security". Another contributing factor to the strong tendency for centralization was the oil boom of 1973–74. Suddenly, Indonesia received a lot of money; there was disbelief on behalf of the central government that the existing autonomous departments in both provincial and *kabupaten* levels had enough effective absorption capacity. As a result, both the central government's regional and *kabupaten* branches were created and all of this re-centralized the structure and function of government institutions at all levels, and created duplication, overlapping, and mal-coordination with autonomous activities.

In 1983, Amir Machmud was succeeded by General Soepardjo Rustam, who came to the position with experience both as a diplomat and as a governor. Although he was working under the Law on Local Government No. 5/1974 and the Law on Village Government No. 5/1979, the climate between the central, provincial, and *kabupaten* governments changed enormously. He envisioned a very different local–central relationship. While he had been a proponent of the unitary legalistic view on the local–central relationship when he was governor, he totally changed after he became Minister of Home Affairs. He ordered a review of the Law on Village Government No. 5/1979 under the auspices of Professor Selo Sumardjan and Professor Mubijarto, a study which showed the wrong assumptions of the law. Unfortunately, Soepardjo Rustam did not live long enough to see the amendment of the law. When I went to Holland in 1989 for a sabbatical year, he asked me to investigate the rationale of Governor General van Mook's[3] idea for Federalism.[4] I believe that Soepardjo Rustam was of the opinion there should not be a homogeneous management system for local government. Was he contemplating a federalistic format? I do not know. But the fact was that he was not happy about how the local government was run *vis-à-vis* the central government.

In 1988, Soepardjo Rustam was succeeded by General Rudini, ex-Army Chief of Staff, with a typical centralistic army attitude. He abolished the provincial Academies of Local Government (Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri, APDN) and put them all under one roof in the College of Local Government (Sekolah Tinggi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri, STPDN) in Jatinangor in West Java Province. The STPDN was equivalent to the Military Academy in Magelang, Central Java, with the initial basic military training as

part of the curriculum. Imagine the military spirit and discipline that was implanted in the minds of future public administrators. He also proposed the abolition of the DPRD I (the provincial DPRD), which was also meant to abolish provincial autonomy. Fortunately, his idea was never implemented; otherwise we would have had a very different picture of local–central relationship by now, where the central government would have been dispersed downwards onto the provincial level.

In order to give a fair judgement of the New Order government *vis-à-vis* the politics of decentralization, it would be interesting to mention some people who brought new positive ideas into the development of policies of the local–central relationship. We have mentioned General Soepardjo Rustam above, who was not content with the character of local autonomy. He had a Director General of Local Autonomy, Atar Sibero, who worked in the central government but thought and acted decentralistically. In addition, despite the fact that up until then Soeharto was recognized as a centralistic and authoritarian figure, in his Independence Day Speech before the Parliament on 16 August 1990, he expressed his wish that the whole theory of decentralization be reviewed. But unfortunately that idea stumbled against the lack of creativity in the Ministry of Home Affairs, where they had not read the spirit of the times. The Minister of Home Affairs (Rudini) had his own ideas, typical of a "good soldier" of that period.

SOME THOUGHTS ON THE SHIFT FROM A FUSED TO A DUALISTIC RELATIONSHIP

The proponents of the *reformasi* movement wanted to make Indonesia anew after the "alleged centralistic and authoritarian years of the New Order". However, in my view, they failed to write a new political system. Instead, they embarked directly on piecemeal political action, which was the reform of local government, rather than making a grand design of a government system for the whole country.[5] These two laws (the Law on Local Government No. 22/1999 and the Law on Local Government No. 32/2004) brought a completely different picture of the local political dynamics.

Unfortunately, the proponents of the *reformasi* movement failed or neglected to design a multi-dimensional agenda for reform. There was also no time frame for reform, which eventually led the nation to fail to prepare politically, economically, culturally, and socially for the challenge of changes (and reforms). It also failed to maintain the spirit of unity of the nation and to stop the emergence of the "local nationalisms" which appeared everywhere in the country, embodying the spirit of separation and/or federalism. Everybody

defined his/her own reforms based on his/her own interests. Sadly, this multi-dimensional crisis was accompanied by violence carried out by certain groups aiming to derail the spirit of the *reformasi* movement in Indonesia. I believe that part of the evil lies in the fact that the *reformasi* movement happened in the period of crisis, and the reform was not built upon a sound democratic system. In the context of decentralization, I must say that there is nothing wrong with *pilkada* as a way of directly electing *kepala daerah*; however, it must be pointed out that to adopt a new election mechanism in a turbulent situation can be worse than the problem to be solved. As the Dutch proverb goes: "The treatment is worse than the illness."

Let me share with you some of my concerns regarding these laws. I believe that there are three basic premises in the course of decentralization. First, it must be stated that Indonesia is still a decentralized unitary state. Second, a decentralization law is simultaneously a constitutional as well as an administrative law, and third, as an administrative law, it deliberates the rights and the obligations of respective tiers of legal territorial communities, and respective tiers of government. A decentralization law then deliberates reciprocal vertical, as well as horizontal, relationships in a framework of a unitary state.

The Law on Local Government No. 22/1999, Article 7 stipulated that "The *daerah* have all the powers except for Judiciary, National Security, Defence, Fiscal and Monetary, Foreign Relations and Religious Affairs." In other words, there is a separation of power, and the *daerah* have residual powers. Indeed, there is no hierarchy of powers, no clear boundaries of the local power. There is no stipulation of "authority above authorities". The governor is the representative of the central government, but he/she has an autonomous position as *kepala daerah*, while the *bupati* is politically fully autonomous. Accordingly, the central — provincial relationship is fused, while the central — *kabupaten* and the provincial — *kabupaten* relationships are dualistic. Some said this kind of relationship was already a federal form of government with the local power in the hands of the *kabupaten* level. All of this was uncommon in almost 60 years of local government practices in Indonesia.

However, there have been changes in several areas with the adoption of the Law on Local Government No. 32/2004. For instance, article 7 of the previous law (No. 22/1999) stipulating the separation of powers between the central government and the *daerah*, made people think that Indonesia was moving towards federalism. This article was replaced by articles 13 and 14 in the new Law (No. 32/2004) which, in my view, are different only in the language. However, there is a new idea introduced, namely that the direct election of *kepala daerah* is to be conducted in free and fair elections, as stated

in article 56. It is also interesting to mention here that the previous Law (No. 22/99) recognized the presence of *ulayat* (local autonomous communities), an institution that functionally still exists, but this disappears in the new Law (No. 32/2004). This mere fact is very unfortunate, since the presence and influence of *ulayat* in the "outer islands" have become stronger since then. It remains to be seen what the social implications of this will be. The Law on Local Government No. 22/1999 had a short lifetime. The second Amendment to the 1945 Constitution written in 2004 led to the adoption of the Law on Local Government No. 32/2004. With this new law the political functions of the *kepala daerah* are clearly defined. These functions are: to administer the *daerah* according to the policies laid down by the DPRD; to promulgate local laws, including budgets, with the consent of the DPRD; to give an annual accountability report to the DPRD and the central government; and to give information on the performance of government to the people of his/her *daerah*, for evaluation purposes. Meanwhile, at the provincial level, the governor is *ex-officio* holding the power of deconcentration, meaning he represents the central government and coordinates the regional offices of the central government, and the administration of *kabupaten* and municipalities.

SOME POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH A *PILKADA LANGSUNG* SYSTEM

The architects of the Law on Local Government No. 22/1999 had only one wish in their minds: "to abolish centralization and centralistic authority of the central government of the New Order Period". This law was a reaction to the spirit of the Law on Local Government No. 5/1974. Unfortunately, the pendulum overshot. From the "extreme centralistic spirit" (which I personally would like to debate!), they drafted a law which brought the pendulum to the "extreme wide-range of autonomy as well as separation of power between the central and local government". Honestly, I must say that the Law on Local Government No. 22/1999 created a federalist spirit, while leaving behind the principles of a unitary state.

Furthermore, the Law on Local Government No. 32/2004 amended the mechanism of "changing the guard" at provincial and *kabupaten* levels. The *kepala daerahs* is to be directly elected, creating a bipolar legitimacy at the respective levels of government. The relationship became dualistic with a complete separation of political and administrative domains of local governance. This was a very fundamental change at the local level. Unfortunately, there is no sign yet of a change of political and administrative patterns of behaviour. There are still many questions that come to the surface.

One is why such a fundamental issue like the direct election of the *kepala daerah* (*pilkada*) was not included in the 1945 Constitution, unlike the direct election for the President, which is stipulated in the Constitution (in the Third Amendment). Since the *pilkada* is not included in the 1945 Constitution and it is regulated by an organic law, the election of the *kepala daerah* is susceptible to change, depending upon the political dynamics of the time. Second, we need to ask what was in the minds of the architects of Law No. 32/2004, when they changed the mechanism for election of the *kepala daerah*, from election by the DPRD to direct election by the people? What was the purpose of the direct election in terms of local democracy; what was wrong with the previous mechanism? What was the basic theory for the shift? If it was for the reason of democracy, there are many democratic countries where the "*kepala daerah*" is also proposed by the "DPRD".

Third, what happens if the candidate *bupatis* and the political parties represented in the DPRD have different political agendas during their campaigns, and then, what happens after the election, when there is a conflict of agendas between the *kepala daerah* and the DPRD which may be constituted by opposing political parties? How is the check and balance mechanism going to work? Does each side have the right to veto? What happens when there is a political impasse? What happens when there is no agreement concerning budget allocations or programmes? Which side will prevail? Can there be a vote of no confidence? Fourth, the candidate or pairs of candidates should — by law — be supported by a political party or coalition of parties. What will be the relationship between the *kepala daerah* and the parties? Reading through the letter of the law, every policy of the *kepala daerah* should have the consent of the DPRD. Does this mean confidence-based policy making? What if the DPRD does not give its consent? Fifth, by taking East Nusa Tenggara as an example, four out of seven winning pairs were supported by a coalition of small parties. That means the major parties, the losing parties, have the role of "opposition" in the DPRD, a role which has not been practised for about 40 years. Do we create a ruling party versus opposing party (parties) relationship? Sixth, by having the same legitimacy, and both having autonomous powers, how should the relationship be arranged between the governor and the *bupati*? How will the coordinating function of the Governor be implemented? Does the Governor have a top-down annihilation power? What is the relationship between the provincial and *kabupaten* services? What if the provincial services are not in line with *kabupaten* services? Who is going to solve the contradiction? These are many questions which I have about the effect of Law No. 32/2004 on the nature of the relationship of direct elections to the existing political system.

Furthermore, an important development in 2007 is the possibility of independent candidates as participants in the *pilkada*. The idea emerged after two candidates for Governor of Jakarta failed to get support from the political parties. They went to the Constitutional Court, which stipulated the shortcomings of Law No. 32/2004 concerning candidacy, and declared that independent candidacy should be possible. This brought new developments in local politics, particularly in the *pilkada langsung*. The role of political parties in local politics, the relationship of *kepala daerah* versus DPRD, and the possible conflict of interest at the local level are some of the important questions to be asked and answered in the future. There are no clear answers yet, and there are no substantial debates on the way. *Quo vadis*?

Additionally, there are questions about the longer-term consequences of these structural changes, and their social/cultural implications, that deserve mention here. First, what is the role of money in the local democracy, particularly in the election of the DPRD and the *kepala daerah*? Reading from experience, a candidate without money almost surely will not be elected. A party without money will not have extensive popular support. It seems that the political landscape and political culture in the near future will be determined by the people and parties that have the most money. It will not be surprising that the role of financial sponsors (business people?) will be a determining factor, a fact that will also have a far-reaching influence on the performance of "good incorruptible government". A law regulating the financing of elections should be given serious consideration. Otherwise, instead of a democratic government, we are creating a plutocratic quasi-democratic government where there is no place for the "have-nots".

With so many questions unanswered, the development in 2007 concerning independent candidates has posed new challenges for local politics and local democracy. The consequences of this new idea are still under discussion. The lifeline of (especially) local political parties is at stake. Let us wait!

Another question is related to local indigenous groups, a terminology a bit alien to the Javanese. In the outer islands, genealogical relationships are still very strong. The influence of genealogical relationships on the political process is unavoidable. A strong sentiment because of familial relations can influence their day-to-day relationships. Local social turbulence as part of the political scenery, even if temporary, can be disturbing. A periodic itinerary for elections for the whole country should be contemplated; for instance, there could be simultaneous elections and a definite date determined for both national and local elections for executive and legislative offices. Social turbulence could then be limited to a very particular point of time.

Also, does the *pilkada* contribute to local democracy? Surely it does, but in what way? At the present time democracy is more confined to general elections; as such it is a procedure. It is not a way of life; thus democracy is more procedural than substantial. It is not yet common practice in bureaucracy. When democracy is just a procedure, the numerical results are of paramount importance, and can be made important; we then run the risk of a tyranny of the majority. In a country as heterogeneous as Indonesia, where primordial and sectarian sentiments are still strong and functional, numerical democracy can have discriminatory and detrimental effects on the harmony of society.

That is why a relationship based on consultative democracy is preferable, with transparency and participation as two basic pillars. With this mechanism, we do not run the risk of ignoring or neglecting the rights of the minorities. The vertical (central–local) and the horizontal (*kepala daerah*–DPRD), fused or monistic relationships — with many variants along the way — did not guarantee a sound democracy in Indonesia. However, the above questions should be answered, before the dualistic relationship — stipulated by Law No. 32/2004 — will prove to be the beginning of a new effective local political culture. In the meantime — I am afraid — negative factors such as money politics may play important roles in the performance of local politics and administration, something Law No. 32/2004 had never envisaged.

CONCLUSION

The shift from the spirit of the Law on Local Government No. 5/1974, to the Law on Local Government No. 22/1999, and then to the Law on Local Government No. 32/2004, has been based on the assumption that during the period of the New Order too little autonomy was given to the *daerah* and the national government was too strongly centralized and authoritarian. Wide-ranging autonomy and separation of powers between central and local government are seen as the answers, including direct election of *kepala daerah* seen as a token of direct democracy and direct legitimacy. Looking back at our history of local government, a political culture of sixty years may be a constraint and handicap for the development of a new political culture. After reading the Law on Local Government No. 32/2004 I find the formulations of the architects of local politics very superficial. I still see a long road in front of us before so many questions can be answered and a local system of government which the architects have in mind can be fully realized.

However, an answer is needed which acknowledges that Indonesia is an archipelagic nation, with no other models found elsewhere. Indonesia is the model herself. One of the failures of the Founding Fathers was that they never

questioned "how to administer this extensive, archipelagic, heterogeneous country?". Their only concern at the time was Independence from colonialism. On the question of "how Indonesia shall be administered after Independence?", they left it to the generation after them.

Through the years, we have administered Indonesia by trial and error, or by reacting to crises or "mistakes" in the previous regime. The politics of decentralization is expected to answer the question of "how to wisely administer the country and simultaneously to prevent it from falling apart (without violence!)". As a consequence of this, the concept of local autonomy should not be a static one. The dynamics of national and local politics and interests ought to play a paramount role in the formulation of the local autonomy format. A balance between extreme centralization and extreme decentralization should be sought, and this can be achieved by preserving the unity of Indonesia and by, at the same time, respecting and administering local particularities. In the end, what Joseph le Maistre had wished, that each nation, province and *kabupaten* had a government they deserve, might be fulfilled.

Notes

1 The following are the laws on local government that have been implemented in Indonesia since the Independence period: Law No. 1/1945, Law No. 22/1948, Law No. 44/1950 (State of East Indonesia), Law No. 1/1957, Law No. 5/1974, Law No. 22/1999 and Law No. 32/2004.

2 This refers to pro-reform movements organized by various actors and organizations that forced the fall of President Soeharto in May 1998.

3 Dr van Mook was Governor General of the Netherlands Indies after World War II, famous as a creator of member states of the United States of Indonesia (except the Republic of Indonesia in Jogjakarta).

4 General Soepardjo Rustam continued his interest in and concern about local autonomy and good governance in a decentralized system, even after he became Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare (1988–92). Unfortunately, he died of cancer in 1992, while still in office.

5 After the loss of East Timor in 1999, Indonesia promulgated Law No. 18/2001 and Law No. 21/2001 giving Aceh and Papua respectively "special autonomy" (*otonomi khusus*), a term not known in the 1945 Constitution or Indonesian Constitutional Law until the 2002 Amendment of the Constitution.

PART I

Political Parties, Politician Elites and the Voters

3

POLITICAL PARTIES IN *PILKADA* Some Problems for Democratic Consolidation[1]

Pratikno

INTRODUCTION

On Saturday 29 April 2005, the city of Tuban, East Java province, was burned. A huge crowd consisting of more than 5,000 supporters of the defeated *pilkada*[2] candidate went down to the street angry. The crowd destroyed and burned the local electoral commission's (KPUD) office, district government offices and vehicles, and the *pilkada* winner's property, including two luxury houses, a hotel, eighteen vehicles, and two factories. A state of emergency was declared by the government, and thousands of police officers were mobilized with a licence to shoot disturbers.

This may be an example of what the government feared would be "unsmooth and disorderly" local head elections throughout the country. Since public pessimism over the implementation of the *pilkada* had been increasing from early on, the Minister of Home Affairs announced the success of *pilkada* in 2005 in influential mass media across Indonesia on December 2005. "Since June 2005, *pilkada* has been executed in 198 regions, 92 per cent of them were run in a smooth and orderly manner."[3] Of course, this used a minimum standard to define a "successful *pilkada*".

Theoretically, the direct election of governors, district heads, and mayors is expected to further deepen democracy at the regional level. By this new

electoral system, the heads of regions are no longer elected by regional assembly members, but are elected by individual citizens. Instead of taking a role in regional legislatures through their representatives, individual citizens now have direct access to vote for their governor, *bupati* (district head) or mayor. It will be argued in this chapter, however, that the path toward deepening democracy has not been significantly furthered by these direct elections, because of the electoral and party system which constrains grass-roots participation. Nevertheless, it is suggested that voters at the grass-roots level are finding their own way to respond. Whether this response will have a positive effect towards the furthering of the democratic transition in Indonesia will be something to be examined further in the future.

The purpose of this chapter is to map out the role and limitations of political parties in the local regional head elections towards widening the space of grass-roots control in local political systems. It starts by elaborating on the rationale for, and debate on, the formulation of the law on local elections; through this we can see the dominant role of political parties in the electoral processes. I argue that the role of political parties is problematic since, as has been shown by several previous studies as well as in the polling, political parties in Indonesia have made little effort to democratize themselves. Some evidence nationwide is examined. It will be shown that coalitions among political parties are purely pragmatic; the role of money is important and at the same time grass-roots participation has been marginalized. This is evident in the widespread conflicts between levels of party organizations, and between party leaders and the masses.

Grass-roots voters have tried to challenge such oligarchic local political structures in their own way. This chapter argues that the high rate of non-participation in the elections, traditionally seen as a way of protesting against the political system, is evidence of the reluctance, pessimism, and resistance of the grass-roots voters toward the elite-dominated *pilkada* processes supposedly accessible to the people. It is further emphasized by the nationwide fact that the proposed candidates of the largest parties have been defeated in many of the *pilkada*. With this as one type of evidence, this chapter argues that the grass-roots voters have tried to find a way to limit the elite domination of local elections. This resistance reflects the ambition and strength of the general population in demanding more democratic local elections in the future.

THE RATIONALE FOR DIRECT REGIONAL ELECTIONS

The direct election of executive heads is not a new practice for Indonesians. Historically, village heads in Java and some other parts of Indonesia were directly elected by the people. During the New Order government, this

tradition was formalized in 1979 (Law No. 5/1979) for application throughout villages in Indonesia. The first step was sub-district government evaluation of the village head candidates' political loyalty and technocratic competence; final candidates were then listed by the village electoral committee. The electoral processes, such as campaigning, voting, and vote counting, were managed by the village electoral committee. In this respect, people at the grass-roots level have been familiar with direct election processes for some time.

However, during the New Order period (1966–98) the executive heads starting at the first level of government (president), the second level (governor), and the third level (*bupati* and mayor) were chosen by assembly members at each level of government.[4] It wasn't until the constitution was amended in 2003 that provision was made for the direct election of the president by the people. Based on this article of the constitution, the first direct presidential election in 2004 saw Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono elected as president.

The initiation of presidential direct elections was driven by the desire to redefine Indonesia as a presidential, as opposed to a parliamentary, system. The pre-amended constitution is closer to parliamentarism, as practised during the Soeharto government. However, following the stepping down of Soeharto from his presidential position in response to the popular movement in 1998, the governmental system has tended to be closer to presidentialism. Constitutional reform, started in 1999, is moving towards the practices of presidentialism in several ways. Firstly, the president is given more significant power to control executive units and functions. Secondly, the president retains his position for the whole period of election, and impeachment must be based on criminal acts rather than on political grounds. Lastly, political legitimacy of the president is strengthened by being directly elected by the people instead of elected by the national assembly members.

Based on the argument that the national governmental system should be consistently applied to all layers of regional government, the design of the local government system based on Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Government was amended with Law No. 32/2004 on Local Government. The legal position of the regional head (governor, *bupati*, and mayor) in relation to the regional legislature has been strengthened, since although the regional legislature still has supervisory powers, the head is no longer accountable to them. Previously, the regional head could be dismissed by the regional legislature if they rejected his accountability report; the new system provides for a more secure position of the regional head. Also, following the national recruitment system, the heads of regions are to be directly elected by the people. This is a major change over the previous system, where the heads of regions were elected by the regional legislatures.

Unlike the election of the Legislative Assembly (DPR and DPRD) which is scheduled nationally, the local head elections are scheduled regionally. Although the term of the regional head is set nationally, that is for five years, due to the different times when the regional governments were established, each region can have different election dates. Therefore, a transitional period was set. The term of regional heads who ended their term from December 2004 up to April 2005 was extended to May 2005. Instead of having an indirect election (by the legislature), which should have been executed for those headship positions, direct elections were held in June 2005. This explains the dramatic number of direct elections in that month; 162 of 196 *pilkadas* were held from June to December 2005. Since then, almost every month there has been one or more *pilkada* in Indonesia, as shown in Table 3.1.

It should be underscored here that Law No. 32/2004 is not only initiating the direct election of regional heads, but also changing the pattern of governmental relations between the national level and local level governments. The stipulation of Law No. 32/2004 strengthens the position of the national

TABLE 3.1
Schedule of *Pilkada* in 2005–06

Schedule		*Level of Government*		*Total*
		Province	*District/City*	
2005	June	7	155	162
	July	–	5	5
	August	–	16	16
	September	–	12	12
	December	–	1	1
Total		7	189	196
2006	January	–	5	5
	February	1	5	6
	March	2	5	7
	April	–	6	6
	May	–	6	6
	June	1	12	13
	July	–	23	23
	August	–	1	1
	September	–	2	2
	October	–	3	3
Total		4	68	72

government in relation to regional government since it provides more administrative and fiscal instruments for the national government to supervise and control, and also gives scope to punish local governments which violate national regulations. This is in comparison to the earlier Laws No. 22/1999 and No. 25/1999 which gave too much freedom to local governments to act without control from the central government. Under Law No. 32/2004, the provincial budget policy must now be evaluated and approved by the Minister of Home Affairs before being executed, and likewise the district or city budget should be evaluated and approved by the provincial government before implementation. Subsequently, the regional governments should report on their budget balance to the national government every semester; otherwise, fiscal transfer from the national government will be postponed. These are some examples of the newly reinstated instruments that the national government has to control local governments which had been eliminated in Law No. 22/1999 on regional governments.

For the proponents of democracy, the initiation of direct elections has increased the expectation that democracy will be deepened further at the local level. The reason is that it gives more direct access for individual citizens to be directly involved in the political recruitment processes. Direct elections were expected to minimize the practice of money politics apparent in the old system. With direct elections, where the whole population has the right to vote, vote buying was assumed to be less possible than in indirect elections where only a small number of assembly members had the power to vote on the regional heads. In addition to promoting better democracy, it was also expected to endorse better governance.

DECENTRALIZATION OF *PILKADA*

Before discussing whether the above expectations were achieved, firstly we need to elaborate on the electoral design of *pilkada* by which we can identify the role and function of related actors. The first main issue that was debated during and after the implementation of the law on direct elections was who would be responsible for managing the elections, the National Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU), or the local governments. The second main issue debated was the role of political parties during the candidacy stage: would independent candidates be possible, or could the candidates only be those proposed by major political parties?

The amended Indonesian Constitution (2002) uses the term '*pemilihan umum*' (general election) to refer to several different types of elections. Firstly, it refers to the election of the legislative members (DPR, Dewan Perwakilan

Rakyat — People's Representative Assembly) of the national, provincial, and district/city parliaments, and the election of DPD (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah — Regional Representative) members; these elections are conducted on the same day every five years. Secondly, it refers to the direct election of the presidential position which is conducted soon after the election of assembly members. The amended constitution does not mention the direct election of regional heads at all, but this is understandable because at the time of the constitutional amendment regional heads were still elected by the regional assemblies. The amended constitution stipulates that the general election would be managed by the KPU, a commission which is autonomous, nationwide, and permanent. Based on this stipulation, therefore, the KPU has branches at provincial and district/city level, which are called KPUD, Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah (Regional Election Commissions). These regional offices are responsible to the national office of KPU in Jakarta. Through these branches, the Election Commission reaches all regions in Indonesia. Because they are permanent institutions, KPU and KPUD continue to exist, even when a election period has ended.

When the idea of direct election of regional heads was first mooted, the crucial debate was who would be responsible? The government and national parliaments proposed that because constitutionally *pilkada* (*pemilihan kepala daerah*) (direct regional head elections) were not part of *pemilu* (the general elections) therefore the *pilkada* should not be controlled by KPU. Additionally, the argument was that to further strengthen decentralization, regional autonomy, and democracy, *pilkada* should be the responsibility of the regional governments. Opposing this idea, the KPU proposed that the "electoral regime" should be separated from the "governmental regime". Therefore, *pilkada* should not be controlled by the regional governments, which would put them under the influence of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Although in the constitution *pilkada* is not formally stated as a part of *pemilu* and hence under the responsibility of KPU, their argument was that *pilkada* is substantively a kind of *pemilu* and, therefore, should be managed by the KPU. Some local KPUs appealed to the Constitutional Court and, finally, that Court supported that it is stipulated in the law that the local electoral commissions should be responsible for the local elections and should be independent of the local governments.

For our purposes, this debate points to the broadening of decentralization in Indonesia. The *pilkada* elections are funded by the regional governments, and managed by the local elections commissions, KPUD.[5] Additionally, unlike in the elections of legislative members and the president, where the local election commission (KPUD) is responsible to the national election

commission (KPU), in the *pilkada* the KPUD is responsible administratively to the regional assembly, especially in the use of funds. The functioning of KPUD and the implementation of *pilkada* as a whole are formally supervised by *panwaslu daerah* (*pengawas pemilu daerah* — regional election supervisory body).[6] Again, because the national supervisory bodies and the branches at the regional level had already been disbanded, a regional *panwaslu* was established by the regional parliaments in each region.

Some positive effects can be discerned from the *pilkada* process. Local direct elections have further strengthened the political and administrative decentralization that was agreed to by the national government in 1999 and has been unfolding ever since. These elections provide more space for regional and local actors to exercise democracy, to manage conflict, and to contextualize the national design into the regional setting. They mobilize a wider participation of regional actors in managing local decision making, by which a sense of belonging and responsibility among regional actors can be developed. They also increase the respect of regional political actors towards the national government since they are being trusted to manage a crucial political event. At the same time, although there has been no evidence yet, the elected regional head will have more opportunity to promote him or herself to become more recognized as a political leader by the upper levels of government.

However, apart from the advantages, there are some difficulties in managing better elections due to the decentralization of *pilkada*. The strength of regional *panwaslu* in *pilkada* is dependent entirely upon the strength of local civil society without any additional support from the national civil society. In the election of the president and legislative members, *panwaslu* is organized nationally and, consequently, supported administratively and politically by its national office. However, in the *pilkada*, since the *panwaslu* is established locally, there is no national support, and those who are responsible for watching over the election face monolithic and oligarchic regional political elites who try to control electoral processes for their own personal interest. The local *panwaslu* members have had to deal with the monolithic regional political structure on their own. The liveliness and strength of regional civil society are the only sources of energy of the *pilkada panwaslu*. In regions with better civil society, such as some urban areas in Java, there will be fewer problems compared to regions with monolithic political structures, such as some remote regions in Indonesia.

A similar problem is faced by KPUD in executing *pilkada* electoral processes. It is the KPUD which pre-qualifies the candidates as required by law. The candidates should be a minimum of 32 years old and healthy according to a report by appointed medical doctors; additionally, they must

be proposed by one or more political parties with total votes of a minimum of 15 per cent in the previous legislative election. In some cases, it was very difficult for the KPUD to stick to the requirements of the law due to mass pressure. To give some examples, following intensive pressures from the masses, the KPUD of Bengkayang[7] and Ketapang[8] of West Kalimantan, KPUD of Situbondo[9] and Banyuwangi[10] of East Java, and KPUD of West Seram[11] of Maluku approved the candidacy of one or more candidates who were administratively problematic.

THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE CANDIDACY

Another significant debate during the formulation of the law on *pilkada* was about the role of political parties in the electoral process, especially in the candidacy process. Theoretically, the options were: (1) all candidates would be independent candidates proposed by non-political parties, (2) both independent candidates and candidates proposed by political parties would be possible, (3) all candidates must be proposed by political parties with a minimum percentage of votes in the legislative election.

During the drafting of the law, in 2003–04, the first option, that all candidates would be independent ones, did not dominate public debate. The two other options, however, were seriously considered. In the first draft of the law proposed by the Ministry of Home Affairs,[12] the second option, that candidates could be independent or proposed by political parties, was put forward. As mentioned in this draft,[13] candidates of *pilkada* could include:

1. Pairs of candidates proposed by one or more political parties which gained a minimum of 15 per cent of the votes in the past legislative election.
2. Pairs of candidates who gained support from a minimum of one per cent of total voters in the region; they could be proposed by:
    a. A minimum of 10 per cent of local assembly members whose parties have not proposed other candidates;
    b. The candidates themselves;
    c. One or more political parties which did not gain seats in the local assembly;
    d. Social and professional organizations recognized by law.

This proposal, however, was rejected by the national assembly. Without any significant debate, the DPR decided that *pilkada* candidates should be proposed by one or a coalition of parties which gained a minimum of 15 per cent of votes in the previous election of legislative members.[14] This decision

was supported by various arguments. Firstly, it was intended to simplify the process of candidacy. The method by which a candidate required the signature of thousands of citizens, supported by a copy of their identity card (KTP), might be difficult to utilize in some remotes areas. Secondly, by using the final option it was hoped to avoid an excessive number of candidates, which may create difficulties in managing electoral processes. At the same time, it was argued that public participation in the candidacy process would still be possible through participation in a party's decision-making processes.

However, these arguments highlighted some serious problems of Indonesian political parties. The popular expectation of the role of political parties in developing a better Indonesia was very momentous during the early stages of democratization in 1998–99. However, due to the bad performance of democratically elected politicians in most areas, the trust that people have in elected politicians, political parties, and the legislature has been declining ever since. Low level of trust towards political parties is not an Indonesian-specific phenomenon. According to the Asia Barometer Survey (Inoguchi 2004), the low level of trust in political parties to defend public interest is also found in the Philippines. If we look at the situation in Indonesia, trust in political parties and the legislature is lower than in any other state and democratic institutions, such as the legal system, the police, and the army. This data is confirmed by a survey conducted by LP3ES (Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial — Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information) in 2003 which indicated that 49 per cent of respondents did not trust that political parties were working for people's interests.[15]

PARTY PARTNERSHIPS: PRAGMATISM IN PARTY COALITIONS

Hence, after the debates, the DPR decided that a political party should have gained a minimum of 15 per cent of the votes in the last legislative election to have the right to propose a pair of candidates. This requirement could be easily fulfilled by some big parties, especially Golkar, PDI-P and PKB[16] in their areas of main territorial support. However, for many other smaller parties it was quite difficult to be eligible to propose a candidate. In addition, the competition is very tough and the "cost" of contestation is significantly expensive. Making coalitions with other parties has turned out to be a better or necessary option for most political parties.

From the total of 183 *pilkada* up to August 2005, there were 65 cases where the winning candidates were those proposed by a single political party without a coalition. Seven of these *pilkada* were at the provincial level, and in

two cases a candidate proposed by a single party won as governor: Central Kalimantan province and North Sulawesi province.[17] The others were for district heads and mayors, and only 63 of the winners were single party candidates, out of the 176 elections in that period.[18] This means that approximately 30 per cent of *pilkada* were won by a single party-proposed candidate. The remainder (approximately 70 per cent of cases) were won by a coalition consisting of two or more political parties.

Interestingly, if we observe the cases of coalition-building among political parties for the *pilkada* in many regions in Indonesia, it is difficult to find a pattern for the basis of these coalitions. The conventional wisdom for mapping out political parties in Indonesia is based on "*aliran*", a term initiated by Clifford Geertz (1960) to show ideological differentiation between political parties. These *aliran* in Java were based on religious ideologies, the *santri* (devout Muslims), the *abangan* (syncretic Muslims), and *priyayi* (traditional Javanese followers). These distinctions were then used by Herbert Feith and Lance Castles (1970) to map out the ideological position of political parties in Indonesia during the Sukarno Era (1945–65) as shown in Figure 3.1.

Following the fall of the Sukarno government in 1965 and the emergence of a military government under General Soeharto, the multi-party system was replaced by a government-promoted political party. In the first election under Soeharto in 1971, ten political parties contested the election, including a newly established government party, Golkar. However, two years later, the political parties opposing the government party of Golkar were forced to fuse into two political parties, the nationalist party of PDI, and the Islamic party of PPP. Consequently, there were only three political parties in the elections of 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997.

However, following the popular movement which brought down Soeharto from power in 1998, the government controlled party system fell and was replaced by a multi-party system again. As guaranteed by the Law on Political Parties of 1999, the number of political parties is not limited, and a group of citizens can easily establish a political party. Consequently, more than 300 political parties were registered with the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. However, after pre-qualification by the National Commission on Elections, only 48 political parties qualified to contest in the 1999 election. With the freedom of expression in a multi-party system, ideological contrasts among political parties similar to the 1950–60s reappeared. Kevin Evans (2003, p. 34) drew a simple figure to map out the ideological lines among political parties in Indonesia. However, this figure does not cover some of the new influential political parties, such as PKS, PD, and PBR.[19] Therefore, some modifications have been made, as in Figure 3.2.

FIGURE 3.1
The Politics of 'Aliran' in Indonesia, 1945–65



Source: Adapted from Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, eds. *Indonesian Political Thinking 1945–1964*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University, 1970, p. 4.

Many believe that the ideological lines show the pattern of inclusion and exclusion, and the possibility of cooperation or coalition for those located in the same axes, and the impossibility of coalitions for those located on different axes. However this assumption is totally false if we look at the pattern of coalitions among political parties in *pilkada* throughout Indonesia during 2005 and 2006. Every single party had the possibility of developing coalitions with any other party in the proposing of a *pilkada* candidate, as shown in Table 3.2.

To give some examples, PBB, the most Islamist political party in Indonesia, was willing to develop coalitions with non-Islamic parties. As shown in Table 3.2, the PBB developed winning coalitions with some secular and Western-influenced political parties, such as Golkar (three cases) and PDI-P (four

FIGURE 3.2
Ideological Lines/Political Culture of Indonesian Political Parties



Source: Adapted from Kevin Evans 2003, with additional position of Partai Demokrat by the author.

TABLE 3.2
Winning Coalitions among Major Political Parties in *Pilkada* during June–August 2005 (Number of Cases)

Political Party	*Golkar*	*PDI-P*	*PPP*	*PD*	*PAN*	*PKB*	*PKS*	*PBR*	*PDS*	*PBB*
Golkar		4	4	3	7	1	3	3	1	3
PDI-P	4		4	3	7	5	3	3	4	4
PPP	4	4		2	6	5	2	1	1	2
PD	3	3	2		4	2	3	1	2	–
PAN	9	8	6	5		5	8	3	2	3
PKB	1	5	5	2	6		4	–	–	–
PKS	3	3	2	3	7	3		1	–	3
PBR	3	3	1	1	3	–	1		2	2
PDS	1	4	1	2	2	–	–	2		1
PBB	3	4	2	–	2	–	3	3	1	

cases), and even with PDS, a Christian party (the case of Bandar Lampung city). The same was the case with the PDS, also a party with an exclusive ideology, which was willing to create coalitions with Islamic parties (PPP one case, PAN two cases, PBR two cases, and PBB one case), and some secular parties (Golkar, PDI-P and PD [Partai Demokrat — Democratic Party]).

PKS, another Islamist party, which is driven by young educated and moralistic Islamic activists, was also willing to cooperate with any party. A more general sketch of these ideological coalitions can be seen in Table 3.3.

TABLE 3.3
Some Examples of Coalitions between Different Ideological Lines

Pattern of Coalition	*Cases (Name of District/ City)*		
Ideological Line	*Parties*	*Won*	*Lost*
Between nationalist-secular and Islamist parties	1. PDI-P-PKS	Kota Dumai, Muko-Muko, Purbalingga	Sumenep, Bengkalis
	2. Golkar–PBB	Ogan Ilir, Tojo Una-Una, Kota Palu	Jember
Between religious parties from different religions	1. PBR–PDS	Kota Bandar Lampung, Kota Medan	Asahan
	2. PBB–PDS	Kota Bandar Lampung	Asahan, Flores Timur
Between Islamist parties and Islamic moderate parties	1. PKS–PKB	Ogak Momering Ulu, Sukabumi, Purbalingga, Tapanuli Selatan	Belitung Timur, Kota Denpasar, Barru, Luwu Timur
	2. PBB–PAN	Ogan Ilir, Kota Metro	Lampung Timur, Blora

Notes:
1. This table does not cover all parties in each coalition which may include more than two parties.
2. This table only considers 183 of the *pilkada* which were from June–August 2005.
3. A more comprehensive table showing the name of regions in every single case of coalition is attached in Table 3.4.

Source: Compiled from various sources.

Ultimately, no ideological lines were drawn and no exclusions were made. All parties became potential partners for each other. Hence a hypothesis about the end of political *aliran* in Indonesia can be proposed. If this is the case, this phenomenon may show a positive trend of rationalization and modernization of political parties in Indonesia. However, if we look at other cases apart from the question of candidacy in local regional elections, the politics of *aliran* has still been important in Indonesian political discourse. Additionally, the members of parties in each coalition have still used their ideological lines and networks to mobilize votes. Debate outside the *pilkada* in daily politics is also still coloured by the politics of *aliran*.

TABLE 3.4
Pattern of Winner Coalitions among Major Political Parties in Local Elections, 2005–06

Political Party	*GOLKAR*	*PDI-P*	*PPP*	*PD*	*PAN*	*PKB*	*PKS*	*PBR*	*PDS*	*PBB*
GOLKAR		Bangka Tengah, Ngawi, Kota Medan, Mandailing Natal	Kota Cilegon, Kota Medan, Kota Binjai, **Kepri**	Gowa, Kota Medan	Kota Cilegon, Ogan Ilir, Pangkep, Luwu Tmr, Kota Medan, Mandailing Natal, Labuhan Batu	Lampung Sltn	Ogan Ilir, Pangkep, **Kepri**	Kota Solok, Kota Medan, Labuhan Batu	Kota Medan	Ogan Ilir, Tojo Una-Una, Kota Palu
PDI-P	Bangka Tengah, Ngawi, Kota Medan, Mandailing Natal		Kapahiang, Purbalingga, Kota Medan, Balangan	Purbalingga, Kota Medan, Sibolga	Darmasraya, Pdg Pariaman, Purbalingga, Kota Medan, Mandailing Natal, Sibolga, Balangan	Jember, Kediri, Purbalingga, Pak-Pak Barat, Balangan	Kota Dumai, Muko-Muko, Purbalingga	Pasaman Brt, Kota Bdr Lmpg, Kota Medan	Minahasa Sltn, Kota Bdr Lmpg, Kota Medan, Sibolga	**Sumbar**, Kota Dumai, Pasaman Brt, Kota Bdr Lmpg
PPP	Kota Cilegon, Kota Medan, Kota Binjai, **Kepri**	Kapahiang, Purbalingga, Kota Medan, Balangan		Purbalingga, Kota Medan	Kota Cilegon, Kotawaringin Tmr, Kota Semarang, Purbalingga, Kota Medan, Balangan	Kotawaringin Tmr Kota Semarang, Purbalingga, **Kalsel**, Balangan	Purbalingga, **Kepri**	Kota Medan	Kota Medan	OKU Timur, Kota Bkttinggi
PD	Gowa, Kota Medan	Purbalingga, Kota Medan, Sibolga	Purbalingga, Kota Medan		Purbalingga, Kota Medan, Ngada, Sibolga	OKU, Purbalingga	Serang, OKU, Purbalingga	Kota Medan	Kota Medan, Sibolga	
PAN	Bangka Tengah, Kota Cilegon, Ogan Ilir, **Jambi**, Pangkep, Luwu Tmr, Kota Medan, Mandailing Natal, Labuhan Batu	Bangka Tengah, Darmasraya, Pdg Pariaman, Purbalingga, Kota Medan, Mandailing Natal, Sibolga, Balangan	Kota Cilegon, Kotawaringin Tmr Kota Semarang, Purbalingga, Kota Medan, Balangan	OKU, Purbalingga, Kota Medan, Ngada, Sibolga		Kotawaringin Tmr OKU, Kota Semarang, Purbalingga, Balangan	Bangka Barat, OKU, Ogan Ilir, Sukabumi, Purbalingga, Sumbawa, Pangkep, Kota Banjarmasin	Rejang Lebong, Kota Medan, Labuhan Batu	Kota Medan, Sibolga	Ogan Ilir, Kota Metro,

PKB	Lampung Sltn	Jember, Kediri, Purbalingga, Pak-Pak Barat, Balangan	Kotawaringin Tmr Kota Semarang, Purbalingga, **Kalsel**, Balangan	OKU, Purbalingga	Kotawaringin Tmr, OKU, Kota Semarang, Sukabumi, Purbalingga, Balangan		OKU, Sukabumi, Purbalingga, Tapanuli Sltn			
PKS	Ogan Ilir, Pangkep, **Kepri**	Kota Dumai, Muko-Muko, Purbalingga	Purbalingga, **Prov.Kepri**	Serang, OKU, Purbalingga	Bangka Barat, Ogan Ilir, Sukabumi, Purbalingga, Sumbawa, Pangkep, Kota Banjarmasin	OKU, Purbalingga, Tapanuli Sltn		**Bengkulu**		Ogan Ilir, Kota Dumai, 50 Koto
PBR	Kota Solok, Kota Medan, Labuhan Batu	Pasaman Brt, Kota Bdr Lmpg, Kota Medan	Kota Medan	Kota Medan	Rejang Lebong, Kota Medan, Labuhan Batu		**Bengkulu**		Kota Bdr Lmpg, Kota Medan	Pasaman Brt, Kota Bdr Lmpg
PDS	Kota Medan	Minahasa Sltn, Kota Bdr Lmpg, Kota Medan, Sibolga	Kota Medan	Kota Medan, Sibolga	Kota Medan, Sibolga			Kota Bdr Lmpg, Kota Medan		Kota Bdr Lmpg
PBB	Ogan Ilir, Tojo Una-Una, Kota Palu	**Sumbar**, Kota Dumai, Pasaman Brt, Kota Bdr Lmpg	OKU Timur, Kota Bkttinggi		Ogan Ilir, Kota Metro		Ogan Ilir, Kota Dumai, 50 Koto	Pasaman Brt, Kota Bdr Lmpg, Kota Medan	Kota Bdr Lmpg	

What I suggest is that pragmatism is behind the development of these coalitions. Each political party was eager to propose a candidate or a pair of candidates for *pilkada* to gain formal political power. Constrained by administrative requirements and access to grass-roots voters, small political parties tended to develop coalitions with other parties. However, these coalitions are not permanent. As mentioned by a senior politician in Golkar, these are actually not coalitions, but instead partnerships that are not permanent, nor are they issue based.

POLITICAL CONFLICTS OVER CANDIDACY

Another problem with the monopoly of parties in the candidacy process is the tendency of Indonesian political parties to be centralized in organization and exclusive in decision making. The character of such oligarchic structures in political party organization has been widely explored by academics (e.g. Dakhidae 1999; Evans 2003; King 2003) and in the Indonesian press. In the case of *pilkada*, it can be seen from various conflicts between the levels of party organization, and between the party organizations and the grass-roots party supporters, as shown in Table 3.5.

These cases illustrate several problems. Firstly, they show that party organization in Indonesia is mostly centralized. Although the elections of local leaders are of local interest and concern, and are meant to be a furthering of the process of local democracy, national elites in political parties have tended to intervene in the choice of candidates for *pilkada*. Therefore, open conflicts between levels of party organization became unavoidable. Secondly, the data indicate the marginalization of grass-roots cadres in the process of party decision making. Since party leadership is oligarchic, space for popular participation in party decision making is very limited. Again, conflict between party organizations and the grass-roots cadres often occurred. It is quite understandable, therefore, if grass-roots voters were dissatisfied with the candidacy process and with the candidates who were totally controlled by the party organization at higher levels.

GRASS-ROOTS RESPONSES

The question then is how grass-roots voters responded to such elitist candidacy processes which were controlled by party elites. No details are available on this issue. But for a rough indication we can use the proxy indicators of voter turnout to look at people's enthusiasm for participation in the local elections. Although the difference is not too significant, the average voter turnout in the

TABLE 3.5
Some Examples of Organizational Conflicts within Political Parties over Candidacy in Local Elections 2005–06[a]

No.	*Region*	*Actors*	*Party*	*Form of Conflict*
1.	Depok City of West Java	DPC-DPAC	Demokrat	DPC failed to reach consensus among DPACs on a candidate.
2.	Surabaya City of East Java	DPC-DPAC	Demokrat	DPC fired DPAC leader who criticized the internal candidacy system.
3.	Semarang City of Central Java	DPD-DPC	Demokrat	Candidate proposed by DPC rejected by DPD.
4.	Bandar Lampung City of Lampung	DPP-DPC	Demokrat	Candidate proposed by DPC rejected by DPD.
5.	Bangka Barat Regent of Bangka Belitung	DPD-DPC	PAN	Some cadres were threatened with dismissal from DPC structure.
6.	Province of West Sumatera	DPP-DPD	PAN	Some cadres were dismissed from DPD structure.
7.	Province of Central Kalimantan	Intervensi DPP	PDI-P	National Office (DPP) intervened in the candidacy.
8.	Boyolali District of Central Java	DPP-DPC	PDI-P	Candidate recommended by DPP rejected by DPC.
9.	Solo City of Central Java	DPP-DPC	PDI-P	Some DPC elite were punished by DPP.
10.	Ketapang District of West Kalimantan	DPP-DPC	PDI-P	Candidate recommended by DPP rejected by DPC.
11.	Sintang District of West Kalimantan	DPP-DPC	PDI-P	Some cadres were dismissed from DPC structure.
12.	Sleman District of DIY	DPD-DPC	PKPB	Candidate recommended by DPD not supported by grassroots cadres.
13.	OKU Timur Regency of South Sumatera	Party - Cadres	PDI-P	Party-recommended candidates were rejected by constituents.
14.	Province of Jambi	Party - Cadres	PDI-P	PDI-P elites were not supported by this party in candidacy. Instead, they were supported by other parties.
15.	Banyuwangi Regency of East Java	Party - Cadres	PDIP	Candidate gained mass support but not recommended by party organization.

Source: Compiled from various local and national media during April–May 2005.

pilkada is lower than the voter turnout during the national election. Data from the KPU shows that voter turnout in the nationally arranged election was 87 per cent. This figure is higher than the voter turnout in *pilkada*, which on average so far is around 70 per cent.[20] To give some examples, the voter turnout in *pilkada* in Denpasar City was 59.1 per cent, in Banyuwangi District 65 per cent, and in Situbondo 72 per cent.

In addition, people may have refused to support candidates proposed by political parties which they supported during legislative elections. As shown in Table 3.6, some minor parties were able to gain significant support from the voters and succeeded in defeating some major parties, such as Golkar and PDI-P. This may be attributed to the personal influence of the candidates. However, these figures can also be understood as a form of resistance towards candidates who were supported more by the elites than the masses. This political energy coming from the grass roots may contribute to the reforming of future political structures at the local level.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The hope in introducing direct elections of regional heads was to further consolidate democracy in Indonesia. Although it seemed like a good idea, party centralization has inhibited the moves towards autonomy instituted with the decentralization laws of 1999, and has considerably constrained local actors. Centralized party systems are good for presidential elections, but when local politics is at stake, it is questionable whether elites at the centre have a proper understanding of local political dynamics. Additionally, the continuing centralized party system has allowed party elites at the provincial and national levels to take advantage of their positions, demanding money, and maintaining control over local political activities. Although the change to the electoral system was supposed to eradicate the money politics which had proliferated in the previous system when the legislature chose the regional heads, it has not done so, and has further led to cynicism and distrust among voters. Additionally, the weakness of party ideology, the lack of loyalty to parties, and the clear opportunism shown in the fielding of candidates and in the coalition of parties have further put into question the relevance of parties to the voters. It is hoped that, in the future, election regulations can sort out some of these matters, so that Indonesian voters do not became too jaded and lose their faith in the consolidation of democracy.

TABLE 3.6
The Victories of Minor Parties vs Major Parties[b] in Local Elections, 2005–06

No.	*Region*	*Contestant*	*% Vote in Pilkada*
1.	Banyuwangi	GOLKAR	19%
		PKB	15%
		PDIP	12%
		PD + PPP	14%
		Coalition of 18 small parties	**39%**
2.	Belitung Timur	GOLKAR	24%
		PDIP + PBR	11%
		PNBK + PIB	**37%**
		PBB	22%
		PPP+PAN+PKS+PKB+PD+PPDK+PPDI	7%
3.	North Minahasa	GOLKAR	13%
		Coalition of 13 Parties	26%
		PD+PKPI+PPD	**41%**
		PDIP	16%
4.	Agam	PPP	8%
		PBB+PM	**40%**
		PKS	16%
		GOLKAR	21%
		PAN	14%
5.	North Luwu	**PPDK**	**47%**
		GOLKAR	20%
		PPP+PBB+PKB	32%
6.	Lingga	**PIB**	**43%**
		GOLKAR	23%
7.	Poso	PELOPOR+PDIP+PD	10%
		PDS	**42%**
		PKPI+PAN+PBR	13%
		PP-PANCASILA	22%
		GOLKAR	13%
8.	Toli-Toli	**PP-PANCASILA+PKPI**	**45%**
		PDIP+PAN+PPP	10%
		PKB+PDK	5%
		PKPB+GOLKAR	34%
		Coalition	6%

Note: [b] Major parties here should be defined as parties which gained a significant number of votes in the past legislative election. However, this table does not give the figures.

Notes

1 I owe a debt of gratitude to Arie Ruhyanto, S2 PLOD Gadjah Mada University, for his assistance in gathering data.

2 *Pilkada* is a term commonly used to represent the direct election of the regional heads, including the election of governors, *bupati*, and mayors. The additional abbreviation *pilkadasung*, used by the government, stands for *pemilihan kepala daerah langsung*, meaning the "direct election of the head of the region".

3 *Kompas* and *Jawa Pos* daily newspaper during December 2005.

4 However, during the New Order the candidates were basically "rubber-stamped" by the national assembly, according to the will of the Ministry of Home Affairs.

5 With the exception of the *pilkada* in 2005, where the national government provided subsidies to support regional governments in financing the *pilkada*.

6 *Panwaslu* is a formal "election-watch" institution established by the government. Its membership includes government officials and civil society activists.

7 *Pontianak Pos* daily newspaper, 17 May 2005.

8 *Pontianak Pos* daily newspaper, 14 May 2005.

9 *Duta Masyarakat* daily newspaper, 20 April 2005.

10 *Bali Pos* daily newspaper, 1 June 2005.

11 *Kompas* daily newspaper, 25 April 2005.

12 It was drafted by the Ministry of Home Affairs and then revised by the State Secretary on April 2004.

13 Unpublished government document, the law draft for Revision of Law No. 22/1999, version of 23 April 2004, article number 38.

14 This will change in the next round of direct elections for heads starting in 2008, when the Constitutional Court has ruled that independent candidates can run.

15 LP3ES. Survey Popularitas Partai Menjelang Pemilu 2004. LP3ES, Juni 2003.

16 Golkar was the ruling party in power for more than three decades during the Soeharto period. PDI-P was an opposition party created by Megawati near the end of the New Order, and is a secular, nationalist party, while PKB was established by Abdurrahman Wahid after the fall of Soeharto, and is a moderate Islamic party.

17 In these two cases, both of the candidates were those proposed by PDI-P.

18 In these 63 *pilkada*, candidates in some regions gained a very significant percentage of the votes, such as in Kota Banjar Baru of South Kalimantan (77 per cent), Kebumen district of Central Java (77 per cent), Bangli district of Bali (70 per cent), Kota Denpasar (69 per cent) and Tabanan District (66 per cent) of Bali, Kota Banjar of West Java (65 per cent) and Kutai Kertanegara of East Kalimantan (61 per cent).

19 PKS is Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party), an Islamic party, PD is Partai Demokrat, Yudhoyono's party, a nationalist party, and PBR is Partai Bintang Reformasi — Reform Star Party — a splinter group from the Islamic party PPP.

20 This is a rough figure only.

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4

BATAM'S 2006 MAYORAL ELECTION Weakened Political Parties and Intensified Power Struggle in Local Indonesia

Nankyung Choi

INTRODUCTION

Since the 1998 collapse of Soeharto's New Order regime, Indonesia has seen rapid and fundamental changes in its political institutions. Simultaneous processes of democratic reform and administrative decentralization have transformed the country's once centralized, authoritarian political system into a more decentralized and democratic one. At the core of democratic reforms has been the introduction of competitive elections and, during the last ten years, Indonesia has successfully staged two general elections (in 1999 and 2004) as well as its first-ever direct presidential election (in 2004). Administrative decentralization has also been a key dimension of political change. In January 2001, two laws on regional autonomy devolved a wide range of power and authority to the regions.

In Indonesia and internationally, many advocates of political reform suggest political decentralization is an effective way to consolidate democracy. In September 1999, Indonesia's local assemblies recovered their right to elect and dismiss local government heads. While the elections of local government heads by Local Assembly members decentralized Indonesia's politics, the character and results of those elections were complex and controversial. The

indirect local elections fuelled a rash of "money politics" at the local level, in which party representatives in local assemblies effectively sold their votes to candidates regardless of their parties' official lines.

In 2002, responding to criticisms from domestic and international organizations and in an effort to achieve consistency with the amended constitution, the National Assembly adopted a direct election system for local government heads. In June 2005, the Indonesian government commenced another important step towards more decentralized politics by holding direct elections for local government heads — i.e., provincial governors, district regents (*bupati*), and municipal mayors (*walikota*). From June 2005 to September 2007, sixteen gubernatorial and over 280 regent and mayoral elections were held. Over the next couple of years, the remaining provinces, districts, and municipalities will hold similar elections. This essay examines how Indonesia's experiment with direct local elections has affected local political dynamics and governance in a single locality. It does so through an analysis of a mayoral election on the island of Batam in the Riau Archipelago.[1]

Given the substantially expanded political and fiscal powers of Indonesia's local governments, it is clear that the move to direct local elections will have significant impacts on the country's political life. However, while there is significant interest in these elections, our understanding of their impacts is still quite limited. Indonesia's tremendous diversity challenges any general conclusions, and a single case study of direct local elections will not permit generalization. That said, given its strategic significance as a site of international commerce as well as its social past as an integral part of the New Order regime, Batam provides an illustrative case of how political decentralization has affected Indonesia's local politics. An analysis of the Batam case can also contribute to the larger task of grasping the dynamics of Indonesia's local political change. To this end, the case of Batam's mayoral election is examined in light of existing empirical studies and theoretical literature on political change in Indonesia.

The analysis is organized in three sections. In the first section, I provide relevant context on Batam's social, political, and economic attributes. In the second section, I analyse Batam's mayoral election, from the nomination of candidates, through the campaigns and voting, to the validation of election results. In the final section, I discuss the practical and theoretical implications of direct local elections on the political dynamics in Batam and beyond.

In light of both my own findings and existing literature of other cases, Batam's experience suggests the need to be cautious about the commonly accepted hypothesis that direct local elections would ultimately promote the

further democratization of local politics. My analysis of Batam's mayoral election and observation of elections in other regions challenge the dominant assumption that direct local elections herald the arrival of local democracy, by improving equity, responsiveness, and accountability of local governance. I rather call attention to two notable features of Indonesia's direct elections of local government heads: a weakened position of political parties in local politics and an intensified power struggle among local interests for local political institutions and governance. The Batam case shows that political parties' influence has weakened despite their monopoly over the nomination of candidates for local government heads, while entrenched and well-resourced political and economic elites have opportunities to dominate electoral competition for local power.

BATAM'S HISTORY AND POLITICS

To appreciate the impacts of direct local elections in Batam, the site of this chapter's empirical case study, an understanding of relevant backgrounds on the island's history and politics is required. One of the most striking attributes of Batam's political economy has been its rapid development from a quiet backwater to a major regional economic centre. Batam's rapid development was possible with support from a political system that was closely tied to Jakarta. Yet Batam's political economy has developed its own internal dynamics, as its economic and demographic features have changed. This became apparent in the late 1990s when conflicts began to emerge between national and local interests.

Only 20 kilometres from Singapore, Batam has rapidly developed as an established destination for large-scale foreign investment. During the last three decades, Indonesia's government transformed the island from a lightly populated settlement to a bustling regional centre of industry, shipping, communications, and tourism. Today, the island attracts foreign investors with its strategic location and cheap land, as well as the cheap labour of workers who come from every part of Indonesia.

The most notable feature of Batam's development has been its remarkable pace of economic transformation. As recently as the 1960s, Batam was nearly all pristine rainforest, with only 2,000 residents inhabiting a few tiny villages. In 1971, the Indonesian government launched an ambitious project to transform the island into a major industrial zone, and to this end established the Batam Industrial Development Authority (BIDA). The island was placed under the custodianship of BIDA, which gained control of land through presidential decree and has remained outside the power of local political institutions. Initially, the Indonesian government limited the development of

Batam to logistic and operational businesses related to oil and gas exploration of Pertamina, the state-owned oil company. Batam's development focus started expanding in the mid-1970s and the island's development potential was fully realized when it joined a Singapore-led growth triangle linking Batam, Singapore, and Malaysia's Johor state in 1986. By December 2004, 750 foreign companies had established operations in Batam, with direct investment totalling US$719 million.[2] Singapore is the largest shareholder, with 279 companies in operation and direct investment of US$453 million in total (BIDA 2005, pp. 21–22).[3]

Batam's development was important not only economically but also politically, especially as an integral part of Soeharto's patronage system that upheld the New Order regime. Until 1998, President Soeharto held a tight grip on Batam's development, principally by assigning his cronies to oversee the island's transformation. First, Ibnu Sutowo, the President-Director of Pertamina, chaired BIDA from 1971 to 1976, until he was fired from his position in the wake of Pertamina's bankruptcy.[4] In 1978, Soeharto installed B.J. Habibie, his most trusted associate and long-standing favourite, to head BIDA.[5] For the next twenty years, B.J. Habibie used the land and capital at BIDA's disposal to serve the interests of Soeharto and his patronage system. For instance, the Salim Group, owned by another Soeharto long-time crony Liem Sioe Liong, dominated investment deals with the Singaporean investors (Colombijn 2003). At the same time, Habibie secured lucrative business opportunities for members of his own family.[6] BIDA continued to control all development projects on Batam until the implementation of the regional autonomy scheme in 2001.[7]

With foreign and domestic investment inflows and large government development projects, Batam's population has grown from 2,000 in the 1960s to 700,000 today. The continuous flow of migrants has transformed Batam into a multi-ethnic, multi-religious society. Batam's five largest ethnic groups are the Malays, Chinese, Javanese, Batak, and Minang, while the three largest religious groups are Muslims, Buddhists, and Christians. While Malay, Javanese, and Minang Muslims form around two-thirds of the population, Chinese Buddhists and Batak Christians make up around 20 per cent. Batam was also historically a part of the Malay world. Since the implementation of regional autonomy, Malay people have brought back their Malay origin and culture, which were usually associated with aristocracy and power, and they often claim to be *putra daerah* (son of the district). This resurgence of ethnic and cultural identity in Batam is contradictory. On the one hand, some see the separation of the Riau Archipelago from Riau province as largely motivated by Malay people's desire to create their own Malay province (Faucher 2005).[8] Yet it is also commonly recognized that the desire to enhance the region's

economic cooperation with Singapore and Malaysia was another important motivation for the split (ibid.). Both the Malays and the migrants seem to understand the significance of this economic goal, which was well reflected in the 2005 gubernatorial election. They elected Ismeth Abdullah, a Javanese who headed BIDA from 1998 to 2004 until he was appointed as an acting governor of the newly separated Riau Archipelago, as governor.

The implementation of regional autonomy has also resulted in overlapping authorities and, unsurprisingly, confusion and frustration among investors. Technically, Batam is still under the custodianship of BIDA. Despite regional autonomy, BIDA remains outside the power of local institutions and retains its monopoly over the island's properties and development policies. Yet BIDA is no longer the only relevant authority on the island. In 1999, the government established Batam as an autonomous region and positioned BIDA as a partner in the island's development.[9] Since 2001, Batam's new and democratically elected municipal government has assumed a wide range of authorities. Like many other local governments, the Batam municipal government has not been shy in introducing new levies. Issuing and charging fees for new industrial licences has proven to be a particularly effective instrument.

Investors have groaned about double taxation and, perhaps more importantly, they have grown wary of inconsistencies, contradictions, and overlaps in the respective policies pursued by BIDA and the municipal government.[10] Evidence now suggests that competing authorities and the accompanying uncertainty among investors are damaging the island's economy. Indeed, between 2000 and 2004, non-oil exports declined by US$1.11 billion, or roughly 20 per cent, and new foreign investments fell by 34 per cent in 2005. However, it is reported that tax revenues from the island did increase modestly, from Rp1.03 trillion (US$111.8 million) in 2004 to Rp1.08 trillion (US$117.2 million) in 2005 (*Kompas*, 21 February 2006).[11]

In October 2005, in an effort to allay investors' concerns, the Indonesian government upgraded Batam to a "bonded zone plus" in which businesses are allowed to import goods duty-free into specified bonded zones.[12] Such a plan indeed gives Singaporean and other foreign investors increased incentives for further investment. Yet, despite its special status, Batam's local regulatory environment seems to increasingly hinge on local, rather than national, political processes.[13] Moreover, with Soeharto and his patronage system gone, Batam's politicians and businesspeople seemed ready to grab the opportunities that direct local elections would present to them. With all these developments, foreign investors need to become increasingly involved in the local society and their need to cultivate local

relationships becomes more important. From this point of view, the mayoral election of Batam should be of great interest to political and economic decision-makers in neighbouring countries and beyond.

BATAM'S 2006 MAYORAL ELECTION

The 2006 Batam mayoral election marked the first open competition between diverse local interests over the island's governance. Previous elections for the Municipal Assembly provided the local society with a new access to decision-making concerning the island's affairs, but also allowed political parties to keep their iron grip on local politics. Direct elections of local government heads are designed to give the local society opportunities to participate in and influence decision-making with regard to their own affairs.

Batam's first direct mayoral election is particularly interesting because it occurred in the context where the power struggles between a national-level agency (BIDA) and a decentralized local authority (the municipal government) had become unmanageable. Under the circumstance where the lines of authority between the two competing authorities remained fuzzy, the election provided local elites with an arena where they could openly compete to control the island's governance. One of the most striking features of Batam's direct mayoral election was the almost complete absence of political parties in the electoral process despite their monopoly over the nomination of candidates for the mayorship. Instead, entrenched and well-resourced local officials dominated the electoral competition, making the election akin to a contest of personality and prestige.

Batam's first direct mayoral election took place in four major phases: the nomination of candidates, campaigns, voting, and the validation of election results. Primary data for this analysis were collected during several field visits between June 2005 and March 2006. The stage of nomination of candidates produced some controversies over internal conflicts within certain parties (PDI-P, PAN, and PKB). The four pairs of candidates eventually nominated by four party coalitions were teamed up by well-established local officials, which has developed as one of the typical patterns of candidate pairings across regions. Political parties, despite their monopoly over the nomination of candidates, were largely absent in the campaigns, contributing to the lack of debate on policy or platforms. Overall, the process of the 2006 Batam mayoral election reveals the organizational malfunctioning of political parties in local power struggles, the heightened competition and realignment among local elites, and persistent technical problems related to the general institutional framework and governing organizations of the election.

Nomination of Candidates and Party Coalitions

Law No. 32/2004 stipulates that only political parties or party coalitions holding at least 15 per cent of seats in local assemblies are eligible to nominate candidates for governors or mayors/regents (Article 59). To win an election, a pair of candidates has to win more than 25 per cent of the vote. After a judicial review of the eligibility of small parties to nominate candidates for local government heads, the Constitutional Court ruled that parties that do not have any representatives in local assemblies still can nominate candidates for governors, mayors, and regents by forming a coalition with other parties in such a way that they garner 15 per cent of votes in the previous legislative elections. Table 4.1 shows the composition of parties in the Batam Municipal Assembly, a result of the 2004 legislative election.

In the 2006 Batam mayoral election, four party coalitions nominated four pairs of candidates. Similar to the previous gubernatorial election of the Riau Archipelago, well-established local officials ran for local government heads. The coalition-building process was quite complicated, with internal — mostly vertical — conflicts evident within the major parties. In particular, the centralized decision-making pretensions of major parties conflicted with political ambitions of local cadres. Deprived of the autonomy to make

TABLE 4.1
Composition of Parties in the Batam Municipal Assembly (2004–09)

Political Parties	*Number of seats in the Municipal Assembly*	*Percentage of the vote received in the 2004 elections*
PDI-Perjuangan	7	13.5
PKS	6	13.5
PAN	6	11.8
Golkar	5	11.1
PPP	4	6.1
PD	4	7.1
PKB	4	6.4
PDS	4	8.0
PBB	1	2.7
PPI-B	1	1.5
PNI Marhaenisme	1	2.7
PNBK	1	1.0
PBSD	1	2.5
Total	45	87.9

Source: Batam branch of the Election Commission (KPUD Batam).

decisions and access to financial contributions made by potential candidates, local cadres stayed away from the electoral process. As in many other localities, there was almost no attempt to nominate female candidates by parties and civil society agents alike, resulting in the absolute dominance of male candidates in the competition for local offices.[14] Table 4.2 presents political parties that built coalitions supporting the four pairs of candidates in the 2006 mayoral election.

In the following section, I briefly examine the profiles of the candidates and the parties that supported them in Batam's 2006 mayoral election.

TABLE 4.2
Candidates and Party Coalitions in the 2006 Batam Mayoral Election

No.	*Names of Candidates*	*Supporting Parties*
1	Ahmad Dachlan, S.H. Zulbahri	PAN and PD
2	Drs. Ahmad Dahlan Ria Saptarika	Golkar, PKS, PPP, and PPDK*
3	Drs. Abdullah Basyid Richard Pasaribu	PKB and PDS
4	Nazief Soesila Dharma Sahat Sianturi	PDI-P, PNI Marhaenisme, PBSD, PPIB, and Partai Pelopor*

* With no seats in the municipal assembly

1. *Ahmad Dachlan-Zulbahri*

The first pair of candidates was Ahmad Dachlan, lawyer and political activist, and Zulbahri, assistant in the Department of Economy and Development of the Batam municipal government. Ahmad Dachlan is originally from East Nusa Tenggara, while Zulbahri is from Padang, South Sumatra. The Democrat Party (Partai Demokrat, PD), which occupies four seats in the Batam Municipal Assembly, nominated the pair and the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN) announced its support for the pair on 25 November 2005 after the process of registration was closed. As I explain below, although PAN secured six seats in the assembly, the party's support for the pair was symbolic rather than substantial because the party was unable to participate meaningfully in the electoral process.

The story behind the PAN's support is quite interesting because the party's Batam chapter originally supported its own candidate, Arifin Nasir, with Ahars Sulaiman of the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP). However, the party's central board supported another candidate, Nazief Dharma. It is said that Asman Abnur, long-established Batam official[15] and currently the PAN representative in the National Assembly, strongly supported Nazief Dharma, which some sources attributed to the two men's business relationship. The PAN's internal regulations oblige its local chapters to follow the central board's instructions. While the PAN's Batam chapter was waiting for the central board's recommendation, the PPP joined the Golkar-PKS coalition that nominated another pair (*Batam Pos*, 1 November 2005) and Nazief Dharma registered as a mayoral candidate of the Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, PDI-P). PAN missed the registration of candidates, and it became clear that the PAN's central board rejected the Batam chapter's decision to nominate Arifin Nasir, claiming that the process and mechanism of nomination at the municipal board did not follow the central board's guidelines (*Batam Pos*, 9 November 2005). The Batam municipal board of the PAN eventually withdrew its support for Arifin Nasir (*Batam Pos*, 10 November 2005).

The rumour ran that Arifin Nasir had failed to gain support from the PAN because he could not pay out Rp2 billion as compensation money (*uang kompensasi*) (*Batam Pos*, 1 November 2005). Arifin Nasir denied it, but interestingly, he did not deny the fact that he had to pay the compensation money for his official candidacy. He instead argued, "It is not true. There is no problem in my financial situation. I have been just waiting for the moment the agreement is made." (*Batam Pos*, 10 November 2005). Stories like the PAN's experience in Batam are not unusual across parties and regions, with the highly centralized decision-making pretensions of most parties and the consequent tension between national leaders and local cadres.

2. *Ahmad Dahlan-Ria Saptarika*

As in the gubernatorial election of the Riau Archipelago, Golkar and the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) built a winning coalition in Batam.[16] Notably, Golkar is the fourth biggest party in Batam's Municipal Assembly, with five seats out of forty-five, while the PKS is the second largest party, with six seats.[17] For the mayoral race, the two parties nominated two high-profile local officials. The mayoral candidate was Drs. Ahmad Dahlan, who worked for BIDA for almost twenty years before

joining the Riau Archipelago provincial government as chief of the Department of Communications and Tourism (Dinas Perhubungan dan Parwisata). The deputy mayoral candidate was Ria Saptarika, chairman of the PKS *fraksi*[18] in the Provincial Assembly of the Riau Archipelago and also secretary of the provincial board of the PKS in the Riau Archipelago. The PPP and the United Democratic Nationhood Party (Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan, PPDK) joined the coalition and, as a result, the coalition represented a third of all seats in the Municipal Assembly. Born in Batam, Ahmad Dahlan was a "local boy", or *putra daerah*, while Ria Saptarika is originally from Riau. Before the election, there was speculation that they both would strongly appeal to Malay-related regional organizations and social gatherings. Benefiting from their long-established careers and reputations as devout Muslims, the pair of a BIDA-affiliated bureaucrat and an engineer-turned-politician was an odds-on favourite from the outset.

3. *Abdullah Basyid-Richard Pasaribu*

The third pair of candidates was Drs. Abdullah Basyid and Richard Pasaribu, nominated by the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB) in coalition with the Prosperous Peace Party (Partai Damai Sejahtera, PDS). With eight seats in the Municipal Assembly, those two parties formed a coalition of Islamic and non-Islamic groups. Born in neighbouring Terong Island, Abdullah Basyid appealed to the hinterland communities on the island as another "local boy", while Richard Pasaribu, a Batak descendant from North Sumatra, appealed to the Christian communities of the island.

Fragmentation within the PKB made Abdullah Basyid's nomination full of twists and turns.[19] A group following the Muhaimin faction of the PKB dominated the nomination process, supporting Abdullah Basyid, while another group following the *ulama* (Islamic preachers) faction objected to it but could not stop Abdullah Basyid from registering as the party's official candidate. Following the Supreme Court ruling that the Muhaimin faction's sacking of an *ulama* faction leader was unlawful, the supporters of the *ulama* faction asked the local branch of the Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah, KPUD) to suspend the electoral process. However, the request was delivered on 24 November 2005, the day when the local election commission was scheduled to determine the official candidates for the election. The local election commission refused to suspend the electoral process just because of the PKB's internal conflicts, quoting the Law No. 32/2004 and Governmental Regulation No. 6 of 2005 (*Batam Pos*, 25 November 2005).

4. *Nazief Soesila Dharma-Sahat Sianturi*

The final pair of candidates was Nazief Soesila Dharma and Sahat Sianturi, nominated by a coalition of five parties: the PDI-P, the Pioneers' Party (Partai Pelopor),[20] the Marhaenism Indonesian National Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia Marhaenisme),[21] the Socialist Democratic Labour Party (Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat, PBSD), and the New Indonesia Alliance Party (Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru, PPIB). The PDI-P is the majority party in the Municipal Assembly with seven seats. As in the PAN case, the national leadership of the PDI-P decided Sahat's nomination as a deputy mayoral candidate and agreed on Nazief's nomination as the party's mayoral candidate. Interviews with some PDI-P representatives at the Municipal Assembly reveal that the central board of the PDI-P rejected all the mayoral candidates — mostly not "insiders" — proposed by the Batam municipal board, but failed to find qualified and popular candidates among the party's local cadres.[22] The central board accepted the nomination of Sahat Sianturi, the chairman of the party's municipal board since 1999, as the party's deputy mayoral candidate. The central board then accepted Sahat's recommendation of his own running mate, Nazief Dharma, a long-established bureaucrat who began his career as sub-district head (*camat*) and served as the acting mayor of Batam (1999–2000) and recently as the head of Department of Industry and Trade in the provincial government of the Riau Archipelago.[23]

As the Batam case and elections in other regions show, coalition-building among parties at the district/municipal level is not as straightforward as at the national level (Choi 2007; Mietzner 2007; Vel 2005). The highly centralized management of major parties prevents local party politicians from making their own decisions regarding who can run for local office. While local chapters select potential candidates, usually through a series of meetings at the sub-district level, it is national leaders who play a decisive role in deciding who is allowed to compete in elections for local government heads and, thus, the possible partners for coalition-building in the regions.[24] This dominance of central boards seems to have also changed the character of "money politics" in local elections. It is now political parties, not individual party representatives in local assemblies, that receive financial contributions from potential candidates.[25]

Compared to the previous gubernatorial election, the competition for the post of the Batam mayor looked much more closely contested with its relatively small electoral territory and campaign finance, making it almost impossible to predict the result. Nonetheless, some predicted the Ahmad-Ria pair's victory by pointing out the smoothness of their nomination, the

solidity of the supporting parties, and their personal profiles. In contrast, all the other pairs of candidates had relatively less competitive profiles and the party coalitions supporting them were relatively fragile with internal conflicts in individual parties.

Campaigns

The most striking feature of the campaigns in the 2006 Batam mayoral election was the almost total absence of parties, party machines, and party platforms. Instead, campaigns were centred on personality and prestige, and an incoherent jumble of marginal issues. In the absence of parties, other social agents, such as regional organizations and the local media, played a more important role in the campaigns. Overall, the campaigns in Batam's mayoral election resembled a politically detached popularity contest, rather than a competition of ideas, programmes, and policies.

Replicating the patterns observed in the gubernatorial election of the Riau Archipelago and elections in other regions, candidates funded their own campaigns and received very limited support from their parties' political machines.[26] Campaigns were focused on personalities rather than platforms. Candidates laid out their "mission, vision, and programme" at the beginning of the campaigns, but their ideas were more or less uniform, with often-heard promises for economic development and good governance, and not many people paid attention to them. A survey conducted by the national news agency Antara found a majority of the Batam electorate gave their preferences to "commanding" (*berwibawa*, 54 per cent) or "accomplished" (*pandai*, 41 per cent) candidates (*Media Kepri*, 5 December 2005). In the absence of policy debate, anything resembling candidates' personalities and socio-economic backgrounds became important considerations in voting.[27]

Diverse social organizations, including youth organizations, religious gatherings, and regional organizations, seemed to take on significant roles in influencing people's choices of candidates. In particular, gatherings organized on ethnic or regional grounds seem to have become more important and active in local political developments. With a large share of the island's population being migrants (*pendatang*), although they are themselves not political, regional organizations — especially those with close relationships between the leadership and the grass-roots members — seemed to influence the campaigns. Among them, the White Hulubalang Paramilitary Group (Laskar Hulubalang Putih), a Malay organization that boasts around 10,000 members and its strong patron–client relationships, officially declared its support for the Dahlan-Ria pair (No. 2) at the outset. "Forum 70", a social

gathering of local leaders who came to Batam in the 1970s and initiated the island's development, also appeared to play an interesting role in local politics. Despite its informality, "Forum 70" appears to have broad influence in the Batam society with its hundreds of members from business, politics, and bureaucracy (including BIDA) circles. As the chairman of this informal but influential organization, Ahmad Dahlan looked to be able to attract support from wide circles of the local elite.

Another important element in the campaigns was the local media. Journalists whom I met in Batam commonly acknowledged that the local media has taken on bigger roles in local politics and the competition among them has also substantially increased in the last several years (see also Hill chapter 11, this volume). The primary role of the media in local elections is to deliver basic information related to the electoral process to the local constituents, helping out the local election commission in organizing the election. The media also introduces candidates to the local populations and helps them form opinions on the basis of the locally defined interests. In practice, however, the incumbents tend to get wider and more frequent coverage compared to low-profile candidates. With a limited effect of debate on policies or programmes and the significance of candidates' popularities in the campaigns, the local media is frequently used in "black campaigning" by spreading unchecked information, unscreened rumours, and negative images of candidates. In general, the lack of professional journalism, reporters' poor pay, and the financial significance of receiving advertisements from local political institutions seem to contribute to unbalanced coverage in many elections. Especially, as reporters of *Batam Pos* point out, the financial stability of a media company appears to be crucial in securing professional journalism and critical attitudes of reporters.[28]

Finally, in the absence of a heated debate on platforms, a jumble of marginal issues grabbed the spotlight in the Batam mayoral election. For example, the long-dragging dispute over the municipal minimum wage (*upah minimum kota*: UMK) overwhelmed the attention of many local populations, especially labourers. Several serious floods during the campaigning period forced the candidates to perform relief activities instead of street convoys or social/religious gatherings.

Voting

Two points need to be considered in relation to the voting phase of the 2006 Batam mayoral election. One is concerned with the limited resources and authority of the local election commissions (KPUD), the institutions governing elections of local government heads. The other is related to the patterns of

voter turnout in direct local elections. The Batam branch of the Election Commission (KPUD Batam), with manpower of five members and fifteen administrative staff dispatched by the municipal government, was responsible for staging the municipal-level election without any centrally coordinated assistance or monitoring. Organizing and staging an election for the first time, KPUD Batam faced many technical and systemic challenges, including issues related to updating voter registration and educating the constituents about the election.

Updating voter registration turned out to be one of the most challenging tasks to KPUD Batam, which had to rely on local governments and assemblies for their budgets and staff. To update voter registration, KPUD had to start by obtaining the data used in the previous election from the Civil Registry Office (Dinas Kependudukan dan Catatan Sipil) of the respective local government. They then verified the primary data and encouraged eligible but unregistered voters to register at the Sub-district Election Committee (Panitia Pemilu Kecamatan, PPK), which has representatives at the village level. A minimum of six months' residence is required to register as an eligible voter. Not only the KPUD Batam, but almost all the KPUD in other localities, have faced two basic problems in updating voter registration: First, the quality of the updated list of registered voters depends heavily on the primary data provided by the Civil Registry Office, which operates under the respective local government; second, the level of voluntary registration was quite low with very little help from political parties and local assembly members.

After some delay, KPUD Batam announced that there were 514,712 registered voters for the 2006 Batam mayoral election, which had increased from 482,112 for the gubernatorial election held on 30 June 2005. Although there were some complaints, there was no legal dispute over voter registration, for which the members of the KPUD Batam gave a sigh of relief.

More registered voters did not guarantee higher voter turnout. Batam citizens seemed quite unenthusiastic about their first direct mayoral election, which was reflected in the lowest voter turnout in the island's recent political history. On 21 January 2006, fewer than half of the registered voters (45.1 per cent) turned up across the island. Three sub-districts in the hinterlands (Belakang Padang, Bulang, and Galang) saw higher turnouts with an average of 64 per cent, while more densely inhabited urban sub-districts recorded lower turnouts with an average of 43.5 per cent. As the fifth election held within less than two years, the mayoral election saw the lowest turnouts on the island: from 78 per cent in the 2004 general elections to 62 per cent in the second round of the 2004 presidential election and to 52 per cent in the 2005 gubernatorial election. What is the explanation for the low voter turnout in the 2006 Batam mayoral election?

One factor to consider is the growing political disillusionment among the local population. Many voters complained that there had been too many elections, while those elections had brought about no meaningful change in their everyday lives. Even journalists, who are directly or indirectly engaged in the issues, showed strong disbelief in, and cynical attitudes towards, democratic processes. The gradual decline in voter turnout itself suggests that the local population have become increasingly detached from the political processes, and it hardly signals the emergence of a vibrant local democracy.

Validation of the Election Results and Inauguration

The election results revealed a somewhat surprising aspect of the election, not because of the winners but because of the unexpectedly tight competition between the other three pairs of candidates. Compared to the results of the 2004 legislative election, the mayoral election results showed some consistency between party affiliation and voting behaviour. However, given that political parties were almost entirely missing from the campaigns and that the local population knew the candidates, who were mostly well-established local officials, relatively well, candidates' personalities and socio-economic backgrounds seemed to play a key role in determining the election results. There was no legal dispute over the election results and the winners took office as scheduled.

On 23 January 2006, KPUD Batam announced the election results and declared Drs. Ahmad Dahlan and Ria Saptarika the winners. They won the election with 41.4 per cent of the vote, prevailing in all the eight sub-districts (see Table 4.3). What was surprising about the election results was that the competition between the other three pairs of candidates was much tighter than many had speculated. They received more or less equal portions of the vote. Many people were especially surprised by the Basyid-Richard pair's performance, coming second in the four sub-districts, including all the three hinterland sub-districts. In most polls before the voting, the Ahmad-Zulbahri pair and the Ahmad-Ria pair held the lead by narrow margins between them, leaving the other two pairs far behind them. In a survey conducted by Indonesian Survey Circle (Lingkaran Survei Indonesia), the Basyid-Richard pair ranked the fourth, with a projected 6 per cent of the vote (*Batam Pos*, 17 December 2005). However, as a "local boy" (*putra daerah*) from one of the hinterland areas, Abdullah Basyid succeeded in appealing to the hinterland communities, while as the only non-Muslim candidate, Richard Pasaribu seemed to attract support from the Christian communities as well as his own ethnic group, the Batak people.

TABLE 4.3
Results of the 2006 Batam Mayoral Election

No	*Candidates*	*Number of Obtained Votes*
1	Ahmad Dachlan, S.H.	
	Zulbahri	45,051 (19.9%)
2	Drs. Ahmad Dahlan	
	Ria Saptarika	93,616 (41.4%)
3	Drs. Abdullah Basyid	
	Richard Pasaribu	43,926 (19.4%)
4	Nazief Soesila Dharma	
	Sahat Sianturi	43,193 (19.1%)
	Invalid votes	6,629 (0.2%)
	Total	232,415 (100%)

If the election results are compared to the municipal-level results of the 2004 legislative election, it looks as if there is a linkage between party affiliations and voting behaviour (see Table 4.4). However, as described earlier, parties, party machines, and party platforms were almost completely absent from the campaigns. In the absence of policy debate, anything resembling candidates' personalities and socio-economic backgrounds looked crucial in voting. As shown in a survey in which a majority of the Batam electorate preferred "commanding" and "accomplished" candidates, candidates' *sosok* — which refers to the candidate's personality, from the person's physical appearance to charismatic character and previous accomplishments — seemed to play a significant role, at least compared to voters' party affiliations, in determining the election results.[29]

TABLE 4.4
2006 Mayoral Election Results Compared with the 2004 Parliamentary Election Results (Municipal Level)

2004 General Election Results (percentage)	*2006 Mayoral Election Results (percentage)*
PAN and PD (18.9)	Ahmad-Zulbahri Pair (19.9)
Golkar, PKS, PPP, and PPDK (32)	Ahmad-Ria Pair (41.4)
PKB and PDS (14.4)	Basyid-Richard Pair (19.4)
PDI-P, Partai Pelopor, PNI Marhaenisme, PBSD, and PPIB (21.8)	Nazief-Sahat Pair (19.1)

Source: KPUD Batam

Unlike the previous gubernatorial election, there were no big controversies over the election processes and results in Batam. Each campaign team reported its campaign funds, which KPUD Batam audited and made public. On 1 March 2006 Ahmad Dahlan and Ria Saptarika were inaugurated as the first directly elected Mayor and Deputy Mayor of Batam. The new Batam municipal government led by long-established and experienced Ahmad Dahlan and respected engineer-turned-politician Ria Saptarika pointed toward political stability and the continuance of development policies. In particular, both the domestic and the international business communities warily anticipated that Ahmad Dahlan's familiarity with BIDA would boost better coordination with BIDA.

WEAKENED LOCAL PARTY POLITICS AND ENHANCED LOCAL POWER STRUGGLES

Among numerous arguments justifying the direct election of local government heads is that it will increase the responsiveness of elected officials to local needs. One take on Batam's direct mayoral election is that it broke the local assembly's stranglehold on local politics. After all, the local people do indeed have the final say over who will be their government heads. However, the advent of direct local executive elections has not addressed a basic problem: dominant parties play gatekeepers, and only those able to pay the gatekeepers get to contest elections. My analysis of the Batam mayoral election also suggests that elections have weakened political parties at local levels. Yet the weakening of political parties in local politics has not enhanced the democratic quality of local politics. On the contrary, the paralysis of parties has twisted the meaning of direct elections of local government heads. Direct local executive elections have, rather, contributed to the repositioning of long-established and well-resourced local elites in local political institutions and governance. I begin by showing that direct local executive elections have not addressed the problem of "money politics" because candidate recruitment still depends on parties. I then argue that, with the nomination door slightly ajar, only political and economic elites slip through. I demonstrate how this worked in the Batam case.

Most political parties failed to nominate qualified and popular cadres and chose to support powerful and well-resourced local elites.[30] This pattern of parties' candidate recruitment turned out to be problematic because it tends not to reduce the significance of "money politics" in local elections, but instead alters their character. In direct elections of local government heads, it is now political parties, not individual party representatives in

local assemblies, who receive money from potential candidates. Therefore, we observe an ironic development in contemporary Indonesia's local politics as a result of the combination of the centralized management of political parties with the introduction of direct local executive elections. Political parties, especially national leaders rather than local cadres, recruit well-resourced local elites as candidates for local government heads. Correspondingly, as the PAN and the PDI-P of the Batam case show, this centralizing pretension of parties' central boards in Jakarta has exacerbated tensions between national party leadership and local cadres.[31] Deprived of autonomy to make their own decisions and, perhaps more importantly, access to money, local chapters of parties were largely absent from the process of direct local elections. Unsurprisingly, ideology and substantive policy debates played a negligible role in many elections.[32]

Instead of political parties, diverse political and economic local elites dominated the electoral competition for local power and governance.[33] Observing well-resourced local elites run for governors, regents, and mayors across the country, many observers speculated about the emergence of "big kings" in the regions.[34] In many cases, the emergence of "big kings" was usually accompanied by intensive competition between different political and economic interests, in which the existent political, economic, and social settings of the locality play an important role. In fact, the power struggle between diverse local elites in the Batam mayoral election turned out to be quite tense, mostly due to the tension that had brewed over the previous five years between a national-level development agency, the Batam Industrial Development Authority (BIDA), and a decentralized local authority, the Batam municipal government.

Recognizing the dangers of the overlap between a selected and an elected authority, an increasing number of stakeholders have called for clearer lines of authority. Ms Nada Faza Soraya, chairwoman of the Batam Chamber of Commerce and Industry, is among the most outspoken. In a meeting at her office in February 2006, Ms Soraya argued that Batam should be granted "indisputable legal status" and that BIDA and the municipal government be integrated into a single body.[35] Indeed, a national government regulation on the working relationship between BIDA and the municipal government has been under consideration since 2000, but it is still unclear when it will be put into effect.[36]

Under this circumstances, the election of Ahmad Dahlan, a familiar face to BIDA officials, as new Batam mayor indicates that the political landscape of Batam is changing in a way that may just rescue Batam from its "split personality". As a self-identified "local boy" born in Batam, Ahmad Dahlan

appears to have taken advantage of his BIDA affiliations in his bid for mayorship and is not shy about boasting of his well-rounded relationships with BIDA. When I met him in late March 2006, he did not deny rumours that he would invite experienced BIDA officials to hold several strategic positions in his government, such as head of the Health Office and head of the Local Planning Board.[37] He insisted that what had kept the two institutions from working together effectively had more to do with "poor communication" than competition, and that his good relationship with his "colleagues" at BIDA would resolve that problem easily. While the central government's designs on Batam remain murky, personal relations linking Batam's mayor and BIDA may bring about some meaningful change. If he succeeds in realizing his plan to work with BIDA to provide investors with "one-stop service" for business licensing, Batam's investment climate will see a measure of improvement.[38] The new Batam mayor also admitted that he is planning to revise "problematic" regulations and by-laws issued by the previous municipal administrations. Whether and how his plans will actually affect the organizational interests and behaviour of the two competing authorities remains to be seen.[39]

No matter what happens, the Batam mayoral election has already changed the island's political setting. A direct election system provided competing local interests with opportunities to contest over the decentralized political institutions and governance, and produced a happy realignment of diverse local elites. More broadly, the Batam case shows that power struggle between different groups of local elites, rather than party politics, tends to shape the process and results of Indonesia's direct local executive elections.

CONCLUSION

The 2006 Batam mayoral election has its own historic significance in Indonesia's ongoing process of democratization and decentralization as a part of the country's new experiments that allow the local people to elect their own governors, mayors, and regents. Batam held its first direct mayoral election under the circumstances where the decentralized municipal government was in conflict with BIDA, the national-level agency in charge of the island's economic development. The open electoral competition provided diverse local interests with opportunities to contest and realign themselves to control the island's governance. In their bid for mayorship, entrenched and well-resourced local elites had to obtain candidacy from political parties, but managed their campaigns with their own resources, while parties were largely missing from the scene. Political parties did not

play an important role in voting, either. Instead, candidates' personalities, socio-economic backgrounds, and previous accomplishments seemed to play a key role in determining the election results. Both the local society and international business community now cautiously expect that the election of an experienced BIDA-associated bureaucrat as Batam's new mayor will boost the investment climate on the island.

Batam's first direct mayoral election has indeed changed the island's political dynamics. However, holding direct local elections does not, in and of itself, enhance the democratic quality of local politics. Political parties keep their monopoly over the nomination of candidates in elections of local government heads. Only those who were capable of obtaining candidacy from parties could contest elections. Despite their privilege as the only institutions eligible to nominate candidates, Indonesian political parties have generally failed to make their presence felt in direct local executive elections. In response to tight control of parties' national leaderships, local cadres stayed away from the electoral process. As a result, direct local elections have paradoxically paralysed political parties at local levels. In place of paralysed political parties, entrenched and well-resourced local elites contested against each other in their bid for local executive heads. Experiences of holding direct local executive elections, at least in Batam, show that such elections seem to be have benefited only selected elites, challenging the dominant assumption that direct local elections herald the arrival of local democracy. Formally holding direct local elections is just the beginning of a long journey towards realizing such intended outcomes as improved responsiveness and accountability of local governance in practice. It is an open-ended journey, and the process and outcomes of direct local elections ultimately depend on the political and economic settings of the locality, the political and economic interests and capacities of diverse local actors, and political attitudes and behaviours of local populations.

Notes

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[1] The 2006 Batam mayoral election is my second case study of Indonesia's direct local elections as a part of a multi-case comparative study. This multi-case

comparison aims to produce an analysis that provides for a comprehensive understanding of local political change in Indonesia, while averting the downside and logistical anxiety of a 'large-n' study.

2 In 2004 alone, according to Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Singapore, forty-one companies established operations in Batam, with new investments totalling more than US$160 million. See his address delivered at Singapore National Day Reception in Batam on 25 August 2005 at http://app.mfa.gov.sg/internet/press/view_press_print.asp?post_id=1424 (accessed 31 August 2005).

3 At the national level, Singapore was the largest investor in 2005, with investments amounting to US$3.69 billion, which was about a third of total foreign direct investment inflows of the year (*Jakarta Post*, 20 March 2006).

4 Ibnu Sutowo, who initially promoted and launched the Batam development project, was known as one of the main suppliers of funds to Soeharto's patronage system. For further discussion, see Liang (2001), Mackie (1970), Robison (1986), and Winters (1996).

5 B.J. Habibie also served as the Minister of Research and Technology until the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) elected Soeharto and him as President and Vice President in early 1998. Later, he led an interregnum government as an acting President from May 1998 to September 1999.

6 For discussion on the business activities of B.J. Habibie's family members in the island during and after his BIDA chairmanship, see Liang (2001, pp. 16–17), *AsiaWeek* ("Now, Habibie Inc.," 5 June 1998; Jose Manuel Tesoro, "En Route to Jakarta," 4 September 1998). B.J. Habibie invited a great deal of controversy when he handed over BIDA chairmanship to his brother J.E. Habibie in March 1998. After several months of critical, even cynical, response from the public, J.E. Habibie resigned from the position in July 1998: See *AsiaWeek* (5 June 1998; 4 September 1998) and an interview with J.E. Habibie in *Tempo* (13 June 1998).

7 The Batam municipality was formed within Riau Province on the basis of Government Regulation No. 34 of 1983. Then, Presidential Decree No. 7 of 1984 regulated the working relationship between the two authorities, stating that BIDA was responsible for the implementation of development policies, while the municipality government was responsible for civic administration.

8 Law No. 25/2002, legislated in September 2002, allowed the Riau Archipelago to be separated from Riau Province but did not take effect until 1 July 2004.

9 Law No. 53/1999 states that the working relationship between the municipal government and BIDA will be clarified by a governmental regulation. In 2000, the Batam municipal government and BIDA issued a joint decree (No. 05/SKB/HK/VI/2000), establishing a working committee to draft a governmental regulation on the working relationship between the two authorities.

10 Mari Elka Pangestu, the Minister of Trade, pointed out "the decline of the exports (in Batam) is related to the issues of taxes, tariffs, labour, bureaucracy, and especially the dualism between BIDA and the municipal government"

(*Kompas*, 21 February 2006); Eddy Akun, Secretary of Batam's Industrial Area Association (HKI), also blamed Batam's unclear status for the overlap in authority and conflicting procedures between BIDA and the municipal government (*Jakarta Post*, 4 March 2006).

[11] It was recently reported that Batam has lost its allure for foreign companies. According to local think-tank Prodata Batam, at least ninety-five foreign companies have left the island for countries such as China and Vietnam since 2001, the first year of the implementation of a wide range of decentralization measures, and thirty-five others have downsized operations or are considering pulling out. Among the matters that investors are wary of, the tax issue has plagued many foreign investors since 2004 when the central government lifted the island's tax-exemption status on non-material products and services such as consultancies. Industries now have to pay an unrealistically high ten years' worth of tax arrears. The government has also lifted exemption on value-added and luxury-goods taxes, forcing companies to pay high taxes when they import products such as electronic parts (*Straits Times*, 18 March 2005).

[12] On 24 January 2005, Coordinating Minister for the Economy Aburizal Bakrie announced that the government decided against a proposal to turn the entire Batam islands area (including 41 neighbouring islands) into a single Free Trade Zone. According to a news analysis of the US Embassy-Jakarta, while BIDA argued the bonded zone scheme decided by the central government would confuse investors and lead to local government graft, local authorities claimed that bonded zones would enable them to better govern Batam as mandated under the regional autonomy laws (US Embassy Jakarta, "Indonesia: Trade and Investment Highlights, January/February 2005": http://www.usembassyjakarta.org/econ/trade%20highlights-jan-feb-05.pdf, accessed 27 September 2005).

[13] In a seminar held in August 2003, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Jakarta-based think-tank, recommended "clear and complementary authorization between local government and BIDA" as an important precondition for formulating Batam as a Free Trade Zone. For further discussion, see CSIS, "Batam Free Trade Zone: A Blueprint for National Economic Recovery" (http://www.csis.or.id/tool_print.asp?type=events&mode=past&id=9, accessed 3 August 2005).

[14] Only the PAN is said to have briefly discussed the possibility of nominating a female candidate.

[15] Asman Abnur was the chairman of the Batam Chamber of Commerce and Industry from 1997 to 2000 and then the Deputy Mayor of Batam from 2000 to 2004.

[16] The coalition between Golkar and the PKS seems to have a strong appeal in the Riau Archipelago. In the Karimun regent election, held on 22 February 2006, Golkar and the PKS formed a coalition which the PPP, the PAN, and the Pancasila Patriots' Party (Partai Patriot Pancasila) joined.

[17] Before forming a coalition with Golkar, the PKS considered four other Islamic-oriented parties (PAN, PD, PPP, and PBR) as potential partners. The PAN was one of the most desirable partners with the same ideological orientation and sizeable presence at the assembly. However, according to the frank acknowledgement by H. Aris Hardi Halim, PKS representative and also deputy chairman of the Batam Municipal Assembly, the party could not compromise the figures proposed by the PAN, which was plagued by tension between the national leadership and local cadres. Compared to other parties, the PKS's system of nominating candidates looks unique in that a networking team consisting of leaders at different levels of the party leadership selects candidates together, reducing hierarchy and enhancing coordination between different levels of party leadership (Interviews with H. Aris Hardi Halim on 6 December 2005 in Batam and H. Mawardi Harni, PAN representative of the Batam Municipal Assembly on 21 February 2006 in Batam).

[18] Party fractions (*fraksi*), grouped by representatives of parties or party coalitions, are unofficial in terms of the structure of local assemblies, but essentially the most important units of decision-making at local assemblies, dominating the process of political bargaining or "horse-trading".

[19] The fragmentation within the PKB worsened when the *ulama* faction held a separate congress in Surabaya and selected Choirul Anam as its chairman in early October 2005. The faction led by Abdurrahman Wahid, the party's first chairman and former President (1999–2001), had already held a congress in Semarang and selected Muhaimin Iskandar as its chairman. The Muhaimin faction brought the case to court, and the South Jakarta National Court ruled that the Muhaimin faction was the only legitimate PKB. On 15 November 2005, however, the Supreme Court ruled that the sacking of Alwi Shihab, one of the *ulama* faction's prominent leaders, by the Muhaimin faction was an unauthorized decision, enabling the *ulama* faction to argue that it is the legitimate PKB (MA No. 1896K/PDT/2005). In September 2006, the Supreme Court brought the conflict to an end by issuing a ruling that the Muhaimin faction was the only legitimate face of the party. The *ulama* faction declared the establishment of the National Ulama Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama, PKNU) in November 2006.

[20] Rachmawati Sukarnoputri, a sister of Megawati Sukarnoputri, the chairwoman of the PDI-P, established Partai Pelopor and received 0.77 per cent of the vote in the 2004 general elections at the national level (Ananta, Arifin, and Suryadinata 2005).

[21] Sukmawati Sukarnoputri, another sister of Megawati Sukarnoputri, formed the PNI Marhaenisme and gained 0.81 per cent of the vote in the 2004 general elections at the national level (Ananta, Arifin, and Suryadinata 2005).

[22] Interviews with Wardi Atmowiyono and Husbandri, PDI-P representatives in the Batam Municipal Assembly and also chairmen of sub-district boards of Batu Ampar and Nogsa, 21 February 2006, Batam. Wardi Atmowiyono and Husbandri

pointed out that the central board could recommend someone as a candidate from outside the list proposed by local boards. They argued that it would be better if there was an independent committee to evaluate the profiles and popularities of potential candidates. They even showed their nostalgia for the indirect system in which local assembly members elected local government heads, by saying that direct local executive elections are too costly.

[23] The PDI-P of Batam held its special working session in September 2005, which 9 municipal board members, 54 cadres from 8 sub-district boards, and 100 village-level cadres attended. The session decided Erdin Odang and Sahat Sianturi as the party's best mayoral and deputy mayoral candidates among the seven hopefuls. Erdin Odang, who was not a party cadre, received the majority of the votes (97 out of 163) as the party's potential mayoral candidate while Sahat Sianturi, the chairman of the party's municipal board since 1999, ranked the first among the four competitors with 93 votes. According to the party's internal regulations, it is the central board that makes a final decision on the party's candidacy. The central board refused to give its recommendation to all the mayoral candidates, including Erdin Odang, but supported Sahat Sianturi as the party's deputy mayoral candidate. Some sources said that Sahat Sianturi was not popular enough to be nominated as a mayoral candidate, so the party had to find a mayoral candidate from outside the party. Sahat Sianturi recommended Nazief Dharma, who was supported by the party's central board but received negative response, and even strong rejection, from some party cadres and supporters. On October 28, around 500 PDI-P supporters staged a demonstration under a placard that read, "Why should it be Nazief?" (*Batam Pos*, 29 October 2005). Even some of the municipal board members did not support Nazief's nomination by pointing out that he had already lost in the previous mayoral election despite the PDI-P's support. However, Sahat insisted on Nazief Dharma's nomination by arguing that Nazief is one of the PDI-P's constituents and his nomination was the party's official decision (*Batam Pos*, 11 Nov 2005).

[24] Similar intra-party conflicts within major parties were also found in many other cases, including in the 2005 regent election of East Sumba (Vel 2005) and the 2006 gubernatorial elections of Papua (Mietzner 2007).

[25] See also Vel (2005), pp. 95–98 and pp. 106–7.

[26] The PKS was again an exception in this matter. When the Ahmad-Ria pair declared their nomination at the Indoor Stadium Tumenggung Abdul Jamal in Batam on 20 November 2005, Hidayat Nurwahid, the chairman of the national People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) and also former chairman of the party, attended the event with a number of high-ranking party leaders from both the central and local boards (*Batam Pos*, 21 Nov 2005). The party's central board was also known to provide its local cadres with training programmes (*Batam Pos*, 28 Nov 2005).

[27] In fact, candidates' attractiveness and popularities were suggested as the most decisive factor in local elections. According to a *Kompas* survey (14 February

2005), most Indonesian voters regard a candidate's education (83%) and leadership experience (85%) as the most important factors in casting their votes in elections of local government heads. Religion and "locality" (*putra daerah*) of the candidates are comparatively less important in direct local elections (41% and 45% respectively).

[28] Interviews with Valdesz Junianto and Muhammad Nur, reporters of *Batam Pos* on 20 February 2006 in Batam.

[29] Comparatively, the results of the previous gubernatorial election of the Riau Archipelago, in which more than 20 per cent of additional votes were cast for the winning candidates, were easier to explain with candidates' *sosok*, rather than with voters' party affiliations or religion or ethnicity. For more detailed discussion, please see Choi (2007).

[30] This pattern of nomination of candidates has resulted in inconsistent patterns of party coalitions across the country. Interestingly, in the Riau Archipelago, Golkar and the PKS have formed coalitions, which are rarely found in other regions, and won in three elections, from the gubernatorial election to the Batam mayoral election and the Karimun regent election.

[31] Most parties' central boards have enhanced their tight control over local cadres. For instance, Article 12 in the revised party law (Law No. 31/2002) stipulates that elected members of the DPR and DPRD can be replaced midterm on the grounds of withdrawal of party membership by the party, or breach of the law causing removal from office (*Kompas*, 10 July 2003; NDI 2003). This "recall" system, which was the norm under the New Order, was not allowed under the former Law No. 4/1999 on the structure and composition of the national and local assemblies, so that the parties' central boards were not able to recall those members who had switched to other parties. The "recall" system has been revived in the new Law No. 12/2003 on the structure and composition of the national and local assemblies.

[32] Most observers of the initial rounds of direct local elections agree that while "accusations of money politics and vote-rigging were plenty" and "political party machineries did not function effectively" (Lanti 2006, p. 98), substantive policy debates played a negligible role in those elections (see also Choi 2007; Mietzner 2007; Vel 2005).

[33] Comparing the 2006 Papuan gubernatorial election with elections in other regions, Marcus Mietzner (2007) also points out that entrenched local political and economic elites dominated the contest for local governance.

[34] Andreas Ufen also observes that direct local elections have facilitated "new local bosses" to entrench themselves in local political process. For further discussion, see Ufen (2006, pp. 26–28). The expression "big kings" is meant to differentiate the directly elected mayors, regents, or governors from the often heard "little kings", who were given their positions by local assembly members.

[35] Interview with Nada Faza Soraya, Chairwoman of the Batam branch of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 22 February 2006, Batam.

[36] In early December 2005, it was reported that the draft of a governmental regulation had been agreed by the two authorities and was ready to be signed by the President (*Batam Pos*, 7 December 2005). Nonetheless, it was still unclear whether the central government had come up with a solution to iron out the conflicting situation caused by the presence of the two authorities in Batam.

[37] Interview with Ahmad Dahlan, Batam mayor, 28 March 2006, Batam.

[38] Indeed, those whom I met after the election results were announced expressed their wishful thinking. Among them are Lilik Lujayanti, staff at BIDA's Public Relations and Marketing Bureau (20 February 2006, Batam) and Paul Tan, senior advisor of Batam Singapore Club (22 February 2006, Batam).

[39] Another important player in the power struggle between BIDA and the municipal governance is the Batam Municipal Assembly. In fact, it is the assembly that has the authority to legislate all the regional regulations. Recently, a company monopolizing water supply in Batam raised its tariff rate following the increase of the electricity tariff rate, but the Municipal Assembly raised a question about the policy. Technically, the company is only responsible to BIDA, which already agreed on the tariff increase, but the Municipal Assembly criticized the company (and presumably BIDA) for raising the tariff without improving its poor quality service and paying more tax to the municipal government (*Batam Pos*, 8 March 2006; 9 March 2006; 16 March 2006).

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5

THE RISING IMPORTANCE OF PERSONAL NETWORKS IN INDONESIAN LOCAL POLITICS
An Analysis of District Government Head Elections in South Sulawesi in 2005

Michael Buehler[1]

In recent years, the initial enthusiasm for decentralization of political authority to the district level and its "democratizing" impact on entrenched political elites in Indonesia has been replaced by increasingly gloomy evaluations of the country's devolution process. A growing number of both academic and donor accounts now tell the story of how the mode of state power that was established under the authoritarian government of Soeharto continues despite the demise of the New Order regime and the institutional reforms that followed. In other words, despite the introduction of free and fair elections and the devolution of political authority, "old elites" maintained their strategic administrative and political positions at the national, provincial, and local levels (Hadiz and Robison 2004, p. 29). This chapter argues that while "old elites" indeed remain in power, the new institutional environment has reshuffled the cards for political elites. Personal networks at the local level have become more important in winning elections, while large party machines have become

a less decisive factor in shaping election outcomes. A more pluralist view than the one stressing continuity above all is thus needed.

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN POST-NEW ORDER INDONESIA

Indonesian politics have been shaped by two main developments since 1998. Firstly, there has been a more democratic spirit in government after forty years of autocratic rule. Secondly, starting with Law No. 22/1999 and Law No. 25/1999, Indonesia embarked on a far-reaching decentralization process of its political institutions that shifted most of the political power to the districts (*kabupaten*) and municipalities (*kotamadya*), leaving the centre — and even more so the provinces — with fewer political and economic responsibilities.

Even after the re-centralization attempts of Law No. 32/2004, local governments are still much stronger than prior to 1998. The ambiguous formulation of Law No. 32/2004 resulted in an unclear distribution of responsibilities between levels of government (Atje and Gaduh 2004, p. 9; Jacobsen 2004, p. 384; Kaiser and Hofman 2002, p. 5). At the same time, Law No. 32/2004 drastically cut the oversight power of the local assembly, the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (DPRD), over the local executive. In short, while attempts to reinstate vertical accountability did not successfully materialize, horizontal accountability between the legislative and the executive at the *kabupaten* level was crippled.

In addition to regulating responsibilities between different levels of government, Law No. 32/2004 outlined new institutional procedures for the direct election of local government heads, *pemilihan kepala daerah langsung* or *pilkada* for short. As the law outlined, regents (*bupati*) and mayors (*walikota*) were to be elected directly by the people for the first time in 2005. In these elections, candidates had to be nominated by parties that had received 15 per cent of the votes or 15 per cent of the seats in local assemblies, either alone or in a coalition, in the 2004 legislative elections.[2] Against the backdrop of the strengthened position of the local executive towards other government levels and its increased political responsibilities and budget authority, it is no surprise that the 2005 *pilkada* attracted considerable attention from local politicians. *Pilkada* thus provide a good opportunity for studying interest group realignments in post-New Order Indonesia.

This chapter will show that, despite the continued dominance of the entrenched political class, only candidates with strong personal networks at the sub-district (*kecamatan*) level had a reasonable chance of winning in the

direct elections. Formerly dominant party machines, on the other hand, are disintegrating. Research in two districts in South Sulawesi supports these arguments and matches experience in other districts of South Sulawesi, as well as other provinces in Indonesia. The 2005 *pilkada* outcomes, then, do not reflect the mere continuation of the New Order *status quo* in Indonesian local politics.

PILKADA IN SOUTH SULAWESI PROVINCE

Pilkada were held in ten of the twenty-three *kabupaten* in South Sulawesi province on 27 June 2005. Ambiguous legal guidelines and a short preparation phase led to various administrative and logistical problems before and during the elections. These problems were not unique to South Sulawesi and also arose in other provinces (Cetro 2005; NDI 2005). *Pilkada* in South Sulawesi province were generally regarded as reasonably free and fair, though some reports of vote rigging in certain *kabupaten* exist (LKPMP 2005). In some *kabupaten*, supporters of unsuccessful candidates staged protests and demonstrations, but these usually died down within a few days (Mietzner 2006a). The voter turnout in South Sulawesi province was 69.8 per cent, which corresponded well with the national average voter turnout of 69 per cent (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2005). Incumbents successfully defended their positions in five of the ten *kabupaten* in South Sulawesi province. In four *kabupaten*, incumbents were not re-elected. In one *kabupaten*, the incumbent was prohibited from running for office again, as he had already served two terms as local government head. Candidates nominated by Golkar, the strongest party in the province in past general legislative elections (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2004), lost in 50 per cent of the districts in which *pilkada* were held.

An analysis of the candidates' sociological profiles shows that an overwhelming majority of those who ran for office in *pilkada* in South Sulawesi province were bureaucrats, politicians, party officials, former members of the military or the police force during the New Order. This finding supports recent research on Indonesian political elites at both the national and local level that stress the endurance of "old elites" in the political arenas of post-Soeharto Indonesia (Hadiz and Robison 2004; Mietzner 2006*a*; Takashi 2003). However, *pilkada* triggered fierce intra-elite competition, as shown by the fact that many of the incumbents in South Sulawesi province were not re-elected.[3] The *classe politique* of South Sulawesi province can thus hardly be treated as a unitary actor. In the following comparison of *kabupaten* Pangkajene dan Kepulauan (Pangkep) and *kabupaten* Soppeng, two rural districts in South Sulawesi province, the

individual candidates themselves are therefore at the centre of analysis. Knowledge of the candidates' backgrounds is crucial to understanding their positions in the power dynamics that unfolded during the first direct elections of local government heads in Indonesia in 2005.

KABUPATEN PANGKAJENE DAN KEPULAUAN (PANGKEP)

In *kabupaten* Pangkep, a district in the southeast of the province, in which most of the population works in agriculture or the fishing industry, three pairs of candidates competed for the position of regent (*bupati*) and vice-regent (*wakil bupati*).

Syafruddin Nur, the eventual winner of the *pilkada*, has been a bureaucrat for the better part of his professional career, starting in the district administration of *kabupaten* Pangkep in 1990. Most importantly, he was the head of the Department for Public Works 1992–2001. From 2002 onwards, he worked in the administration of Makassar, again in the development sector as Development and Economics Assistant. Andi Kemal Burhanuddin, Syafruddin Nur's running-mate, was a long-standing local politician who had held various positions within the Golkar party of *kabupaten* Pangkep. For example, he was the head of the Golkar party in the district 1999–2004 (Hanafi, pers. comm. 13 March 2006; KPUD Pangkep 2005*a*). Nur and Burhanuddin were nominated by Golkar, PAN, and PKS (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2005).

Gaffar Patappe was *bupati* of Pangkep from 1999–2004. A bureaucrat for his entire life, Patappe held various positions in the administration of *kabupaten* Pangkep 1965–85 before subsequently working in the administrative apparatus of the city of Makassar and in various positions in the provincial administration 1985–99. Patappe's running-mate, Effendi Kasmin, worked in bureaucratic positions since 1984, mainly at the sub-district and district level (KPUD Pangkep 2005*a*). The pair ran on a coalition ticket consisting of small parties such as PBR, Partai Merdeka, PPDK, PPNUI, PDIP, Partai Demokrat, PBSD, PIB, PKPI, PKBP, Partai Pelopor, and PPDI (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2005).

Taufik Fachruddin, the third candidate who competed for the position of district government head in *kabupaten* Pangkep, is a businessman who held executive positions in Makassar-based companies for almost 20 years. Fachruddin was by far the richest candidate who ran for office in Pangkep (KPUD Pangkep 2005*b*).[4] For the elections, Fachruddin teamed up with Andi Ilyas Mangewa, a bureaucrat who had worked in sub-district positions since 1985 (KPUD Pangkep 2005*a*). PPP nominated the pair (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2005).

In the years prior to the *pilkada*, Nur had already positioned himself as a clear front-runner for these local elections. In 1999, when district government heads were elected via the DPRD, Nur lost against Patappe. After his defeat, Nur immediately started to campaign intensively for the 2005 *bupati* elections at the *kecamatan* level. He visited popular roadside restaurants, attended local weddings and funerals, organized social events for the public, and courted the *imam* by donating money or building material for their mosques. He also held open debates with religious leaders in various villages[5] and organized recreational events for the people in *kabupaten* Pangkep.[6] Just before the elections, Nur accelerated the pace of his informal campaign and visited the villages and hamlets of the *kabupaten* together with his *tim sukses* (campaign team) on a daily basis. Urdin, the head of Nur's *tim sukses*, stated in an interview that he and Nur spent four to five days per week together in the villages in the sixteen months prior to the *pilkada* (Urdin, pers. comm. 14 March 2006).

Nur also went to great lengths to unite the Golkar party behind him before the 2005 local elections. According to regulations adopted in 1999, bureaucrats in Indonesia were prohibited from being party members. Consequently, Nur had had to leave Golkar that year. A potential rival for Nur in any upcoming election was therefore the head of the Golkar party in Pangkep, which was the strongest party in the district (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2004). As a result, Nur installed his own man, Syamsuddin, as the head of the local Golkar party in 2004 under the condition that Syamsuddin would not run for the local government head post in the 2005 and 2010 *pilkada*, as several interviewees mentioned. Nur also maintained close relations with the party after 1999,[7] which culminated in Nur choosing the former head of Golkar Pangkep, Kasmin, as his running-mate for the 2005 *pilkada*. In this way, Nur firmly positioned himself with regard to his personal network, as well as with the strongest party in the district, well ahead of the *pilkada*.

Many parties approached Nur prior to the *pilkada*, eager to nominate this clear front-runner. Nur chose two more parties to be in his coalition, PAN and PKS, despite the fact that the Golkar party nomination would have been sufficient to reach the mandatory 15 per cent threshold mentioned above (Nur pers. comm. 9 March 2006). In addition to his strong personal network and the support of relatively well-organized and integrated parties, Nur successfully united a considerable share of the local business community behind him, most of whom were from the contracting industry. An analysis of the composition of his campaign team shows that more than 10 per cent of the registered contractors in *kabupaten* Pangkep, *officially* joined Nur's *tim sukses* (Gapensi 2006; KPUD Pangkep 2005*c*).[8] Nur also revived his close links to the provincial level. The governor, eager to expand his own

footing in the districts of South Sulawesi with regard to the upcoming 2007 direct gubernatorial elections, generously supported Nur's political ambitions, according to several interviewees. Finally, Nur appointed close relatives of the electoral commission members to important positions in his campaign team, thereby ensuring good links to the supposedly neutral commission, a body which is important not only in accrediting the nominations of prospective candidates prior to the *pilkada*, but is also the sole implementing agency for all stages of the elections, including the counting of votes and announcement of the winners.[9] Having already campaigned at the sub-district level for years before the *pilkada*, Nur did not have to campaign during the official campaign period to a great extent. According to his own accounts, Nur spent US$180,000 for his official campaign, an amount considerably lower than the ones mentioned by his competitors (Nur, pers. comm. 9 March 2006).

Unlike Nur, Patappe, the incumbent, did not visit the villages and hamlets of *kabupaten* Pangkep very extensively. According to Patappe, he did not campaign at the sub-district level because his position as district head did not provide him with sufficient time to do so (Patappe, pers. comm. 20 March 2006). According to a civil society organization monitoring *pilkada* in *kabupaten* Pangkep, Patappe did not campaign at the sub-district level because he thought that simply being the incumbent would provide him enough coverage and political support to win (Salma, pers. comm. 4 February 2006). During the official campaign period, however, Patappe too visited villages and hamlets, directed his campaign team to lobby for his cause, and organized festivities for the masses (KPUD Pangkep 2005*d*).

With Golkar under the firm control of his rival, Patappe had to look for other parties that would nominate him. According to Patappe, this was a difficult process (Patappe, pers. comm. 20 March 2006). With no other major party at his disposal, Patappe had to gather a coalition of twelve parties. Most of them only had a few or no seats in the DPRD (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2004). This meant that these parties had very weak or non-existent party structures at the sub-district level. Furthermore, Patappe's position within the party coalition, which was formed *ad hoc* prior to the *pilkada*, was rather weak since he had no prior relations to most of these parties, according to his own accounts (Patappe, pers. comm. 20 March 2006). Like his main rival Nur, Patappe did have good connections to certain parts of the business community, though, and close links to the electoral commission.[10]

Fachruddin, the third candidate in the race for the post of *bupati* of Pangkep, mostly lived and worked in Makassar and therefore had weak ties to the *kabupaten*. However, Fachruddin also tried to expand his rudimentary

network in the district in the years prior to the *pilkada*. In his position as manager of an Indonesia-Japanese joint-venture company called Maruki, he tried to establish a political base in the sub-districts by employing hundreds of people from Pangkep in his company in Makassar. These employees were bussed in each day by the company even though there was an abundance of labourers already located in the provincial capital.

Though Fachruddin had relatively weak personal contacts in the district, he had a close personal history with the Golkar party until a few weeks before the *pilkada*. Besides his father, Ir. Fachruddin, being a Golkar representative in the National Assembly DPR-RI for more than 20 years during the New Order, Fachruddin himself repeatedly ran for political positions as a Golkar candidate, the last time being in the 2004 legislative elections for the provincial assembly.[11] That same year, Fachruddin tried to become the head of the Golkar party in *kabupaten* Pangkep, but lost against Syamsuddin, the candidate installed by Nur. Misjudging and overestimating his position within the Golkar party, Fachruddin believed the Golkar party would nominate him for the *pilkada*. Fachruddin, therefore, waited for the "green light" by the Golkar party until a few months before the *pilkada* (Fachruddin, pers. comm. 14 March 2006; KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2004). As it turned out, Fachruddin's name did not even appear in the Golkar internal convention during which the party chose its nominee prior to the *pilkada* (Hanafi, pers. comm. 13 March 2006).[12]

Realizing too late that Golkar would not nominate him, Fachruddin officially approached PPP only a few weeks before the official campaign period for the *pilkada* was to start (Fachruddin, pers. comm. 14 March 2006). Meanwhile, PPP had already been successfully courted by another pair of prospective candidates. Mansur and Tualle were the official candidates of PPP Pangkep until March 2005 as party internal letters show (PPP 2005*a*). Intensive lobbying of PPP officials at the sub-district, provincial, and national levels by Fachruddin, however, led to the party dropping the Mansur-Tualle nomination in favour of Fachruddin and his running-mate.[13] Since Fachruddin was named the official candidate of PPP only a few weeks before the official campaign period for the *pilkada* was to start, Fachruddin admitted to encountering severe difficulties in his attempts to unite PPP behind him (Fachruddin, pers. comm. 14 March 2006). Since Fachruddin's position within PPP was very weak, especially after long years with the Golkar party, many PPP members at the *kecamatan* level broke away from Fachruddin and supported other candidates.

Due to the difficulties he had to overcome prior to the *pilkada*, Fachruddin did not start campaigning much at the sub-district level before the official

campaign period. By his own accounts, he also had profound difficulties in merging his own personal network with the PPP network. Consequently, his *tim sukses* did not function well. Some of the members of his *tim sukses* who were PPP members, for example, would not support him, and instead supported other candidates or simply did not campaign on his behalf despite being paid to do so. According to Fachruddin's own evaluation, this unfavourable constellation made his campaign not only very expensive, but also largely ineffective, a view shared by other observers of the *pilkada* in Pangkep regency (Fachruddin, pers. comm. 14 March 2006; Salma, pers. comm. 4 February 2006).[14]

PILKADA RESULTS IN PANGKEP

Nur won the *pilkada* with 58 per cent of the total votes (Table 5.1). Patappe, the incumbent, who won the 1999 local elections via the DPRD, did not win a single sub-district, and neither did Fachruddin, the most affluent of all candidates. Only in *kecamatan* Ma'rang, where Patappe had worked as a *camat* in 1966–70 (KPUD 2005*a*) and where Patappe's wife was born, did he gather a number of votes that challenged Nur's dominance. Personal relations, or the lack thereof, to the sub-district level also had an affect on Fachruddin's results. In none of the districts did he come close to challenging Nur's dominance, and he also lost against the incumbent Patappe in most of the sub-districts. This poor result reflects his rudimentary network in Pangkep. However, Fachruddin did come in second in *kecamatan* Pangkajene and Balocci. This result might be due to two reasons: First, many of the employees working in the company managed by Fachruddin live in the two constituencies, according to several interviewees. Second, Balocci is the sub-district where Tualle, the prospective PPP candidate until a few weeks before the elections as mentioned above was born. According to Tualle's accounts, a considerable share of the electorate was unaware of the changes made by PPP regarding their nominee, thus voting for PPP, erroneously thinking they were voting for Tualle at the ballot box (Tualle, pers. comm. 21 April 2006).

In summary, the election in *kabupaten* Pangkep was won by a political figure who had a firm footing at the sub-district level, which came as a result of years of campaigning in the hamlets and villages of the *kabupaten*. His strong personal network at the sub-district level was further supported by his success in imposing his personal agenda and political ambitions on the Golkar party, a relatively well-organized and integrated party in *kabupaten* Pangkep. He also brought on his side PAN and PKS, two other reasonably consolidated parties whose party networks could potentially yield votes. Nur

TABLE 5.1
Pilkada Voting in Pangkep by Pairs of Candidates and Sub-district

	HA Gaffar Patappe and H Effendi Kasmin	*H Syafruddin Nur and HA Kemal Burhanuddin*	*HM Taufik Fachruddin and H Andi Ilyas Mangewa*	*Informal*
Pangkajene	3,254	13,409	3,946	193
Minasate'ne	3,102	9,677	2,300	180
Balocci	1,887	4,251	2,006	128
Bungoro	4,117	11,466	3,008	226
Labakkang	4,449	14,262	2,929	256
Tondong Tallasa	1,313	2,509	1,131	58
Ma'rang	6,147	6,546	2,321	218
Segeri	4,031	4,640	949	146
Mandalle	2,636	3,135	705	55
Liukang Tupabiring	5,845	8,538	757	230
Liukang Kalmas	2,000	3,494	665	83
Liukang Tangaya	3,040	4,554	1,060	126
Totals	41,821	86,481	21,777	1,899
Percentage of total votes	27.5	56.9	14.3	1.2
Total votes	151,978			

Source: KPUD Pangkep 2005*f*.

ran against an incumbent whose personal network was rather detached from the sub-district level and who had only minor, ill-consolidated parties at his disposal, whose structures did not reach deeply into the sub-districts. In addition, Patappe only started to campaign at the sub-district level a few weeks prior to the *pilkada*, which inevitably hurt him at the polls. Finally, Fachruddin, who had lived and worked mainly in Makassar prior to the election, had only a rudimentary personal network in the hamlets and villages of the district and could thus not yield many votes. He was also prevented from using the apparatus of the party that nominated him for his own ends because of his weak position within the party itself.

KABUPATEN SOPPENG

In *kabupaten* Soppeng, whose socio-economic profile is similar to *kabupaten* Pangkep, a majority of the population works in the agricultural sector. Four pairs of candidates competed for the position of district government head and

deputy district government head. Again, a description of the candidates' sociological profiles is essential in order to understand the *pilkada* outcome.

The winning candidate Andi Soetomo was a bureaucrat who occupied various positions at the sub-district level such as village head, village official and sub-district head over the last twenty-five years (KL2SS 2005; KPUD Soppeng 2005*a*). It was only in the few years prior to the *pilkada* that Soetomo worked as the head of the Public Works Office in the administration of South Sulawesi province (KL2SS; Soetomo, pers. comm. 24 March 2005). For the district government head elections, Soetomo partnered with Saransi, another bureaucrat who was working in the district bureaucracy of Soppeng at the time, but had worked at the *kecamatan* level in 1987 and 1995–98 (KPUD Soppeng 2005*a*). Five parties — Partai Merdeka, PSI, PPNUI, PAN, and Partai Demokrat nominated Soetomo and Saransi (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2005).

The incumbent, Andi Harta Sanjaya, had been *bupati* in the 1999–2005 period. Before that he had worked as a bureaucrat at the district level of Soppeng regency since the early 1990s. After becoming the district government head in 1999, he subsequently became the head of the Golkar party in the district. Syarifuddin Rauf, who had been deputy *bupati* from 1999–2005, was Harta Sanjaya's running-mate again in 2005. Rauf was a bureaucrat who had worked mainly at the district level of Soppeng regency in various positions since 1980 (KPUD Soppeng 2005*a*). The Golkar party nominated this pair to run in the *pilkada* (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2005).

The third candidate, Andi Munarfah, is a lecturer at Universitas Negeri Makassar. He teamed up with another academic, Andi Rizal Mappatunru, a lecturer at Universitas Republik Indonesia. Mappatunru is also a member of the board of PKS and deputy chair of the local assembly (DPRD) of *kabupaten* Soppeng (KPUD Soppeng 2005*a*). The pair ran on a PKS and PDI-P ticket (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2005). Finally, there was Bismirkin, a businessman who had been born in Soppeng but lived in Jakarta for his entire life (KPUD Soppeng 2005*a*). Andi Burhanuddin joined Bismirkin to contest in the local elections. Burhanuddin had worked as a bureaucrat in the administrations of several *kabupaten* of South Sulawesi province but never in Soppeng district itself (KPUD 2005*a*). Bismirkin and Burhanuddin gathered a coalition of eleven parties: PDK, PBB, PIB, PNBK, PKPI, PKPB, PKB, PBR, Partai Patriot Pancasila, PPP, and Partai Pelopor (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2004, 2005).

Andi Soetomo's unique career path provided him with a very strong personal network at the sub-district level. In addition to his excellent personal contacts, he also extensively campaigned at the sub-district levels during the

last few years before the elections. Like Nur in *kabupaten* Pangkep, Soetomo visited popular food stalls, attended weddings and funerals, and participated in religious ceremonies. He also visited different mosques each Friday during the last two years leading up to the *pilkada* during which he socialized with the people there (*Fajar* 8 June 2005) and financially supported the *imam* (Yunus, pers. comm. 12 January 2006).

With much of the business community closely connected to the incumbent Harta Sanjaya, Soetomo had to rely on sponsors outside the *kabupaten* to finance his political ambitions. He found support in the district government head of *kabupaten* Enrekang, a close relative and major contractor in the region. According to several interviewees, including upper-level members of Soetomo's campaign team, Soetomo's close contacts with the governor of South Sulawesi province, which were established during his years as a bureaucrat in the provincial administration, provided him with a further source of funds (Lucky, pers. comm. 30 March 2006; Salam Djalle, pers. comm. 27 March 2006). Like Nur, the successful candidate in Pangkep, Soetomo also had close relationships to the KPUD in Soppeng.[15]

Though only minor parties with weak organizational structures nominated Soetomo, he was firmly rooted in the sub-district level because of his aforementioned career path. This provided him not only with an elaborate personal network, but also allowed him to render the seemingly strong party machine of the rival candidate dysfunctional. As the composition of Soetomo's campaign team shows, many lower-level Golkar members joined his campaign team (KPUD Soppeng 2005*b*), much to the chagrin of the vice-chairman of the Golkar party in Soppeng, Nur, who lamented the disloyalty of his party members in an interview (Nur, pers. comm. 27 March 2006). Rauf, the Golkar candidate for deputy *bupati*, deplored that the Golkar elite could not prevent party members from turning towards other candidates (Rauf, pers. comm. 27 March 2006). Soetomo's success in bringing sub-district actors from the Golkar party to his side seems to have been facilitated by his long-standing position in the lower rungs of the Golkar party in Soppeng in the years before he had to leave the party in 1999 due to his status as a bureaucrat.[16] According to Soetomo, many lower-level Golkar members were also part of his extended family in the hamlets and villages (Soetomo, pers. comm. 24 March 2006). In short, while Harta Sanjaya, the head of Golkar *kabupaten* Soppeng and official Golkar nominee, controlled the top level of the Golkar party, the centripetal forces unleashed by Soetomo's strong personal network at the sub-district level lured many Golkar followers away. This prevented Harta Sanjaya from using the relatively consolidated Golkar structures to their maximum potential to mobilize voters.

Harta Sanjaya, the incumbent, was born into an aristocratic family in *kabupaten* Soppeng and thus had excellent contacts at the provincial and national levels. Furthermore, both the Golkar elite of *kabupaten* Soppeng, as well as the upper level of the bureaucracy were on Harta Sanjaya's side. Interestingly, Harta Sanjaya not only failed to impose discipline on the Golkar party and use its structures for his own ends, but he also could not match Soetomo's network at the sub-district level, despite being born in *kabupaten* Soppeng. An analysis of Harta Sanjaya's career path shows he never worked in sub-district positions similar to the ones of Soetomo nor did he campaign with the same intensity as Soetomo at the sub-district level. It was only a few weeks before the *pilkada* that Harta Sanjaya and his campaign team started to visit the villages (*Tribun Timur*, 17 June 2005; Rauf, pers. comm. 27 March 2006).

This should not belie the fact, however, that Harta Sanjaya was a widely known public figure in *kabupaten* Soppeng. The way he and his family, many of whom occupied strategic positions in the bureaucracy and in the legislature as soon as Harta Sanjaya came to power in 1999, ran the district government for their own ends was frequently debated amongst the people and subject to newspaper coverage. Rumours about severe malpractices by Harta Sanjaya's family culminated when news broke a few months prior to the elections about the *bupati* and some of his family members being involved in fraudulent activities in a development project; these included a mark-up scam of US$2.1 million, a crime for which Harta Sanjaya is currently facing trial (*Tribun Timur* 25 November 2005). These corruption allegations undoubtedly had an effect on Harta Sanjaya's election results.

Munarfah and his running-mate Mappatunru were nominated by PKS and PDI-P, two relatively well-organized parties that were fairly well rooted in the district (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2004). Since Mappatunru was one of the founders of the PKS branch in *kabupaten* Soppeng and currently acts as one of the party's board members, the position of Munarfah and Mappatunru within PKS seems to have been quite established. However, this was not the case for the PDI-P party. It seems that the PDI-P party in *kabupaten* Soppeng did not support their candidates beyond nominating them since the nomination only came after pressure from the former Governor of South Sulawesi province, Palaguna, who is not only a long-standing PDI-P member close to Megawati Sukarnoputri but also the uncle of Munarfah. According to Munarfah, PDI-P refused to campaign for him and his running-mate after the party officials learned that he was too poor to pay for their travel expenses and "pocket money" (Munarfah, pers. comm. 29 March 2006).

In addition to his lack of financial resources and his relatively weak position within his party coalition, Munarfah lacked a strong personal network

in *kabupaten* Soppeng, as he primarily lived and worked in Makassar prior to the *pilkada*. Only his running-mate, Mappatunru, had a rudimentary personal network to fall back upon as he was born in one of the sub-districts of *kabupaten* Soppeng. The lack of a personal network was also reflected in the composition of the pair's campaign team. In contrast to Soetomo, the successful candidate, whose top level of the *tim sukses* counted no fewer than 126 names, all with close connections to *kabupaten* Soppeng, Munarfah and Mappatunru only gathered seven people in their *tim sukses*, most of them former students of theirs, some of whom had no bonds to *kabupaten* Soppeng whatsoever (KPUD 2005*b*, 2005*c*; Mappatunru, pers. comm. 27 March 2006). Given this background, it is not surprising that Munarfah "did not campaign" prior to the 2005 *pilkada* (Munarfah, pers. comm. 29 March 2006).

Financial concerns of this sort were unknown to Bismirkin, who was by far the richest of all of the candidates in *kabupaten* Soppeng (*Tribun* 13 Juni 2005). Bismirkin, a businessman, had lived and worked in Jakarta for most of his life. Since he was virtually unknown in Soppeng prior to the *pilkada*, his personal network was very limited. He also lacked connections to the political establishment of *kabupaten* Soppeng. He brought together a coalition of eleven minor, cash-strapped parties that were only very weakly rooted in the district. Nine of the parties did not have a seat in the local DPRD (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2004; KPUD Soppeng 2005*d*). In addition to a lack of personal links to the district, Bismirkin was unable to activate any party structures for his own campaign ends, which was reflected in the rather blunt way he campaigned. According to a member of the election monitoring commission (Panwaslu) in Soppeng, Bismirkin distributed motorbikes and televisions to people in the hopes of getting their votes during his short but intense campaign (Mallari, pers. comm. 26 April 2006).

PILKADA RESULTS IN SOPPENG

Soetomo won the *pilkada* with 40 per cent of the total votes (Table 5.2). Soetomo performed strongest in *kecamatan* Lalabata, the sub-district where he was born, followed by *kecamatan* Liliriaja, Lilirilau, and Ganra, all sub-districts where Soetomo had worked as village head or sub-district head in the past.[17] Harta Sanjaya, the incumbent who won the election in 1999 via the DPRD, only won two of the seven *kecamatan*, Mario Riwawo and Mario Riawa, two sub-districts where he has close personal relations.[18] Munarfah obtained most of his votes in *kecamatan* Lilirilau, where he even beat the incumbent, Harta Sanjaya. Again, close personal relations might be the explanatory factor as Mappatunru, Munarfah's running-mate, was born in

TABLE 5.2
2005 Pilkada Voting in Pangkep by Pairs of Candidates and Sub-district

	Dr A Munarfah M, MS and Drs A Rizal Mappatunru, MSi	*Drs H Andi Harta Sanjaya and Drs H Syarifuddin Rauf, SH*	*Drs H Andi Soetomo, MSi and Drs Andi Sarimin Saransi*	*Ir H Bismirkin Manrulu and HA Burhanuddin T, SH, MSi*	*Informal*
Mario Riwawo	2,306	12,409	7,743	2,751	129
Liliriaja	2,636	5,566	9,239	2,669	96
Lilirilau	6,000	5,723	8,550	2,941	122
Lalabata	3,496	7,345	12,880	844	108
Ganra	1,108	1,609	3,808	399	21
Donri-Donri	1,961	5,489	5,725	853	53
Mario Riawa	3,297	7,245	4,989	1,194	106
Totals	20,804	45,386	52,934	11,651	635
Percentage of total votes	15.8	34.5	40.3	8.9	0.5
Total votes	131,400				

Source: KPUD Soppeng 2005.

kecamatan Lilirilau (Mappatunru, pers. comm. 27 March 2006; KPUD Soppeng 2005*a*). Finally, Bismirkin got a small 9 per cent of the total votes in the Soppeng *pilkada*.

As in Pangkep regency, the candidates' personal networks at the sub-district level seem to have been the decisive factor in winning the *pilkada* in Soppeng. A seemingly dominant party machine was levered successfully by a figure with a strong personal base in his district, which was the result of two decades of work as a bureaucrat in sub-district positions and an intensive campaign in the villages and hamlets years before the official campaign was to start. The incumbent, though in firm control of the top level of the strongest political party in the district, the bureaucracy, and large parts of the business community, was ousted from power since his personal network did not reach as far down in the *kabupaten* as the network of his more successful competitor. Finally, similar to *kabupaten* Pangkep, an affluent businessman who ran for office had limited chances of winning the elections due to the lack of a personal political base at the sub-district level. The vast amounts of money he spent during his campaign did not translate into local votes.

PILKADA IN PANGKEP AND SOPPENG COMPARED

An analysis of the sociological profiles of Syafruddin Nur and Andi Soetomo showed that both were well-grounded in their district. This allowed the two candidates to establish close-knit personal networks, which they capitalized on in the *pilkada*. Candidates who lacked such a popular base did not win in the *pilkada* in the districts examined. The incumbents in both districts were somewhat detached from their constituency and mainly interacted with the upper level of the party structures, the bureaucracy, and the business community in their respective districts. Likewise, businessmen who were wealthy, but without a popular base at the sub-district level, stood little to no chance of winning these local elections, as the cases of Fachruddin in Pangkep and Bismirkin in Soppeng showed.

While being downward-oriented now seems to be a necessity for any successful candidate, the nature of the relations to the upper levels in the institutional hierarchies appears to be changing as well. The provincial level these days seems to act as more of a facilitator for candidates who derive their power from being rooted in their respective populations rather than acting as a decisive factor in these local elections. This is in contrast to the New Order period in which the governor or the provincial level determined the local government head via the Local Assembly. In other words, while the provincial political arena is used as an additional source of financial support by players from the local political arena, political forces at the provincial level do not seem to be able to actively shape district electoral outcomes any longer. In fact, political players at the provincial level seem to have become more downward-oriented themselves. They are now more eager to provide financial support to popular local figures at the district level as these are figures whose personal networks will be much needed in future direct elections of governors. The current governor of South Sulawesi province, HM Amin Syam, is a striking example of provincial-level figures who have started to establish their own personal networks at sub-provincial levels. Syam, who had already announced in 2005 that he will be running again for the position of governor in the 2007 election (*Kompas*, 17 December 2005), not only supported candidates in the 2005 *pilkada* in the districts, but soon after the district elections ended, he created an expert team (*tim ahli*) at the governor's office. The team consisted of most of the candidates who finished second in the 2005 *pilkada* in South Sulawesi province.[19] It is their extensive personal networks that Syam relied on, in addition to the ones of the successful candidates he supported in the *pilkada*, to obtain votes in the 2007 gubernatorial elections.

While strong personal networks at the sub-district level seem to have been crucial to win local elections, parties played only a minor role in a candidate's fate. As the *pilkada* in *kabupaten* Pangkep and Soppeng demonstrated, parties often could neither provide lower-level party structures to their nominees nor could they guarantee the delivery of votes. This not only holds true for small parties that are largely disintegrated and defunct between elections, but also for seemingly well-integrated parties that received a considerable number of votes in past elections. In *kabupaten* Pangkep, for example, PPP, the second largest party in the DPRD after *pemilu* 2004, could not prevent its sub-district constituents from supporting another candidate, as in the case of Fachruddin. Similarly, in *kabupaten* Soppeng, the leadership of the Golkar party, which was the strongest party in the DPRD after *pemilu* 2004, could only watch as considerable parts of the party's sub-district levels broke away in favour of another candidate. Furthermore, as the case of Nur in Pangkep showed, even in cases where the candidate had united the party behind him, he did not have unrealistic hopes about the party's actual potential to mobilize voters. Nur, who was nominated by the Golkar party, by far the strongest party in the district according to results from the general election of 2004, nevertheless brought PAN and PKS into his coalition, although he already reached the required 15 per cent threshold by being nominated by Golkar alone. The fact that Nur formed more than a minimum winning coalition exemplifies that he had no false expectations regarding the voter mobilization possible through the Golkar party. In short, for candidates who already have firm roots in their respective districts, strong parties may act as an additional source for yielding results, and weak parties do not necessarily prevent candidates from winning the elections.

Additionally, the election laws of 2004, which required candidates to be nominated by parties provided the latter with a strategic position from which to impose financial demands on the candidates, as already noted elsewhere (Hillman 2006).[20] As the example of Mansur and Tualle showed, prospective candidates without sufficient financial resources do not get nominated. However, the fact that certain candidates are prevented from running for office in the *pilkada* is the unintended consequence of the parties' financial demands rather than the result of a party strategy of any kind. In other words, as parties demand money from the prospective candidates, they act as early blockers or facilitators by default. Overall, it is important to note that parties only played a minor role in shaping the outcome of the *pilkada* in the two *kabupaten* examined in this chapter and that they do not have much power to shape the local contests beyond skimming off candidates early in the electoral process.

Finally, money was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for winning the 2005 *pilkada* in Pangkep and Soppeng. Running for the post of *bupati* is an extremely expensive undertaking. Being wealthy does not guarantee a win, however. Affluent candidates without a popular network in the sub-districts did not win the *pilkada*; such was the case of Fachruddin in Pangkep and Bismirkin in Soppeng. In other words, "money politics" alone did not yield votes in the districts compared in this chapter.

SOUTH SULAWESI AND BEYOND

Many of the observations from the districts examined above find their equivalent in the wider political arena of South Sulawesi and other provinces of the archipelago. Studies on the 2005 *pilkada* in Batam (Choi 2005), Papua, North Sumatra, North Sulawesi (Mietzner 2006*a*, *b*, *c*, see also his chapter in this volume) and East Sumba (Vel 2005) provide examples and evidence that political figures who were known by the people at the local level successfully won in the 2005 *pilkada*.

At the same time, seemingly powerful party machines were rendered dysfunctional by individuals with strong personal networks all over South Sulawesi province. This is best shown by the fact that Golkar lost 50 per cent of the elections in South Sulawesi, a region that once was the party's stronghold (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2004, 2005). Golkar's fate in various *pilkada* of 2005 in the wider political arena of Indonesia provides further evidence of the disintegration of seemingly powerful party machines, as mentioned above. Many district heads of the local Golkar party who were unpopular in their districts clung to their power position within the party and pressed for nomination, subsequently leading the party into defeat. According to a Golkar internal document from April 2006, the party lost 63 per cent of all *pilkada* in Indonesia in 2005 and 50 per cent of all *pilkada* carried out in the first four months of 2006 (Golkar DPP 2006).

High-ranking Golkar officials at both the provincial and national levels stated in interviews that they were caught by surprise by the dynamics of the *pilkada* for which the party was apparently ill-prepared (Parenrengi, pers. comm. 29 March 2006; Rulli, pers. comm. 3 April 2006). According to Rulli, the Golkar party's Deputy Secretary General, the party missed the opportunity to nominate appropriate figures in many districts. This was seen as a consequence of the national Golkar party's loss of control over the nomination processes of its local party branches (Rulli, pers. comm. 29 March 2006). How profoundly the dynamics created by the *pilkada* and described above have impacted on party machines is shown by a statement by

Sumarsono, the Secretary General of the National Golkar Party, made during an interview with a newspaper in March 2006 on the question of why Golkar continues to lose *pilkada* in so many districts:

> Why did they [the Golkar candidates] not succeed? Data from our evaluation shows that the candidates who won *pilkada* are those who were known by the people. There were several candidates who didn't sell themselves properly. Therefore, it is not the party that is the decisive factor in the victory of a candidate. This is a reason to nominate candidates from outside the party who can sell themselves (…) Hence, there are about 6 to 7 people we evaluate. After this, the results are examined. Also, the perception of Golkar in a region is examined in this survey. Are Golkar cadre better [perceived by the population] than figures from outside the party? If there is only a small difference in perceptions, we will go with our cadre. However, if there is a big difference, it is better to nominate a figure from outside the party. (translated from *Fajar*, 31 March 2006).[21]

In short, in many districts and provinces across Indonesia, the dynamics created by the *pilkada* have degraded the once dominant Golkar machine to court individuals with strong personal followings in their districts.

As a reaction to the new realities on the ground, the party publicly announced that the old days are over when Golkar party heads could expect to automatically be the Golkar candidate in upcoming elections (*Fajar*, 31 March 2006). At the same time, the central party board in Jakarta is trying to regain control over the local nomination process of the party's candidates for upcoming *pilkada*. In this vein, the central party board cut back the voting power of the district branches in the nomination process for *pilkada* candidates from 65 per cent down to 20 per cent, as a comparison of the party's internal voting regulations before and after 2005 *pilkada* shows (Golkar DPP 2005*a*, p. 28 Paragraph 1c; Golkar DPP 2005*b*, p. 32, Paragraph 5d). This change will allow the party to nominate figures with a popular base in their respective districts instead of detached local Golkar elites if there is a need.

Finally, also in the wider context of South Sulawesi, money seems to be a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition to win *pilkada*. As a comparison of data on the candidate's personal wealth with their respective election results shows, it was not the most affluent candidates who won 2005 *pilkada* in most of the districts of South Sulawesi. While businessmen seem to be increasingly able to penetrate the nomination process for elections (Magenda 2005, p. 75), they do not seem to be able — yet — to win these contests to

a similar degree, often due to the lack of a firm rooting in the district in which they are running for office.

CONCLUSION

An analysis of the candidates' socio-economic backgrounds showed that old elites who have their origins in the New Order period were able to maintain their power positions to a great extent. The *pilkada* imposed new rules on these elites, however, and triggered fierce intra-elite competition at the local level. Some figures within these old elites were better positioned for the interest group realignments that unfolded during the *pilkada* in 2005, either because of their career background or their ability to anticipate the new dynamics created by direct elections, and thus acted accordingly.

In both districts examined above, it was political figures who were rooted in their districts who won. The fact that many of these candidates were successful in *direct* local elections but could not win elections via the DPRD in 1999 is an indication that the *pilkada* increasingly allow people from the lower rungs of the aforementioned old elite to ascend to power. Against this backdrop, it would be too simplistic to argue that the 2005 *pilkada* outcomes reflect the mere continuation of the New Order *status quo* in Indonesian local politics. In many cases, the *pilkada* seem to have indeed brought government closer to the people. Whether this results in more democratic politics remains to be seen.

Notes

[1] An initial version of this chapter was presented at a conference titled "Local District Elections, Indonesia 2005: A Multi-Disciplinary Analysis of the Process of Democratization and Localization in an Era of Globalization", 17–18 May 2006, NUS, Singapore. A revised version was subsequently published in *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs* Vol. 41, No. 1 (2007): 119–47.

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[2] On 23 July 2007, the Constitutional Court overruled this article in the autonomy law, allowing candidates to run in local elections without a party nomination. The debate is ongoing.

[3] In Indonesia overall, 40 per cent of the incumbents were not re-elected (Mietzner 2006*a*, p. 18).

[4] The candidates provide information about their personal wealth to the KPUD. This self-reported data, however, may be incomplete or inaccurate, and has thus to be analysed with caution.

[5] For example, Dermaga Maccini Baji Labakkang, 14–15 August 2004; Laskar Muda Pendukung Ir. H. Syafruddin Nur (LMPS), 12 June 2004 Parang Luara; Laskar Muda Pendukung Ir. H. Syafruddin Nur (LMPS), 12 June 2004, Taraweang; Laskar Muda Pendukung Ir. H. Syafruddin Nur (LMPS), 20 June 2004 Panaikang.

[6] For example, Kelompok Pecinta Alam Tropica Kegiatan Bakti Sosial Masjid Darussalam Tompo Bulu, 27 June 2004; Kelompok Pecinta Alam Tropica Kegiatan Cross Country and Games Parang Luara-Tompo Bulu, 25–27 June 2004; 'Race on the Beach', 14–15 August 2004.

[7] For example, according to Paharuddin Nur, the Vice Chairman (Wakil Ketua) of the Golkar party Pangkep, Syafruddin Nur would pay the costs of the annual festivities to celebrate the founding of Golkar Pangkep or plane tickets for Golkar cadres for travels to Jakarta (Nur, pers. comm. 14 March 2006).

[8] Nur's close links to the contracting industry were apparently established during his time as the head of the Department for Public Works, a government department that carries out transportation and infrastructure work. This position arguably also allowed Nur to accumulate considerable personal wealth given the numerous opportunities for corruption in the infrastructure sector in Indonesia.

[9] Udir, the head of Nur's campaign team, for example, is the owner of a contracting company and the older brother of Ratna Sari, a member of KPUD Pangkep.

[10] The head of KPUD Pangkep, Amir Anin, for example, was a long-standing business partner of Patappe. Anin, owning an electricity company, received many lucrative tenders during the time Patappe was governing, such as the project to supply electricity to the islands of kabupaten Pangkep, according to several interviewees.

[11] Fachruddin ran on a Golkar ticket in *pemilu* 2004 DPRD I in DP4 (Daerah Pemilihan-Wilayah 4) in South Sulawesi province (Aidir, pers. comm. 24 January 2006; Fachruddin, pers. comm. 14 March 2006).

[12] According to a Golkar member who followed the party internal convention, only Syafruddin Nur and Zaenal Abidin, the former district government head of *kabupaten* Takalar, were proposed as candidates (Hanafi, pers. comm. 13 March 2006).

[13] In an interview, Fachruddin mentioned that he made several trips to the sub-district heads of PPP Pangkep, on whom a recommendation letter suggesting a prospective candidate to the party centre in Jakarta depends. Fachruddin also met with party representatives at both the provincial and national levels (Fachruddin, pers. comm. 14 March 2006). Meanwhile, Arfan Tualle, the candidate mentioned above, according to his own accounts, was asked for

US$25,000 by the heads of PPP from the party centre for being nominated. Tualle, who expanded the party base considerably in Pangkep in his position as head of the Board for Good Order in the General Election (Bappilu-Badan Pemenangan Pemilu) in 2004, was disappointed that the party centre still asked him for such a large sum of money despite him working for the party's cause for years (Tualle, pers. comm. 22 April 2006).

[14] Fachruddin stated that he spent "much more" than US$200,000 on his official campaign alone (Fachruddin, pers. comm. 14 March 2006).

[15] Musa, the head of KPUD Soppeng, is Soetomo's second cousin (Soetomo, pers. comm. 24 March 2006; Musa, pers. comm. 16 March 2006).

[16] In 1999, for example, Soetomo was the head of the Board for the Good Order in the General Election (Bappilu-Badan Pemenangan Pemilu) of the Golkar party Soppeng and "pulled the strings" for the party at the sub-district level for *pemilu* 2004 (Mallari, pers. comm. 28 March 2006).

[17] Soetomo worked as a village head in Ganra 1978–85, as a sub-district head in Liliriaja 1989–95, and again as a sub-district head in Liliriau 1995–97 (KPUD 2005*a*; Soetomo, pers. comm. 24 March 2006).

[18] Harta Sanjaya was born in Mario Riawa, and Harta Sanjaya's niece is married to the sub-district head of Mario Riwawo (Mallari, pers. comm. 26 April 2006).

[19] The governor's "expert team" currently includes figures who lost in 2005 *pilkada* in kabupaten Selayar, Bulukumba, Maros, Luwu Utara Gowa and Soppeng (Rauf, pers. comm. 27 March 2006).

[20] According to my own interviews with candidates, party heads, DPRD members, and KPUD representatives, a candidate faces costs of US$100,000–300,000 for the party nomination alone. Again, based on personal communications, a conservative estimate of the total costs a candidate in *pilkada* faces (such as party nomination, campaigning, and reimbursement of *tim sukses*) is between US$500,000 and US$700,000. This is an average calculated from interview data in the resource-poor districts of South Sulawesi. The prices are undoubtedly much higher in resource-rich *kabupaten* where the return-on-investment, once a candidate is in office, is likely to be larger. Anecdotal evidence from East Kalimantan, for example, shows that candidates there face minimum costs of about US$700,000 (*Pare Pos*, 11 June 2005).

[21] Mengapa mereka [the Golkar candidates] tidak lolos? Setelah dievaluasi, kita mendapatkan data bahwa dalam Pilkada langsung, yang menang adalah figure dikenal rakyat. Ada beberapa figur yang tidak layak jual. Jadi dalam hal ini, bukan partai yang menetukan kemenangan seorang figur. Hal inilah yang mendasari untuk mengambil figur dari luar partai yang layak jual (…) Jadi ada sekitar 6 hingga 7 orang yang disurvei. Setelah itu, hasilnya akan dilihat. Dan portret Golkar di satu daerah akan terlihat dari hasil survei itu. Apakah kader Golkar lebih baik dari tokoh di luar Golkar. Kalau perbedaanya sedikit, kita akan mempertahankan kader kita. Tapi kalau jauh, maka lebih baik mengambil tokoh dari luar.

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PILKADA, MONEY POLITICS AND THE DANGERS OF "INFORMAL GOVERNANCE" PRACTICES

Syarif Hidayat

INTRODUCTION

Since mid-2002 (approximately one year after the implementation of Law No. 22/1999), discussions on decentralization and regional autonomy policies in Indonesia began to focus on the realities of so-called *otonomi kebablasan* (over-exaggerated autonomy) vs. *otonomi setengah hati* (half-hearted autonomy).[1] Polemics on this issue started to penetrate upwards in early 2003, due to the agreement of various involved parties on the necessity to revise Law No. 22/1999, agreed to be the most effective remedy to end the practices of *over-exaggerated* and *half-hearted* regional autonomy. By 2004 the debate on the urgency of revising Law No. 22 faded somewhat from public discourse because of the interest stirred by the direct presidential election. Then, in October 2004, after the election of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla as president and vice president, the government together with the DPR (National Assembly) decreed Law No. 32/2004 to replace Law No. 22/1999.[2]

Substantially, one of the important changes instigated by Law No. 32/2004 is the implementation of the so-called *sistem pilkada langsung* (a direct election system for local government heads). In following up the performance of this constitutional mandate, the central government decided to carry out the direct elections immediately, starting in mid-2005. This

decision has been valued by many observers as a "big step", and a fundamental reform, towards a more democratic local government in Indonesia. However, it is also possible to conceive of a number of factors which could, directly or indirectly, threaten the attainment of that expectation. Amongst other things are the dangers of so-called "money politics" (during the *pilkada* process), and "informal governance" practices in the post-*pilkada* period.

Theoretically, it has been contended that the implementation of a direct election system for local government heads would bring a number of promises to the establishment of a democratic local government, or what many scholars have currently labelled as "local good governance" (Arghiros 2001; Smith 1985). Decentralization policy, it is believed, pushes the central government to disperse its power and authority to local governments. Meanwhile, directly electing local government heads allows the attainment of an accountable local government, as a corollary, thus leading local governments to be more responsive to the demands of their communities. Thus, together decentralization and a direct election system have been seen as a way of reducing the power and size of swollen central state bureaucracies, and of improving accountability for development planning and spending at a more local level.

However, I would argue that theoretical arguments regarding the value of a direct election system above (including the *pilkada*) become meaningful only when the direct election system is analysed from a "substantive democracy" perspective, that is when so-called "democratic behaviour" exists both within the realm of local state actors and within society at the regional level (Ostrom 1991; Oyugi 2000). "Democratic behaviour" means that the majority of voters (society) qualitatively possess enough knowledge of politics that they will make sure that their vote is given to the right candidate, and their decision to vote is based on rational political considerations. I suggest that this "substantive democracy assumption" is less relevant as a conceptual framework for understanding Indonesia's *pilkada* since there is a relatively low standard, or even the absence, of democratic behaviour both in the realm of state actors and within society in general.

The question then is what are the possible dangers of executing a direct *pilkada* system when "democratic behaviour" is relatively absent in reality? This paper attempts to answer this question, beginning with briefly casting light on the rationality of implementing a direct *pilkada* system, then proceeding to illuminate its implication towards money politics practices, as well as the dangers of informal governance practices in the post-*pilkada* period.

DECENTRALIZATION AND THE DIRECT *PILKADA* SYSTEM: EXPECTATIONS VS. REALITY

Conceptually, the urgency of implementing a direct *pilkada* is closely related to the efforts to realize the basic goals of decentralization, namely the creation of a democratic local government and the enhancement of society welfare. Although at the theoretical level a direct relationship between decentralization policy and efforts to put into place democracy and social welfare continues to be debated (Oyugi 2000), academics are still convinced that a system where the people directly elect their local leaders is among the better ways to embody local good governance, and to develop people's sovereignty.

Brian Smith (1985) explicitly states that the direct election of local government heads, as well as the members of the local representative council, is one of the most important requirements to actualize an accountable and responsive local government, and to build up what he calls "political equality" at the local level. Arghiros (2001) similarly points out that the expectations of a decentralization policy are that it reduces the power of the central government, while direct elections create a means by which an accountable and responsive local government can be achieved. Arghiros (2001) argues that while in reality a directly elected local government head does not always prove more accountable and responsive compared to a non-elected local government head, procedurally at least, a direct election system is better than a non-elected one.

However, one should be aware that direct elections and the presence of democratic local governance are not absolutely correlated; there are still other factors that are the determinant variables which influence the achievement of a democratic local government system, even when a direct election system has been put into place. One of these determinant variables is what has been called by Ostrom (1991) and Oyugi (2000) "democratic behaviour", or what Ostrom (1991) calls the "spirit" of democracy. This democratic behaviour should be well established at both institutional and apparatus levels, as well as in the realm of society. Case (2002) argues that if democratic practices are only involved in strengthening the democratic institutions (such as introducing direct elections), then this type of democracy is procedural democracy, and has not yet reached the level of substantive democracy. This perspective then looks at the move towards democracy as a transition, as a process where a political system changes or transforms from merely a democracy of form and procedure towards a substantive democracy that is more substantial. Or in other words, transition towards democracy is not, as is conventionally thought,

a simple process or change from an authoritarian political system towards a democratic political system, but instead is achieved step by step.

Returning to the implementation of the direct *pilkada* system in Indonesia, if we assume that Indonesia is at the present time in a transition towards democracy, what then are the implications of direct elections? One of the basic characteristics of the transition towards democracy is the still relative lack of democratic behaviour on the part of state actors, as well as at the societal level.[3] As a result, the political process is still strongly dominated by interaction, competition, and compromise of interests among state actors, on the one side, and societal actors,[4] on the other. In these circumstances, even though the direct *pilkada* is carried out, it would be difficult to deny afterwards that the election process in itself, as well as the performance of local governance after the election (post-*pilkada*), will be heavily coloured by competition and compromise of interests among the elites.

Meanwhile, on the part of the wider society, because the majority do not fully understand the importance of political participation in the *pilkada*, it is certain that most of the voters would base their political decisions more on pragmatic considerations; for example, what material benefits can be gained directly from the candidates for local district head, and who and in what way are the societal figures affiliated to such candidates. It is in this context that we reach the theoretical justification of why money politics, for instance, becomes important in the effort to mobilize the constituents.

The features of local governance, particularly the performance of the elected local government heads in the post-*pilkada* period, will be closely related to what happened during the *pilkada* process itself. If the *pilkada* process was heavily coloured by political and business alliances, it will not be surprising that in the post-*pilkada*, the elected local government head (*kepala daerah*) will dedicate more of his loyalty to his political and business clients instead of his constituents. If this is the case, theoretically among the most common dangers is the emergence of so-called "informal governance" practices: a government which performs under the control of strong social, economic, and political forces that operate outside the formal government structure. William Reno (1995) and Barbara Harris White (1999) have labelled these informal governance practices a "shadow state" and an "informal economy" respectively.

In brief, the correlation between the *pilkada* process and the performance of a day-to-day governance in the post-*pilkada* period is illustrated in Figure 6.1.

FIGURE 6.1
Inter-Correlation between *Pilkada* Process and the Performance of Local Government in the Post *Pilkada*



PILKADA AND THE PRACTICE OF MONEY POLITICS

As discussed previously, in conditions where the majority of the constituents are parochial in their political culture, and there is a relative lack of democratic behaviour on the part of state actors, it would be difficult to avoid mobilizing supporters through idolized figures and money politics practices.

In the case of money politics, for instance, based upon data compiled by the Indonesian Corruption Watch, ICW (2005), it is clear that this practice has continued to exist in the process of *pilkada* in Indonesia. Money politics practices started from the process of nomination, during the campaign, up to "D" day itself, when the votes were cast and counted. The pattern of money politics varies, but in general can be grouped into two main categories: "direct" and "indirect" money politics.

Direct money politics is generally in the form of cash payments given by candidates for local government head positions to individuals or institutions. The value differs from area to area. A few examples are provided in Table 6.1 illustrating the practice of direct money politics in the *pilkada* during the year 2005.

TABLE 6.1
Examples of Direct Money Politics Practices in the 2005 Pilkada

Modus for money politics	*Case/location*
1. Cash payments from Rp10,000 up to Rp30,000 (per person) by the success team of the local government head candidates to certain potential constituents during the *pilkada* campaign and before election day.	City of Semarang, City of Depok, City of Pekalongan, and Kediri District
2. Cash payment of Rp6.1 billion by one of the local government head candidates to one of the political parties as the disbursement of "boat rent"* and campaign costs.	*Pilkada* in Malang District
3. The drawing of a sum of money (Rp10 million) by the political party coalition from candidates for *bupati* (regent) who needed a "boat", and the request for ready funds amounting to Rp10 million for campaign costs (10 per cent of these funds is dedicated to the party treasury).	*Pilkada* in Sleman District
4. The drawing of "boat rent" (Rp500 million up to Rp1 billion) by certain political parties from the candidate to be promoted.	*Pilkada* in South Konawe District
5. The disbursement of Rp30 million by one of the local government head candidates to each political party leader.	*Pilkada* in South Konawe District
6. Cash payment of Rp5 million/person to every functionary member of one of the political parties by one of the candidates for local government head as part of "boat rent" funds.	*Pilkada* in South Kalimantan Province
7. Cash payment of Rp2 million for the building of a mosque by one of the candidates for local government head.	*Pilkada* in Asahan District
8. Disbursement of Rp15 million by one of the candidates for local government heads to one of the KPU (general election committee) functionaries.	*Pilkada* in North Sulawesi Province

Note: *) "Boat rent" is the popular terminology used by political activists and observers to label the payment (rent) by each candidate for local government head/vice local government head to the political party nominating the *pilkada* candidates. This is due to Law No. 32/2004 and governmental regulations for the *pilkada*, obliging the nomination of a local government head/vice local government head by a political party.
Source: processed from Indonesian Corruption Watch data (2005).

Likewise, in the context of indirect money politics, a number of variations could also be found in these practices. Substantially the difference between direct money politics and indirect money politics lies in the form of material objects given by the candidates. While the material object in direct money politics is cash, the material objects given in indirect money politics are goods.

Goods used in indirect money politics payments are those possessing high use value, as well as high exchange value. It is thus understandable that products included in the "nine basic needs" (*sembilan bahan kebutuhan pokok — sembako*)[5] have become prime commodities used as indirect money politics payments. While the candidates also present other goods, they are more contextual, since the goods given must be adjusted to the specific needs of the target group. To get a more comprehensive picture of this matter, Table 6.2 presents some examples of indirect money politics practices during the 2005 *pilkada*.

TABLE 6.2
Examples of Indirect Money Politics Practice in the 2005 Pilkada

Modus of Money Politics	*Case/Location*
1. Distribution of gifts and door prizes like: motor bikes, refrigerators, televisions, irons, etc. by the success team of one of the candidates for local government head.	*Pilkada* in the city of Semarang
2. The distribution of 1,000 shirts by the success team of one of the candidates for local government head.	*Pilkada* in the city of Semarang
3. Distribution of *sembako* (nine basic needs), cassettes and wall clocks by the success team of one of the local government head candidates.	*Pilkada* in the Kutai Kerta Negara District
4. *Sembako* distribution by the success team of one of the local government head candidates.	*Pilkada* in Pangkajene District
5. Free medical treatment run by the success team of one of the candidates for local government head.	*Pilkada* in Barru Islands District
6. Distribution of cement and 25 trucks of plaster calcium by one of the candidates for local government head.	*Pilkada* in Bandung District
7. Distribution of the Al-Quran by one of the candidates for local government head.	*Pilkada* in Indramayu District
8. Distribution of sports equipment and calendars by one of the local government head candidates.	*Pilkada* in the province of South East Sulawesi

Source: Processed from ICW data (2005).

It is clear from these tables that money politics practices (direct as well as indirect) have coloured the *pilkada* process. The existence of money politics demands a strong financial base, and the individual financial capacity of each candidate for government head may not be sufficient; it is in this context that we see the rationality of entrepreneurs becoming involved in the *pilkada*. They are needed by each candidate in order to accumulate enough financial capital.

What are the implications of the involvement of "political investors" in the *pilkada* process on the performance of elected local government heads in the post-*pilkada* period? The discussion in the next two sections will attempt to answer this question. First I will look at several studies where other authors have suggested the dangers of "informal governance", and then I will present two cases from my own research in Banten and Jambi provinces.

THE DANGERS OF INFORMAL GOVERNANCE PRACTICES

In the study of state–society relations, the existence of informal governance practices is actually not something new. At a theoretical level, discussion among scholars on the phenomena of the "shadow state", for instance, had already come to the surface in the 1990s. William Reno (1995), for example, writes about "shadow state" practices in his study of Sierra Leone, Africa. Elsewhere, Barbara Harris White (1999) writes about the inter-correlation between "informal economics" and "shadow state" practices, referring to her findings in India.

In the Indonesian context, particularly in the post-New Order period, there have been few critical analyses of "shadow state" practices. Henk Schulte-Nordholt (2003) is one observer who has explicitly mentioned the possibility of shadow state practices at the regional level in the context of decentralization and regional autonomy policies in the past-Soeharto period. He writes:

> [D]ecentralization in Indonesia does not necessarily result in democratization, good governance, and strengthening of civil society at the regional level. Instead we witness a decentralization of corruption, collusion/ and political violence that once belonged to the centralized regime of the New Order but is now moulded in existing patrimonial patterns at the regional level (Schulte-Nordholt 2003, p. 572).
>
> On the whole, regional leadership may take the shape of what John Sidel (1999) has called bossism, which operates in regional shadow regimes characterized by alliances of bureaucrats, party bosses, businesspeople, military and criminals (Schulte-Nordholt 2003, p. 579).

William Reno (1995) gives a more comprehensive theoretical and empirical discussion of shadow state practices in his in-depth study of Sierra Leone. He has also forwarded a critical review on the strengths and weaknesses of the shadow state itself as an approach to illuminating the reality of African governments in particular, and developing countries in general. In short, Reno writes, the existence of a shadow state cannot be separated from the existence of informal market practices, i.e. legally proscribed production and exchange that contribute no revenues to government (Reno 1995, p. 1). Whereas a shadow state itself has been defined by Reno as "the emergence of rulers drawing authority from their abilities to control markets and their material rewards" (Reno 1995, p. 3).

Among the *modus operandi* of informal market practices is state actors inviting investors (national and foreign) to join in the shadow state network; in return, those businessmen get protection through formal authority owned by state actors (Reno 1995, pp. 2–3). It is obvious that economic and political "deals" have been reached between officials and businessmen without the necessity of going through formal state institutions. What we see here is "politicians and a few businessmen without state office exercising significant political authority through private control of resources" (Reno 1995, p. 1).

Barbara Harris White's (1999) work on informal economy and shadow state practices in India is also very interesting. According to Harris White, there are at least two types of informal economy practices. The first has to do with individuals and/or companies being unregistered and thus not paying taxes to the state. The second has to do with behaviour, that is the attempt of formal institutions (public as well as private) to avoid regulations. This includes: laxness of tax collection, misuse of public policies, corruption, collusion, and enforced privatization of state assets (Harris White 1999, p. 4). From those two categories of informal economy activities above, it can be suggested that the first form is an arena for the "little men", farmers and small entrepreneurs, while the second form is the domain of the "big men", big entrepreneurs and state actors. Thus, based upon her findings, Harris White suggests a majority of economic transactions in India are done through an informal economy mechanism. There are various non-state instruments supporting the continuity of these informal economy practices: "the use of trusted family labour; bilateral and multilateral contracts (especially repeated and interlocked contracts); individual and collective institutions; an inconsistent normative pluralism; and private protection forces" (Harris White 1999, pp. 4–5). Further on, when discussing shadow state practices in India, Harris White explains:

> Some elements of the shadow state are played simultaneously by real state players. Other shadow state livelihoods are a form of self employment, though they depend on state employees, politicians and other interested social forces for their incomes, e.g. private armies enforcing black or corrupt contracts, intermediaries, technical fixers, gatekeepers, adjudicators of disputes, confidants, consultants and chore performers.
>
> Hence the real state with its shadow is bigger than the formal state and has a vested interest in the perpetuation of a stricken and porous state. The shadow state spills spatially into the lanes surrounding offices and into the private (some argue the "female") domestic space of an official's residence. This must be the most vivid image of the blurred boundaries between state and society. (Harris White Lecture 5/Chapter 6, p. 15).

By following the theoretical discussion, as well as empirical experiences of Africa and India above, there are at least four general characteristics of "informal market" and "shadow state" that can be documented. First, informal markets and shadow states exist as a result of the decay of formal (state) institutions, and this situation gets worse if accompanied by an acute economic crisis. Second, accumulation of short-term political and economic benefits outside the framework of formal regulations is the main target of "transactions" through the informal market. In this context each actor attempts to maximize the resources he has as tools for exchange. Third, there are variations in the work mechanism of the informal market and shadow state, which are generally through manipulation of public policies, or maximizing individual and institutional alliances. Fourth, the actors involved in the informal market and shadow state are state actors and societal actors. Schulte-Nordholt (2003) talks about, for example, entrepreneurs, politicians, political parties, and even criminal groups, while Reno (1995) accentuates more on entrepreneurs and Harris White (1999) explores the role of the entrepreneur and other society elites grouped by caste, class, and gender.

Overall, referring to the above four characteristics, it can be concluded that the "shadow state" (or more specifically the "shadow government") and an "informal economy" will exist when formal government institutions fail to carry out their functions. The main cause of this condition is because the state elite lose their power in the face of dominant social, economic, and political influences outside the government structure. As a consequence, in reality the execution of day-to-day government is much more under the control of "informal authorities" outside the government structure than by formal authorities within the governmental structure.

INFORMAL GOVERNANCE PRE-*PILKADA* SYSTEM: THE BANTEN CASE

This first case does not look directly at the relationship between *pilkada* and informal governance practices, but instead is presented to provide a general picture of the existence of informal governance practices in the period before the implementation of Indonesia's direct election system.

Banten was the first of the five new provinces established after the enactment of Laws No. 22 and 25 of 1999 on regional autonomy.[6] Banten was officially separated from West Java in October 2000 by the ratification of Law No. 23/2000. The administrative area of Banten covers four regencies (Serang, Pandeglang, Lebak, and Tangerang), and two cities (Tangerang and Cilegon). Serang was picked as the capital city of Banten province.[7] As with the establishment of other new provinces and regencies with the application of regional autonomy, it was hoped that Banten would become more prosperous, peaceful, and democratic with its own local government. But unfortunately this optimism proved baseless as soon as the formal government of the new province started to carry out its functions. This happened because the formal state elite (especially the governor and his deputy) were left almost powerless to face social, economic, and political forces outside the formal governmental structure.

Some resource persons interviewed, for instance, said that the government of the Banten province became "nearly lame" in carrying out its functions because there were informal powers controlling the governor.[8] Furthermore, HOS[9] (a member of the provincial assembly) explicitly stated that there is, at present, a kind of "private government" led by a *jawara* (strongman) who is also a big businessman. This "private government", HOS explained, is in control of the provincial government, especially in terms of the economy. The members of this "shadow government" have not only monopolized nearly all provincial government projects, but they have also given direction, or even put pressure upon the provincial government, to accommodate their interests when the annual development programme is in the planning phase. Another informant, BOB, an academic at the Tirtayasa University,[10] related that informal governance practices exist not only in the economic sector, but also in the bureaucratic sector, particularly in determining promotion and personnel replacements within the structure of the provincial government.

"*Jawara-pengusaha*" is the popular name used by observers in Banten to label individuals or business groups who possess a dominant influence on provincial officials in Banten.[11] "Tuan Besar"[12] is one of the important actors in the circle of *jawara-pengusaha*. Since the 1980s Tuan Besar has

been known as a top businessman in the construction field. When Banten was part of West Java province, Tuan Besar was well connected to the West Java government officials, and frequently was trusted to carry out construction projects for the West Java provincial government. Meanwhile, the status of Tuan Besar as a *jawara* (strongman) has not only come from hereditary connections (his father and grandfather are also known as *jawara*), but has also resulted from his role as the founder of one of the *jawara* organizations in Banten. Furthermore, Tuan Besar is also one of the senior politicians of the Golkar party.

In an effort to dig deeper into the influence of "informal authority" in the performance of local government in the Banten province, I then decided to focus on the case of *premanisme proyek* ("project racketeering"). This case has its roots in the monopolistic practices in the execution of physical infrastructure projects for the Banten provincial government during fiscal year 2003. From the information written in the Work Unit Budget Document (Dokumen Anggaran Satuan Kerja, DASK) of Banten's Regional Budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah, APBD), it is known that the total value of the construction budget for Banten province in fiscal year 2003, both that financed from the APBD and from the National Budget (Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Negara, APBN), was approximately Rp35 billion.[13] From this budget, the Banten provincial government financed numerous physical and non-physical development projects which reached a total value of approximately Rp18 billion (51.4 per cent of the province's total development budget for that year).[14]

According to Presidential Decree (Keputusan Presiden, Keppres) No. 18/2000, specifically in Article 12(2), the procurement of contracting goods/services and other services shall be done through tender. Indeed, in formal terms nearly all the Banten provincial government's development projects during fiscal year 2003 were implemented through tender. However, as indicated by HOS,[15] many of these tenders were simply formalities to comply with the administrative procedures. In reality, HOS continued, the tender winner had already been determined.

Tuan Besar played an important role in influencing the Tender Committee and other important personages. His *modus operandi* varied from informal lobbying of local officials and distribution of "envelopes" (bribes), to physical intimidation. It is difficult to know the precise value of the projects managed directly by Tuan Besar. He owns several companies not registered in his name, and often uses other companies that he does not own as a strategy for winning tenders. Even so, as HOS pointed out, in general Tuan Besar is interested mostly in physical construction projects. Tuan Besar is among the top entrepreneurs in the lucrative construction sector.

For projects not carried out by Tuan Besar himself or allocated to business operators in his group, a project fee of 10–11 per cent of the project value was levied. The percentages of these project fees, by category of activity and source of financing, can be seen in Table 6.3.

TABLE 6.3
Project Fees by Category of Activity and Source of Funds

Project classification	*Project Fees by source of funds (%)*	
	APBD[a]	*APBN*[b]
Road and highway projects	10	11
Irrigation projects	11	11
Building construction projects	10	10
Procurement projects	10	10

Notes:
a. Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah - "Regional Budget"
b. Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Nasional- "National Budget".
Source: This information is quoted from a circular letter sent on 12 April 2002 to a business operator who was to perform a project with classification K-1.

Overall, the above *premanisme proyek* case suggests that there have been considerable informal political and economic forces in the execution of local governance in Banten province. This occurs mainly because the governor of the Banten province and his deputy face a great many problems in running the provincial government because of the looming presence of people such as Tuan Besar, who took the role of "political and financial sponsor" for these two provincial officials during the gubernatorial election.

INFORMAL GOVERNANCE POST-*PILKADA* SYSTEM: THE JAMBI CASE

Jambi was the first province in Indonesia to hold the direct *pilkada* for governor (pemilihan gubernur, *pilgub*) on 26 June 2005. In this election Zulkifli Nurdin and Anthony Zeidra Abidin emerged as winners, receiving 995,792 votes, which was 80.3 per cent of the total (Monitoring Committee on Jambi's Governor and Vice Governor Election, 2005 p. 23). As soon as Jambi's elected governor and vice governor assumed their positions, there were indications of collusion between local government officials and entrepreneurs. An important issue that heated up local politics considerably

from the end of 2005 till February 2006 was the "Water Boom case" — the construction of a tourist and recreation park located in the south of Jambi. This case attracted public interest because it was suspected that the Water Boom project involved a triangle of collusion between entrepreneurs, the governor, and the chairman of the Jambi Legislative Assembly (DPRD) (*Jambi Independent*, 13 January 2006).

In accordance with the feasibility study of the Jambi Tourist and Recreation Park (2006), the total area to be used was approximately 33 hectares. On this land a number of tourist and recreation facilities were to be constructed, among them a playground, entertainment facilities, a water boom park, a zoo, and other tourist supporting facilities (2006, p. 11). The time span needed to finish the construction of this park was 27 months, starting from the beginning of 2005. A total investment of Rp121.7 billion was required and it was to come from the Jambi Provincial Annual Budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah, APBD) (Feasibility Study Document 2006, p. 22).

In July 2005, a memorandum of understanding (MoU) had been signed between the Jambi provincial government and an entrepreneurial partner, PT Karya Restu owned by Sudiro Lesmana (a Jakarta businessman). Then, on 14 December 2005, a joint work contract was signed between the Jambi provincial government and PT Laksana Aneka Sarana as the construction firm that won the tender.[16] No more than two days after the signing of the contract with PT Laksana Aneka Sarana Rp4 billion was disbursed from the provincial budget for the construction of this tourist and recreation park. Then, on 28 December 2005, another Rp2.4 billion was allocated out of the provincial budget (*Jambi Independent*, 4 January 2006). In January 2006, with this Rp6.4 billion investment, the piling and flattening of the water boom park site at Taman Rimba, Paal Merah was completed.

After the signing of the joint work contract for park construction and with the disbursement of provincial budget funds on 16 December 2005, university students and NGO activists started to protest. One reason for their criticism of the Jambi Tourist and Recreation Project — popularly called the "Water Boom Project" — was because this development was not an urgent need for Jambi society at large. There would have been no criticism if the building of this tourist and recreation site was to be financed by a private investor; however, since the funds were allocated out of the province's budget it was considered a massive waste of the province's finances.[17] Hence starting in mid-December 2005, the "Water Boom" case was thrust into public discourse. Complaints were directed to the Jambi Legislative Assembly (DPRD), but the chairman of the assembly, Zoerman Manaf, was unresponsive.

In one of his press releases, Zoerman said, "Society will, at last, agree and enjoy the existence of Water Boom as a recreation place. Water Boom is the only one in Sumatra and will bring income for the local government" (*Jambi Independent*, 19 December 2005). Jambi vice-governor, Antony Zeidra Abidin, in his press release on the same day, gave a relatively different perspective. According to Abidin, the government was planning a review of the planned Water Boom Project. The important question, Abidin said, was whether it was necessary to build the water boom park, and whether it was the people's desire (*Jambi Independent*, 19 December 2005).

Student protests reached their peak on 26 December 2005, when the Jambi Legislative Assembly was going to hold its plenary session on the discussion of the 2006 budget plan. Students joined in the GMJPR (Gerakan Mahasiswa Jambi Pro-Rakyat, "Jambi Pro-People Student Movement") and held demonstrations outside the Assembly House in Jambi. Because there was no response to their demands from the assembly members inside the building, the university students forced an entrance into the building. As a result there was a clash with the police and the government guards and dozens of students were wounded and hospitalized (*Jambi Independent*, 27 December 2005).

The "bloody incident" caused a delay in the DPRD plenary session to ratify the annual budget plan. The Chairman of the assembly clarified that "because of the protests, this meeting is cancelled for an indefinite period of time". In the subsequent days, the governor and chairman of the assembly held an emergency meeting on 27 December 2005 together with the Budgetary Committee (Panitia Anggaran, Panggar) to discuss the student protest and to seek a response to their demands. The result of this meeting was presented by Jambi's governor, Zulkifli Nurdin, and assembly chairman, Zoerman Manaf, in their press conference on 28 December 2005. Zulkifli announced that because of the protests, they agreed to cancel the Water Boom Project. Because the budget allocation had already been given out, the assembly chairman of the DPRD said, the review of that budget allocation would be discussed in more detail by the Budgetary Committee (*Jambi Independent*, 29 December 2005).

The news of the cancellation of the Water Boom Project by the Jambi provincial government understandably caused a shock to the entrepreneurial partner, PT Karya Restu. On 30 December 2005, its owner, Sudiro Lesmana, visited Jambi to seek clarification of this news. *Jambi Independent* interviewed Sudiro regarding his reaction to the cancellation:

> I: What are the ensuing steps you will take regarding the cancellation of the water boom park funding?

S: I only want to appeal to the conscience of Jambi's society and its government. What is going to be built is for the society of Jambi. But it is also they who cancelled it.
I: Is there any plan toward a legal action?
S: I will not yet take any legal action. If I open a lawsuit, I am confident that my company is going to win. It is not only a MoU that I have, but I have other important documents and proof besides.
I: Why don't you take an open stance toward this matter?
S: If I speak out openly, a lot of people will be involved. Therefore, principally the law is not to be violated and I will not go against justice. I feel oppressed, since I only wanted Jambi to become a good place and own a tourist site (*Jambi Independent*, 30 December 2005).

Sudiro's attitude, and his lobbying of the governor and the assembly chairman, had some success. This can be seen by, among other things, that the construction of the Water Boom Project continued, despite the announcement of its cancellation. Facing this reality, students continued to criticize and protest, but not as vehemently as before. On the part of the local government, there was a new emerging phenomenon, a kind of "passing of the buck" in response to the students' protest. The Jambi governor, for instance, said he signed a letter of cancellation of the project. On the other hand, the Head of the Tourism Board, as the authority overseeing the Water Boom Project, said that he never received a "work order cessation" from the governor of Jambi (*Jambi Independent*, 5 January 2006).

After reviewing this "Water Boom" case, the question is, why did the Jambi provincial government become involved in the construction of a project that invited so much protest from so many circles? And more specifically, did the Water Boom Project have a connection with the election of Jambi's governor (*pilgub — pemilihan gubernor* — gubernatorial elections) in 2005? Based on in-depth interviews with a number of resource persons during my fieldwork, there is indeed a strong indication of a connection between the Water Boom Project and the *pilgub* process in Jambi.

The chronology of the "Water Boom" case above explicitly shows us the presence of three main actors: the chairman of the local Legislative Assembly, the governor, and Sudiro (the entrepreneurial partner); their business and political alliances most likely developed because each had a personal interest in this project. For instance, according to in-depth interviews with some resource persons, the assembly chairman received economic benefit from the project. As stated by AA,[18] a senior official in the governor's office, he obtained a "project fee" from the entrepreneurial partner. The same information has also been given by SP,[19] a local entrepreneur in Jambi. According to SP,

the assembly chairman also played a role in approving the Water Boom Project proposed by the Governor. This is mainly because he received an "envelope" (money) from the entrepreneur who acted as the project executor.

As for Jambi's Governor, what would be his individual interest in the Water Boom project? The following citation from an in-depth interview with ZF[20] can give a more comprehensive understanding of the situation.

> Pak (Mr) Zul is the governor incumbent. This means that he held the same position in the previous five-year period … and … has a strong network with business people, this is a very natural thing. It is likewise that an intimate relationship between Mr. Zul and Mr. Sudiro had been established when Mr. Zul was governor in the previous period. Sudiro had even been offered some projects to handle by the provincial government. For example, he handled the renovations of Jambi's representative office in Jakarta. Therefore, the fact that Sudiro contributed funds to Mr. Zul in the last *pilgub*, this is quite understandable. Then, after Mr. Zul was re-elected, the Water Boom Project became part of the business compensation given to Sudiro (Interview with ZF on 14 April 2006).

A relatively more explicit piece of information was offered by KS (a journalist of a local newspaper), and IB[21] (a NGO activist, International Transparency). These two resource persons clearly gave some indication of the value of funds contributed by the entrepreneur partner who acts as the Water Boom Project executor. KS,[22] for example, mentioned that funds contributed by a "client business" to Jambi's current governor during the *pilkada* was somewhere between Rp5–10 billion. Whereas IB explained that according to his investigations, funds contributed by the "client business" amounted to Rp10 billion.

Overall, if information from the above in-depth interviews is taken into account, it is clear that the Water Boom Project is one form of business compensation given by the elected local government head to one of his entrepreneurial clients who played the role of "donor" in the *pilkada* process. This is, perhaps, the main explanation for why the governor, supported by the assembly chairman, seems to have wanted to fund the Water Boom Project, even in the face of furious protests from the students. This also explains why, even though the governor himself declared that the project was to be cancelled, funds were still disbursed, and the construction of the Water Boom Park continued. According to the latest information, the Water Boom Project has not yet been completed; its status is still "afloat", or what has been called by the Jambi people *di-statusquo-kan*.[23]

CLOSING REMARKS

What does the material presented in this chapter tell us about "*Pilkada*, Money Politics and the Dangers of Informal Government Practices"? In brief, it may be argued that the theoretical logic suggested by Smith (1985) and Arghiros (2001) regarding the values of a direct election system (including the *pilkada*) towards the actualization of a democratic government or "good governance" is only likely to be realized if it is based on substantive democracy. In other words, direct elections (such as the *pilkada*) will be less likely to lead to democratic practices or good governance in a period of transition towards democracy.

This is mainly because the political process in the period of the so-called transition towards democracy is still strongly dominated by the interaction, competition, and compromise of interests among *state actors,* on the one side, and *societal actors,* on the other. In this situation, when the direct elections are carried out, it would be difficult to deny afterwards that the election process in itself, as well as the performance of local governance after the election (post-*pilkada*), would be heavily coloured by competition and compromise of interests among the elites.

Elsewhere, within wider society, due to the majority of constituents not yet understanding the importance of political participation in the *pilkada*, it is also difficult to deny that their decision to vote will be based more on pragmatic considerations. Voting decisions would be made after calculating what material benefits could be gained from the candidate, and to whom the candidate is affiliated, instead of looking at each candidate's leadership capacities, political experience, and vision.

In this context we come to the theoretical justification for why "money politics" practices are extremely important as strategies for mobilizing the constituents, and why the roles of business people (as financial sponsors) are needed by each candidate. The evidence presented in the previous discussion shows that the practice of money politics (in both direct and indirect forms) existed in the process of Indonesia's *pilkada* during 2005. Additionally, the *pilkada* process, which is heavily coloured by political and business collusive practices, will have an important influence on local governance in the post-*pilkada* period. One of the dangers that commonly occurs is the emergence of so-called "informal governance" practices.

The *premanisme proyek* case in Banten, for instance, has strongly indicated that informal governance practices existed before the direct *pilkada* system was implemented. The governor of Banten province and his deputy faced a great many problems putting into place the formal function of the government

due to the looming presence of people such as Tuan Besar, who had taken a role as "political and financial sponsor" for those two provincial officials during the gubernatorial election. Thus, it is probably no overstatement to say that the influence of Tuan Besar on the performance of day-to-day government in Banten province is part of the return cost of his "political and economic investment" planted at the moment of the elections.

A similar situation seems to have taken place in the context of Jambi's Water Boom Project. The study indicates that the Water Boom Project became a kind of business compensation given by the Jambi governor to one of his entrepreneurial clients who had played the role of "financial sponsor" in the *pilkada* process.

These all, then, seem to have eventually supported the postulate proposed by this paper that although the direct election system of regional heads has been implemented, it is questionable whether democracy has really been achieved. It is hard to deny that the election process itself, as well as the performance of local government in the post-*pilkada*, is heavily coloured by competition and compromises of interests between state and societal elites. This means that the desire to uphold "people's sovereignty" and civil political liberties as a principle goal of the direct election is still too far away to be actualized in reality.

Notes

1. The term *otonomi kebablasan* has been used to imply that local governments had inflated their power, particularly in exercising Law No. 22/1999 (on regional government). Meanwhile, the term *otonomi setengah hati* is meant to illustrate that the central government remained reluctant to disperse more power and authorities to local governments.
2. Although this law only came into effect under Yudhoyono, it was in fact Megawati who signed into Law UU No. 32/2004.
3. Amongst the characteristics of state–society relations in the transition towards democracy is that members of society are not fully excluded from the process of policy making and policy implementation. However, the inclusion of society, in this sense, does not take the form of "popular participation" yet, but is more likely in the form of societal elites' participation. This means that, in essence, the pattern of state–society relationship is more characterized by an interaction between local state elites and societal elites. Therefore, it is undeniable that collusion and bargaining of interests among elites would become the prevailing features of the policy-making process as well as policy implementation (Hidayat 2003, p. 59).
4. I have employed the terms "state actors" and "societal actors", following Mark

Evans' "elitism theory" (see Evans, 1995, pp. 222–46). In the Indonesian context, the terms "state actors" and "societal actors" have been used by MacIntyre (1990) to name groups of elites within the state and some people within the society who play significant roles in the process of policy making and policy implementation.

5 The materials are: rice, sugar, salt, eggs, cooking oil, kerosene, wheat flour, salted fish, and laundry soap.

6 The other provinces were Bangka Belitung, Gorontalo, North Maluku, and the Riau Islands.

7 Articles 3 and 7, Law No. 23/2000 on the formation of Banten province.

8 Among the interviewed resources were HKI (an academic and NGO activist, interview on 1 May 2004); MUM (member of the Banten province council, interview on 30 May 2004); TNT (official of the Serang regency, interview on 14 April 2004); and MAA (a Banten reporter, interview on 15 May 2004).

9 HOS is a Council member of the Banten province. Interview conducted on 9 May 2004.

10 Interview with BOB on 7 May 2004.

11 This information was obtained from interview results with, among others, Iwan Kusuma Hamdan (1 June 2004) and Boyke Pribadi (7 June 2004).

12 Tuan Besar is not his real name; I use this term as a name to protect his privacy. "Tuan" is another word for "Bapak" (literally "father", "sir") used for esteemed persons. The adverb *besar* — "big", indicates rank/status, influence, and power. Tuan Besar does not only represent "*jawara-pengusaha*", but is also the main actor in informal governance practices in Banten province.

13 Decree of the Governor Banten No. 902/Kep 45-Hak/2003, on Determination of the Work Unit Budget Document (DASK) of the Banten Provincial Budget (APBD). The writer has a photocopy of this document.

14 Decree of the Governor Banten No. 902/Kep 45-Hak/2003, on Determination of the Work Unit Budget Document (DASK) of the Banten Provincial Budget (APBD), Books 1, 2, and 3. The writer has photocopies of these documents.

15 Interview with HOS, 9 May 2004.

16 It is important to delineate here the relationship between these two firms. PT Karya Restu is acting as the provincial government's entrepreneurial partner (the main contractor), which is responsible for the whole Water Boom Project. PT. Laksana Aneka Sarana is the project executor (sub-contractor), which only takes responsibility for the physical construction of the Water Boom tourism park.

17 An interview with IB (activist of Transparansi Internasional) on 8 April 2006.

18 Interview with AA on 14 April 2006.

19 Interview with SP on 16 April 2006.

20 Interview with ZF on 14 April 2006. ZF is one of the new senior officials at the governor's office (appointed after the *pilkada*). He was a member of the current governor's *tim sukses* (success team) during the governorship election. According

to some resource persons, ZF's current position in the governor's office is a political reward given to him for his contributions during the previous gubernatorial elections.

[21] Interview on 7 April 2006.

[22] Interview on 8 April 2006.

[23] See, for instance, GATRA, No. 20 Tahun XIII (29 Maret – 4 April 2007), p. 38. To get further information regarding the progress of the Water Boom Project, I also did an interview via telephone with Antony Zedra Abidin (Jambi Vice Governor) on 5 December 2007.

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7

ELECTING DISTRICT HEADS IN INDONESIA
Democratic Deepening or Elite Entrenchment?

Jim Schiller

INTRODUCTION: ELECTIONS AND DECENTRALIZATION

What are *pilkada*[1] — direct regional and local government head elections — meant to achieve? What, for that matter, are any elections supposed to do and to mean to the participants? How do we know if the *pilkada* have been successful and how should we measure success? Should we be looking more closely at the candidate nomination process, the campaign, the voter turn-out and vote count, the results and their acceptance, or at other more nuanced long-term consequences? What consequences have the direct elections had for the everyday politics of deepening democracy?

This essay will suggest answers to some of those questions in three ways. Firstly, it will present some ideas about what elections in general, and *pilkada* (direct district head elections) in particular, are supposed to achieve in Indonesia. Secondly, it will briefly examine some observations, competing assessments, and explanations of *pilkada* processes, outcomes, and their consequences. Thirdly, it will present some local perspectives on the *pilkada* in Jepara — a district on the north coast of Central Java — that I have been studying for more than twenty-five years.

The *pilkada* research began in April 2006, and its aim was to capture local elite expectations of the *pilkada* election process and the expected behaviour — and strategies — of candidates, parties, media, and civil society organizations with local elite explanations of what they think has actually happened. I wanted to investigate how politically active Jeparans saw the election rules, local culture, the political constellation, and the early manoeuvring of would-be candidates (*bakal calon*) and parties. I asked them to forecast and account for the likely outcomes of the first Jepara *pilkada*. I also had prolonged conversations with NGO activists, religious leaders, political party heads, journalists, politicians, would-be candidates, bureaucrats, and the outgoing deputy district head (*wakil bupati*). In interviews and informal discussions they were asked to reflect on what was happening and seemed likely to happen in the Jepara *pilkada* election. I returned to research the election scheduled for 6 December 2006. For reasons discussed later the election was postponed and eventually took place on 4 February 2007. The results were as predicted: the incumbent won by a wide margin. However, the assumptions, expectations, observations, evaluations, motivations, and conclusions of the Jepara political public about likely voter, candidate, party, and bureaucratic behaviour and their explanations of election outcomes are interesting.

Reformasi

In the years since Soeharto's fall, Indonesia's politicians and bureaucrats have written into law a number of "reforms" to the Indonesian political system. These reforms include the withdrawal of the military from its formal role in the political system and bureaucracy, the establishment of a system of checks and balances which have weakened the executive and strengthened the legislature and judiciary, and the drafting of an electoral law allowing free and fair legislative and executive elections. The Indonesian state has also taken some fitful steps along a path of democratic decentralization aimed at increasing the depth and breadth of the constituency that feels a sense of belonging to, and participation in, the Indonesian Republic.

Given that the legal "reforms" of the post-Soeharto period have been reviewed and enacted — if not always proposed and drafted — by the same political party, bureaucratic, and military elites that had thrived under the authoritarian and centralized "New Order", it should not be surprising that some have seen the democratic decentralization and other reforms as modest, compromised, and "half-hearted".

Without much preparation Indonesia began a substantial decentralization reform in 1999 that promised to reduce the power of the Department of

Home Affairs and provincial governors while empowering districts (*kabupaten*) and cities (*kotamadya*) by transferring numerous powers, authorities, personnel, and agencies from central and provincial to local control. Some financial decentralization also occurred with the national government setting aside 25 per cent of revenue for allocation to provincial and local governments — mainly through natural resource revenues, a General Allocation Fund (DAU) and Special Allocation Fund (DAK) — and turning over some revenue-raising powers to the districts. This was accompanied by empowerment of local assemblies (*dewan* or DPRD), theoretically making them equal partners in local government with the district head, and certainly enabling the district assembly to hold the district head accountable.

A major part of Indonesia's formal-legal "democratization" has been electoral reform, which began with direct popular election of national, provincial, and local legislators in 1999 supervised by an independent electoral commission (KPU). Political parties were allowed to contest the election if they were able to establish branches and gather petitions from two-thirds of the provinces. Golkar — the Soeharto era state party — was allowed to compete, but its connections with the state and the military were officially severed. Serving state officials were legally forbidden from standing for office or supporting political parties.

For the 1999–2004 period the president, governors, district heads, and mayors were elected indirectly by national, provincial, and local representative assemblies respectively.[2] The chief difference with New Order indirect elections was that the state no longer "dropped" the candidate and ordered the assembly to choose him. Since 2004, the president, and since 2005 the governors, district heads, and mayors (as well as their deputies) have been directly elected by the people.

There has been substantial criticism levelled on both the democracy and regional autonomy sides of Indonesia's "democratic decentralization". There has also been criticism of the assumptions about the connections between devolving power and deepening democracy. Supporters of decentralization have seen Law No. 32/2004 as another major setback for regional autonomy.[3] The Law reinforces the governors' power[4] over the district heads and mayors, requires local regulations (*perda — peraturan daerah*) to be approved by the Minister of Home Affairs, removes the power of assemblies to dismiss the district head, and reduces the power of local assemblies to hold the district executive accountable.

Critics of regional autonomy claim that it has decentralized and increased corruption, that it has created a new group of "little kings" (*raja kecil*), and that it has led to collusion between the executive and legislatures to corrupt the budget. They also argue that excessive and unpredictable revenue raising

and rent-seeking behaviour has been bad for business and that local governments lack the technical skills or the discipline needed for good governance. How much of this criticism is valid, and how much is exaggerated and rooted in national and provincial elites' resentment about lost opportunities for rent-seeking, is debatable.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess the consequences or progress of regional autonomy.[5] Instead, this paper explores the democratic aspects of "democratic decentralization" — the operation and impact of the *pilkada* electoral system and its potential role in elite entrenchment or democratic deepening.

FROM INDIRECT TO DIRECT DISTRICT HEAD ELECTIONS

> What do elections do? Elections … [have] … multiple meanings, often simultaneously. They bestow legitimacy on those holding public office and, cumulatively, on the political system itself. They are also a process by which elites rotate among themselves access to public coffers…. (Taylor 1996, p. 4)

Why do states hold elections? The authors of *The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia* (Taylor 1996) tell us that liberal democratic theorists see elections as opportunities to educate voters and politicians, to determine the will of the people, to choose and rotate leadership among elites, and to provide the state with legitimacy and the government with a mandate for its policies. Anderson, Taylor, and Jomo, in their papers in that volume, add to this list — the "dark" or hidden side of elections — their potential role in pacifying and disempowering the population. Elections can delegitimize efforts toward radical or rapid social change through street politics, general strikes, and rioting. They can do this either by suggesting that voting is the only moral way to change governments or key policies, or by demonstrating state power and hegemony, thus convincing the general population of the immorality of not waiting until you win a majority and the futility of resistance. Anderson (1996) sees most elections as boring, and argues that they only become interesting when they threaten to unveil the injustices and inequalities they attempt to cloak. Liddle (1996), in the same book, sees Indonesia's New Order elections as providing President Soeharto with a "pretend democracy" which the middle class was willing to accept only as long as their economic future looked promising.

In liberal democratic theory elections are meant to be educational. Election campaigns are supposed to inform voters of important issues, of party and

candidate achievements, and of the character and vision of the contestants. This notion about elections assumes rather altruistic political parties and candidates who try to be truthful in their statements and in their criticisms of their opponents. It also requires informed, "rational" voters who want to make the best possible voting decision and are willing to vote based on their own and their community's best interests.

Elections are also meant to be educational for candidates and parties. Campaigning and voting are supposed to provide voters with a chance to communicate their concerns and needs. Parties and candidates that lose elections are expected to ponder why — because their policies were unpopular or not well explained, their track record unpopular, or their image not credible — and to take appropriate action.

A third reason for states to hold elections is to empower voters. It is argued that regularly holding government accountable through general elections encourages citizens to see themselves as having the right to make demands on the state. At the same time, it suggests to government officials that they should see their people as citizens with rights to public service. This is supposed to reduce violent conflict by encouraging people to see elections as the only legitimate opportunities for change.

A fourth reason to hold elections is to recruit leaders and to rotate access to state positions and state resources among the elite. Elections, at least potentially, offer the possibility of merit-based recruitment. They may also reduce conflict between elites by offering a regular, non-violent path to power, wealth, and status as well as the opportunity to try again.

A fifth rationale for elections is to provide those who govern and, in the long run, their institutions, with a source of legitimacy and a mandate — stronger — than the alternatives. Seen this way, a popular majority or even a plurality can be a modern substitute for a crown or kinship ties in establishing leaders' right to rule and citizens' obligation to obey (Antlov 2004).

This fifth 'rationale' for elections has a shadow side. Elections can pacify the populace by convincing them that they are made equal by the vote and that their political concerns and demands should be pursued through the ballot box. The notion is that if they are not election winners, they have had their say and lost. So they should respect the decision of the majority and wait until the next election. From this perspective, elections are a device for tempting voters to give up the militant pursuit of their rights and interests for the promise of liberal democracy.[6]

The proponents of direct elections for district heads, mayors, and governors saw much the same range of benefits in having popular elections. A key assumption behind the direct elections was the idea that the combination of

decentralization and democratization would bring government closer to the people. As one optimistic political observer speaking at the Habibie Centre argued: "The direct election of the regional head will strengthen democracy in the regions."[7] He goes on to argue that direct elections will increase the political consciousness of constituents, expand civil society, and widen access to influence in government decision-making. He contends that: "Direct elections will produce higher quality district heads who are also well-positioned as holders of a popular mandate."[8]

One additional benefit expected from the *pilkada* was that it would reduce the power of the regional assembly (DPRD). As one analyst put it: "Constituent involvement in local government will increase while the arrogance of local representatives can be reduced."[9] He notes that direct elections will prevent regional assemblies from claiming the sole popular mandate, and so limit their power and authority and their ability to conduct political manoeuvres like hidden political extortion from the executive.

We should not be surprised that the political parties that control the National Assembly (DPR) enacted legislation that did not significantly reduce the power of the parties. The nomination process puts the parties in a gate-keeping position. Independents are not allowed to run for office, so the only way to become district head is to gain the support of one or more parties. In a press release, the Habibie Centre states that those who are pessimistic about *pilkada* "… are of the opinion that it is still the parties or coalitions of parties which offer the would-be regional head candidates to the constituents. The voice of the people only becomes political legitimacy."[10]

In the pre-2005 elections, district heads were nominated by the *fraksi*[11] and elected by the assembly representatives. In the new *pilkada* elections only political parties or coalitions of parties with 15 per cent or more of the seats in the assembly or 15 per cent or more of the vote for the regional assembly at the last legislative election can nominate candidates.[12]

While the new rules may have reduced the power of the local assemblies, they have placed even more power in the hands of the political party organizations, most of which are highly centralized. In the previous post-Soeharto election system assembly representatives sometimes defied the party leadership in the district head vote. In the new system the party headquarters must sign the nomination form. Independent candidates are not allowed, although a few candidates have emerged under a liberal interpretation of the law allowing coalitions of new and old small parties to nominate if they could claim 15 per cent of the vote at the last legislative election.[13]

The candidates run in tandem with their deputy.[14] After nomination they are screened by the local election commission. If he or she is a candidate

the district head is stood down and replaced by an acting district head.[15] They are elected by the voters after a two-week campaign period and three "quiet days". To win office a candidate is required to win a plurality of votes and at least 25 per cent of the total votes cast. If these conditions are not met, a run-off election between the top two candidates is held. A Regional Election Commission (KPUD) and a Regional Election Oversight Committee (Panwasda) — accountable to the regional assembly — have been established to implement the election and enforce campaign and campaign finance rules.

There have been concerns about the neutrality and competence of the regional election commissions. There have also been media reports that funding was inadequate, misspent, or arrived too late to allow voter education about the *pilkada* and that this negatively affected voter registration, voting and vote-counting processes.[16]

While vision and mission statements and candidate debates are part of the *pilkada* campaign process, they are not very informative. As in the industrial democracies, voter education is obviously a lower campaign priority than winning! That is why candidates are offered training in political marketing. Sixty district head candidates attended a course titled "Political Marketing Strategy to Attract the Sympathy of the People in a Regional Head Election" offered by the PWI (Indonesian Journalists Association) and two media-related NGOs. Candidates were told that there needs to be mutually advantageous interaction between the press and a candidate's *tim sukses* (victory team).[17] Vice President Yusuf Kalla's advice to district head candidates at a Golkar candidate training session was "don't wear a checked shirt". He notes that wearing a short-sleeved plain shirt will leave the impression of the candidate as honest and a hard worker.[18]

While lip service is paid to an educational campaign, most funding and most effort reported in the press is for a "recreational" (*rekreatif*) campaign. Such campaigns provide entertainment, show off local and national celebrity supporters, conduct lotteries for motorbikes and other prizes, hand out "transport money" — usually between Rp10,000 and Rp40,000 per person to attend a rally — and provide food to attract a maximum number of "supporters". Campaign rallies are thus oriented more toward demonstrating wide public support and the candidate's largesse than conveying information. Still more funding seems to go to providing handouts of cigarettes, travel money, and snacks to individual voters and larger payments to patrons who can deliver votes. In some districts considerable sums have been spent on short television commercials aimed at marketing an image of the candidate.[19]

What lessons are candidates and political parties learning from the election process? I am tempted to say it is too soon to tell. However, there are some

clues about how political parties and candidates have read the opportunities and risks — the electoral logic — created by voter behaviour and the election system. The media coverage of election results also provides us with some insight into the accuracy of elite visions of voter behaviour.

ELITE VIEW OF VOTERS AND THEIR VOTING BEHAVIOUR

> Mobilizing the masses is always connected with *pil kado* (gift tablets). Nowadays it is difficult to find people who want to demonstrate or to get sweaty showing their enthusiasm except because of blind fanaticism or *pil kado*. All the better if the gift includes fresh money. (Wahyu Wicaksono 2005)

The notion is widespread in Indonesia that the ordinary citizens, especially the rural population, are deeply embedded in patron–client relations and that many cast their vote based on primordial ties, ideology, charisma, patronage and patron–client relations, identity, and money politics.[20] The Soeharto government's concept of a "floating mass" was based on the idea that the masses would be happier and better off kept isolated from the complicated world of political choice. To some degree these ideas about the masses still inform elite and middle class views of politics. The question is how do these ideas about voters affect Indonesian elections?

Antlov criticizes the notion that Indonesian voters are irrational and that they make their voting decisions based on "primordial" sentiments. He notes that "voting behaviour is always determined by a variety of factors" (Antlov 2004, p. 23).[21] These include voter concerns about their security and well-being, their sense of shared identity and culture, as well as the language, personality, and images of the candidates. Antlov goes on to argue that "there is still an (ultimately unfortunate) belief among both commentators and politicians that voters in Indonesia still can be manipulated and mobilized by elites" (ibid., p. 26).

If campaign techniques emphasize vote-buying, patron–client relations, and candidate image, then voters are not likely to be "educated" or helped to make an informed decision by campaigns. In the absence of a campaign about ideas or track records, "rational" voters are more likely to see "money politics" as the only tangible gain from the election. Similarly, this elite view of how voters make their decisions makes it less likely that candidates or parties will learn much from elections. Instead, voters' choices will be seen as either irrational and unexplainable, or due to money politics and patron–client ties.

So this is a kind of vicious circle in which elite doubt about voters' autonomy or rationality leads candidates to employ "money politics" and entertainment, rather than informative and persuasive campaigns. This, in turn, increases voter disaffection.[22] Voter become more apathetic and expect more pay-offs for their campaign attendance or votes. Another more hopeful possibility is that voters may feel free to take a candidate's money and vote as they please.

Fragmentary evidence from *pilkada* and from legislative elections suggests that voters know their interests or, at the least, they know what they don't like. Incumbents have a track record that can be used to rally support or opposition. Adung Rochman, the director of JPPR (Jaringan Pendidikan Pemilih Untuk Rakyat — Peoples' Voter Education Network), an election monitoring NGO, states that in the 2005 *pilkada*, 210 incumbents ran for re-election. Of these, 124 (59 per cent) won and 86 (41 per cent) lost.[23] We don't know how many others did not win nomination or did not seek nomination because they thought they could not win. So, it seems likely that in excess of 50 per cent of incumbent district heads desiring re-election were unable to satisfy that ambition.

The patronage and name recognition available to district heads should give them a real advantage. This would seem to suggest that a large number of voters are dissatisfied with their district government and are willing to vote on that basis. *Pilkada* election results from Banyuwangi where the winning candidate (Ratna Widiasuti) — who was opposed by candidates of the four major parties in the assembly (PKB, PPP, Golkar and PDI-P) — won by more than 15 per cent. Her coalition included eighteen parties, none of which had won a seat in the local assembly. Her victory was due to many factors, but a strong campaign promising free primary education and reduced charges for health care in government health centres was widely popular.[24]

Mahendra (2005, pp. 48–49) reports that the parties with cabinet seats in the SBY government won 61 of 116 *pilkada* elections. This means that well-connected parties like Golkar, Demokrat, and PDI-P — which we would expect to have access to candidates with more money and power — were able to win just over 50 per cent of the contests.

The defeat of Golkar in the 1999 legislative elections and the 2004 decline in votes for the major government parties — which mainly went to the new parties — also suggests that voters were motivated by factors other than money politics. Similarly, the substantial number of voters who supported a political party in the 2004 legislative elections but did not vote for that party's candidate for President suggests that voters were not locked into a choice of party or candidate by identity politics or patron–client relations.

Elite Rotation and Recruitment

Vice-President Yusuf Kalla, the Chairman of Golkar, said that "the correlation between party and candidate in direct [district head] elections is very thin, because the consideration of the voters is not about politics but rather about the culture and image of the candidate".[25] This is partly because the law creates a contest between individuals and does not show party symbols on the ballot paper. Party machines also tend to be weak. Antlov sees most Indonesian political parties as not much more than vehicles for raising funds and electing candidates (2004, p. 24). They do little to train cadre or candidates, do not have public events or discussion forums and have weak grass-roots connections.[26]

This notion of failed parties and irrational or dependent voters is common in the opinion pieces of Indonesian newspapers. If you assume that the voters are just going to vote on the basis of public image, money payments, or primordial ties, then it makes sense for parties to choose candidates who are public figures and can bankroll a campaign. The election system also encourages joint nomination of candidates and choosing a pair of candidates from differing parties. Often the most acceptable candidates are those without strong ties to one party, which often equates with strong opposition from other parties.

Candidate selection appears to be highly centralized within district branches and then to require approval by provincial and national party leaders. It is widely acknowledged that candidates frequently have to pay party leaders at all levels to be nominated.[27] Amounts mentioned range from a few million rupiah to eight billion rupiah or more to each of the parties nominating the candidate. If a candidate has to pay large sums to contend the election he is likely to expect to pay large amounts to campaign and win the election.

It should not be surprising that these kinds of recruitment practices have led to a large number of former bureaucrats and long-standing politicians standing for the district head position. In 11 districts and cities of Central Java, out of 80 candidates who ran for the district head positions, 14 were incumbent district heads or deputies, 24 others were from the local government executive or assembly, and 27 others were from business and the professions.[28] Having a public image and a network may mean that a candidate will need less money to win office. He or she might need to pay less to acquire a party nomination because they are more likely to win and thus more likely to be able to reward the party later.

The number of entrepreneurs who have been candidates has also increased. However, the elected district heads are more likely to be ex-bureaucrats — perhaps with access to capital — than business owners or community leaders.

A CSIS analyst states that 18 per cent of candidates were social activists, but few of those were elected.[29] In some NU dominated districts there seems to have been a movement away from bureaucrats toward NU background politicians and religious teachers and leaders.

An early look at these partial numbers suggests a somewhat fluid elite rotation, with entrepreneurs and politicians joining bureaucrats in contesting and winning district head and deputy head positions.[30] On the other hand, the prospects for good governance are not so bright. It seems to take more money, or access to it, to win office so we would have to assume that the winners will try to recoup their own or their backers' investment from the policies and largesse of the local state (see also Hidayat, Chapter 6, this volume).

SPEAKING OF LEGITIMACY AND MANDATES

How can we tell whether the *pilkada* elections deliver a mandate for the winner or legitimacy for the state? One possible measure of the popularity of the election process is voter turn-out. Although low voter turn-out can be an indication that citizens are satisfied and see no threat to their well-being, it is usually taken to be a sign of voter disaffection. While it does seem correct that voter turn-out in the *pilkada* election is down slightly from the legislative elections, this is to be expected after the first democratic election in over forty years in 1999 and three national elections in 2004.[31] Local elections do not attract the same media attention as national elections, nor do they have the sense of spectacle that comes from having the whole nation vote on a single day. Local elections in the "advanced" liberal democracies tend to have substantially lower turn-outs than the 73 per cent that is asserted for Indonesia's *pilkada*.[32]

One obvious challenge to the legitimization function of *pilkada* is the number of disputed results. One count was that there were 53 challenges to the results out of 173 *pilkada* elections.[33] Street demonstrations and violent protests trying to block the winner from taking office or throwing them out occurred in a number of cases, most recently in Tuban and Banyuwangi. The reluctance to accept election results would suggest that the legitimizing power of elections is still strongly contested.

Another challenge to the election's legitimizing goal is the prominence of the "*putra daerah*" (native son) issue in the *pilkada* campaigns. This assertion that the district head should share a local, cultural, ethnic, or religious identity with the local population might be popular with local majorities, but it excludes religious, cultural, linguistic, and religious minorities and may lead them to question the legitimacy of the state.

Now I want to turn to Jepara and to its "political public" — the portion of Jepara society with the time, energy, wealth, and inclination to follow and to imagine that they can influence Jepara politics — and to their views of the scheduled *pilkada*.

THE VIEW FROM JEPARA

Jepara district is on the north coast of Central Java. Jepara's administrative centre is 75 kilometres from Semarang. Its one million people live on about 1,000 sq. km. of land between Mt. Muria and the Java Sea. For most of the last twenty-five years Jepara has been relatively prosperous, mainly because of its furniture industry which directly employs some 85,000 workers. This industry and the many Jepara furniture factories and shops spread across Indonesia are overwhelmingly owned and managed by indigenous Indonesians. There are more than 2000 *pribumi* (indigenous) owned small furniture businesses in Jepara.

Like much of the *pesisir* (north coast of Java) it is strongly Islamic in character and its oldest and most important religious and social organization is Nadhlatul Ulama (the Awakening of the Muslim Scholars). Competing as a political party in 1955, NU won 55 per cent of the vote in Jepara. All through the six controlled elections of the New Order period, NU — and, after 1971, its proxy PPP — kept Jepara competitive, defeating the Soeharto state party (Golkar) once and coming close in the other five elections. NU used its local hegemony and its PPP representation in the Local Assembly to uncover and criticize corruption, repression, and mis-management in the local government.

As I have written elsewhere (Schiller 1996), faced with this hegemonic religious and social organization and with the emergence of a prosperous, rather autonomous Muslim business elite, the Jepara local government (*pemda*) elite — mostly from Java's less Islamic south — learned the benefits of being more responsive, more cooperative, and more careful. The result, I have argued, was something approximating a "developmentalist" state in which a relatively capable local government learned to work with a relatively strong civil society.

In the last few years of Soeharto's rule, and since the beginning of the Reformasi era, civil society has blossomed in Jepara. There are dozens of registered civil society organizations and branches of national NGOs operating in Jepara, and many more less formal forums, movements, and coalitions. Many of them are affiliated with, or led by, NU-background activists. These NGOs are active in nearly every sector of the society. They

include "radical" groups, who see their role as exposing the local state's failures; advocacy groups crusading for better governance through the media and the legal system, and development or environmental organizations that monitor the delivery of government services or work to implement government programmes.

The politics of post-Soeharto Jepara saw the creation of a new NU-connected party, PKB, that tended to represent the more liberal and inclusive wing of NU. The local leaders of PPP were angered by what they saw as an attempt to usurp their position as the party of Islam and NU. They believed that they had struggled against the state party (Golkar) and suffered the consequences of New Order repression and that now they should be rewarded.

Even before the election period, in April 2001 conflict between PPP and PKB followers within the NU community led to what became known as the Dongos Incident. This led to newspaper headlines warning that other places might be Jepara-ized (*diJeparakan*), meaning they might become sites of large-scale mass violence (Sahadin 2004). There were few other cases of village and inter-village violence in the campaign period. NU's leadership pulled back from full-scale support for PKB, and PKB pulled back from trying to establish branches in PPP villages and ran a low-profile campaign. The election resulted in a PPP victory. It won 44 per cent of the vote and 18 seats in the 45-seat district assembly.[34] This meant that it had more than twice as many seats as its nearest rival PDI-P (eight seats), PKB came third (seven seats) and Golkar fourth (with four seats). Most of the NU and NGO leadership saw these elections as marred by the PPP's use of coercion. As one election monitor put it: "PPP won, using the old methods."

Less than one year later, in January 2002, the Local Assembly elected (24 votes to 19) the former *sekwilda* (Regional Secretary — Jepara's senior bureaucrat), Hendro Martoyo, as the new district head. His victory involved a coalition of all the other parties against the biggest, PPP. He was nominated by PDI-P and chose as his running mate Ali Irfan, a PKB religious teacher and deputy head of the Local Assembly. The PPP candidate, who was the chairman of the Jepara assembly, privately complained that he could not compete against money politics, but publicly accepted the results and so helped to defuse a tense situation.[35]

The 2004 elections were not nearly so contentious. The PPP leadership was satisfied that it had won the chairman position in the assembly and was, perhaps, a bit abashed that it had made enemies in all the other parties.[36] It also no longer saw PKB as a real threat to its dominance. The local legislature election results showed a sizeable decline in the PPP vote (from 44 to 31 per cent) and small declines in the PDI-P and PKB (5 and 3 per cent, respectively).

Golkar's share of the vote rose three points to 11 per cent and the new minor parties raised their share of the vote from 6 to 16 per cent.

The 2004 Local Assembly now includes representatives from nine parties — up from six in 1999. The two largest parties are PPP with fourteen seats and PKB with nine seats out of the forty-five representatives. The small parties hold eight seats and PDI-P and Golkar eight and six, respectively. The result is an assembly which is not under the control of any one party and not necessarily supportive of the district head. The assembly itself is both a channel for representing interests and citizens' demands and complaints and a part of local government subject to a prolonged campaign by many NGOs for its alleged corruption and fraudulent budget claims.[37] Many of the 1999–2004 District Assembly representatives have been charged with corruption and have repaid millions of rupiah in an effort to avoid prosecution or prison. The former chairman and one of the deputy chairmen are in the Jepara prison.

What I am suggesting is that Jepara has a relatively open local political economy, with competitive parties, thriving and demanding entrepreneurs, a wide range of vocal NGOs, a strong elite sense of identity, some capable bureaucrats and, as I am about to demonstrate, a skilful district head. It also has *preman* (gangsters), rent-seeking behaviour by some bureaucrats, inequality and exploitation, and a sometimes useful reputation, as a place where the people are outspoken and can be violent if they feel mistreated. It has all the problems that go with rapid and uneven socio-economic change and a vibrant civil society.

LOOKING FORWARD TO THE *PILKADA*

Jepara's *pilkada* election was scheduled for 3 December 2006. There seemed to be little doubt in Jepara's political public that the election would be managed without much bias or violence. For more than a year many of the political public were busy gossiping about who might run for the office or who might like to be a candidate.

Most of the people interviewed thought that the incumbent was very likely to be re-elected "K-1" (the District Head's licence plate number) and that the real question was who would be "K-2" — deputy district head. PPP, at its convention, asked Hendro to be their candidate for *bupati* and nominated a candidate for deputy district head. Golkar, also at its convention, nominated the district head for re-election. Within parties and within NU, leaders manoeuvred for the deputy head or district head positions or for the ultimate winner's favour. The law requires there be two pairs of candidates, so one of the problems was to find a willing loser.

In a *Suara Merdeka* article on empowering voters in the *pilkada* elections, the district head of Jepara, Hendro Martoyo, wrote that "The essence of democracy is the presence of individuals who are able to play a role with the capacity to rationally determine their own choice."[38] Instead, in Indonesia he found: "in making their choice most voters still see who invited them, who mobilized them, and who has done them a service. As well they consider who is acquainted with them and even who can give them more."[39] He goes on to argue that candidates are likely to exploit these "voter weaknesses" and to express his concern about the loss of an opportunity for educating and empowering voters in the *pilkada*.

Hendro's ideas about voters lacking autonomy were similar to those expressed by party leaders and others in Jepara. A senior PDI-P figure said: "Our voters are mobilized (*digerakan*), it is not possible that they vote based on their own choice."[40] A Partai Demokrat executive said that although the people are influenced by the *kyai* (respected Muslim religious teachers) they are becoming more independent. A PKB leader noted that voters have learned to take your money and vote for someone else.

This view of voters as uninterested in policies, new ideas, and track records leads to the acceptance of the need for money politics to pay brokers and voters. One community activist said: "Money politics will increase because the society's logic is expanding in that direction. The people do not want to do something for free. This is the moment for getting paid."[41] A retiring senior politician says: "There is a great war going on between idealism and materialism. Materialism is winning an absolute victory."[42]

Money politics was seen as unavoidable. A candidate either had to have his or her own money or have wealthy backers to which he or she would be indebted. Estimates ranged from 8 billion rupiah up to 20 billion rupiah (A$100,000–250,000) for the campaign. There was even some doubt that you could be elected deputy district head for less than 7 billion rupiah. The retiring deputy head stated that even a charismatic *kyai* with a mass following would be laughed at if he contested the election without money.

The retiring deputy head told stories about the role of entrepreneurial brokers who visited candidates and explained they were going back to the village for a *pengajian* (Muslim sermon or public lecture) and asked if the candidate would like to be mentioned. Few candidates, he said, could resist giving these brokers "petrol money". Later, the brokers promised to take the candidate to the village to demonstrate the popular support the broker had secured.

Another way to understand how the candidates, party leaders, and their victory teams believe voters make their choices is to ask how and why a candidate wins or loses the *pilkada* election. Given that Hendro was a firm

favourite, I will first explore why and how they believed the incumbent district head, Hendro, would win re-election. Then I will explore their notions of why and how he might have been defeated. It will soon become clear that while money politics may be important, other factors may be more decisive. The political public's concept of voter decision-making is more nuanced than the caricature of an irrational or easily directed voter.[43]

Explaining Hendro's Likely Victory?

> The (district head) candidate's victory will be determined by four factors … the effectiveness of the party political machine … the formal and informal approach to the *kyai* and *pesantren* [Muslim teachers and schools] … the approach to *preman* (gangsters) with mass following…and the personal approach to village heads … the best at playing all four instruments is the incumbent. (Interview with PDI-P party leader, 21 April 2006)

Why did most people believe Hendro would win? One of his strengths is that he has been a senior official in Jepara since the 1970s. He has "done things" for business and for social, religious, and community organizations, as well as for many individuals.[44] This means that many Jeparans, especially influential Jeparans, owe him favours and have grown used to working with him.

His inner circle is made up of officials who moved to Jepara with or shortly after him in the early New Order. Many of them are now in strategic positions as heads of, for example, the Regional Income Service and the Public Works Service. This means that they can dispense or deny patronage in the form of contracts, jobs, permits, funding, insider information, and contacts. This made it easier for him to raise money and more difficult for other candidates to gain endorsement and financial backing.

The quote and discussion above emphasizes a political economy argument in which people vote for their interests. But there are also performance based, media based, cultural, and personality based factors that seemed to be very strong for Hendro.

Under Hendro's leadership *pemda* (*pemerintaan daerah* — the local government) Jepara has won many state and independently monitored awards including a recent "Autonomy Award" for the highest share of the budget spent on education in Central Java. The Jepara local government substantially increased its income and Hendro was careful to give strong support to NU for its buildings, mosques, schools, and universities. He also involved NGOs in monitoring development programmes and discussion about programmes. While there was much criticism of individual bureaucrats and of *pemda*, most

of the "political public" seemed to see the local government as better managed than most.

Hendro takes a keen interest in media relations. He writes occasionally for the provincial newspaper, has a weekly radio talkback show, his information office publishes and circulates a monthly magazine and pays close attention to the local journalists. News coverage about him was always generally favourable. Hendro's and *pemda*'s media image emphasized achievement, as well as meeting and listening to the people.

One of Hendro's strengths is that "he can win the hearts of the masses through cultural symbols".[45] He started with a handicap. He originated from the neighbouring district of Pati and is not from a *santri* (devout Muslim) background. It was said that on arrival in Jepara he could not even accurately utter the Muslim greeting (*salam*). Over his years in Jepara he has learned the icons that identify someone as Muslim and as NU, and he has been careful to build close relations, not just with Jepara's leading *kyai,* but also with their former teachers and leaders from around Java. At a funeral for a leading Jepara Islamic scholar, Hendro demonstrated his grasp of NU sensibilities by giving a moving speech about the deceased and reciting the Al-Fatikhah.[46]

His Muslim and NU-an image was reinforced by weekly visits with his *pemda* senior officials to villages for Friday prayers (Jumatan). He is said to bring at least a million rupiah or other "aid" or gifts to the villages on these visits. One journalist said that in the early months of 2006 the *bupati* started leading prayers in villages almost every night and that "Hendro was more *kyai* than the *kyai*."

Hendro's personality, attention to detail, and his practical political skills also made him a formidable opponent. He has a reputation for visiting patients in hospital and offering assistance to families. He also attends many weddings. He seems to enjoy helping people and being there for difficult or special occasions, and the families of critical NGO leaders and politicians are often the target of his visits.

This argument about why Hendro was generally believed to be able to win suggests that voters are not just moved by money politics, or mobilized by patrons, but also note whether a leader performs well, has learned local cultural practices, and is sensitive to local social structures. They are also interested in whether he seemed capable, interested, and generous.

Explaining Hendro's Unlikely Loss?

I must admit having had a difficult time imagining this. It was a long time before an opposition coalition emerged who looked competitive; however,

rumours circulated about Hendro that may have ultimately weakened his chances for victory. There was a rumour that his children did not want him to run and risk the family wealth campaigning or chance running afoul of the new laws trying to repay his financial backers. Another rumour stated that Hendro had some bad spiritual omens, including losing one shoe on a visit to Habib Lufti, a charismatic *kyai* from Pekalongan and head of *tarekat* Sjadziliyah — a meditation/spiritualist group with many Jepara followers — to ask for his blessing. Uncharacteristically, he missed two big NU affiliate gatherings in the months before candidate registration. Many Jeparan political figures are interested in mystical "signs", and this may have had an effect on how people perceived him.

One NU figure thought that Hendro could be challenged on several grounds.[47] One was that Hendro was not a *putra daerah* (native Jeparan) and that Jepara had not had a local as district head sine 1967. Another line was that Jepara was devoutly Muslim and NU in character, and it should have a leader from that background. Still another was that Hendro and his inner circle were all "*sisa-sisa Orde Baru*" (leftovers from the New Order). A fourth argument was that in his second term Hendro might try to enrich himself at Jepara's expense in preparation for retirement.

Another PKB leader thought that Hendro and his inner circle might get caught up in the corruption scandal that had engulfed the 1999 local assembly.[48] Several informants noted that the village heads' association was angered because Hendro's proposed Regional Regulation (*perda*) extending their terms was rejected by the governor. In the 1982 legislative elections the anger of village heads over a reduction in their term of office lead to a Golkar defeat in Jepara. If many village heads blamed him for the central government's decision to force them to stand down or run for re-election, then Hendro might have had some difficulties.

Strangely, no one mentioned the downside of incumbency as a possible weakness. Hendro could be blamed for the economic hardship caused nationally by petrol price hikes (and related inflation), or locally by the furniture industry decline.

However, in general, most of the hopes of the camp proposing an alternative to Hendro looked weak to me. They relied on quickly changing a public image that Hendro has been cultivating for years, as competent, enthusiastic, warm, and well assimilated to Jepara and NU culture.

THE CANDIDATES, THE CAMPAIGN, AND THE ELECTION

Two challengers emerged in time for the candidate registration. Perhaps the biggest surprise of the election was the conspiracy of these two challengers

and their supporters to delay the election. They hoped that in the interim the Constitutional Court would rule that district heads seeking re-election had to take leave from their office while a candidate. The assumption was that this might prevent the blatant use of the bureaucratic network that reaches down to village level for winning re-election. The challengers dreamed that some of the *bupati*'s inner circle in the bureaucracy might go over to the opposition if they thought he might lose.[49] Others in the opposition camp hoped that ongoing corruption investigations of the district assembly would eventually implicate the *bupati* and prevent the district head's victory, or at least weaken his support. Other excuses for further postponements, like waiting until Jepara's pilgrims returned from the *haj*, were thought to possibly buy still more time for a turn-round in their fortunes. The most locally influential newspaper, *Suara Merdeka*, criticized the challengers for using legal loopholes to deny people their democratic right to vote.[50]

The Constitutional Court did decide that the election law required both that there be more than one candidate, and that candidates submit required documents to KPUD shortly after filing. The day before the filing deadline the opposition election teams met at a mosque and traded key documents so that both candidates could be sure that the other team could not commit treachery by completing their application at the last minute. This led to three postponements before the district head arranged for a supporter from Golkar to run as a "pretend" candidate. Shortly after this the PDI-P withdrew its candidate's nomination[51] and claimed to be neutral in the election, which was finally scheduled for 4 February 2007. The incumbent, Hendro Martoyo, was nominated by PPP (a conservative Muslim party and Jepara's largest), Golkar, Partai Demokrat, PAN, and several minor parties. His challenger, Nur Yachman, was a wealthy Jeparan furniture businessman nominated by PKB, and there was also a Golkar (*pendamping*)[52] "accompanying" candidate — who along with the PAN leader had been directed to withdraw from the incumbent's coalition to make up the required number of candidates for district head and deputy positions to hold an election.

What do the nomination process and campaigns tell us about local elite views of elections and voters? It was obvious that the candidates thought they had to reward and entertain the voters to get them to come to rallies or to vote. Sub-district and village rallies mostly took the form of scantily clad *dangdut* (pop music) singers and dancers who prepared the audience for the candidates' and their spokespersons' brief speeches. The incumbent had the most expensive and extensive entertainment. This attracted lots of young males, but the main party of his coalition, the PPP (a conservative Muslim party), found that its village religious teachers and women's organization leaders were embarrassed or offended. Few women attended. Food and soft

drinks were often supplied. Candidates and key supporters made short speeches between songs and dances or, occasionally, prayers. Speakers who talked for too long risked being booed or losing their audience.

The candidates, even the pretender, set up victory teams (*tim sukses*) at the district, sub-districts and village levels. These teams were mostly made up of village and local notables and patrons and were generally more influential than political parties, both with their families, neighbours, and clients and in the conduct of the election. Candidates and their leading supporters complained that activists had to be paid to organize campaign rallies or witness voting and vote-counting processes. The district head's victory team included a number of retired civil servants in important roles.

The highlight of the Nur Yachman campaign was a rally attended by Gus Dur (the former President, revered NU leader, and PKB founder) which attracted 20,000–30,000 people, the largest rally of the campaign. After the rally Gus Dur and hundreds of religious teachers attended a meeting where the candidate signed a stamped (said to be legally binding) political contract which, among other things, included a promise to deliver free primary education to all Jeparans and to resign if he was proven to be corrupt. On radio, posters, and at rallies Nur Yachman tried to argue that it was time for a native of Jepara (*putra daerah*) to run Jepara. He said that the *bupati* was not from Jepara, not a traditionalist Muslim from NU, not a furniture entrepreneur, and hinted that Hendro was unable to end corruption.

Hendro campaigned emphasizing the development programmes he had delivered and the awards his government had won, and countered the charges that he was not from a Muslim background by circulating a Javanese letter written in Arabic script (Pegon) to several hundred thousand households, from an influential religious teacher at Al-Anwar *pesantren* in Rembang urging all *santri* (devout Muslims) to support the incumbent.

On the second day of the campaign the "real world" disrupted the election atmosphere. On 18 January, the Jepara Central Market burnt down for the second time in two years. Hendro immediately met with a delegation of stall owners at his campaign headquarters. He reportedly promised rapid reconstruction of the market, temporary arrangements for their stalls, and no market rental charges until they had recovered. In their presence he phoned senior bureaucrats to demonstrate his concern[53] about the fire victims and reportedly promised everything the victims requested.

The next day, Hendro's campaign parade took him near the market. A large crowd of stall-holders accompanied by NGO activists with a megaphone tried to force the district head to stop and sign a political contract promising rapid rebuilding and guaranteeing no market fees for market stall owners.

Probably not wanting to be seen as being forced to sign a document, or not wanting to be legally bound to one, he reportedly said "I know what you want and that is unfair to me" and then turned and drove away.[54]

On 4 February the polls closed at 1 p.m. and the unofficial vote count was completed before 2 p.m. As expected, Hendro Martoyo, the incumbent, easily won re-election. Hendro collected 60 per cent of the vote and won in every sub-district and in more than 80 per cent of Jepara's 194 villages. His challenger, Nur Yachman, won 35 per cent of the vote, and the Golkar *pendamping* gained 5 per cent.

The campaign, election, and vote count were generally seen by the candidates, the monitoring NGOs, and the election commission and oversight committee as fair and free, without many incidents or irregularities, and little sign of intimidation. Despite predictions of large-scale vote-buying there seemed to have been only very small payments (A$3–4) to some voters or, more frequently, to members of the candidates' success teams and to election-day polling station witnesses. More of the campaign money was spent on rallies and entertainment. Interestingly, the furniture businessman had the greatest declared wealth, Rp15 billion (A$2 million) and claimed the greatest expenses for the campaign, about Rp3 billion (about A$400,000), compared to half that for the district head and well under Rp200 million for the Golkar "pretend" candidate. If these expenditure figures can be believed, then the businessman's money was no competition for the district head's connections to village heads and local religious teachers, and his record of bringing development programmes and patronage to the villages.

The unofficial voter turn-out for the election was 52 per cent, which many Jeparan NGO critics view as a sign that the election failed to offer credible solutions to the problems important to the lives of ordinary Jeparans.[55]

CONCLUSIONS

Election systems, including *pilkada*, are proposed with certain assumptions about elections and what they will achieve. Participants in the elections also have expectations about voters, parties, candidates, and elections. This paper presented common rationales for elections, and examined the intentions of those who drafted the *pilkada* election system. It noted that the Soeharto-era politicians who dominated the National Assembly protected the interests of the parties in drafting the election laws. The result was a system in which political parties act as gatekeepers and candidates need to buy or win their approval before they can go on to the task of winning the support of voters. Whether candidates, success teams, and political parties see voters as mainly

responding (by voting) to rational arguments about issues, policies, track records, and character or as being largely mobilized by cash, patrons, and brokers, affects the campaign. The expectation that the party has to be paid adds to the likelihood that candidates will see elections and office-holding as a commercial venture. This may lead to a rising spiral of cynicism (or is it realism?) by voters and further expectation of money politics.

This paper also provides a sketch of how some of Jepara's "political public" perceive voter behaviour and the processes for selecting candidates, campaigning, and winning office. It suggests that the political public's view of voters may be paternalistic, but when asked how candidates can win office they present a more nuanced view of voters as both rational and concerned with identity and cultural connections with the candidate. Similarly, when campaigning the incumbent put most of his efforts into "entertaining" the masses, but at the same time when "real world" difficulties emerged he was right there to offer help. But should we emphasize the speed and concern of the district head to assist, and to be seen to be assisting, the devastated stall-holders or should we stress the callousness or concern for his own dignity that some see in his refusal to stop and visit them in his campaign drive-by?

Reactions of Jeparans to elite manoeuvrings, such as the conspiracy to withdraw nominations to delay the election, are also worth investigating. Is the low voter turn-out (52 per cent) an indication of dissatisfaction with politicians and the political process? Are Jeparans increasingly seeing elections as a *sandiwara* (drama), sanctioning elite entrenchment but not providing candidates who will debate[56] and deal with local problems? On the other hand, the increasing demand from the masses for politicians to deliver on their promises or, at least, pay for their attention and their vote, reflects growing political savvy and unwillingness to give away their rights. Are a growing number of ordinary Jeparans able to make demands on their government and expect a positive response? The emergence of political contracts, signed and unsigned, suggests that the effort to deepen democracy by making elected leaders responsible and accountable continues. Mass and elite perceptions of voters, candidates, and elections are complex and changing. The risks and opportunities they offer will continue to be worth watching.

Notes

1 *Pemilihan kepala daerah langsung* (direct regional head election), also known as *pilkada*.

2 The President was elected by a joint setting of the DPR (People's Representative Assembly) and the DPD (Regions' Representative Assembly).

[3] See, for example, the call for revision of the law by Centro, an electoral NGO.
[4] Even in the heyday of the decentralization reforms governors retained substantial power over district governments. They could reward or punish district heads by blocking or providing access to lucrative infrastructure and other funds.
[5] Though I would note that substantial local, provincial, and national corruption predated regional autonomy.
[6] There are also other potential benefits from elections. In a world where the most powerful nation calls itself a democracy, holding elections often bestows on a country the title of fellow democracy or fledgling democracy. This means it may qualify for additional foreign aid and investment. Holding successful elections may also demonstrate to would-be investors that a state is strong and capable, a safe place for investment.
[7] Djohermansyah Djohan in "Pilkada Langsung Perkuat Demokrasi di Daerah". *Kompas*, 17 December 2004.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] There was a *fraksi* for every political party or groups of parties and until 2004, one for the appointed Army/Police faction (normally 10 per cent of the assembly).
[12] This latter option was added to Law No. 32/2004 as a result of a ruling of the Constitutional Court.
[13] Most notably the new *bupati* of Banyuwangi, whose coalition included 18 small parties and had no seats in the Local Assembly. She defeated candidates from all four major parties by a sizeable majority.
[14] This seems to encourage coalitions with the candidate for deputy district head coming from a junior partner in the coalition.
[15] This is usually either the sekda (regional secretary), the senior civil servant in local government, or the deputy *bupati*. In many cases there are charges that the acting district head used the local state apparatus to support the incumbent candidate.
[16] About Rp 700 billion was spent from the national budget on the 226 *pilkada* held during 2005.
[17] This may mean payments to the press or it may mean providing facilities and good stories. "Mendagri: Hasil Pilkada harus berkorelasi dengan Kemajuan Daerah" [Minister of Home Affairs: the results of the Pilkada election have to correlate with the Regions's Progress] *Sinar Harapan*, 3 May 2005 http://www.sinarharapadn.co.id/berita/0504/07/sh09.html
[18] Golkar prioritaskan reputasi calon dalam pilkada langsung. [Golkar prioritizes the reputation of the candidate in the direct *pilkada*.] *Kompas*, 31 Januari 2005.
[19] See David Hill's chapter in this book.
[20] See, for example, Riswandha Imawan (2005).
[21] Although he does seem to see patron–client relations and the voter expectation of goods and cash as important.

[22] This is not so different from the disaffected democracies of the "advanced" economies.

[23] See "LIPI: Tak ada Partai yang Mengakar di Masyarakat" [Indonesian Academy of Sciences: None of the Parties Has Roots in Society] *Suara Karya*, 14 October 2006. Accessed 12 January 2007

[24] See "Bupati Banyuwangi Tanpa Dukungan Parlemen: Isu Pendidikan Gratis Mampu Membius Masyarakat" [District head of Banyuwangi without Parliamentary Support: the Issue of Free Education Was Able to Drug the Voters] *Kompas*, 14 July 2005. Accessed 3 May 2006 http://www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0507/14/Politikhukum/1894938.htm.

[25] "Golkar prioritaskan reputasi calon dalam pilkada langsung". [Golkar prioritizes the reputation of the candidate in the direct pilkada.] *Kompas*, 31 Januari 2005.

[26] The obvious exception to this rule is PKS, which has a strong cadre development programme.

[27] Some of these payments are official and go into the Party treasury, most probably do not.

[28] The other fifteen candidates in Central Java were retired military, village heads, private sector employees, and retired officials. "*Pertempuran Mantan Kepala Daerah*" [Battle of the Former Regional Heads] *Kompas*, 5 July 2005.

[29] We should be trying to research the age, gender, wealth, occupation, ethnicity, socio-cultural background, organizational membership, and education of not just the winners but also the losing candidates and those who actively tried to win nomination or were discussed as possible nominees.

[30] There are some interesting new district heads. The number of women elected district head has increased, and there have even been Chinese Indonesians using Chinese names running for district head and deputy head positions.

[31] Measuring and comparing turn-out percentages is also problematic. The regional election commission often registered fewer voters than in the last national election.

[32] The only official comparative figure I have is for 17 Central Java districts and cities where the turn-out for the *pilkada* elections ranged from 65–82 per cent. This compares with 68–88 per cent in the 2004 legislative election and 75–84 per cent in the first round 2004 Presidential election and 73–83 per cent in the 2nd round Presidential election. Source: KPU Jateng data.

[33] "Pilkada: Masalah dan prospek". Seminar CSIS, 30 Agustus 2005.

[34] Forty elected and five appointed armed forces and police representatives.

[35] The Brimob elite police unit had a company deployed in Jepara for election day.

[36] Arguably, the anger of local party elites about PPP tactics was a factor in their loss of the district head election to every party but the PPP coalition.

[37] This led to the recent jailing of the chairman and one deputy chairman of the (1999–2004) district assembly.

[38] "Memberdayakan Pemilih dalam Pilkada" [Empowering Voters in Regional Head Elections]. *Suara Merdeka*, 11 May 2005 http://www.suaramerdeka.com/harian/0505/11/opi3.htm.

[39] Ibid.
[40] Interview, 21 April 2006.
[41] Interview, 2 April 2006.
[42] Interview, 25 April 2006.
[43] Of course, selling your vote to the highest bidder could be seen as rational if that is all that the voter can hope for from the candidate.
[44] See Antlov (2004) for a useful discussion of *jasa* and a sense of indebtedness in Javanese ideas about power and leadership.
[45] Interview, NGO leader, 2 April 2006.
[46] A Muhammadiyah follower would have recited the Basmalah.
[47] Interview, 20 April 2006.
[48] Interview, 19 April 2006.
[49] The *bupati* did take leave. He moved from his official residence to a private house and from his office to PPP party headquarters and stopped using his official cars. With two minor exceptions there was no reported use of local bureaucrats for his victory.
[50] *Suara Merdeka Tajuk Rencana Gagasan Terobosan Hukum Pilkada Jepara*. http://www.suaramerdeka.com/harian/0611/18/opi01.htm. Accessed 18 November 2006.
[51] A close associate claimed that the PDI-P demanded several million rupiah as a donation to the party campaign.
[52] Masun Duri described his entry into the race as Golkar's candidate "saving democracy". In Jepara http://www.suarakarya-online.com/news.html?id=165231. Accessed 12 February 2007.
[53] His detractors say he was showing his power and shouldn't have been commanding state officials while he was legally not district head.
[54] Interview, NGO leader, 21 January 2007.
[55] The entertainment and hand-outs at rallies, and the money politics, are also seen as a sign of voter cynicism and apathy. However, 52 per cent of registered voters, while lower than in Indonesian national elections, is not low compared to local elections in other countries without compulsory voting.
[56] There was a formal debate broadcast on local radio which brought in leading Jeparan academics to ask questions and moderate the discussion. The candidates were supposed to outline their views of Jepara's needs and their strategies for local government. The audience, including the listeners, was not very large and the questions not very probing.

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8

GENDER AND REFORM IN INDONESIAN POLITICS
The Case of a Javanese Woman *Bupati*

Tri Ratnawati

INTRODUCTION: WOMEN IN INDONESIAN POLITICS

It is often stated that an important feature for the consolidation of democracy is the inclusion of the marginalized into the decision-making process; one of the marginalized groups often cited is women (Chusnul Mari'yah 2002; Haynes 2001, p. 10). Indeed, in the process of reform that started in Indonesia with the fall of Soeharto in 1998, the inclusion of women has been one of the stated goals. Some women activists argue that "Democracy without the involvement of women is not democracy" (Chusnul Mari'yah 2002, p. 4). A quota of 30 per cent inclusion of women politicians, for both the representatives (DPR) and the local district leaders (*bupati*), was formulated as a goal in the legislative elections of 2004. Although there was pressure from women's groups to implement this quota, it was in the end decided that it would be encouraged, but not required. Since it was not mandatory, nowhere was a 30 per cent rate of female political participation met, and there has been both passive and active resistance to the wider inclusion of women in politics in Indonesia. In this chapter I want to examine one case of a woman who has made her name in local politics in Indonesia, Rustriningsih, the *bupati* of Kebumen District in Central Java, and examine what her election has meant to reform and the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia.

Under the New Order there were several women *bupati* in Indonesia. But as Hana Satriyo notes:

> Women's political participation reached its lowest point during the New Order period. The strong central government in Jakarta was able to intervene in the activities of all formal and informal political institutions, at both the national and local level. As part of its tight control over political parties and national and local parliaments, the Soeharto administration made sure that most women politicians were appointed on the basis of their connections with prominent and politically powerful men. The limitations on women's political participation were even greater at the local than at the national level. Structural barriers (such as party regulations) preventing women from entering local political institutions worked hand in hand with patriarchal values to discourage women from taking up public positions and participating in public affairs (Satriyo, 2003, p. 219).

In 2000, Rustriningsih was the first woman *bupati* elected democratically by the local legislature under Habibie's regime. She had emerged as politically active during the New Order when she became a member of the PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia — Indonesian Democratic Party), Megawati's party, in Kebumen District. After the end of the New Order, it was Megawati, as the national leader of the PDI-P party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia — Perjuangan — Indonesian Democratic Party — Struggle), who brought Rustriningsih further into the political orbit. The worldwide concern with gender issues during the reform era focused on Megawati and Rustriningsih in their positions as political leaders; the press and mass media, which had become much freer in the reform era, helped to make Rustriningsih famous, both nationally and internationally. Additionally, a favourable democratic political environment in the reform era made it easier for female political activists to connect with the world. Rustriningsih and Megawati used their networks ("think-tanks", consultants, including some Indonesian intellectuals who had graduated abroad) to link them with the "global market" funding gender reform. Hence Rustriningsih and Megawati became symbols of "the weak", who had been repressed by an authoritarian regime, gaining attention, sympathy, and funding from global human rights activists. Being a woman politician in Indonesia at the time brought real advantages to these women, and this did inspire some other Indonesian women to get involved in the public domain. Rustriningsih, then, can be seen as one of the Indonesian women who symbolized the emergence of women in politics in the country. The question is, however, whether these women have used their position to further the cause of democracy and the inclusion of the marginalized in

decision-making, or whether they have utilized their positions more for their own personal benefit, thus furthering the pattern of corruption, collusion, and nepotism of the old regime. It is this concern that will be examined in this paper.

KEBUMEN DISTRICT: THE LOCAL POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

Since June 2005 Indonesia has held *pilkada langsung* (direct elections of regional heads) based on Law No. 32/2004. The *pilkada* system has replaced the indirect election by the local legislatures (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah — DPRD) under Law No. 22/99. By mid-2006, more than 200 of approximately 400 districts and cities in 32 provinces in Indonesia had held *pilkada*.[1] Money politics and conflicts (sometimes with violence) have been the trend in the "local democracy feasts" under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's administration (Prihatmoko 2005). Below I will describe and analyse the *pilkada langsung* in Kebumen District, in which Rustriningsih and her vice-*bupati* candidate, K.H. Nashirudin, won.

Kebumen district (*kabupaten* Kebumen) is a poor agricultural region located in Central Java province. This district is divided into 460 villages (*desa/kelurahan*) and 26 sub-districts (*kecamatan*). Of 1,200,000 people in 2005, the majority of the population of Kebumen were Muslims, who worked as farmers, small traders, labourers, carpenters, and fishermen. Some university graduates work as local government employees and professionals. The education level of most of the population of Kebumen is only elementary and junior high school. They have been generally strong PDI-P supporters, since the PDI-P party has had the reputation of standing up for the poor in Indonesia. Another segment of the populace are followers of traditionalist Islam (Nahdlatul Ulama). In this respect Kebumen's political culture can be said to follow the *aliran* (streams) of *abangan* (nominal Muslim) and *santri* (traditionalist Islam), identified in the 1950s by Clifford Geertz (1960). At that time, the party of PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia), which was nationalist and NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), which was traditional Islam, were dominant in Kebumen. They were associated with the *abangan* and *santri*, respectively. During the reform era (from 1999 onwards) those *aliran* reappeared (Sherlock 2004); in Kebumen, PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan) emerged as the successor of PNI and PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa) as the new party vehicle of NU. They received the majority of supporters, followed by the Golkar party. In Table 8.1 we can see that PDI-P and Golkar (nationalist parties), and the Islamic parties (PKB/traditionalist Islam party, PPP and PAN/modernist Islam party) led in the 2004 General Assembly election for

TABLE 8.1
Composition of DPRD (Local Legislature) of Kebumen Based on 1999 and 2004 General Elections

No.	*Political parties*	*Number of seats won in 1999 elections*	*Number of seats won in 2004 elections*
1.	PDI-P	16	19
2.	PKB	9	7
3.	Golkar	5	7
4.	PPP	5	5
5.	PAN	2	4
6.	PBB	1	
7.	PNU	1	
8.	Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan	1	
9.	Partai Demokrat		3
10.	TNI/Polri	5	
	TOTAL	45	45

Source: KPUD Kebumen, 2006.

local representatives, while quite a few small, newer parties failed to receive any seats at all. Compared with the results in the 1999 assembly election in the Kebumen DPRD, PDI-P increased by three seats, while PKB decreased by two seats, indicating the increased popularity of the PDI-P during that period, which can be attributed to the leadership of Rustriningsih.

It is clear from Table 8.1 that Golkar and PAN also increased their seats in the DPRD in 2004, while PPP won the same number of seats as in the 1999 general election. PD — Partai Demokrat (President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's party) gained three seats, while a number of parties failed to get any seats in the DPRD. The army (TNI/Polri), which still retained some seats in the 1999 elections, lost all its seats in the 2004 elections.

The *pilkada*, or direct election for *bupati*, in Kebumen District was held on 5 June 2005. There were four pairs of candidates running for *bupati* and vice *bupati* as follows:

(1) Candidates from PDI-P: Dra. Hj. Rustriningsih, M.Si, the *bupati* of Kebumen 2000–05, Head of PDI-P of Kebumen Branch, 38 years old, and K.H.M. Nashiruddin AM, Head of At Taqwa *pesantren*, the vice *bupati* 2000–05, 44 years old.
(2) Candidates from Democratic Party/PD and the National Mandate Party/PAN): Drs. HM. Zuhri Effendi, M.Ag. Democratic Party member,

DPRD member, a retired government employee, 63 years old and Agus Supriyanto, SE, MM, a businessman living in Jakarta, 48 years old.

(3) Candidates from the National Awakening Party (PKB): Koesnanto Karsoprayitno, a civil servant living in Jakarta, 58 years old, and KH. Mudjani Bunjamin, a NU functionary, Head of PKB's Dewan Syuro in Kebumen, 54 years old.

(4) Candidates from Golkar party: Ir. Ananto Tri Sasongko, a businessman living in Jakarta, 39 years old, and Suprapto, Head of the Golkar Party, Kebumen branch, a DPRD member 1997–99; 1999–2004, 48 years old.

The descriptions above show that candidates' backgrounds were varied: the incumbent *bupati*, political party leaders, businessmen, members of the local legislature, retired/active government employees, *pesantren*/religious functionaries, etc. Their education levels and backgrounds also varied. All candidates are *putra daerah* or "native sons" (and daughters) of the region,[2] except KH. Mudjani Bunjamin and Suprapto. Bunjamin was born in Cirebon (West Java) and Suprapto was born in Surakarta (Central Java).

Rustriningsih is head of the PDI-P party in Kebumen. She was born into a lower-class family in Gombong (one of the sub-districts in Kebumen District). Based on Law No. 22/1999 under Habibie's government, Rustriningsih was elected in 2000 by the majority of district legislature members to become *bupati* of Kebumen. She replaced the former *bupati* from the Golkar Party (a military man). Under her leadership Kebumen experienced a tremendous change in terms of development projects (such as roads, electricity, schools, health, agriculture, fishery, and so on). In the early years of her government, Rustriningsih was a populist leader who stressed development projects to boost small-scale enterprises. No big factories have been built, nor has there been a lot of investment in this agricultural region. In fact, under the New Order Kebumen was famous as one of the poorest regions in Central Java. Rustriningsih's populist leadership was in line with her party's doctrine which focuses on "*wong cilik*" ("small people").

Because of her consistency in anti-KKN (collusion, corruption, and nepotism) in Kebumen District Government, in 2003 she was promoted by the mass media (local and national) as a "clean" woman *bupati*, leading Kebumen in "good governance" issues and anti-corruption.[3] At that time she was still a single and humble woman, who did not wear the head scarf/*jilbab*. She received an award from the United Nations because of her good reputation in local governance. However, it can be argued that power and fame have changed her. From my interviews with several local sources, I was told that from 2003 her accumulation of wealth became obvious. She bought land,

houses, and other properties, for herself and her relatives. In 2005, she married a businessman from South Sulawesi whom she had met in Mecca on the *haj*. The position of *bupati* in Indonesia gives real economic advantages to the incumbent, such as so-called "*komisi*" (commission/a kind of bribery) from business partners and development projects. It is becoming evident, also, that wealth is important to support the campaign process for *pilkada*; this includes for entertainment purposes (see the chapter by Jennifer Lindsay in this volume) and for buying votes, also referred to as "money politics" (see the chapter by Syarif Hidayat in this volume). Hence the wealth that she accumulated as *bupati* could certainly have served in her bid for re-election. Indeed, in the run-up to the elections, Rustriningsih had accumulated many critics and "political enemies" who doubted the "cleanness" of her wealth, citing the fact that she had come from a lower-class family. She was particularly suspected by politicians in the DPRD. In my interviews with Rustriningsih, I could tell that she was aware of the criticisms against her.

Nevertheless, Rustriningsih had no real competitors in the Kebumen *pilkada*; she was basically unchallenged. As the incumbent *bupati* and the PDI-P party's leader, she had influence with the bureaucracy, PDI-P's functionaries, local leaders, and local people. Many locals are uneducated, poor, and have not been critical of her leadership. Civil society in Kebumen district is still weak, and has not been able to speak up effectively against corruption. Even some local NGOs have been more interested themselves in seeking money than in defending democracy. It can be argued that a strong civil society is necessary to balance the ruling elite. One of Rustriningsih's advantages was the good use she made of the media during her first period as *bupati* (2000–05). She used the media centre in the *bupati*'s office, the local mass media and the local government TV, radio and websites to put across her messages and build a good image of herself. This allowed her to become closer to the people. Those facilities were funded by the local government's budget. So she took advantage of many of the facilities and opportunities available from her *bupati* position to support her campaign. On the other hand, her competitors, Supriyanto, Karsoprayitno, and Sasongko, were all disadvantaged by the fact that although they were born in Kebumen, they had been living in Jakarta for a long time. They only returned to Kebumen to contest the local elections. People were not familiar with them, had no emotional ties with them, and may have even seen them as political opportunists who had not previously tried to do anything positive for their homeland. This had a negative impact on their *pilkada* results.

Pilkada regulations (mainly Law No. 32/2004) have not allowed independent candidates to contest in the elections without the support of a

political party or parties which had gained a minimum of 15 per cent of the total seats in the local legislatures in the 2004 general election. So an independent candidate like Ananto Tri Sasongko, for instance, had to "buy" Golkar party support as his political vehicle (for about 2 billion rupiah, according to some reliable informants). As a result, this law resulted in what might be termed "horse-trading politics" in these local elections, with political party elites emerging as the main beneficiaries. It could be said that such a practice reduced the meaning of *pilkada* as a democratic, fair, and accountable process. Many argue that this means that Law No. 32 and the *pilkada* system need to be revised.[4]

THE CAMPAIGNS AND THE *PILKADA* RESULTS

Campaigns were carried out by all candidates from 27 March to 18 May 2005. For their campaigns, the PD/PAN candidates spent about Rp 6 million, the PKB candidates spent Rp 40 million, while the PDI-P and Golkar candidates spent about Rp 300 million (KPUD's report, Kebumen, October 2005). It is quite possible that these officially reported amounts of money did not include money that was spent to buy votes from the prospective voters. Unfortunately, the KPUD (Election Commission) and the *panwas* (election monitoring committee) did almost nothing to examine these cases of money politics in the election.

During the *pilkada* campaign period, all candidates had access to local government TV (Ratih TV) and the local government radio (In FM Radio) to convey their visions and missions (*visi dan misi*) and programmes. The candidates also held meetings (dialogues) with local communities and attended community gatherings such as the Prophet Muhammad's birthday/Maulid Nabi, Friday prayers, *pengajian*/Quran reciting. Upon examination, the candidates' visions and missions are very similar. They all spoke about increasing religious life and improving the local economy. However, in many local people's perspectives, their campaign platforms were not as important as the attractiveness of the figures, that is the personality of the candidates and their leadership styles. From this perspective there is no doubt that Rustriningsih and Nashirudin were the most popular of the candidates. They were the incumbent *bupati*/vice *bupati* in 2000–05. This couple was popular in Kebumen because of their attachment to the "grass roots". Rustriningsih's power was her party (PDI-P) and its followers, while Nashirudin's power was NU and the *pesantren* communities (he withdrew from PKB). It became apparent that a coalition between nationalist and traditionalist Islam was the ideal political chemistry for gaining the support of the voters in Kebumen.

On election day there were 1865 TPS (*tempat pemungutan suara* — voting places), 460 PPS (Panitia Pemungutan Suara, Village Election Committees) and 226 PPK (Panitia Pemilihan Kecamatan, Sub-District Election Committees). All were organized by the District Election Commission/KPUD. On Sunday 5 June 2005, people in Kebumen entered the voting centres to vote. As many people had predicted, Rustriningsih/ Nashirudin won the *pilkada*. They received 462,568 votes (77.48 per cent of the total). For the *pilkada* results, see Table 8.2.

TABLE 8.2
Pilkada Results in Kebumen District in June 2005

No.	*Candidates*	*Vote Numbers*	*Percentage*
1.	Rustriningsih - Nashirudin (PDIP)	462,568	77.48
2.	Zuhri-Agus Supriyanto (PD-PAN)	26,341	4.41
3.	Kusnanto-Mudjani (PKB)	42,963	7.20
4.	Ananto-Suprapto (Golkar)	65,152	10.91
	TOTAL	597,024	100.00

Source: KPUD Kebumen, 2006.

Based on Table 8.2 it is obvious that Rustriningsih and Nashirudin's victory was absolute. Even the Golkar candidates only received 11 per cent of the total votes. Ironically, in the capital city of Kebumen, Rustriningsih/ Nashirudin lost. Conversely, the Golkar candidates won in Kebumen city sub-district. See Table 8.3.

Based on Table 8.3 it can be seen that in Kebumen City, Rustriningsih/ Nashirudin received only 4,071 votes, while Golkar's candidates got 6,258 votes. The PKB received 5,392 votes. There was thus a strong competition in the capital city of Kebumen.

Rustriningsih's loss in the capital city of Kebumen showed Golkar's strength as well as the urban inhabitants' resistance to her nomination in the *pilkada*. She was perceived by her retractors as a "corrupt and authoritarian leader". Several KKN (corruption, collusion, and nepotism) allegations were directed towards her by certain local NGOs and local community leaders (Hamdan Basyar 2005). She also replaced several officials who did not fall in line with her wishes, or those of her cronies (in-depth interviews with several DPRD members and other sources in Kebumen, March 2006). Thus Rustriningsih did not act as Javanese women are expected to, with "gentle hints" and refined behaviour, and this was unacceptable to some urban elites.

TABLE 8.3
Pilkada Results in Every Sub-District (Kecamatan) in Kebumen District

No.	*Sub-Districts*	*Candidates No. 1 (PDI-P)*	*Candidates No. 2 (PD-PAN)*	*Candidates No. 3 (PKB)*	*Candidates No. 4 (Golkar)*
1.	Ayah	23,267	1,699	2,137	2,390
2.	Buayan	23,843	405	1,029	1,793
3.	Puring	21,450	760	2,038	3,199
4.	Petanahan	20,053	1,112	3,780	2,949
5.	Klirong	22,379	1,235	1,741	3,857
6.	Bulupesantren	18,863	1,159	2,508	3,513
7.	Ambal	20,982	2,513	1,726	3,719
8.	Mirit	16,397	1,557	1,864	3,122
9.	Bonorowo	6,799	636	1,374	1,112
10.	Prembun	10,311	1,216	511	1,734
11.	Padureso	5,176	616	260	1,068
12.	Kutowinangun	15,029	1,411	1,579	3,598
13.	Alian	18,660	687	2,916	2,502
14.	Poncowarno	5,994	206	627	760
15.	Kebumen	4,071	433	5,392	6,258
16.	Pejagoan	19,251	871	1,431	1,785
17.	Sruweng	20,500	735	1,961	3,410
18.	Adimulyo	14,413	505	1,233	2,795
19.	Kuwarasan	18,469	514	1,916	1,864
20.	Rowokele	18,603	418	695	1,804
21.	Sempor	25,113	1,001	1,373	2,266
22.	Gombong	20,454	787	1,047	2,951
23.	Karanganyar	14,585	441	609	2,312
24.	Karanggayam	20,217	424	896	2,416
25.	Karangsambung	7,319	172	516	483
26.	Sadang	13,870	930	1,741	1,492
	TOTAL	426,068	22,433	42,963	65,152

Source: KPUD Kebumen, 2006.

Additionally, Rustriningsih had been using her position to benefit her relatives politically. Her younger brother became the secretary of PDI-P's Kebumen branch, and the most powerful man behind the *bupati*. Rustriningsih has been cultivating him to succeed in the 2010 elections. Furthermore, her elder sister became a member of Kebumen's DPRD from the PDI-P party in 2004. Several other relatives were included in Rustriningsih's "victory team" (*tim sukses*) in the *pilkada*, two of them local business people and three of them medical doctors. Thus there were charges of nepotism, cronyism, and collusion between the *bupati* and various members of the business community.

This rather "bleak picture" of Rustriningsih contradicted the image cultivated in the media, government brochures, and the Kebumen government website, where she is always presented as an honest politician and a clean, open, and democratic leader, the image she had built up in her early years of rule. In her opponents' views, she was famous as a populist figure, who used money and other material assistance from the local government budget for "the weak" in Kebumen. This was criticized by her opponents as "money politics" with the PDI-P party as the main beneficiary.

Despite these criticisms, the *pilkada* vote revealed that Rustringsih/Nashirudin won with a significant margin, proof that she was still supported by the majority of the population of Kebumen District. The *pilkada* ended peacefully despite protests from the losers; two out of four witnesses even refused to sign the vote-counting document (KPUD's report, 2005). This was a symbol of their dissatisfaction with the *pilkada* results. According to them, Rustriningsih's victory was not fair because of the lack of professionalism and neutrality on the part of the KPUD (the local Election Commission). From their perspective, her right to rule was not legitimate.

One of the reasons for arguing that her rule was not legitimate was based on the high level of "*golput*"(*golongan putih*, literally the "white group"), that is the group of people who did not exercise their right to vote; in Indonesia traditionally this was seen as a protest vote during the New Order. There were 241,450 people (28.9 per cent of the total voters) who were classified as *golput*. The *golput* phenomenon partly showed apathy to the *pilkada* (mostly among the educated and certain NGO activists), and their disappointment with Rustriningsih and her administration. "Political fatigue" is another explanation for the high *golput* level in Kebumen. Three consecutive elections in Kebumen (legislative election in April 2004, direct presidential election rounds I and round II in July and September 2004, and the *pilkada* in June 2005) had made the voters "tired" of voting. Many locals who work as migrants in Jakarta, Surabaya, and other cities did not return home to participate in the Kebumen *pilkada*. This was due to economic reasons as well as "political fatigue" (Source: KPUD Kebumen 2006). In this regard it is worth noting that in Kebumen a growing number of local people felt that the elections would not improve their quality of life. They did not believe that there was a positive correlation between democracy and economic development, even though scholars argue that there is a causal relationship between democratic consolidation and economic performance (Marsh et al. 1999).

This "*golput*" phenomenon can be seen to be increasing over the past three consecutive elections in Kebumen from Table 8.4.

Table 8.4 indicates a tendency for the number of votes to decrease from one election to the next.

TABLE 8.4
The Level of Participation and the Golput in the Three Elections in Kebumen District

Elections	*Voters*	*Valid Votes*	*Invalid Votes*	*Did not vote* golput
2004 Legislative Election	810,340	620,765	48,870 (7.29%)	140,705 (17.36%)
Direct President Election/PDE (round I)	830,659	618,402	14,776 (2.33%)	197,481 (23.77%)
PDE (round II)	824,795	638,700	15,927 (2.44%)	170,168 (20.65%)
Pilkada (5 June 2005)	856,625	597,024	18,151 (2.95%)	241,450 (28.19%)

Source: KPUD Kebumen, 2006.

However, Rustriningsih and Nashiruddin's victory with the majority of the voters, especially the poor, cannot be denied. This can be attributed to their efforts during the 2000–05 period, when they brought many development projects to Kebumen, such as those for education, health, and infrastructure development. Rustriningsih's position as the leader of PDI-P in Kebumen and as *bupati* meant that she was close to Megawati, in fact she is one of Megawati's favourite "children". While Rustriningsih was *bupati*, Megawati was not only the national leader of PDI-P but also the President. During President Megawati's administration the progress of development in Kebumen was clearly seen. Development projects and funding from Jakarta and from more than ten international agencies (such as Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia (PGRI), the World Bank, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Kartika Soekarno Foundation (KSF), RTI International, USAID, AUSAID, etc.) entered Kebumen. PGRI's project focused mainly on local governance reform (training for local government employees, seminars/workshops, etc.). It also gave funding to the district government to prepare for the direct election of the district leader. World Bank and JICA funding for projects in Kebumen was mainly for developing local small-scale enterprises (farmers, traders, and fishermen) and infrastructure; the KSF, RTI, USAID, and AUSAID were concerned with basic education of the poor in Kebumen. Rustriningsih's relationship with those international agencies cannot be separated from the role of her consultants from Gadjah

Mada University (where she obtained her master's degree) and other consultants (including from her party and business communities) who had connections with the international community. These members of her "think-tank" became her motivators, mediators and facilitators in helping her achieve her various goals. So the "poor", as the major part of population of Kebumen, were the main beneficiaries of Rustriningsih's and Nashiruddin's leadership. Under Rustriningsih's populist leadership, Kebumen improved its rank from the one of the poorest districts in Central Java (ranked 8th), to being one of the more better off (ranked 3rd). So, it was not a surprise that mostly the poor and less-educated people supported her in the *pilkada*.

Rustriningsih's success in the *pilkada* was also supported by information technology (IT) such as the internet and websites, certain local and national daily newspapers, local government TV (Ratih TV), and radio. It is worth noting that in her early years in government, public relations (*kehumasan*) was one of the main priorities in her development agendas. She intentionally worked on a "self-image building project" (*proyek pencitraan diri*) to draw public sympathy and support. Image building as an educated and democratic leader, as well as positive communication skills, were taught to Rustriningsih by Ken Sudarto,[5] a Chinese businessman who founded the Matari Advertising Company. Later, Sudarto became the local government's communications consultant. He supported an E-government project (www.kebumen.go.id), Ratih TV, IN-FM Radio (local government radio) and the development of a press room/media centre in the *bupati*'s office. In sum, *bupati* Rustriningsih used all of these tools for the sake of building a positive political image. She also developed her image as a pious woman, wearing a headdress (*jilbab*) after her pilgrimage to Mecca and giving financial and other assistance to mosques and *pesantren*.[6] This was part of her strategy to gain support from NU, K.H. Nashirudin's followers. All of these factors are important to explain her victory in the *pilkada*.

In return for her support, Megawati also received advantages from Rustriningsih's leadership. Rustriningsih's allegiance to PDI-P and Megawati contributed to Megawati's victory in the direct president election in this district, as can be seen in Tables 8.5 and 8.6.

It can be argued, therefore, based on the previous description, that Megawati and Rustriningsih supported each other in politics. In other words, there was a mutual relationship between those two women.

In sum, Rustriningsih's "good image" in the local and national mass media was part of "an intentionally sophisticated engineering" by herself and her cronies. In this regard, technology was used effectively by a woman politician to increase her popularity nationally and internationally. More

TABLE 8.5
Results of 2004 Direct Presidential Election (Round I) in Kebumen District, April 2004

No.	*Candidates*	*Number of Votes*
1.	Wiranto-Salahuddin Wahid	132,483
2.	Megawati-Hasyim Muzadi	227,648
3.	Amien Rais-Siswono Y. Husodo	70,836
4.	Susilo B. Yudhoyono-Y. Kalla	193,224
5.	Hamzah Haz-Agum Gumelar	28,211
	Total	652,402

Source: KPUD Kebumen, 2006.

TABLE 8.6
Results of 2004 Direct President Election (Round II) in Kebumen District, July 2004

No.	*Candidates*	*Number of Votes*
1.	Megawati-Hasyim Muzadi	346,608
2.	S.B. Yudhoyono-Yusuf Kalla	288,930
	Total	635,538

Source: KPUD Kebumen, 2006.

importantly, Rustriningsih's projects have built a "neo-patron–client relationship" between herself and certain intellectuals and professionals (including journalists) in a sophisticated way. The reform era in Indonesia has provided the possibility of a "stage" for politicians, bureaucrats, and intellectuals to become "neo-celebrities", like media artists. Mass media, internet, TV, radio, and "think-tanks" (universities, NGOs, etc.) will support the creation of celebrity status as long as money is provided.

Nonetheless, it can be argued that some people had a negative opinion of her, despite this imaging-building exercise. Demonstrations and protests from a number of local organizations (because of several corruption charges against her), the high number of *golput* in the *pilkada*, and her loss in the capital city of Kebumen raise questions about her reputation, and indicate that quite a number of people were dissatisfied with her.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Rustriningsih's victory in the *pilkada* in May 2005 was closely linked with her position as ex-incumbent *bupati* and the PDI-P's leader. The popularity of her rivals in the *pilkada* was below hers, which can be seen by the large percentage of votes gained by Rustriningsih and Nashirudin. Part of their lack of popularity can be attributed to the fact that some of Rustriningsih's rivals lived in Jakarta, hence most locals were not very familiar with them. However, a large part of her victory had to do with the cultivation of her image as a woman politician in an emerging democracy, which garnered for her ample international funding, allowing her to implement many projects during her first term of office. Despite the subsequent allegations of corruption against her, and her obvious accumulation of wealth as the incumbent leader, she still managed to garner considerable popularity as a generous ruler for the poor and an example of "good governance". Part of Rustriningsih's success can also be attributed to her clever use of information technology to build her image as an extraordinary female *bupati*. Additionally, the support of NU followers for Nashirudin, Rustriningsih's vice *bupati*, helped to gain sympathy from a significant segment of the Kebumen population. All of these factors help explain Rustriningsih's overwhelming victory in the *pilkada*.

Can Rustriningsih's victory be seen as a step in the direction of empowerment for women in Indonesia and a sign of consolidating democracy? There are problems with this, in my opinion, because of what appears to be the great temptation to which Rustriningsih succumbed, to abuse the local bureaucracy and international funding to benefit personally. Although Chusnul Mari'yah comments that "Democracy without the involvement of women is not democracy" (2002, p. 4), she also comments that Indonesia is at the present time displaying its "ugliest characteristics". The ugly face of politics is the search for power and wealth for its own sake (ibid., p. 3). It appears that Rustriningsih has followed this trend and has capitulated to the temptation of corruption, collusion, and nepotism (KKN). In my view, in order to cleanse Rustriningsih's name and image from allegations of KKN, she needs to return to her previous "dream" of good local governance. Transparency, accountability, and public participation in Kebumen's politics must be improved in her second term as *bupati*. A "strong" Javanese woman must not be "weakened" by victory and praise. Self-control and self-correction are fundamental in Javanese philosophy to maintain harmonious relationships between the micro- and the macro-cosmos (Mulder 1994). Rustriningsih's victory in the *pilkada* has given her a second chance to make corrections in her style of local governance and in herself, in order to become a "real" good

and democratic leader. The question of legitimate power often highlights issues of accountability and the morality of power holders, and this is what she will need to cultivate in order to continue to have a positive image in the public eye.

Notes

1 See *Kompas* daily newspaper, 19 June 2006.
2 Regarding *putra daerah*, see also Ford 2003, p. 145.
3 Gatra.com 8 October 2003.
4 The system will be revised in 2008, when independent candidates are to be allowed to run for regional heads.
5 From an in-depth interview with Rustriningsih in Kebumen, March 2006.
6 Interestingly, however, some locals told me that despite her pious image, she had the backing from many *preman* (gangsters).

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9

PILKADA IN BANTUL DISTRICT
Incumbent, Populism and the Decline of Royal Power[1]

Priyambudi Sulistiyanto

INTRODUCTION

The year 2005 saw an increase in local political activities throughout Indonesia with the regions embarking on *pilkada* (*pemilihan kepala daerah langsung*) (direct elections of district heads). Although there have been criticisms of *pilkada*, such as the absence of independent candidates, the limited logistics, the lack of political socialization, the inexperience of regional electoral commissions, and the confusion over legal frameworks, surprisingly *pilkada* went relatively smoothly with only a few regions experiencing political troubles and crises. By any measure, it can be argued that *pilkada* contributed significantly to local democracy in the regions (Amirudin and Bisri 2006; Prihatmoko 2005; Romli 2005).

There is no doubt that *pilkada* in the regions produced both different as well as similar experiences across Indonesia and it is important to locate these in the context of the recent studies of decentralization and local politics in post-Soeharto Indonesia (Aspinall and Fealy 2003; Erb, Sulistiyanto, and Faucher 2005; Hadiz 2004; Kingsbury and Aveling 2003; Sakai 2002). Decentralization policies implemented since 2001 are a part of a democratization process in Indonesia that has changed the nature of the centre–region relationship between Jakarta and the regions, and paved the

way for the emergence of local governance. While the local government is now closer to the people, theoretically empowering people in the regions, decentralization has also been accompanied by an increase in corruption activities, and the rampant spread of "money politics". Also, it has been pointed out by Hadiz (2004) that decentralization has not changed the "oligarchic" nature of Indonesian politics, since those who controlled and benefited from the political and economic resources during the Soeharto period have reorganized themselves and adjusted their roles at both national and local levels in a new democratic environment.

While accepting these views, I want to argue for a more locally grounded perspective for examining the dynamics of local politics. This will take into account various factors such as the importance of local leadership styles, local political networks, local cultural resources, and local historical knowledge, especially among the ordinary people. By suggesting this, it is important to avoid making generalizations about the emerging phenomena of *pilkada* in the regions. This requires recognizing *pilkada* as a part of the local political context where each election has its own features that differ from others. This is not to ignore the importance of the structural and external factors in shaping *pilkada* in the regions, but instead recognizing that there is a blending of these factors into the dynamics of local politics. In the case of Bantul district, it is important to note that there is the unique political and cultural nature of the Sultanate of Jogjakarta (Kasultanan Jogjakarta) that has been searching for a place in the new democratic setting of the post-Soeharto period. It is important here to place the Kasultanan Jogjakarta as a type of political actor, which has been involved in coalition building, at the same time protecting and controlling its interests in Bantul district.

Within this context this chapter examines the *pilkada* in Bantul district, Jogjakarta province, which took place on 26 July 2005. The *pilkada* in Bantul district was an interesting local political phenomenon because it tells us about more than just a local political contest. It includes a cultural dimension whose significance cannot be ignored. In this chapter I want to explain the factors that brought overwhelming victory for the incumbent *bupati* and also to trace the incumbent's populist policies which contributed to this victory. I also want to discuss the views and insights of the ordinary people in Bantul about the strengths and weaknesses of the incumbent leader. The contest in this *pilkada* will be examined at length by looking at the configuration of local political networks in Bantul district. I will address the significance and basis of the royal power during the *pilkada*. This chapter argues that despite the fact that politically the incumbent is often in a superior position *vis-à-vis*

other contenders, this does not always translate into winning the local elections. What the incumbent did while in power and his ability to win over the hearts and minds of the local people in Bantul district were also crucial. There are several important questions to be asked, such as what kind of leadership styles and local political configurations exist in Bantul? How have these factors played out in the Bantul *pilkada*? How have both external and local factors contributed to shaping the dynamics of the Bantul *pilkada*?

This chapter is divided into four parts. The first is a brief description of the political history of Bantul district with emphasis on the historical link between Bantul and the Kasultanan Jogjakarta and the significance of this relationship to the people and local leaders in Bantul district. The second part is an examination of the processes and results of the *pilkada* in Bantul district in 2005. It looks closely at the profiles of each candidate and their political alignments, and how the ordinary people viewed these candidates and their policies. The third part will examine the notion of incumbency and the factors that helped the incumbent *bupati* win the local election and it will also critically examine the populist policies implemented by the incumbent *bupati.* The fourth part is an analysis of the decline of royal power by assessing the role of the Kasultanan Jogjakarta and the candidacy of a royal person in these local elections.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE KASULTANAN JOGJAKARTA IN BANTUL DISTRICT

Bantul district is located in the southern part of the Special Province of Jogjakarta and it has a population of about four million, who live in seventeen sub-districts (*kecamatan*) and seventy-five villages (*desa*). The transformation of Bantul district cannot be separated from the changes that occurred in Jogjakarta in the past few decades. Economically, Bantul is dependent on the economic activities of Jogjakarta since the people of Bantul district commute to work there on a daily basis. Bantul provides cheap labour for Jogjakarta and also floods the markets in Jogjakarta with a variety of agricultural and other products produced by the villagers (Huiseman and Stoffers 1998; Rotge 2000). These days Bantul district is known as an important tourist site where local people produce ceramics, handicrafts, woodcarvings, and other fine arts for overseas and domestic markets. Whilst it has embraced globalization and modernity, Bantul district has remained in many respects rural. The people of Bantul are proud of their Javanese culture, and their identification with it can be found in many local art performances and activities throughout the villages in Bantul.

Bantul district has a rich local history which can be traced back to the Mataram period in the sixteenth century (see Moedjanto 1994). Jogjakarta has been and has remained the bastion of Javanese culture and traditions. In the past, the *bupati* of Bantul was always appointed by the Sultan of Jogjakarta and given a royal title appropriate for this position. The *bupati* was the Sultan's "person on the ground" and reported directly to him on issues unfolding in the district. Thus those who held the position of *bupati* in Bantul had to be loyal to the Sultan and had to be skilful in administrative, political, economic, and cultural areas. Through the *bupati*, the Sultan could establish a political link with heads of the sub-districts (*camat*) and the villages (*lurah*), enabling him to know the views and the voices of the ordinary people.

This kind of political relationship continued during the Dutch colonial period and remained so in the post-Independence period when, in 1950, under the leadership of the late Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, the Kasultanan Jogjakarta was granted a special status by the Indonesian government. The popularity of Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX and his leadership style contributed significantly to the continuity and relevance of the royal monarchy for the people of Jogjakarta. They regarded him highly, as he was seen as the king who cared for and was close to the common people. He championed the idea of "the Crown for the People" (Tahta untuk Rakyat) as a way in which the Kasultanan Jogjakarta could adjust itself to modern democratic principles in Indonesia. In order to achieve this, Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX introduced a series of measures aimed at democratization from the district to the village level in Jogjakarta (Wahyukismoyo 2004, p. 39). The current Sultan, Hamengkubuwono X, who was crowned in 1989 and subsequently appointed as the Governor of the Special Province of Jogjakarta in 1998, continued the existing political legacies of the Kasultanan Jogjakarta.

Having explained the historical setting, it is important to acknowledge the importance of the political and cultural influences of the Kasultanan Jogjakarta on local leadership succession in Bantul district. In the past, the Sultan had the right to appoint *bupati*, but in recent years when *bupati* had to be appointed by the local legislature, the Sultan's moral and political support was crucial. Without this support, *bupati* would lose their political and cultural legitimacies in the eyes of the ordinary people in Bantul district. However, this type of relationship mutually benefited both sides. Kasultanan Jogjakarta has a great stake and interest in Bantul district. For instance, there are many important archaeological and cultural sites (Pleret, Imogiri, Parangtritis, Samas) and other business interests (such as tobacco and sugar plantations) owned by the Kasultanan Jogjakarta and scattered all over Bantul.

All of these required the support and cooperation of the Bantul *bupati* and without this cooperation the future and the continuity of cultural and economic interests of the Kasultanan Jogjakarta would be in jeopardy.

PILKADA IN BANTUL DISTRICT, 2005

As in other regions, there were important issues, such as funding, security matters, and the candidates' profiles that emerged prior to the *pilkada* in Bantul district. According to the Law on Local Government (No. 32/2004) the local government must provide an election budget for the local electoral commission, KPUD (Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah) to run *pilkada* in the regions. In Bantul district, the KPUD needed more than Rp 9.5 billion and the lack of the necessary funds was raised by GKR Hemas, a member of the national-based Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD) and a wife of Sultan Hamengkubuwono X (*Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 26 March 2005; 11 June 2005). The urgency of this issue was raised in the local media, and it was clear only by May 2005 that the funding needed for local elections in Bantul district had finally been approved by the local legislature. The KPUD then officially announced the three pairs to contest the *pilkada* in Bantul district (*Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 4 May 2005).

Meanwhile, some candidates began to register for political parties as early as March 2005. According to the Law on Local Government a political party or a coalition of political parties must have a minimum of 15 per cent of the total votes in the local legislature to endorse a pair of *bupati* and *vice-bupati* candidates; no independent candidates may contest in the *pilkada*.[2] Consequently, the Law has given a powerful position to political parties as it gives them the right to select candidates. It is important to note that the *pilkada* in Bantul was held in the climate of the high popularity of the incumbent *bupati*, Idham Samawi, who had run the district since 1999. There was an atmosphere of uneasiness among the local political actors in Bantul district about the absence of alternative candidates to contest the local elections.[3] The success of the incumbent *bupati* in running Bantul district during his term in office, and the fact that the stories of success were circulated widely by his supporters during the campaign, made it almost impossible for other candidates to compete with him.

As we can see from Table 9.1, Idham Samawi (with his running mate, Sumarno) won about 73 per cent of the total votes, leaving the remaining votes to other contenders: GPH Yudhaningrat with his running mate, Aziz Umar (21 per cent) and Totok Sudarto with his running mate, Riswanto (5 per cent). The results show that Idham Samawi and Sumarno won in

TABLE 9.1
Results of the Pilkada in Bantul District in 2005

No.	*Candidates*	*Votes*	*Percentage*
1	Totok Sudarto and Riswanto	25,521	5.37
2	Idham Samawi and Sumarno	347,214	73.06
3	Yudhaningrat and Aziz Umar	102,501	21.57
	Total	**475,236**	**100.00**

Source: KPU Bantul.

almost all *kecamatan* (sub-districts) and *kelurahan* (villages) in Bantul district, except in the village of Giriloyo where the voters gave their preferences to the pair of Yudhaningrat and Aziz Umar (Rohi 2005, p. 86).

The following paragraphs look closely at the profiles of each candidate and their political alignments and how the ordinary people viewed these candidates and what they stood for. It also examines the processes and results of the *pilkada* in Bantul district in 2005.[4]

Idham Samawi comes from a prominent family in Jogjakarta, and his father was one of the founders of the local newspaper *Kedaulatan Rakyat*. Before he took up the *bupati* position in 1999, Idham worked as a journalist with *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, and with this past professional background he was known among journalists in Jogjakarta. Through this network of media circles he was able to mobilize public opinion promoting his image as a successful local leader in Bantul district.[5] The dominance of Idham Samawi was also associated with the fact that he belonged to the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, PDI-P), the party with the most seats in the local parliament. As shown in Table 9.2, there are 45 seats in Bantul's local legislature and the rest of the seats were shared by other political parties such as the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN), the Nation Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB), and Partai Golkar (*Suara Merdeka*, 14 April 2005).

During the *pilkada* in 2005, the incumbent *bupati*, Idham Samawi, was supported by a coalition of the major political parties who controlled most of the seats in the local legislature. Idham Samawi chose Sumarno, a native son of Bantul and a respected local bureaucrat, as his running mate. Sumarno has strong links with Muhammadiyah as he was the leader of the youth wing of Muhammadiyah's local branch in Bantul district. The two complemented each other, with Idham providing a strong political leadership, and Sumarno contributing knowledge of running the local government in Bantul. The pair

TABLE 9.2
Seats in Local Parliament
(2004 General Elections)

No.	*Political Parties*	*Seats*
1	PDI-P	16
2	PAN	7
3	PKB	6
4	Golkar	5
5	PKS	5
6	PPP	3
7	PKPB	2
8	PD	1
	Total	**45**

Source: KPUD Bantul.

campaigned on three issues: that the local government would keep democratic principles, that the welfare of the local people would improve, especially in health and education levels, and that the local economy would experience growth, creating job opportunities and eradicating poverty (Rohmaniyati et al. 2005, p. 30).

The second pair were Yudhaningrat and Aziz Umar, who were supported by a coalition of the Justice and Prosperous Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) and the Nationhood and Caring Party (Partai Karya Perduli Bangsa, PKPB). Yudhaningrat is a brother of Sultan Hamengkubuwono X and is a civil servant in the provincial government office in Jogjakarta. He is also the chief of the royal military command (*manggala yudha*) in the Kasultanan Jogjakarta. Yudhaningrat chose Aziz Umar, a former member of the local legislature in Bantul, as his running mate. Aziz is also a prominent Islamic leader in Bantul and the head of an Islamic boarding school in Sanden, Bantul. Their campaign issues dealt mainly with the improvement of the economy and moral and religious awareness in Bantul district (Rohmaniyati et al. 2005, p. 31).

The third pair were Totok Sudarto and Riswanto. Totok Sudarto was a middle-rank air force officer who had been Idham Samawi's vice-*bupati* when he was chosen in 1999, but resigned from that position in 2002. Totok Sudarto chose Riswanto, a former local bureaucrat in Bantul district, as his running mate; he was also the former vice-head of the Golkar local branch in Bantul (*Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 28 March 2005). In this *pilkada*, they were supported by the PAN and other small political parties in Bantul; because of

PAN support, Amien Rais (the national leader of PAN) came during the campaign period (*Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 22 June 2005). Their campaign issues were focused on the improvement of local government performance. This involved the adoption of principles of good governance, the provision of better local infrastructure and improving educational facilities, as well as following the "rule of law" (Rohmaniyati et al. 2005, p. 29).

By assessing their campaign issues, it can be said that there were not many differences between the candidates. Generally, they campaigned on the economic, educational, and job creation issues that mattered most for the people of Bantul. The slight difference was that the pair of Yudhaningrat and Aziz Umar strongly emphasized the importance of religious, moral, and cultural factors as they believed that these issues were fundamental to improving the quality of human development for the people of Bantul district.

The campaigning activities were held throughout June 2005 and were not very different from previous (legislature and presidential) elections held in Bantul district in 2004, except that this time the focus of attention was on local issues. The activities were as follows:

- The candidates used various forms of public campaigning for promulgating their ideas and programmes, including print and electronic media.
- They visited villages throughout Bantul district and talked directly to the audience in an open field and were accompanied by supporters from political parties and by followers or loyalists of each of the candidates.
- They frequently brought national and local political figures in order to attract the voters.
- During the campaign period, they often gave packages of basic needs such as rice, sugar, tea, salt, and cooking oil to the audience (*Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 13 June 2005). The candidates also entertained the audience in villages with music concerts such as *dangdut* (pop music) and local and traditional performances like *wayangan* (shadow puppet performance) or *kethoparakan* (local opera).
- To cater to the more educated audiences, the candidates were invited to a number of public forums organized by local media or local universities in Jogjakarta. In this kind of interactive public forum, the candidates were questioned and scrutinized by a group of panellists about their visions or ideas (*visi dan misi*). The panellists then invited the audience inside and outside the forum to participate in the discussion.

Controversial issues regarding the track records of the candidates also appeared in local media and unpublished bulletins circulated during the

campaign period.[6] These issues ranged from corruption to personal issues. As I observed this *pilkada* closely, these controversial issues seemed only to add "flavour" to the local elections with attempts by each candidate to damage and to destroy their opponents' good names (called "black campaigning"). This was proven at the end when there was no serious attempt made by the local police to investigate the allegations directed at the candidates. However, the positive aspect was that at least the people of Bantul district were presented with different stories (and faces) of the candidates that otherwise might not have appeared in public forums or gatherings.

POLITICS OF INCUMBENCY AND POPULIST POLICIES

Scholars in the field of local politics have argued about the advantages of incumbents over other candidates in electoral competitions (Miller III 1999; Somit et al. 1994). The incumbents have already occupied public office, have controlled the bureaucracy, have formulated policies and have implemented programmes, in comparison to their opponents who may not have all of these advantages. In the case of Bantul district, Idham Samawi had these advantages as he had held his position from 1999 to 2004 and he had accomplished a lot during this period. However, as I mentioned earlier, it is important to recognize that the overwhelming success of Idham Samawi cannot be interpreted only as the result of his position as an incumbent local leader. Rather, it is what he did while in power and his ability to win over the hearts and minds of the local political actors and of the ordinary people in Bantul district which secured his strong victory.

Idham Samawi implemented several populist policies that benefited the majority of village people during his first term in office (Suharti 2005, pp. 156–58).[7] These populist policies were, for instance, the introduction of a scheme to protect farmers from the volatility of commodity prices (rice and chilli) during the harvest season from March to August, when the prices usually dropped dramatically due to over-supply in the local market. According to Idham Samawi, his government studied the rise and fall of these commodity prices over the past twenty years and came up with several ideas. One of these was to work together with 800 farmers' groups to monitor prices and not allow them to sell their commodities below the market price until the prices were stable. The second was to buy these commodities directly from farmers above market price; this was costly as the Bantul government had to spend around Rp 3.5 billion in 2003 (as cited in *Kompas*, 3 May 2003, accessed 22 March 2006).

In 2003–04, Idham Samawi introduced the so-called *babonisasi* programme, a scheme of giving two hens to each primary school student in

Bantul district. The logic of this scheme was to improve the health of pupils in the long term as they would eat eggs rich in protein (Figure 9.1). The scheme was also a way of encouraging pupils to save money. In the health sector, Idham Samawi introduced a scheme to establish a ward in every local community clinic (*puskesmas*), guaranteeing local people quick and cheap access for their medical and health needs. He also established a new local hospital, Panembahan Hospital, in Bantul that was staffed with professional healthcare workers.

FIGURE 9.1
A Basket of Eggs

Source: Sulistiyanto (2006).

In the education sector, Idham Samawi introduced a scheme to send the heads and teachers in Bantul primary schools to study for a master's degree in universities in Jogjakarta. This scheme was aimed at improving the overall quality of human resources in Bantul district. To improve the local employment situation, Idham Samawi invited domestic and foreign investors to invest in Bantul with the aim of providing more job opportunities for local people. The areas he targeted were the agricultural sector, small-scale industries, and the manufacturing sector (Suharti 2005, p. 158).

In the eyes of the people of Bantul, Idham Samawi's policies were good and these made him very popular. Additionally, his leadership style, which is a down-to-earth, approachable, communicative one, won the hearts and minds of ordinary people. In my conversations with a range of people of Bantul district, I came across various opinions about Idham Samawi's leadership style. Most of them agreed that Idham Samawi is a very popular person in Bantul district. He responded well to the needs of local people, and did much to improve the infrastructure facilities, especially by building good roads connecting villages throughout Bantul.[8] Idham Samawi was also skilful in respecting the views of ordinary people (*wong cilik seneng nek diwongke*).[9] He often visited villages in find out the real issues affecting the villagers, bypassing the local bureaucratic institutions in Bantul. People frequently commented that Idham Samawi was willing to assist or respond to any request asked of him even if this required him to travel to many villages throughout the district. While on these visits he often ended up spending his own money if he was confronted with people who desperately needed financial assistance.[10]

Meanwhile, the critics of Idham Samawi argued differently about his leadership style. One of the accusations was that Idham Samawi's populist policies were introduced without the proper procedures/regulations (*peraturan daerah*) which required the approval of the local legislature.[11] The policies were implemented in an *ad hoc* manner and aimed at raising his political stature in Bantul district. It is true that Idham Samawi was a popular leader because he knew how to construct a positive political image in the eyes of the people in Bantul district. However, he should have known that the nature of his job was to serve the local people rather than just to give an image that he was a caring leader. Meanwhile, others added that Idham Samawi manipulated the local government resources for his personal gains. When he introduced the *babonisasi* programme, the local parliament did not evaluate it and follow up to see if this programme succeeded or failed. In fact, I heard one story from a group of villagers who received three hens from the Bantul government, but they died within ten days. When they asked for replacements, they did not get any. According to these villagers, this situation happened not only in their village but also in other villages. The scheme was basically a failure.[12]

The critics questioned the funding issue for those populist policies that Idham Samawi implemented in his first term in office. It appeared that Idham Samawi used both non-budgetary (or discretionary) funds, as well as budget funds, to support these populist schemes. The first type of funds come directly from his office and do not require approval from the local legislature; the second type of funds, however, require the cooperation and approval of the legislature. However, since Idham Samawi's political party,

the PDI-P, gained the most seats in the local legislature, he did not have difficulty getting them to support his populist policies (Suharti 2005, pp. 159–60). One informant even suggested that the reason that the local legislature did not critically evaluate these schemes was because of the involvement of local business players who were close to the PDI-P in Bantul district.[13] The critics of Idham Samawi also believed that he used the populist schemes to increase his political popularity in Bantul district, and he was not, and still is not, seriously interested in establishing a system of good governance in Bantul district.

Having explained the populist policies implemented by Idham Samawi that contributed significantly to his winning the *pilkada* in Bantul in 2005, we must now look at the local political players and groups who were the main part of his political bases. First of all, it is important to examine the significance of Sultan Hamengkubuwono X. According to the electoral regulations Sultan Hamengkubuwono X was not allowed to openly endorse a particular candidate. He had to appear to be a neutral leader. However, the ordinary people followed closely any "statements" or "signals" from the Sultan that indicated which candidate he preferred for *bupati*. Therefore the "signal" that came from Sultan Hamengkubuwono X was very crucial for Idham Samawi. The close relationship between Sultan and Idham Samawi started back in the 1970s when they were friends and knew each other well. From the time Idham Samawi took up his position in 1999, they have been on good terms, especially since as a *bupati*, Idham Samawi had the important job of protecting the stakes and interests of the Kasultanan Jogjakarta in Bantul district. During the *pilkada* in 2005, Sultan Hamengkubuwono X urged the people of Bantul district to vote for the *bupati* who had already done a lot for them, and this was interpreted by the people of Bantul district as an endorsement for Idham Samawi. The Idham Samawi camp utilized these statements (some say manipulated them) by distributing banners and pictures of Idham Samawi and Soetrisno with a quotation from the Sultan saying, "Vote for a candidate for *bupati* who will be useful to the people" (*Pilih calon bupati yang bermanfaat untuk rakyat*). This, no doubt, sent "the right signal" to the voters.

The local bureaucrats were also an important backbone for Idham Samawi. In particular, he relied on support from the Paguyuban Lurah Tunggul Jati, an association of village bureaucrats comprising village heads and their employers in Bantul district. This association was known to the public in 2003 when Idham Samawi organized thousands of villagers and their village heads from Bantul district to go to Jogjakarta's legislature building to support the re-election of Sultan Hamengkubuwono X as the Governor of the Special Province of Jogjakarta. The origins of this association can be traced back to

the Soeharto period when it was established by Notosuwito who was the village head in Argomulyo in Sedayu, Bantul district and who was also one of Soeharto's stepbrothers. Under the leadership of Notosuwito, this association was very powerful, to the extent that even *bupati* had to ask for support from Notosuwito in order to get things done in Bantul district. However, after his resignation in 2004, Notosuwito and many village heads who were the members of this association shifted their loyalties to Idham Samawi. During the *pilkada* in 2005, Idham Samawi was able to gather support from them and this contributed greatly to his win in the elections.

Outside the main political parties, there are religious organizations, such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, and other types of social organizations in Bantul district which supported Idham Samawi. The NU openly endorsed the leadership of Idham Samawi; this was done by setting up a special team to help the campaign activities of the Idham Samawi camp during the *pilkada*. While the Muhammadiyah did not openly endorse Idham Samawi, they did offer support to him by giving instructions to the members of Muhammadiyah to vote for Idham Samawi (Rohmaniyati 2005, pp. 98–99). There are also other social and cultural organizations such as Macan Tamil, Garda Nusantara, Passerbumi, Berantas, Pordasi that played their part in mobilizing support for Idham Samawi. A non-government organization called Lappera led by Dadang Yuliantara, a former student activist, also worked closely with Idham Samawi. The partnership of Lappera and Idham Samawi resulted in, among other things, the establishment of the School for Village Government (Sekolah Pemerintahan Desa, SPD) to train and to educate village heads in Bantul district (Rohi 2005, pp. 92–93). This partnership allowed Idham Samawi to get support from the NGO community in Bantul district.

As a former journalist as well as one of the owners of *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, Idham Samawi has good supporters in the media community in Bantul and Jogjakarta. He also set up a special television programme known as Plengkung Gading, covering the development activities in Bantul; this programme was broadcast to millions of viewers. Maintaining a good relationship with the local media was a crucial point for Idham Samawi during the *pilkada* in 2005 because through building a good image of his leadership in Bantul district, the people of Bantul were convinced that he was their only choice. However, the critics argued that with the absence of alternative local leaders, Idham Samawi transformed himself into a *raja daerah* ("local king") in Bantul district.[14] As one informant put it bluntly, in spite of his political dominance, Idham Samawi had failed to establish a proper way in which the local political successions could occur smoothly in Bantul district.[15] Therefore, the danger

is that the more popular and powerful Idham Samawi becomes, the more difficult for his supporters to see the importance of strengthening local/traditional institutions and the spirit of democracy, both of which have already been well established in Bantul district. This was the irony of Idham Samawi's reign; he had not proven he could use the power of incumbency to nurture the emergence of a vibrant local democracy in Bantul district.

THE DECLINE OF ROYAL POWER IN JOGJAKARTA?

Scholars have argued that the political history of Kasultanan Jogjakarta, like other monarchies in Southeast Asia, has been shaped by internal rivalries and conflicts among the members of the royal family (Heryanto 2003; Moedjanto 1994; Rozaki and Hariyanto 2003; Wahyukismoyo 2004). As we can see in Table 9.1, the pair of Yudhaningrat and Aziz Umar was able to capture about 21 per cent of the total votes, and arguably this result is worth further examination because it shows that the "Yudhaningrat factor" cannot be dismissed. The appearance of Yudhaningrat, one of the Sultan's brothers, as a *pilkada* candidate generated a lot of public interest about the political involvement of Kasultanan Jogjakarta in local elections. It is, however, important to locate the *pilkada* in Bantul district within the context of the existence of Kasultanan Jogjakarta.

Who is Yudhaningrat? He comes from the Kasultanan Jogjakarta and is one of the sons of the late Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX (from the wife KRAy. Hastungkoro). As the stepbrother of the current Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, Yudhaningrat had at his disposal both political and cultural resources for contesting in the local political arena. The news about his intention to run in the *pilkada* in Bantul district appeared in the local media as early as November 2004 (*Republika*, 4 November 2004). Why did he enter the *pilkada* in Bantul district in 2005? He claimed that he was approached by several political parties and local leaders.[16] After considerable discussion, finally his candidacy was endorsed by the PKS and PNKB, a political party closely associated with Tutut, the daughter of former president Soeharto, which has a strong base in Sedayu area in Bantul district. Getting the PKS on his side was a bit hard as they scrutinized his private life, track record, and financial background.[17] Beyond political parties, he was also supported by an umbrella organization called the Aliansi Masyarakat Pendukung Ulama (AMPUH), comprising several grass-roots political and social activists from the PPP, Angkatan Muda Demokrat, Angkatan Muda Ka'bah and from the local *pesantren* in Bantul (*Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 3 May 2005).

On his political motives, the primary aim of Yudhaningrat was to celebrate and to improve the quality of local democracy in Bantul district as he was concerned that the voters had no alternative candidate in the *pilkada*. By doing this, he also followed his father's idea of "the Crown for the People", which he wanted to nurture in the context of local politics in Bantul district. He was worried that his brother was too close to Idham Samawi and this would have implications for Sultan Hamengkubuwono X in the future. As one of the Sultan's brothers, he thought the Sultan should have behaved properly during the *pilkada* in Bantul in 2005, instead of openly taking sides with Idham Samawi and endorsing his candidacy. He believed that the Sultan should have shown his neutrality as was required of a democratic person.

As a member of Kasultanan Jogjakarta, Yudhaningrat was favourably regarded in the eyes of ordinary people in Bantul district. For instance, Yudhaningrat may have been well received in Imogiri (a small town where the royal cemetery is located) because many *abdi dhalem* (servants of the palace) live there and they have a strong loyalty to the Kasultanan Jogjakarta. Indeed, as one informant suggested, the local people in Imogiri will give him another chance if Yudhaningrat re-enters the *pilkada* race in the future.[18] Reflecting on his failure to win the election, some have argued that the candidacy of Yudhaningrat was still a positive political phenomenon because it showed that there was someone who dared to challenge the dominance of Idham Samawi in Bantul district.[19]

What did Yudhaningrat think about his failure to gain many votes in 2005? He accepted the results of the *pilkada* in Bantul district in 2005 with a positive attitude and argued that as a citizen, he has the right to enter politics. No one, including his own brother Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, could stop the members of the Kasultanan Jogjakarta contesting in local elections in Jogjakarta. Although his brother did not support him in 2005, he believed that the voters were given choices and alternatives in the *pilkada*, and therefore his candidacy contributed towards the emergence of a vibrant local democracy in Bantul district. Can his failure be seen as a sign of the decline of the political and cultural influences of the Kasultanan Jogjakarta in Bantul district? It is perhaps too early to tell. However, I would argue that the pros and cons regarding the Yudhaningrat candidacy in the *pilkada* in Bantul showed that the royal family was divided both internally and politically. Yudhaningrat himself acknowledged that the Kasultanan Jogjakarta needs to readjust itself to the changing nature of local politics in Bantul district, in particular, and in the Special Province of Jogjakarta in general. He argued that the Kasultanan Jogjakarta is still an important institution in a cultural sense, but politically the local people will gradually move away from it, in the sense that the members of the royal family will not always have influence over

the dynamics of local politics. The "special status" that the Kasultanan Jogjakarta was given in the past, which was something the people of Jogjakarta are proud of, cannot continue forever, especially since people are now living in a different era. Having said this, he also argued for the continuation of the Kasultanan Jogjakarta in maintaining the cultural identity that embodies the centuries of existence of this remaining royal monarchy in Indonesia.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has examined the *pilkada* in Bantul district, Jogjakarta province, which took place on 26 July 2005. It has suggested that the *pilkada* in Bantul district was more than just a local political contest but also had a cultural dimension which cannot be ignored. In this paper I have critically examined the factors that brought the overwhelming victory for Idham Samawi, the incumbent *bupati* of Bantul district, and traced the significance of Idham's populist policies in contributing to this victory. I have also discussed the views and insights of the ordinary people in Bantul on the strengths and weaknesses of Idham Samawi's leadership style and its impact. Having explained this, I have argued that in spite of the fact that politically Idham Samawi was in a superior position *vis-à-vis* other contenders because of his incumbency, this was not the only factor that ensured his winning the *pilkada* in Bantul district. Instead, I have suggested that what Idham Samawi did while he was in his first term in office and his ability to win over the hearts and minds of the local people in Bantul district were also crucial.

This paper has argued for a more locally grounded view in examining the dynamics of local politics in Bantul district by taking into account the various factors such as local leadership styles, local political networks, local cultural resources, and historical knowledge. By suggesting this, I have argued that it is important to avoid making a generalization about the phenomena of *pilkada* in the regions. It is therefore required to accept the view that the *pilkada* in Bantul district must be seen as a local political phenomenon with its own features without ignoring the structural and external factors that shaped the processes and results of the *pilkada* in 2005. Through this paper I have argued that the case of the *pilkada* in Bantul district in 2005 embodied the problematic political and cultural roles of the Kasultanan Jogjakarta in its journey to have a place in a new democratic setting of the post-Soeharto period. The internal dynamics or even rivalries spelled out during the *pilkada* in Bantul district showed much about the need for the local people, and the members of the royal family, to build together a strong foundation to nurture the emergence of a vibrant local democracy in Bantul district.

The insights we can learn from the *pilkada* in Bantul district were that the local people were confronted with both embracing the local electoral mechanism and the traditional-emotional loyalty to the Jogjakarta Sultanate embedded in the society. This will be important in Indonesia because this is one place where the power of the monarchy is still real and it will not disappear from politics as has happened with other royal monarchies such as in Solo, Cirebon, Ternate, and Palangkaraya.[20] The Jogjakarta Sultanate survives because it has been able to adapt to the changes that have happened in Indonesian politics over the years. I believe that the *pilkada* will continue to open up opportunities for the members of the royal family in Jogjakarta to enter politics in the future.

Notes

1 This paper is based on my fieldwork trips to Bantul district, Jogjakarta, Central Java, in June and July 2005 and in April 2006. I want to thank the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, National University of Singapore for providing a research grant and to the Southeast Asian Studies Programme and the Asia Research Institute for additional support. Thanks also to Amirudin, Rudy and David for helping me to gather information about Bantul district.

2 This is due to change in 2008, when independent candidates will be allowed throughout Indonesia.

3 In some districts, where the popularity of the incumbent was so great, there was considerable difficulty in finding opponents, and the *pilkada* had to be postponed. For one example, see Jim Schiller's chapter in this volume.

4 See also Jennifer Lindsay's chapter in this volume for some discussion of the *pilkada* in Bantul.

5 See also David Hill's chapter in this volume on the increasing emergence and success of media figures in Indonesian politics.

6 The following information is discussed in Rohmaniyati et al. (2005, pp. 31–32).

7 The following information is quoted from Suharti (2005).

8 Conversation with Gondrong (a *becak* driver), Jogjakarta, 18 April 2006.

9 Conversation with Bejo (a *becak* driver), Jogjakarta, 19 April 2006.

10 Conversation with Bagus (a former member of the local legislature), Kotagede, 24 April 2006.

11 Conversation with Harianto (a journalist), Bantul, 21 April 2006.

12 During the campaign period in June 2005, they asked the Bantul government to provide ducks instead, and they received nineteen of them, of which fourteen survived. When the ducks laid eggs, the villagers divided the profits in two ways: some for those who looked after the ducks and the rest for the villagers' organization. Conversation with a group of villagers in Pundong village, Bantul, 20 April 2006.

[13] Conversation with Nono (a cultural worker), Bantul, 19 April 2006.
[14] Conversation with Nono, Bantul, 19 April 2006.
[15] Conversation with Bagus, Kotagede, 24 April 2006.
[16] Conversation with Yudhaningrat, Jogjakarta, 20 April 2006. The following section is based on this conversation.
[17] In this conversation he told me that he did not have many financial resources and therefore he relied on donations and financial support from the PNKB.
[18] Conversation with Simuh, Imogiri, 19 April 2006.
[19] Conversation with Nono, Bantul, 19 April 2006.
[20] See Claire Q. Smith's paper in this volume for a case where the royal family of Ternate has tried unsuccessfully to make a comeback in local politics.

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NEWSPAPERS

Kedaulatan Rakyat
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PART II

Media and Campaigns: Comparing Local and National Elections

10

POMP, PIETY, AND PERFORMANCE *Pilkada* in Yogyakarta 2005

Jennifer Lindsay

Performance is an integral part of Indonesia's election culture. National elections — from Indonesia's first election in 1955, throughout the New Order, to Reformasi and the present — have always been marked by parades, fairs, and performances, by both performing artists and politicians themselves, as I have discussed elsewhere (Lindsay 2005, 2007). National election campaigns are in many ways one long show, with a clearly marked performance season. Live performance is integral to these campaigns: as an attraction to provide a festive atmosphere and draw crowds to party rallies (just as a family hosting a wedding or circumcision party provides entertainment for guests), as a way for a political party to highlight its endorsement by well-known artists, or to provide an opportunity for political candidates themselves to perform in another voice.

Election Day, too, despite real political tensions or even because of them, is also marked by a sense of play. It is common to find polling booths decorated as for a festive occasion, particularly weddings. Recently a new trend has emerged. At some polling booths, officials dress up in costume (traditional dance costume, for instance) or ceremonial dress (like hosts at a wedding reception), playfully emphasizing the ceremonial performance of voting.

In 2004, the year of national legislative elections and the first direct presidential election (held in two stages), this play aspect was highly evident.

The main campaign performance stage, however, shifted to television, which featured celebrities (pop stars, singers, and *sinetron* artists) debating their political affiliations, and infotainment shows about celebrity choice. In many ways, this was a natural development from the role television began to play in the 1999 elections, when New Order media control suddenly disappeared and television was used in a highly performative way to encourage voter awareness and participation (Lindsay 2002). But the significant new aspect in 2004, particularly for the presidential election, was that voters were for the first time choosing people (and thus candidates, as personalities or celebrities) rather than parties. This fostered a tighter link between popular culture and politics, via the media.

In 2005, Indonesian citizens voted in the first direct local/regional elections or "*pilkada*" (*pilihan kepala daerah*) at the provincial, municipal, and regency levels. Formerly, other than the national elections when people voted for political parties at the two levels of legislature, the national level (DPR) and the provincial level (DPRD), the only other time Indonesian citizens voted was at the village level. Unlike national elections, in elections for a village head people voted directly for people rather than parties, although this distinction was blurred of course.[1]

The electoral changes of 2004, which came about as a consequence of regional autonomy introduced in 1999, ushered in the new practice of direct election of *bupatis* (regents) (whose jurisdiction is over the administrative unit of *kabupaten* or clusters of *kecamatan* determined by population), mayors, and provincial governors. The 2004 regulation for *pilkada* requires that candidates be nominated by eligible political parties or clusters of parties. Independent candidates are forbidden; thus in *pilkada* it is more a case of candidates shopping around for parties to nominate them, rather than parties fronting candidates. The electorate had been prepared for this foregrounding of candidate over party by the 2004 direct presidential election. While each presidential and vice-presidential candidate in 2004 was a representative of his or her political party, the pairs of presidential/vice-presidential hopefuls combined candidates from different parties. The same is true for *pilkada*.

Having previously observed the 2004 legislative and presidential elections in Indonesia from the vantage points of Jakarta and central Java, in June 2005 I went to Jogjakarta during the campaign period for Jogjakarta's first *bupati* elections, held in three out of Jogjakarta's four *kabupaten*: Gunung Kidul, Sleman, and Bantul.[2] I stress at the outset that in many ways Jogjakarta is a special case. Jogjakarta is designated as a "*daerah istimewa*" ("special region"), a status granted to it in recognition of the role played by the region and its then Sultan (Hamengkubuwono IX, father of the present Sultan) during

Indonesia's revolution against the Dutch (1945–49). This special status gave the region of Jogjakarta the political status of a province, instead of being absorbed into the province of Central Java, as was the case with the neighbouring realm of Surakarta (Solo).[3]

In 1950, Jogjakarta's (then) Sultan was made governor of Jogjakarta for life. His son, the present Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, became governor in 1998, elected (unopposed) by the Jogjakarta regional legislature. In 1999, following the passing of the decentralization law by the Habibie Cabinet, the Sultan-Governor immediately authorized the drafting of legislation to submit to the national assembly (DPR) to secure the "special status" (*keistimewaan*) of Jogjakarta, that is to secure the ongoing status of Jogjakarta as a province. The wording of that draft assumed that the Jogjakarta governorship is an *ex officio* position, making the Sultan governor (and therefore effectively holding the governorship for life). This legislation was drafted pre-regional autonomy, when there was as yet no question of governors being directly elected. However, after the national legislation of 2004 made governors nationally subject to direct election, the "special" governor situation in Jogjakarta was an unresolved (and largely unspoken) issue there. In 2005, then, the co-existence in Jogjakarta of mechanisms for new direct elections at *bupati* and mayoral level with the non-elected position of governor (as royal personage) was thus totally unique.[4]

Apart from considerations of Jogjakarta's special status, my observations of the Jogjakarta *pilkada* in June 2005 must be further qualified. Clearly, they were limited to one place, and cannot be taken as representative of *pilkada* in Indonesia in general. And while I followed media coverage in all three *kabupaten*, I travelled around in only two of them, Sleman and Bantul, with a sideways glance for comparison with the mayoral elections taking place concurrently in nearby Solo. However, while my observations are limited to a specific situation and place, this very specificity might also highlight the need to view election practices of *pilkada* in their own local context, rather than seeing them as merely replicating a common national pattern.

I was particularly interested to see how the performance element would operate in the Jogjakarta local elections. Would campaigns adopt the same practices as national election campaigns? Would the performance elements be the same or different, and where I found differences, what might be some reasons for them? Would there be more or less participation and play when the election target came closer to home? And what features might I find that could be specific to Jogjakarta?

At first glance, the *pilkada* election campaigns in Jogjakarta did indeed seem merely to repeat the established election pattern. The regulatory

framework was familiar. There was a defined campaign period (two weeks, 9–23 June 2005) followed by a short quiet period (three days) before the election day itself on 26 June 2005. Campaign activities began daily at 8 a.m. and had to cease at 10 p.m. During the election period, candidate teams could erect fixed billboards, posters, and banners, distribute election material ("*atribut*"), and hold parades and public rallies on designated days. Both Bantul and Sleman, with three and four teams of candidates respectively, used the roster system of one day per team to prevent any clashes of activities (or supporters) of competitors on the same day. Thus each team had run of the complete *kabupaten* every third or fourth day. Gunung Kidul, with five teams and a geographical area over twice the size of the other two *kabupaten*, used a different system, dividing the *kabupaten* up into five areas and allotting each team, in rotation, one area in which to campaign per day. Everywhere, all forms of campaigning were prohibited until the official campaign opening day, but in fact all candidates were active before that in what is referred to as a "black campaign" (the English term was used), a kind of infiltration of existing events to "slip" in one's own promotional messages, and to smear opponents.

Campaigning also involved the usual election fare: a formal opening when teams presented their "vision and mission" ("*visi dan misi*"); lots of media coverage of candidates mingling with the people, particularly at markets; live discussions called "*rapat terbuka*" and "*dialog*"; talk shows and interviews on local radio and television (TVRI Yogya; Jogja TV and Global FM); TV clips; and reports (no doubt circulated by each candidate about his rivals) of the distribution of cash inducements for votes, always referred to with the English euphemism "money politics". Billboards were erected at strategic places, often in competing clusters.

Rallies with some kind of performance component were held in public squares, where candidates and prominent supporters addressed the crowd. There were the usual parades of young people roaring around on motor bikes accompanied by a few crowded cars and vans.

However, looking closer, one finds differences between the *pilkada* and national election practice. And even where a national practice appears to be replicated, it takes on different meanings in the local context.

BILLBOARDS

Until 2004, Indonesian election campaign billboards always featured symbols of parties, not pictures of people. Billboards familiarized voters with the party symbols to be used on Election Day when voters pierced (*nyoblos*) the chosen symbol on the ballot paper. This changed with the 2004 direct presidential

elections, when voters were no longer choosing parties, but people. The billboard images were of president/vice-president pairs — two faces in a single image, or two images side by side. Faces had to be clear, in close-up. The style was formal. Candidates wanted to project a presidential image. All the male candidates wore the formal black *peci* hat, the official uniform of government ministers. Stylistically, the campaign images followed the model of photographs of the president and vice-president that hang in all government offices, with the most powerful figure (the president) always hung on the viewers' left. Candidates projected an image that they were *already* president and vice-president by adopting an established national image of power.

Billboards and posters for the 2005 *pilkada* in Jogjakarta similarly set out to familiarize (the awful word "*mensosialisasi*" is always used for this) voters with faces, which was again how people would vote. Billboards adopted the presidential election model. Party symbols did not appear. The images of candidates — notably male, except for two female vice-*bupati* candidates in Gunung Kidul — were the usual photos in official pose.[5] Yet ironically, replication of this standard national model, instead of familiarizing voters with particular faces, actually ended up making them all look the same, a phenomenon that was not lost on local cartoonists (see Figure 10.1).

FIGURE 10.1
A Cartoon published in the Jogjakarta newspaper *Bernas* on 7 June 2005. The text reads "Get to know the faces first. Programmes come later".

Source: Reproduced by kind permission of *Bernas Jogja*.

A few candidates, however, chose to portray a more informal image, and did not strictly conform to the presidential photo model. Their pictures conveyed more an image of intimacy, perhaps stressing local familiarity and local leadership and difference from national authority. (Hey! this is *pilkada*, *not* national elections. We are close to you.) The most radical in this respect was the Sutrisno/Yulianto team from Sleman, which used photographs of the two candidates smiling, wearing no *peci*, jackets or white shirts, and Achmad in an open-necked shirt.

Amongst them all, however, one billboard/poster image stood out, that of the team H GBPH Yudhaningrat and KH Aziz Umar from Bantul (see Figure 10.2). Here we find the common formal smileless pose, but no black *peci*, and no Western suit jackets. The candidates are not wearing the national

FIGURE 10.2
Widely Circulated Election Advertisement of H. GBPH Yudhaningrat and KH Aziz Umar from Bantul.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
MOHON DOA RESTU
Untuk maju sebagai Bupati dan
Wakil Bupati Kab. Bantul 2005 - 2010
Drs. GBPH. H. Yudaningrat, MM
(Bupati)
KH. Aziz Umar, BA
(Wakil Bupati)
Kami ucapkan terima kasih atas dukungan Masyarakat Bantul yang terus meningkat,
bagi yang bermaksud memberi bantuan dana, bisa disalurkan melalui rekening
Bank Mandiri KK Yogyakarta (KHA Dahlan)
No. 137.00.0465495.6 a.n. Drs. GBPH. H. Yudaningrat, MM
dan bantuan perlengkapan kampanye bisa sampaikan ke :
Sekretariat, Jl. Jend. Soedirman No. 192 Badegan Bantul. Telp. 741 7676 / 081328403596

Source: Kedaulatan Rakyat, 6 June 2005.

uniform of power, but represent authority nonetheless. Yudha is in Javanese dress, wearing the Jogjakarta-style hat (*blangkon*). Aziz is wearing the white hat (*kopyah*) of someone who has made the *haj*, a white robe, and scarf. Their picture shows two *distinct* images of power, side by side. Gusti Yudha is a prince from the Jogjakarta palace, a brother of the present Sultan. His Javanese dress is a statement of his position in a Javanese, Jogjakarta system of power, and the citing of his title GBPH (Gusti Bendara Pangeran Harja) reminds all Javanese voters of this. The H tells us he has, as a good Muslim, also made the *haj*. (Note that all candidates cite titles, usually academic ones. This is because one of the eligibility criteria to run as *pilkada* candidate is minimum S1 or bachelor's degree). The image of Yudha's running-mate, KH (= Kyai Haji) Aziz Umar, projects his position of power as a *kyai*, a religious leader and teacher with ties to the traditionalist Islamic organization, Nahdlatul Ulama. And, indeed, Aziz is a *kyai* at a local Islamic school or *pesantren* in Bantul, At-furqon. In this team's image, the national model of power has been translated into a local context of traditional power. The image at once situates these candidates locally and is also a statement of their uniqueness, their difference to all the other contestants.

RALLIES AND PERFORMANCE

Campaign rallies were integral to the 2005 *pilkada* in Jogja just as in national elections. The rallies in public squares featured performances to entertain the crowd. However, as locally run and funded events, there was not the money or clout to hire big-name national performers or celebrities from Jakarta. At rallies for national elections, national artists, paid from Jakarta, are often sent in to make an appearance, supplementing local entertainment. In the Jogjakarta *pilkada,* there was some attempt to provide outside glamour. In Sleman, the Sutrisno/Yulianto team brought in singer-songwriter Ebiet G Ade, who was very popular in the 1980s, for its campaign closing event. The Asrom/Kusbaryanto team brought in model, ex-beauty queen, and Partai Demokrat assembly member Angelina Sondaqh for the close of its campaign on 21 June. Presumably, as an assemblywoman called upon to support a nominee who was from her own party, she did not have to be paid a hefty fee. The same tactic was used by the Subiyanto-Sri Purnomo team, which invited *sinetron* actor and PAN assembly member Dede Yusuf for its Sunday 19 June rally in Sleman. (Actress and PDI-P assembly member Marissa Haque had been announced in pre-rally publicity, but did not attend.)

To place this in some comparative context, the mayoral election campaign held in nearby Solo at the same time as Jogjakarta's three *bupati* election

campaigns could still bring in national artists. The Achmad Purnomo & Istar Yuliadi team (with party-backing of PAN) hired *dangdut* superstar Rhoma Irama as support act for the closing of its campaign.

But if you can't bring in big national stars, you can always perform yourself. A tried and true feature of election campaigns in Indonesia is for political party representatives or candidates to perform themselves — especially to sing. This is a practice that works particularly well at the local level. People in prominent positions are used to being invited to sing in public, and even expect to be asked (a practice perhaps boosted by the advent of karaoke). As just mentioned, the Sleman team Sutrisno/Yulianto brought in singer Ebiet for its closing campaign rally on 20 June. But Ebiet's main role was actually to sing along with the candidates and highlight *their* singing expertise. Sutrisno and Yulianto had been photographed singing everywhere they went throughout their campaign appearances, and they even performed together with a local rock band (Celtic) on Jogja TV at the close of the programme "Sang Kandidat" (Friday 17 July).

Bantul candidate (and incumbent) Idham Samawi also got up on stage at his rally events to sing along with a backing *campursari* group. (*Campursari* is a form of popular music that mixes Javanese and Western musical instruments.)

Other than presenting "stars", the provision of some kind of performance entertainment for rally attendees is accepted election campaign activity. Choosing performers for Jogjakarta *pilkada* rally events was the task of each candidate pair's success team ("*tim sukses*"). The person responsible for performances for Bantul candidate (and incumbent) Idham Samawi was Hendro Plered, a comedian and former *ketoprak* actor. Hendro explained to me some basic practical considerations behind the choices he made. Firstly, cost; artists cannot be too expensive. Second, and related to this, is the size of the group. The group should not have complicated staging requirements, and should be easily transportable because they often perform at various venues within a single campaign day. Thirdly, the performance must be able to finish before the campaign cut-off time of 10 p.m. Put together, these constraints rule out performances involving many heavy *gamelan* instruments, and all-night *wayang kulit*. Trance-dance (*jatihlan*) performers were employed, but their use was limited because they perform only during the day, and not on stage.[6] The most practical (and cheap) popular performance forms for their campaign, meeting all the above requirements, were *campursari*, with 4–10 musicians, and *organ tunggal* (portable electric keyboard), which can be just one musician. For campaign performances, *campursari* and *organ tunggal* both always featured female soloists singing Indonesian pop songs, and songs with new campaign lyrics written (in mixed Javanese-Indonesian) by Hendro himself.

Hendro also mentioned performances of *qasidah* and *selawatan,* both of which are overtly Islamic performance forms using religious lyrics exhorting piety and good behaviour, for the Idham Samawi campaign. *Qasidah* is religious popular music sung by female voices in chorus to rhythmic accompaniment. *Selawatan* is also Islamic chant, sung by male voices.

A notable exception in Hendro's list of performance forms for the Samawi campaign, however, was *dangdut,* a form of popular dance music which mixes Indian, Middle Eastern, and Western musical elements, which to date has been *the* performance form at election rallies in Indonesia nationwide. Recently, *dangdut* has developed in two opposing streams: as a form of pious popular music with an Islamic message (of which Rhoma Irama used to be the king), and as raunchy dance music with gyrating female singers (of which Inul Daratista used to be the queen). The ideological stand-off between these forms exploded in 2003 in Rhoma's very public denunciation of Inul and "erotic dancing" in general, and helped fuel the heated national debate that flared in 2006 surrounding the draft of proposed "Anti Pornografi-Pornoaksi" legislation, which, if ever ratified in the form Rhoma Irama wishes, would outlaw all kinds of public "erotic" dancing.

In mid-2005, as displays of Muslim religiosity and denunciation of "erotic" dance and dress were on the rise, hosting public *dangdut* performances with sexy singers was becoming more risky. Local thugs — in the name of morality and Islam — could cause trouble and threaten to shut down the show, as indeed was already occurring for *dangdut* shows outside campaign activities.[7] A safer choice, particularly to bring to less urban, less broad-based audiences, was *campursari*, which is local in flavour and still features attractive female singers but without the associations of eroticism, rhythm, and movement of *dangdut*. *Campursari* is also safer because, as it is not dance music, the audience is not as enticed to move. Even with *campursari*, however, at Idham Samawi's election campaign in Bantul, event organizers were particularly careful to maintain audience control. The night rally I attended on 20 June at Mertasanan, a strongly Islamic area near Kotagede, kept the gender-segregated audience at a good distance from the stage.

Given the heated national-level debate in Indonesia about performance, female movement, and dress, and given the increasing power of the Islamic religious right to determine moral standards and enforce them, often through intimidation and violence, these days the choice of performance for any public event is increasingly sensitive, not only for *pilkada.* One can expect that political parties, even in national election campaigns, will become more nervous about the types of performers and performances they choose for crowd entertainment. There is one important difference, though, between *pilkada* and national elections; for *pilkada* the *responsibility* for the choice is

local. Local organizers cannot blame some headquarters in Jakarta. The buck stops with them.

While performance at campaign events is intended to bring people together, to provide a sense of enjoyment and unity to a crowd, it seems that at a local *kabupaten* level — in Jogjakarta at least — the choice of performance now actually highlights *differences* between groups. Audiences for *dangdut* and *qasidah*, for instance, are now split. If one form is chosen to please one group, this will alienate another. And the candidate knows that the responsibility for that alienation will stick with him. It also becomes more difficult to choose a performance that will unite people because the performers themselves are usually local. *Pilkada* budgets cannot stretch to fund performers from Jakarta, who in their star status are largely able to escape local tensions of the identification of performance in terms of religiosity or eroticism.

Campaign organizers were careful in their choices and placement of performance. While the Idham Samawi campaign avoided *dangdut*, the PDI-P-backed Ibnu Subiyanto-Purnomo team in Sleman hired a *dangdut* band to entertain the crowd for its Sunday 19 June rally. Significantly, this was a daytime rally which was held in the town square in Sleman, on the main Jogjakarta–Magelang highway. It was thus an urban setting, with a more heterogeneous audience.

A different campaign strategy was to draw attention away from performance as entertainment, and instead highlight the performance of public piety. Quran readings (*pengajian*), were sponsored by candidates, particularly targeting women's groups. The Bantul pair Sudarto-Riswanto closed their campaign with a "*pengajian akbar*" on 21 June, and invited PAN party leader Amien Rais and star preacher Zainuddin MZ to attend. Candidates held "joint prayer" (*doa bersama*) sessions, and "*silaturahmi*" (notably, never the Javanese *slametan*). And piety could also provide a way to get around campaign regulations. For instance, on 12 June, three days into the *pilkada* campaign period, a *doa bersam*a was held in Bantul, funded of course by the incumbent *bupati*. This was depicted as a general inter-faith gathering and not as a campaign activity for any candidate. Christian, Hindu, and Islamic faiths were all represented, together with "prominent figures from various political parties". Former President Abdurrahman Wahid also took part. The communal prayer session was followed by an all-night *wayang kulit* performed by senior Jogjakarta *dalang* (from Bantul) Ki Timbul Hadiprayitno. The 10 p.m. campaign curfew was ignored because the *wayang* was presented as part of a non-campaign prayer session, even though the entire event was a cleverly organized public relations portrayal of Samawi as the *bupati* beyond factionalism.

For imaginative creativity in marrying established (national) election culture with local expression, the prize must surely go to the Yudha/Aziz team in Bantul. I have already commented on the visual image of this pair — the depiction of two non-national images of power, side by side. Another aspect in their campaign was their fusion of the profane and the pious, within the umbrella of "Javanese tradition". This was achieved through exploitation of Yudha's royal status and access to palace resources.

Sunday 19 June was the only weekend campaign day for the Yudha team. It was important to draw the crowds. They chose the large public square at Trirenggo to hold what was announced as a "*pawai budaya*" ("cultural parade") (see Figure 10.3). A large stage with an awning had been set up in the middle of the square, and to the left of the stage were three open trucks with *gamelan* instruments (gongs, *kempul, kenong*, drum) and huge *bedug* drums (the kind used at mosques). To the right of the stage was erected a huge picture of the Yudha/Aziz team. On stage, campaigners drilled the crowd, notably speaking not in Indonesian but in Javanese, urging them to vote for "Gusti Yudha, son of Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, brother of Sultan Hamengkubuwono X". At every "Who are you going to vote for?" ("*Benjing badhe nyoblos sinten*?") a sign was given to the *gamelan* trucks, and a loud drum roll thundered from the *bedug* and gongs. "*Gusti Yudha*!" Another strike on the gongs. And so forth. The climactic drum roll was when Gusti Yudha himself spoke — in

FIGURE 10.3
Gamelan at the "Cultural Parade" on 19 June 2005

Indonesian. This was followed by Islamic prayers (in Arabic) by Aziz, with climactic gongs and *bedug* to end.

The entire square was surrounded by horse carts (4-wheeled *andong* and 2-wheeled *bendi*) decorated for the "cultural parade". On the square, some riders worked a few well-groomed horses. Gusti Yudha is in charge of the horses at the palace, and he himself is known as an expert horseman. These were no *andong* ponies — they had the look of palace breeding. The master of ceremonies announced the climax of the event on the square. There would be a demonstration of how to vote. Wielding a long wooden lance, medieval-jousting style, one of the horse riders galloped towards the giant poster and lunged at the picture. He was followed by a horse-drawn carriage, the coachman in what seemed to be a *kraton* costume, who also held a lance to "*nyoblos*" the picture. But the climax was the appearance of two elephants — the *kraton* elephants Kyai Arga and Nyi Gilang with their riders (*pawang*) (see Figure 10.4) and especially when they wielded lances which they used to puncture the picture (see Figure 10.5) accompanied by loud gongs and *bedug*.

FIGURE 10.4
The Royal Elephants Kyai Arga and Nyi Gilang at the Rally on 19 June 2005 at Trirenggo Alun-alun in Bantul

FIGURE 10.5
Voting Practice. The Elephants and their Riders Demonstrate How to "Nyoblos" on Election Day

This particular use of local royal regalia and pomp, while on the one hand making an imaginative statement of local cultural identity, also drew attention away from the political backers of the Yudha/Aziz team, the Islamic Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) or Justice and Prosperity Party formed in 2002 by Hidayat Nur Wahid, and the Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa (PKPB) — the right-wing reactionary Golkar break-away party formed in 2002 by Soeharto's daughter Tutut and General Hartono. The use of emblems of Javanese "tradition" and the Jogjakarta court put a soft, familiar face on the real politics of hard political alliances behind the scene. But it is hard to determine exactly who was using whom. On the one hand, one could say an Islamist party was using a local royal personage and court ceremony to further its influence. On the other hand, a local prince with few higher career prospects within the court structure (he will never be Sultan) was using the backing of an Islamist party in an attempt to gain a local position of political power.[8]

Notably, no one commented (publicly) on inappropriate use of *kraton* resources for personal political purposes, even though throughout the *pilkada* campaigns in Jogjakarta, any intimation of the Sultan's endorsement of particular candidates was a closely policed and hotly contested issue.[9] Perhaps

Yudha's use of regalia was acceptable because the horses, elephants, and carriage are associated personally with Gusti Yudha himself. Or perhaps the use of palace resources and status by the royal family for political position is actually something people in Jogjakarta have come to expect.

As the *kyai* and *kraton* prince stood side by side on the stage, with prayers in Arabic, thundering *gamelan* and *bedug*, and election billboard-jousting on royal elephants, it was clear that here was an event where "Javanese culture" still allowed for Javanese — or Jogjakarta — incorporation of Islam into performance. Here was a fusion of the pious and the profane, packaged as pomp. Yet all this — even the elephants — didn't help in the end. Idham Samawi had a resounding win in the Bantul election. Gusti Yudha got only 21 per cent of the vote.

Media coverage might have been one factor in this. The Jogjakarta newspapers *Kedaulatan Rakyat* and *Berita Nasional* gave minimum coverage to the *pawai budaya*. The *Kedaulatan Rakyat* photo of the event was taken off to the side, showing the floats waiting to start the parade, and no elephants or horses to be seen. This is not surprising when one knows that *Kedaulatan Rakyat* is owned by none other than Bantul *bupati* Idham Samawi and was established by his father.

The extent to which media coverage of the Jogjakarta *pilkada* campaigns actually influenced public opinion is debatable, however, and better left to others with more specific data to speculate upon. More relevant to this discussion about performance in *pilkada* is the extent to which local media generated or participated in a sense of excitement and fun about the elections, in comparison to the national elections.

Here, the answer has to be — not much. TVRI Yogya's programme Kampanye Dialogis used a debate-style format, featuring two teams in a 90-minute programme, each team being "grilled" (in Indonesian) by a team of three outside "experts", imitating a TV style from the presidential debates in 2004. A 10-minute "biodata" of the candidates was screened before the dialogue began. The programme was broadcast live during the day (12.30 p.m.). Jogja TV's "Sang Kandidat", which was broadcast at prime-time (9–10 p.m.), used talk-show format of the candidates speaking (in Indonesian) to a presenter, with viewers phoning in questions, as is common on radio (the TV programme was also simultaneously broadcast on Global FM radio). The talking-heads were periodically interrupted by short biographical clips about the candidates, or the candidate's election message. Despite attempts by the young programme host (Zulfina Nora) to inject some Jakarta 'zing' into the programme (she spoke about twice as fast as the interviewees), the programme (like the TVRI programme) felt like a stodgy, unsophisticated version of national election programmes.

Newspaper coverage was also straight news-style coverage. There were no celebrity interviews, even of local figures. Despite being a town full of artists, many of whom are well known nationally, they showed no interest in making political declarations of support for candidates. Perhaps the national model did not work at the *bupati* level in Jogjakarta because the interest in *bupati* elections is so narrowly geographically defined. The media, especially television, were no longer working to make the local election a media event, namely something in which people over a wide area have a sense of participation precisely *because* of the media. Without that sense of a wide national media community taking notice of what happens locally, and without the sense of being a local participant in an event occurring simultaneously throughout the nation, the sense of play evaporated. There was no shared national event to bounce off locally. Who cared which candidate a Jogjakarta actor chose for *bupati* in Sleman? And what artists would care about making a show of support when the audience for their caring was so local? As for the elephants, unless they were election mascots of a candidate of relevance beyond the *kabupaten* of Bantul, who really cared about them, beyond the excitement of the live performance event in Bantul itself?

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Pilkada election campaigns at the *bupati* level, in Jogjakarta at least, have not yet found their own election style. The outward form adopted for the 2005 campaigns followed national election practice, but the end result was the impression of poor country cousin, a kind of national election without the pizzazz. Although these were local elections, in general the Jogjakarta *pilkada* did not employ local identity in developing any new kind of election culture. The one exception was the Yudha/Aziz campaign in Bantul, which exploited the cultural capital of Jogjakarta "royalty", something only possible because of who the candidate was — a prince. He lost.

At the same time, elections at the *kabupaten* level introduce new tensions which can actually make the replication of national election cultural practices sensitive. The provision of live entertainment at rallies is one such practice. Once the election moves away from urban centres, the audience base for performances narrows, and social divisions around performance forms considered to offend local religious sensitivities are sharpened. While this may also be increasingly true for performances held for national election campaigns, the crucial difference between the *bupati* elections and national campaigns is that the responsibility for the choice of performances for this narrower audience base lies locally, with the candidate.

As elections move closer to home, the sense of fun and play also seems to lessen — or this was the case in Jogjakarta. This could be because local power issues, so visible and so identifiable, are serious. But it could also be that local activity is also only locally interesting, and the sense of play dissipates because there is no sense of national participation. The Jogjakarta *pilkada* had none of the play so strongly expressed in Jogjakarta during the national elections of 2004. Not even the media could convey this. During national elections, the media is the conduit between the national and the local, and while events are staged locally, there is the sense of both national attention to the local, and local participation in something national. National elections allow for people to perform locally their sense of participation in a wider national community. Part of the fun is in hearing about or seeing others "play" with the event in which you yourself are participating. But with *pilkada*, even if coverage of campaign events is broadcast locally, actual participation in the election is restricted to certain areas. There is no sense of participation and fun beyond those areas.

Media coverage of the actual election day of the *pilkada* elections in Jogjakarta reported the day as "boring". There was no excitement, no sense of participation or play. Elections left people cold ("*masyarakat masih kelihatan adem ayem*"), the local newspaper *Berita Nasional* noted in its editorial (10 June 2005), a comment also made of *pilkada* elsewhere.[10] Despite the fact that with regional autonomy the position of *bupati* is more powerful than ever before, the elections themselves did not generate excitement.

The *bupati* is the lowest level official — the most local — to be directly elected in regional elections. It appears that the "da" of *daerah* in these particular *pilkada* does not yet generate a sense of excitement and participation in the election process, as reflected in the performance of election campaigns and on election day itself. Models of election campaigning adopted from national elections do not necessarily translate well to this local level. Indications are that mayoral or even governor-level elections, with their broader-based and more urban electorates, may allow more for a sense of participation and play expressed in established Indonesian performative behaviour during election campaigns. Whether the different local elections (the different "*da*" of the *pilkada*) will develop their own characteristics in the future — different both to national elections and to each other — as these elections become established recurring events, remains to be seen.

Notes

[1] Village heads were elected even during the New Order, although the election result had to be approved by the state-appointed paid official higher up, the

camat. During the New Order, village heads had to be loyal to the state apparatus, Golkar, which officially was not a political party, although to all intents and purposes it functioned like one. For further discussion see Antlov 1995, pp. 43–44. Recently, village heads have begun demanding the right to be affiliated to, and to represent, political parties. See "Para Kepala Desa Pun Ingin Ikuti Tren", *Kompas*, 13 April 2006.

2 Jogjakarta's fourth *kabupaten* is Kulon Progo.

3 The special region of Jogjakarta was formed by uniting the Jogjakarta Sultanate and the Pakualam Regency, as both rulers made early declarations of support for the Indonesian republic. In 1950, the then Sultan (Hamengkubuwono IX) was made governor for life, and Sri Paku Alam VIII was vice-governor. On the death of Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX in 1989, the Paku Alam took over as governor. Upon the Paku Alam's death in September 1998, the new Sultan declared himself governor, but at the insistence of the central government the provincial legislature (DPRD) was made to vote. The Sultan was the only candidate. Unsurprisingly, he was elected governor by the local legislature in October 1998.

4 The legislation is still "pending". Actually, this Jogjakarta draft legislation anticipated Indonesia's direct elections of *bupati* and mayor. Ironically, while the legislation enshrines the Sultan as governor and Paku Alam as vice-governor, it also precedes the 2004 national electoral changes by introducing new democratic ("*meningkatkan kualitas demokrasi*") direct elections of *bupati* and mayor in Jogjakarta. The draft text installs the Sultan as governor and Paku Alam as vice-governor, appointed directly by the President for a 5-year (renewable) period. Note, however, that in 1998 the Sultan's governorship was not a direct presidential appointment, as previously. He had to go through the process of being elected by the DPRD. See further Ong Boon Nga 2003. In mid-2007, perhaps because the above draft legislation was not moving, the Sultan announced that he would step down as governor if a new ongoing supervisory position was created for the Sultan that would basically be above that of governor. This, too, is "pending".

5 In the 2004 national legislative election, an official quota was set of 30 per cent female candidates fielded by each party contending. There is as yet no such quota in *pilkada*, and hence very few female candidates. See further "Perempuan dalam pilkada langsung, Ratnawati" *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 7 June 2005).

6 In Gunung Kidul, the Gandung Pardiman-Untung Santosa team used *reyog* performers on their daytime parade (see "Reyog Penarik Kampanye Gandung", *Bernas Jogja*, 16 June 2006). Their choice for stage performance, though, was also *campursari*.

7 For instance, a performance by Inul in Bekasi on 3 December 2005 was cancelled because of "threats to security". See "Inul Daratista Sakit Hati!", *Kompas*, 9 December 2005.

8 It is instructive to compare this situation with Iwan Dzulvan Amir's writing on the 2004 national elections in Aceh (Amir 2005, p. 57). He points out that in Aceh, the *ulama* traditionally did not support performances that were "mere display of royal leaders' vanity". During the New Order, *ulama* were drawn into

public practices closely identified with royalty that ceremonially supported the state. However, post-New Order this link of royalty and *ulama* is again coming apart. While in Aceh the *ulama* are antagonistic to the Sultanate, Sultans, and to post-independence revival of royal ceremony, in central Java, royal ceremony appears to be becoming more overtly Islamic and the courts are increasingly linking politically and culturally to contemporary expressions of public Islam.

[9] See, for instance, the fuss made over the Sultan's attendance on 6 June 2005 (prior to the official campaign period) at a "Forum Silaturahmi Masyarakat Sleman Berdaya" which, although ostensibly for all candidates, was attended only by Sutrisno/Ahmad Yulianto (*Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 7 and 8 June 2005; *Bernas*, 6 June 2005), and the "issue" of the Idham Samawi/Sumarno team "misappropriating" the Sultan's name in their poster advertising (*Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 17 June 2005).

[10] See Amirudin and Bisri 2006, p. 32. They comment that *pilkada* in general were "*tanpa greget*" ("without enthusiasm").

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11

ASSESSING MEDIA IMPACT ON LOCAL ELECTIONS IN INDONESIA

David T. Hill[1]

INTRODUCTION

For most Indonesian citizens, the opportunity to elect not only their members of the national parliament and their president but also their local district heads has been one of the most tangible demonstrations of democratic reform made possible by the resignation of President Soeharto in May 1998 and the withering of his authoritarian "New Order". Subsequent laws governing the elections of leaders — from district to national level — pushed through parliament by reformist elements mean that instead of being appointed by Jakarta, provincial governors, mayors, and local district heads are directly elected by the constituency to which they are responsible. With 349 districts (*kabupaten*), 91 mayoralties (*kota*), and 33 provinces,[2] all of which have to elect their heads directly, it is a long and complex process, which has been unfolding across the archipelago since 1 June 2005 when the first elections took place.

This paper discusses the relationship between the media generally (and local media in particular) and the outcomes in such local elections. It is exploratory and tentative, being based mainly on secondary materials collected by others, but builds upon and extends previous studies of this relationship (Hill 2008). The hypothesis it examines is that access to local media, and local television in particular, has already become, and is likely to be increasingly, a major factor in local electoral success in Indonesia. By extrapolation, it

posits that aspiring local politicians will be seeking to exert greater influence over the media that are available in their local environs. The case studies suggest that such politicians could optimize local media access in a variety of creative ways apart from simply seeking to own it or to intimidate it — the two strategies adopted most commonly during the New Order. This paper attempts to test such assertions with reference to four very different localities, primarily using voter exit poll data collected by local election monitoring organizations.

The study is made possible because of the massive election monitoring efforts undertaken by hundreds of thousands of Indonesians, coalescing in a variety of formal organizations and alliances (several of which undertook voter attitude surveys). These election monitoring organizations were born out of a desire to ensure the fairness and transparency of the elections since, at national level, polls had been manipulated throughout the New Order period to ensure a victory for the favoured Golkar party. In the case of the local elections, a major monitoring exercise was supported by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), which describes itself as "a non-governmental organization based in Washington, DC with a mission to strengthen democracy worldwide". The NDI maintains a national office in Jakarta and provided training, assistance, and funding to support local monitoring organizations in the 1999 and 2004 national legislative (and 2004 presidential) elections. In 2005, it selected particular localities in which it offered support to grass-roots organizations wishing to monitor elections in their particular communities. One of the most visible aspects of this support was to assist such partner organizations undertake exit poll surveys, dubbed "quick counts", in order to provide the public with reliable, if unofficial, indications of the likely poll outcomes, and thereby to act as a disincentive to poll manipulation. Over the past two decades the NDI has undertaken such "quick counts" in twenty-five countries including, since 2004, in Indonesia.

In the 2004 national legislative elections, NDI collaborated with three partner organizations, LP3ES (Institute for Research, Education and Information on Social and Economic Affairs), Yappika (Foundation for Strengthening Participation, Initiative and Partnerships in Indonesian Society) and JAMPPI (Community Network of Election Monitors) to develop a "standard of election observation" that it referred to as "*jurdil*" (*jujur dan adil*- "honest and fair").[3] Such *jurdil* surveys became regarded as an "independent, accurate, and neutral" method of accurately projecting election results on the basis of an exit poll of a sample of voters. The actual surveys were conducted by local volunteers from various community organizations in each locality, with the assistance and guidance of NDI staff. Each of the surveys tended to

focus on a standard set of core questions, providing reasonable grounds for comparison across localities.

In 2005, the NDI-Jurdil alliance monitored four particular elections which we shall examine in some detail. These were in the district (*kabupaten*) of Kutai Kartanegara in East Kalimantan; in the province of North Sulawesi; in the provincial capital of Manado in north Sulawesi; and in Surabaya, Indonesia's second largest city and the capital of East Java province. These four case studies represent extremely different electorates, with vastly different constituencies in both size and demography. They include a relatively isolated district with a small population, a provincial capital, a peripheral province, and Indonesia's second largest metropolis. Crucially for the purposes of our analysis, they have very different media environments, with a wide disparity in access to local media, whether print or electronic. Using the NDI-assisted voter attitudinal surveys we will attempt to build up a picture of the impact of media on voter preferences in these diverse locations.

CASE STUDIES

Kutai

The district of Kutai Kartanegara is located in the province of East Kalimantan, with its capital Tenggarong located about 140 kilometres from the region's dominant city of Balikpapan. It covers an area of 28,928 sq. km. and has a population of about 517,384, of whom 375,925 were registered to vote in the local elections.[4] The district is cut by the Mahakam River which winds its way nearly 1,000 kilometres through the landscape, at various points stretching up to 900 metres in breadth. So central is the river to the geography of the district that during the local elections 94 of the 1,391 polling stations scattered across Kutai Kartanegara's 18 sub-districts (*kecamatan*) were actually located on the water.[5] Kutai Kartanegara emerged as a separate district in 1999 when the central government subdivided the former district of Kutai into four new and separate administrative districts. After the division, Kutai Kartanegara continued to be formally named simply Kutai, but in 2002, to distinguish the new district from the former larger entity, it was officially renamed Kutai Kartanegara. It has been the site of some of the country's most extensive logging activity, and the buoyant local economy (described as "the wealthiest district in the nation" (Istiqomatul Hayati 2005) with an annual budget (APBD) four times that of the entire province of West Kalimantan (Try Harijono 2005)) has been fuelled largely by timber cutting (both legal and illegal), and other extractive industries.

When it took place on 1 June 2005 the election for district head (*bupati*) in Kutai Kartanegara was the first such direct local election in Indonesia. It was a closely contested one, although the participation rate was relatively low at 70.67 per cent. There were three contesting pairs of candidates in the poll, which was won by Golkar candidate Prof. Syaukani Hassan Rais (and his deputy Samsuri Aspar) with 61 per cent of the vote.[6] In addition to serving as the rector of the local university, Universitas Kutai Kartanegara (Unikarta), Syaukani had been the first head of Kutai Kartanegara when it was initially upgraded to the status of "district" in 1999. His leadership style and activities had polarized the community. He has been described by one foreign researcher as:

> a dynamic character who is not afraid to stand up to the Central Government to demand more revenue and autonomy. In May 2000, he hosted a meeting in Tenggarong of 300 [*bupati*] from Indonesia and was duly elected as the leader of the District Association Management Council (Dewan Pengurus Asosiasi Pemerintahan Kabupaten or DP-APK) and [a member of] the Regional Autonomy Review Council (Anggota Dewan Pertimbangan Otonomi Daerah).[7]

In 2001, charges of corruption were lodged against him, and there were various lingering accusations from community groups that he had enriched himself by manipulating official budgets and inflating tenders to incorporate kickbacks. But when his initial term as *bupati* expired on 10 December 2004 and the Minister for Home Affairs replaced him with an acting *bupati*, for several weeks boisterous protests took place in the district supporting Syaukani, including by teachers who went on strike.[8] No legal action appears to have been taken over those corruption allegations, with the East Kalimantan Attorney's office finally dismissing the charges shortly after Syaukani's victory in June 2005.[9] This was despite appeals by some community spokespeople just prior to the June elections to the Attorney General either to pursue the charges or face a class action from disgruntled petitioners.[10]

Syaukani faced the poll enjoying some of the advantages of an incumbent. More importantly, he had strong backing from the Golkar Party, having served two periods as the district's Golkar chief. Political opponents pointed to his substantial wealth — reportedly "hundreds of billions of rupiah" — implying, but not apparently providing actionable evidence, that he had become wealthy by dubious means and that he manipulated the results of the elections.[11] However, when ordinary voters were asked on exiting the polling station what they felt was the key issue to be tackled by an incoming *bupati*, only 5 per cent of those surveyed nominated "putting corruptors on trial".

Much more important for them was stabilizing the basic price of goods (19.84 per cent), improving the environment (16.4 per cent), reducing education and health care costs (16.35 per cent), and creating more employment (15.94 per cent).[12]

Candidates in the Kutai Kartanegara poll invested substantially in a variety of local advertisements and promotions, across all media. *Kompas*, Indonesia's largest and most respected national newspaper, reported that:

> as if unconvinced of their community support, the pairs of candidates for *bupati* and deputy *bupati* vied to place half page ads in the locally published newspapers. This placing of advertisements was done continuously for more than one month, even prior to the beginning of the campaign. There were even pairs of candidates who took their campaign to the national commercial television media, whose broadcasts spanned the entire nation. All this, when the target being aimed at was just the potential voters in the district of Kutai Kartanegara, who numbered only 375,925 people! (Try Harijono, *Kompas*, 1 June 2005)

A wide variety of campaigning strategies was used by the various "success teams" supporting the candidates. Apart from the ubiquitous banners, posters, billboards, stickers, and entertainment, there was also free medical treatment, and "gifts" such as wall clocks, *dangdut* music cassettes, sarongs, clothes, fish fingerlings (*bibit ikan*), and palm oil seedlings (*bibit kelapa sawit*). Such strategies were expensive. By one estimate, a medium-sized billboard would cost about one million rupiah, with a banner about Rp 150,000 and a banner with photo about Rp 200,000. Yet there were thousands of these displayed around the constituency, in addition to ads in newspapers, on radio, and on television.

Kutai Kartanegara offered only very modest mass media as vehicles for such political campaigning. According to a local website,[13] Kutai appears to have only one local newspaper based in the district capital of Tenggarong, *Harian Pos Kota Kutai Baru*, although there are local bureaus supplying news for three other provincial daily papers, *Kaltim Post*, *Samarinda Pos*, and *Swara Kaltim*. There were four local radio stations and, innovatively, a very technically impressive local government website[14] (though one suspects only a handful of locals would regularly access the internet)[15] and a local television station Televisi Kutai Kartanegara (referred to as Kukar TV).

The idea of establishing a district television station appears to have emerged from discussions in February 2003 between the then *bupati* Syaukani and W. Sumardi, the Director of the Jakarta-based company PT Catur Daya Perkasa Pratama (CDPP), who proposed the construction of a 100-sq. m. TV

station in Tenggarong, complete with a news broadcast studio, an audio control studio, a master control, newsroom, and editing suite. Syaukani embraced the concept, stating: "Possibly through this TV [station], we can make programmes like public debates and we can know the community's aspirations more transparently."[16] By the time it began operations in September 2003, however, the venture was more modest, operating from the local Kukar District Government Radio Station, with only a couple of handycam video cameras and minimal editing capacity. To his credit, Syaukani had succeeded in attracting three investors — two from Jakarta and one from Samarinda — to set up the facilities, which (according to the agreement) would be transferred to the local government once operational.[17] While the final financial and legal arrangements are unclear, TV Kukar was providing live broadcasts of various official events in Tenggarong, featuring the *bupati* among others, by November 2003.[18] One might surmise that, if candidates were placing expensive advertisements on national television networks to influence the Kutai Kartanegara voters, they would also have been ensuring that the campaign attracted beneficial coverage via TV Kukar's modest facilities.

An indication of the impact of such campaigning upon voters' choices emerges from the Voter Attitude Survey undertaken by the NDI and Pokja 30, a local independent, non-government, non-profit organization, using a sample of 1,720 voters selected from 191 polling stations. The survey's primary focus of interest was not on the use of mass media but on two particular variables that might have an influence upon a voter's choice of *bupati*: a voter's ethnicity (in what is an ethnically very diverse region), and the political party a voter had chosen in the previous national legislative elections. Nonetheless, the Pokja 30 survey does suggest something about other factors that informed voter choice. It reported that:

> 26.94 per cent of respondents felt that direct communication which had been maintained by the support team of the pair of candidates was the [campaign] method which most influenced their choice. In addition, 15.12 per cent of respondents said that indirect communication such as brochures, posters, or street banners linked to a pair of candidates influenced them. If these two figures are combined, the result is still much higher than the 18.42 per cent who felt that *imbalan* [financial reward, compensation] influenced their choice.[19]

Pokja 30 contrasted this finding that "[direct] communication with voters was a very important factor" in the Kutai Kartanegara district elections with their observation during the 2004 direct presidential election that "the electronic media was the most persuasive (influential) medium". It would

appear that in the isolated district of Kutai Kartanegara, direct approaches by the candidates' teams, together with "traditional" campaign paraphernalia and financial handouts were more important than mass media coverage, whether in the local or national media.

Clearly, whatever role was or was not played by the mass media in Kutai Kartanegara, lingering rumours of corrupt practices dogging Syaukani did not lead to defeat in the polls. In the provincial elections in North Sulawesi, the incumbent was also under a cloud of corruption, but the outcomes and the influence of the media appear very different.

North Sulawesi

Just as Kutai Kartanegara's was the first direct election of a *bupati* in Indonesia, the poll three weeks later in North Sulawesi was the first direct election of a provincial governor. North Sulawesi's new governor was elected on 20 June 2005 in a five-cornered race. The province, covering 15,365 sq. km, had 1,522,244 registered voters out of a total population of approximately 2.1 million. In what was renowned as a staunch Golkar stronghold, the incumbent, Golkar's A.J. Sondakh, was defeated by a "clean-skin" career bureaucrat S.H. Sarundajang, running on a PDI-P ticket. Sarundajang had a strong local following as a former *bupati* of the province's major port town, Bitung. He had also previously served with distinction as acting governor of the neighbouring provinces of both Maluku and North Maluku, each riven by civil unrest and inter-religious rioting.[20] Sondakh, whose record as governor had been marred by accusations of corrupt behaviour (unproven but widely covered in the local media), managed only 17 per cent of the votes, less than half of Sarundajang's 39 per cent.

Compared to the modest media available to the aspirant *bupati* of Kutai Kartanegara, the gubernatorial election in North Sulawesi was contested in a region extremely well served by a range of (primarily local) media. Apart from radio stations that are relatively dispersed, the province's media is almost exclusively located in the provincial capital of Manado, where there are three daily newspaper groups (each producing a variety of associated "lifestyle", sports, or "sensationalist" periodicals, either daily or weekly) and about a dozen radio stations. Unlike Syaukani, the governor had no need to establish an official television station to get media coverage, since by the time of the gubernatorial election there were two new independently owned local television stations located in Manado, in addition to a local facility for the national public television network, TVRI.[21] All broadcast regular and extensive news and current affairs programmes and regarded such coverage of local and

provincial affairs as their primary attraction for local viewers. While reception was not uniformly good, these stations were received throughout most of the province, at least in the major population centres.

In North Sulawesi the NDI worked with the local NGO Publika, which interviewed approximately 3,250 respondents across the province's nine districts in the polling day Voter Attitude Survey. The venture was also supported by TV-Manado (known as TV-M), the smaller of the two local television stations in the provincial capital of Manado.[22] As in Kutai Kartanegara, the NDI survey found that "the most effective means of influencing voters was direct communication with members of the campaign team".[23] In North Sulawesi, 24.34 per cent selected this option, making it twice as effective as the next category, newspaper coverage (11.69 per cent), just ahead of "campaign materials" (such as brochures, posters, or banners) (10.91 per cent), TV news (10.70 per cent), the televised candidate debate (broadcast by the local TVRI studio with the support of the provincial Electoral Commission) (6.37 per cent) and TV advertisements (6.03 per cent). Tellingly, NDI reported that: "Among all the candidate pairs, respondents felt the [winning pair of candidates] was the most effective at using all these campaign techniques."[24] The winning candidate, Sarundajang, rated better than his main rival, incumbent Sondakh, in the efficacy of his employment of all communication means with the exception of TV commercials (see Table 11.1).

Of those in the electorate who voted for Sarundajang, the largest proportion (24.49 per cent) were influenced by "direct communication with the campaign team", with newspapers the next largest influence (13.15 per cent), closely followed by brochures, posters, and banners collectively (12.32 per cent), and television news (11.04 per cent) (see Table 11.2). If one compares the efficacy of the various conventional media — daily newspapers, radio, and television — then it appears television (including advertisements, news, and televised debates) looms as the most influential media with 20.96 per cent, considerably ahead of newspapers (13.15 per cent) and radio (3.98 per cent). The electronic media were even more influential in drawing votes for the incumbent, Sondakh, with television rating even higher (at 26.96 per cent), ahead of newspapers (9.66 per cent) and radio (4.11 per cent). The major discrepancy between the victor and incumbent was in the role of television advertisements, where Sondakh gained 10.20 per cent compared to Sarundajang's 3.98 per cent. One might also speculate that the incumbent has the benefit of a higher media profile over time, although in the case of Sondakh this may have been partially mitigated by the adverse nature of some of the coverage of his corruption case.

TABLE 11.1
Choice of Governor of North Sulawesi Based on Communication

Media Considered	*Henky – Togas*	*Sondakh – Aryanti*	*Ferry – Hamdi*	*Sarundajang – Sualang*	*Wenny – Marhanny*	*No Answer*	*Total*
TV Commercial	7.36%	24.68%	13.42%	22.94%	11.69%	19.91%	100%
TV News	6.83%	16.10%	12.68%	35.85%	13.90%	14.63%	100%
Debate on TV	9.43%	10.66%	19.26%	32.38%	15.16%	13.11%	100%
Radio	10.77%	17.69%	11.54%	33.08%	16.15%	10.77%	100%
Newspaper	7.59%	12.05%	13.17%	39.06%	14.96%	13.17%	100%
Brochures/Poster/Banner	6.94%	12.68%	18.66%	39.23%	13.16%	9.33%	100%
Direct Communication with Campaign Team	8.04%	15.33%	15.11%	34.94%	15.96%	10.93%	100%
Entertainment Show	4.55%	15.91%	15.91%	45.45%	4.55%	13.64%	100%
Money Politics	25.00%	12.50%	18.75%	31.25%	12.50%	0.00%	100%
No Influence	9.62%	13.29%	15.21%	34.09%	15.73%	12.06%	100%
Others	6.48%	14.81%	13.43%	37.50%	18.98%	8.80%	100%
Abstain	7.60%	11.70%	15.20%	25.15%	6.43%	33.92%	100%

Source: Table taken from NDI-Publika press release, 'Honesty and Ability Key Factor for North Sulawesi Voters', 22 June 2005, downloaded from <www.jurdil.org>, accessed 24 April 2006.

TABLE 11.2
The Most Effective Method Influencing Vote for Governor of North Sulawesi

Voter Consideration - Candidate	*Henky – Togas*	*Sondakh – Aryanti*	*Ferry – Hamdi*	*Sarundajang – Sualang*	*Wenny – Marhanny*	*No Answer*
TV Commercial	5.52%	10.20%	5.39%	3.98%	4.86%	9.13%
TV News	9.09%	11.81%	9.04%	11.04%	10.25%	11.90%
Debate on TV	7.47%	4.65%	8.17%	5.94%	6.65%	6.35%
Radio	4.55%	4.11%	2.61%	3.23%	3.78%	2.78%
Newspaper	11.04%	9.66%	10.26%	13.15%	12.05%	11.71%
Brochures/Poster/Banner	9.42%	9.48%	13.57%	12.32%	9.89%	7.74%
Direct Communication with Campaign Team	24.35%	25.58%	24.52%	24.49%	26.26%	20.24%
Entertainment Show	0.65%	1.25%	1.22%	1.50%	0.36%	1.19%
Money Politics	1.30%	0.36%	0.52%	0.38%	0.36%	0.00%
No Influence	17.86%	13.60%	15.13%	14.65%	16.19%	13.69%
Others	4.55%	5.72%	5.04%	6.09%	7.37%	3.77%
Abstain	4.22%	3.58%	4.52%	3.23%	1.98%	11.51%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: Table taken from NDI-Publika press release, 'Honesty and Ability Key Factor for North Sulawesi Voters', 22 June 2005, downloaded from <www.jurdil.org>, accessed 24 April 2006.

The North Sulawesi survey suggests that the most common public campaign method in previous (national) elections, namely outdoor entertainment rallies (and possibly also the hand-outs dubbed "money politics" which influenced 18.42 per cent in Kutai Kartanegara), provided neither main candidate with any appreciable boost (see Table 11.2). One possible interpretation for this may be that for provincial elections, where voters are spread over a vast territory, the media provide a more effective tool than entertainment shows, which are highly localized to a relatively small population centre in their effect.

Thus comparing the NDI-sourced data from Kutai Kartanegara and North Sulawesi, both large and dispersed electorates, it appears that direct communication with voters remains the most significant influence on voter choice, but in a gubernatorial election the possibility of mobilizing print and electronic media by an aspirant governor is greater than that available to an aspirant *bupati*. Television, particularly, emerges as the most influential media in the gubernatorial race (attracting 20.96 per cent of voters to the victor, just behind the 24.49 per cent attracted because of "direct communication"). For the incumbent, backed as he was by the powerful and very well-resourced Golkar Party, television ads provided a substantial — though ultimately not a successful — boost to his polling.

Manado

Golkar funding — and internal politicking — played an important role in the Manado mayoral elections, too. The Golkar incumbent Wempie Frederik failed to gain the party's endorsement to run again, as the local branch of the party fractured from within. Frederik ended up having to migrate across to the PDI-P mayoral ticket. Despite the advantages of incumbency and the fact that his wife — also a Golkar official — owned one (albeit the smallest) of the town's three daily newspapers, *Global News*, Frederik was beaten by the new Golkar candidate Jimmy Rimba Rogi.[25] In the Manado polls, family ownership of a newspaper provided no guarantee of political success, but the two local television stations fulfilled an important role by bringing campaign policies to the attention of Manado's population of about 410,000, of whom 292,625 were registered voters.[26]

Six pairs of candidates contested the mayoral race.[27] In a predominantly Christian community, Rimba Rogi, a Christian, opted for a prominent Muslim leader as his running mate, thus garnering a strong vote from the local Islamic constituency. After Sondakh lost the gubernatorial election for

Golkar in North Sulawesi the previous month, the party nationally came in strongly behind Rimba Rogi. One industry source claimed the Golkar national office invested at least Rp 125 million (about US$13,000) per day — or five times the annual official salary of the mayor (not including generous "housekeeping" bonuses) — into Rimba Rogi's television ads alone.[28] Rimba Rogi did not disappoint, winning the election with 30 per cent, only slightly behind the 32 per cent Golkar had achieved in North Sulawesi in the 2004 general election, and only a short lead ahead of Frederik at 27 per cent.

Manado was essentially served by the same local media as the province of North Sulawesi, in that most of the province's media enterprises were headquartered in the city. In the Manado mayoral elections the NDI again collaborated with Publika Manado to undertake their exit poll survey, using a sample of 1,490 voters (in an electorate in which 198,005 valid votes were cast) selected from 148 out of Manado's 969 polling centres, across the city's 157.27 sq. km.[29] They found that, when pooling responses from voters for all candidates, 29.57 per cent of respondents regarded TV as the most significant communication medium influencing their voting (see Table 11.3). Television had nearly twice the impact of the "traditional" local determinant, "communication with the candidates' electioneering team" (with only 17.56 per cent). TV's impact exceeded newspapers (12.22 per cent), brochures, posters, or banners (7.22 per cent), and somewhat surprisingly was vastly greater than the much more ubiquitous radio (2.43 per cent). Of that 29.57 per cent who felt TV influenced them most, 13.5 per cent attributed this specifically to televised debate (when all candidates were given equal coverage to elaborate upon their policies in a live-to-air broadcast), 10.8 per cent to news coverage and 5.27 per cent to party advertising. While all candidates funded television spots (and the payment of stations to broadcast favourable campaign coverage was reportedly widespread, though not publicly acknowledged by either candidates or stations), Golkar had invested an unprecedented amount in TV ads, with Rimba Rogi even engaging an American-trained Jakarta political consultant to advise on strategy and image-making.

As Table 11.4 indicates, of those voters who were influenced primarily by television advertisement, the victor Rimba Rogi garnered the largest proportion (30.77 per cent), although he scored behind the unsuccessful incumbent Frederik with those voters primarily influenced by the televised debate. Both scored equally well in the minds of voters primarily influenced by TV news reports (with 23.13 per cent). Both Rimba Rogi and Frederik attracted about one-third of those voters influenced by "money politics" (33.96 per cent and 30.19 per cent respectively).

TABLE 11.3
Communication Means That Were Most Influential in Voters' Choice for Mayoral Candidate in Manado

Communication Means	*Kumaat – Watuseke*	*Rimba – Buchari*	*Rumayar – Weku*	*Masengi – Alkatiri*	*Lontaan – Lihiang*	*Frederik – Damongilala*	*No Answer*	*Total*
TV Ad	4.12%	6.49%	6.25%	5.61%	10.42%	5.54%	2.48%	5.27%
TV News	15.64%	10.00%	10.16%	9.35%	10.42%	10.79%	8.26%	10.80%
TV Debate Shows	14.81%	9.46%	21.09%	15.89%	12.50%	12.83%	14.46%	13.50%
Radio	2.47%	2.70%	3.91%	2.80%	8.33%	1.17%	1.65%	2.43%
Newspaper	14.81%	10.00%	13.28%	5.61%	6.25%	14.29%	13.64%	12.22%
Brochure/Poster/Banner	5.76%	9.73%	3.91%	8.41%	8.33%	7.29%	5.79%	7.22%
Direct Communication with Campaign Team	18.93%	18.92%	13.28%	25.23%	16.67%	16.91%	14.05%	17.56%
Entertainment Shows	1.23%	2.43%	2.34%	0.00%	0.00%	2.33%	2.48%	1.96%
Money Politics	2.88%	4.86%	1.56%	2.80%	4.17%	4.66%	2.07%	3.58%
No Influence	12.76%	15.95%	14.06%	14.02%	14.58%	14.87%	17.77%	15.12%
Other	2.47%	4.32%	3.91%	3.74%	4.17%	5.83%	3.72%	4.19%
No Answer	4.12%	5.14%	6.25%	6.54%	4.17%	3.50%	13.64%	6.14%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: NDI-Publika Press Release, 'Voters Seek to Improve Quality of Life through Election', 23 July 2005, downloaded from <www.jurdil.org>, accessed 25 November 2005.

TABLE 11.4
Choice of Mayor of Manado Based on Communication Method

Communication Means	*Kumaat – Watuseke*	*Rimba – Buchari*	*Rumayar – Weku*	*Masengi – Alkatiri*	*Lontaan – Lihiang*	*Frederik – Damongilala*	*No Answer*	*Total*
TV Ad	12.82%	30.77%	10.26%	7.69%	6.41%	24.36%	7.69%	100%
TV News	23.75%	23.13%	8.13%	6.25%	3.13%	23.13%	12.50%	100%
TV Debate Shows	18.00%	17.50%	13.50%	8.50%	3.00%	22.00%	17.50%	100%
Radio	16.67%	27.78%	13.89%	8.33%	11.11%	11.11%	11.11%	100%
Newspaper	19.89%	20.44%	9.39%	3.31%	1.66%	27.07%	18.23%	100%
Brochure/Poster/Banner	13.08%	33.64%	4.67%	8.41%	3.74%	23.36%	13.08%	100%
Direct Communication with Campaign Team	17.69%	26.92%	6.54%	10.38%	3.08%	22.31%	13.08%	100%
Entertainment Shows	10.34%	31.03%	10.34%	0.00%	0.00%	27.59%	20.69%	100%
Money Politics	13.21%	33.96%	3.77%	5.66%	3.77%	30.19%	9.43%	100%
No Influence	13.84%	26.34%	8.04%	6.70%	3.13%	22.77%	19.20%	100%
Other	9.68%	25.81%	8.06%	6.45%	3.23%	32.26%	14.52%	100%
No Answer	10.99%	20.88%	8.79%	7.69%	2.20%	13.19%	36.26%	100%

Source: NDI-Publika Press Release, 'Voters Seek to Improve Quality of Life through Election', 23 July 2005, downloaded from <www.jurdil.org>, accessed 25 November 2005.

The NDI surveys have enabled a disaggregation of communication factors influencing voter choice. In Kutai Kartanegara, traditional communication with the campaign teams was unquestionably the main factor. In North Sulawesi, such direct communication remained the main factor, but was followed closely by television coverage. The example of Manado highlights most strikingly the power of television — and in this instance we can confidently interpret this to be primarily if not exclusively *local* television from the three local stations — as the dominant factor influencing voter choice (with 29.57 per cent), approaching double the impact of direct communication with campaign teams (17.56 per cent).

Surabaya

The city of Surabaya differs from the media environment of the previous three case studies in several distinct ways. The metropolis, covering 326 sq. km, has a population of 2.7 million; that is, 25 per cent greater than the entire province of North Sulawesi in only 2.12 per cent of its land area. Surabaya drives a provincial economy which is surpassed nationally only by Jakarta. Given the size of the Surabaya economy, the governorship may be regarded as the country's most powerful local government position after the governorship of Jakarta. The city provides a sound economic base for local media. It receives all the major national television stations, and has a local studio for the national public network, TVRI. There are about two dozen local radio stations, and two major local daily newspapers, with local bureaus serving the half-dozen major national papers.

Of greater significance, it is also home to the largest media conglomerate in Indonesia, the Jawa Pos Group, which achieved that distinction without having to base itself in Jakarta, previously regarded as essential for a "national" media group. Having established a network of more than eighty publications throughout the archipelago, and diversifying successfully into commercial office buildings, a paper mill and printeries, in 2002 the Jawa Pos Group established PT Jawa Media Televisi, investing approximately Rp150 billion to begin Jawa Pos Television, known as JTV. After JTV in Surabaya, local television stations followed in Batam and Riau (Ari Windyaningrum and Hendaru 2004).[30] Surabaya thus has a media that is simultaneously both local and national. The national network of Jawa Pos publications is based on the strategy of identifying local news and local staff and ensuring they are both at home in the local Jawa Pos-offshoot paper. The Jawa Pos Group has become successful economically precisely because it has been able to achieve both evocative locality and provide a link into a shared national network providing access to national and international news.

In undertaking the Quick Count and Voter Attitude Survey in Surabaya, the NDI collaborated with the FRI Jatim, the East Java Rectors' Forum, a non-partisan observation organization established in 1998 under the umbrella of the province's university rectors. Five pairs of candidates contested the election on 27 June 2005, a week after the North Sulawesi polls. There were 960,240 valid votes cast, but the participation rate of registered voters was only about 53 per cent, which the NDI judged "the lowest turnout rate so far observed compared to other regions" [sic].[31] The election was orderly and safe, with 98 per cent of polling stations reporting no intimidation or cases of violence, and 99 per cent of FRI monitors declaring "the voting and counting process was conducted fairly and transparently".

For our purposes, a unique aspect in the Surabaya poll was that one of the contestants was amongst the country's most experienced senior media practitioners, having worked at the head of both print and television media. Arif [Arief] Afandi[32] had been working in the Jawa Pos empire since 1991 and brought together exceptional expertise in media with a particular interest in regional autonomy issues. He was Editor in Chief of the *Jawa Pos* newspaper, News Director of JTV, and less prominently, Director of the Jawa Pos Pro-Autonomy Institute established in 2001 to research and evaluate issues relating to regional autonomy.[33] He became the running mate of the PDI-P's Bambang Dwi Haryono, who was standing for a second five-year term as mayor. The pair garnered a convincing 51.34 per cent of the vote, more than twice the runner-up's 20.73 per cent.

Media played an important role in their success. When Arif's candidacy was announced the PDI-P had to quash rumours that he was only being co-opted to gain the party greater media profile. PDI-P secretary for Surabaya, Budi Harijono, retorted that Arif was chosen because Surabaya needed a skilled "communicator". "Till now, one of the problems for Surabaya has been poor communication between the executive and the legislative [branches of government] which are always at loggerheads. As someone from the media, Arif Afandi can get on top of that issue", he stressed.[34] The contest had particular currency because while the city of Surabaya was regarded as pro-PDI-P, the surrounding province of East Java was a stronghold of the PKB, whose candidate-pair of Alisjahbana and Wahyudin Husein came in second. Additional candidates were put up by a coalition of the Democrat Party and the National Mandate Party (PD-PAN), whose partnership of Erlangga Satriagung and A.H. Thony came in third, and an alliance between Golkar and the Prosperity and Peace Party (PDS), whose pair Gatot Sudjito and Benyamin Hilly took final place.

The NDI-FRI exit poll survey in Surabaya was based on 3,196 respondents from a sample of 304 polling stations selected randomly across the electorate. In their press release reporting the findings of their survey, the NDI-FRI stated that, when totalled across responses regarding all candidates, "the use of the media — television, radio and newspapers — was the most influential method determining the respondents' choice (44.93 per cent)" with television alone contributing 31.71 per cent, "while material gifts such as money or basic foodstuffs were the least effective (1.15 per cent)". In contrast to the previous elections discussed above, "direct communication" by the candidates' campaign team had a relatively modest influence, selected only by 12.13 per cent of respondents, and "entertainment shows" determined the vote of only a miniscule 1.38 per cent overall (see Table 11.5).

According to the survey, the Bambang-Arif Afandi partnership was the most effective in all methods of communication.[35] Strictly speaking (as Table 11.6 indicates), when respondents are broken down according to the means of communication that most influenced their votes, the Bambang-Arif team was most successful with those influenced by any form of television or newspapers, though it was slightly overtaken by one competitor (the Alisjahbana-Wahyudin team) when it came to mobilizing radio communication. For the Bambang-Arif team, only 1.01 per cent of those voting for them regarded radio as the form of communication most influencing their vote (see Table 11.5), surprising given the radio industry claims the average time spent listening to the radio in Surabaya to be more than three hours a day.[36] It may be noteworthy that Arif had professional media experience in both newspapers and television, but not in radio.

It is not unusual internationally to find owners of media or media personalities moving successfully into politics. Silvio Berlusconi, the former Prime Minister of Italy, was also the founder and principal shareholder of the massive Fininvest conglomerate, whose media interests included three national TV channels constituting virtually half the entire domestic TV market.[37] Similarly, Thaksin Shinawatra, former Prime Minister of Thailand, owned Thailand's largest media conglomerate, the Shinawatra Computer and Communications Group, with interests in cable TV, mobile phones, and satellite communications.[38] Within Indonesia, media magnate Suryo Paloh, who has a controlling interest in the Metro TV network and Media Indonesia newspaper (together with a string of other profitable businesses), unsuccessfully sought Golkar's endorsement as presidential candidate in 2004, but remains posed for another attempt from his current position as Chair of the Golkar Party Advisory Board. Trading on different skills, there are numerous examples

TABLE 11.5
Most Influential Method Determining the Choice of Particular Mayoral Candidates in Surabaya

Communication Means	*Erlangga – Thony*	*Bambang – Arif*	*Gatot – Benyamin*	*Alisjahbana – Wahyudin*	*No Answer*	*Total*
TV Ad	7.58%	9.64%	6.16%	7.59%	8.97%	8.67%
TV News	12.30%	12.76%	14.38%	11.28%	11.45%	12.19%
TV Debate Shows	13.11%	9.97%	10.27%	10.20%	11.22%	10.85%
Radio	1.84%	1.01%	1.37%	2.82%	2.13%	1.73%
Newspaper	11.68%	11.67%	10.27%	10.85%	11.69%	11.49%
Brochure/Poster/Banner	12.50%	10.99%	5.48%	15.18%	10.98%	11.58%
Direct Communication with Campaign Team	13.93%	11.33%	13.70%	17.35%	9.09%	12.13%
Entertainment Shows	1.84%	1.78%	0.68%	1.30%	0.71%	1.38%
Money Politics	1.43%	0.51%	2.74%	1.30%	1.53%	1.15%
No Influence	14.14%	20.46%	20.55%	14.10%	18.06%	17.89%
Other	5.12%	5.58%	9.59%	4.12%	3.90%	5.02%
No Answer	4.51%	4.31%	4.79%	3.90%	10.27%	5.92%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: 'Pemilih Kota Surabaya Mencari Walikota Penyelesai Masalah', 29 June 2005, downloaded from <www.jurdil.org>, accessed 24 April 2006

TABLE 11.6
Choice of Mayoral Candidates in Surabaya Based on Most Influential Method of Communication

Communication Means	*Erlangga – Thony*	*Bambang – Arif*	*Gatot – Benyamin*	*Alisjahbana – Wahyudin*	*No Answer*	*Total*
TV Ad	13.65%	42.07%	3.32%	12.92%	28.04%	100%
TV News	15.75%	39.63%	5.51%	13.65%	25.46%	100%
TV Debate Shows	18.88%	34.81%	4.42%	13.86%	28.02%	100%
Radio	16.67%	22.22%	3.70%	24.07%	33.33%	100%
Newspaper	15.88%	38.44%	4.18%	13.93%	27.58%	100%
Brochure/Poster/Banner	16.85%	35.91%	2.21%	19.34%	25.69%	100%
Direct Communication with Campaign Team*	13.93%	27.46%	4.10%	16.39%	15.78%	100%
Entertainment Shows	20.93%	48.84%	2.33%	13.95%	13.95%	100%
Money Politics	19.44%	16.67%	11.11%	16.67%	36.11%	100%
No Influence	12.34%	43.29%	5.37%	11.63%	27.37%	100%
Other	15.92%	42.04%	8.92%	12.10%	21.02%	100%
No Answer	11.89%	27.57%	3.78%	9.73%	47.03%	100%

Note: *A mathematical error occurs in the source, which only provides data for a total of 77.6 per cent.
Source: 'Pemilih Kota Surabaya Mencari Walikota Penyelesai Masalah', 29 June 2005, downloaded from <www.jurdil.org>, accessed 24 April 2006.

of individuals who converted their popularity as media stars or celebrities into electoral support. Film actors Ronald Reagan and Arnold Schwarzenegger became the president of the United States and governor of California respectively. In Indonesia, Sophan Sophian graduated from film acting to the National Assembly (DPR).

However, the case of Arif Afandi is noteworthy for different reasons. Firstly, he was neither the businessman-owner of a media conglomerate, nor a "media personality" who became known to the audience through television or film appearances. He was, rather, a "behind-the-scenes" player, with a keen awareness of how the media operates, and years of experience in both highly successful print media and in the newly emerging area of local free-to-air television. What Arif Afandi was able to bring to the political equation was not *control* of the media (though his connections would have proved beneficial) nor a media-generated popular image such as may be enjoyed by "celebrities" or "artistes" in the Indonesian context. Rather, he brought a keen understanding of how the media operates. He was "media savvy". His knowledge and understanding of the industry and how it operates, and how an aspiring politician may maximize positive images in the media, would have been invaluable.

In this context it is interesting to note exit poll responses to the question, "Was the candidate for deputy mayor an important factor in your vote?" Overall, 16.22 per cent of respondents indicated their choice was determined primarily by the deputy, while the largest proportion, 40.42 per cent, indicated that what was important was the team of candidate and deputy (see Figure 11.1). Of those respondents who voted for a pair of candidates because of the deputy mayor, the largest proportion, some 42.23 per cent, voted for the pair in which Arif was that deputy (see Figure 11.2). That is, having Arif as his deputy was a major boost to the chances of success for the victor. For voters in this category, Arif provided nearly three times the pull of the next most appealing deputy mayoral aspirant.

CONCLUSION

This brief survey of a select sample of local electorates is not sufficient to prove that it is local media, and more specifically local television, which exerts the greatest influence over local voting trends. Such a claim would need to be supported by substantial empirical research at a variety of research sites. Nonetheless, the evidence provided by the NDI surveys, with their methodological consistency, is intriguing in that, across a variety of very different kinds of electorates, television coverage — and by extrapolation local television coverage — emerges as a significant factor in both the general

FIGURE 11.1
Was the Candidate for Deputy Mayor an Important Factor in Your Vote for Mayor of Surabaya?


No, although my mayoral candiate chose the wrong running partner 0.48%
No answer 10.69%
No, the important factor was the mayoral candidate 29.05%
Other 2.68%
Yes, I chose a candidate due to their deputy 16.22%
Yes, I did not choose a candidate due to their deputy 0.45%
Yes, I considered the mayoral candidate and the deputy as a pair 40.42%

Source: Forum Rektor Indonesia Jawa Timur, 'Hasil Survei Perilaku Pemilih di Kota Surabaya', 29 June 2005, p. 16, downloaded from <www.jurdil.org>, accessed 26 April 2006.

FIGURE 11.2
Those Who Voted for a Pair of Candidates in Surabaya Because of the Deputy Mayor



Source: Forum Rektor Indonesia Jawa Timur, 'Hasil Survei Perilaku Pemilih di Kota Surabaya', 29 June 2005, p. 17, downloaded from <www.jurdil.org>, accessed 26 April 2006.

inclination of voters as well as a major medium through which the victors have managed to mobilize support.

This would not surprise the Indonesian Association of Local Television Stations (ATVLI) which believes local news programmes — generally containing about 90 per cent local items with the balance national or international — are their stations' greatest asset. (Ari Windyaningrum and Hendaru 2004). *Reporting* their locality to the audience *in* their locality is what local television stations do best; better than national television networks, and with potentially more immediacy than print media, and the visual impact that radio lacks. In some instances, the local election candidates appear to have invested not only in ensuring strong supportive coverage on their *local* television channels, but also in placing advertisements on national television networks (though *Kompas* clearly regarded this to be overkill in the case of Kutai Kartanegara). In Manado, well served by three local television stations, such national coverage was irrelevant to the electoral campaign strategies of the main candidates, who concentrated their ads and their appearances on *local* television. Incumbents appear inclined to the benefits of having a local station, whether commercial or government-sponsored. Television can, thus, be expected to drain increasing amounts of campaign funding, either in direct political advertising or covert payments for positive coverage.

Accepting that data sets like those made available by the NDI are open to multiple interpretations, reading the statistics across the four electorates nonetheless supports the assessment that the influence of television increases proportional to the level of urbanization of the electorate. Television appears least influential in a dispersed, primarily rural district like Kutai Kartanegara. It grows in proportional influence in North Sulawesi, rising noticeably in Manado. But it attains its greatest influence in the metropolis of Surabaya. In Surabaya, we might detect the influence of media generally and television in particular, both in the exit poll surveys (that is, in the explicit choices of individual voters) as well as in the active (and successful) candidacy of a major media practitioner, bringing a hitherto unknown level of media expertise into a contesting team. It is hard to think of any successful, elected Indonesian politician, at any level of government, whose experience within the media industry would match that of Arif Afandi, and the exit polls indicate that Arif's contribution in inclining voters to that pair of candidates was substantial.

Identifiable also is the decline in importance of "direct communication with the campaign team" in almost inverse proportion to the rise in significance of television as a factor. In Kutai Kartanegara, such direct contact is pivotal, attracting 26.94 per cent; in North Sulawesi it declines slightly to 24.34 per cent, falling further to 17.56 per cent in Manado, plummeting to only 12.13

per cent in highly urbanized Surabaya. Thus, in what must present a challenge to the capacity of an aspirant's election team, such direct communication ranks as more important in vast dispersed electorates than it is in compact urban ones where voters appear more reliant on mass media. Most surprising, given prevailing assumptions that radio was the most ubiquitous and widely accessed mass media in Indonesia (particularly in rural areas), is that it features as one of the least influential media for the victors across all three electorates for which we have specific data. It attracts only 3.23 per cent for Sarundajang, 2.7 per cent for Rimba Rogi, and a tiny 1.01 per cent for Bambang-Arif.

As the Indonesian media throws off the stupor of the Soeharto years and a new and complex system of electoral democracy emerges, practitioners with media experience will become increasingly valued, both for advice and, if the Surabaya case is any indication, for the boost their candidacy may bring to a party's chances. If the experience of these four diverse electorates scattered across Indonesia can be synthesized into a common trend it is that television, and increasingly local television, will become the electoral vehicle driving successful local political aspirants, and that the methods of harnessing the political power of television will be many and varied.

Notes

[1] This chapter was originally drafted during a Visiting Senior Research Fellowship at the National University of Singapore Asia Research Institute, for which I express my appreciation.

[2] See "Kode dan Data Wilayah Administrasi Pemerintahan per Provinsi Seluruh Indonesia", downloaded from <http://www.depdagri.go.id/konten.php?nama=DataWilayah>, accessed 8 May 2006.

[3] Details available from the Jurdil website, <www.jurdil.org> accessed 11 May 2006.

[4] Background information on Kutai Kartanegara can be found at <http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kutai_kartanegara>, accessed 24 April 2006.

[5] Try Harijono. "Pilkada Kutai Kartanegara Bertaburan Segalanya…". *Kompas*, 1 June 2005, located at <http://www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0506/01/utama/1789459.htm>, accessed 3 May 2006.

[6] The other pairs of candidates were Aji Sofyan Lex and Muhammad Irkham, backed by the Prosperity and Justice Party (PDS) and the National Mandate Party (PAN), and Tajuddin Noor and Abdul Djabar Burkam, supported by the Development Unity Party (PPP), the Pancasila Patriot Party, and the Freedom Party. For a brief and very favourable biography of Syaukani, see <www.tokohindonesia.com/ensiklopedi/s/syaukani-hr/index.shtml>, accessed 3 May 2006.

[7] Anne Casson. *Decentralization of Policy Making and the Administration of Policies Affecting Forests and Estate Crops in Kutai* (DRAFT dated 18 September 2001), Center For International Forestry Research (CIFOR) Bogor, downloadable from <http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/publications/pdf_files/drafts/desentralization/kubar1.pdf>, accessed 23 May 2008, which cites "Syaukani Pimpin 300 Regent: Juga Anggota Dewan Pertimbangan Otonomi Daerah", *Kaltim Post*, 31 May 2000, p. 1.

[8] According to Indonesian Corruption Watch, Syaukani was one of four bureaucrats accused in a Rp 4.6 billion corruption case, but the case languished in the East Kalimantan Attorney's office (*Kajati Kaltim*). See <http://www.antikorupsi.org/docs/perkembangankasuskorupsikaltim06.pdf>, sighted 5 May 2006. For a report of the corruption case and protests against Syaukani's replacement, see "Mantan Bupati Kukar Dilaporkan ke KPK". *Media Indonesia*, 8 January2005, downloaded from <http://www.antikorupsi.org/mod.php?mod=publisher&op=viewarticle&artid=3322>, accessed 5 May 2006.

[9] Financial restitution of Rp 13 billion appears to have been made to close the case. Sri Gunawan Wibisono. "Kejaksaan Tinggi Kaltim Petieskan Kasus Dugaan Korupsi Syaukani". *Tempointeraktif*, dated 10 June 2005, downloaded from <www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/nusa/kalimantan/2005/06/10/brk,20050610-62345,i…>, accessed 4 May 2006.

[10] Anton Aprianto. "Masyarakat Kutai Gugat Jaksa Agung". *Tempo Interaktif*, 26 May 2005, located at <www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/nasional/2005/05/26/brk,20050526-61502,id.html>, accessed 4 May 2006. Syaukani was subsequently relieved of his post when in August 2007 he was tried on four counts of corruption totalling 120 billion rupiah, with the prosecution calling for a 20-year jail sentence (Kholil & Donatus Nador. "Syaukani Diminta Nonaktif". *Seputar Indonesia*, 9 August 2007, at <http://www.seputar-indonesia.com/edisicetak/politik-hukum/syaukani-diminta-nonaktif.html>, accessed 1 November 2007).

[11] "Pilkada Pertama Kab. Kutai Berbuntut Masalah". *Pikiran Rakyat* 6 June 2005, at <http://www.pikiran-rakyat.com/cetak/2005/0605/06/0504.htm>, accessed on 3 May 2006.

[12] Pokja 30 press release, "Voters hope the newly elected bupati is able to increase the quality of life", 4 June 2005, downloadable from <www.jurdil.org>, accessed 24 April 2006.

[13] <www.kutaikartanegara.com/direktori/berita_media/>, accessed 24 April 2006.

[14] <www.kutaikartanegara.go.id>.

[15] See Hill and Sen (2005), particularly Chapter 4, for a discussion of internet accessibility in Indonesia.

[16] "Kukar Jajaki Pendirian Stasiun TV Daerah", <http://www.kutaikartanegara.com/berita/news160203.html>, accessed 24 April 2006.

[17] "Kukar TV Siap Siarkan Pembukaan Erau" (dated 20 September 2003), downloadable from <http://www.kutaikartanegara.com/erau/news200903.html>, accessed 4 May 2006.

[18] "Bupati Kukar Buka Festival Bulan Penuh Hikmah IV", <http://www.kutaikartanegara.com/berita/news161103.html>, accessed 24 April 2006. It appears the station failed to survive after the elections.

[19] Quotation from Pokja 30 Press Release "Imbalan Materi Masih Merupakan Faktor Penting, tapi Komunikasi Langsung dengan Pemilih Jauh Lebih Penting", 20 June 2005, downloadable from <www.jurdil.org>, accessed 24 April 2006.

[20] For brief biographical details on Sarundajang, see <http://www.sulut.go.id/?buka=pejabatnegara&kode=gubernur>, accessed 5 May 2006.

[21] Not relevant from the point of view of this paper was another very local specialized Christian station, GO-TV, that transmitted programmes produced by a Christian organization in Jakarta and did not cover local politics or elections (Hill 2005, p. 17).

[22] On the media environment in Manado, see Hill (2008).

[23] Quotations and statistics from NDI-Publika press release, "Honesty and Ability Key Factor for North Sulawesi Voters", 22 June 2005, downloaded from <www.jurdil.org>, accessed 24 April 2006.

[24] Quotations from NDI-Publika press release, "Honesty and Ability Key Factor for North Sulawesi Voters", 22 June 2005, downloaded from <www.jurdil.org>, accessed 24 April 2006.

[25] For a more detailed study of the Manado mayoral elections, see Hill (2008).

[26] Badan Pusat Statistik Kota Manado, *Kota Manado dalam Angka 2003*. Badan Pusat Statistik Kota Manado, 2004, p. 64.

[27] The pairs and respective parties were: Teddy Kumaat and Elvy M. Watuseke (coalition of minor parties), Jimmy Rimba Rogi and Abdi W. Buchari (Golkar); Audie Rumayar and Yanny S. Weku (PDS & PPIB); Daniel A. Masengi and Djafar Alkatiri (PPP, PKPB), Johan J. Lontaan & Elisabeth A. Lihiang (Democratic Party); Wempie Frederik and Jeremia J.S. Damongilala (PDI-P).

[28] Confidential interview with senior television executive, Manado, 22 July 2005.

[29] I thank Anastasia Soeryadinata of NDI and Ismail Dahab of Publika Manado for their assistance during my observation of the mayoral elections and for sharing their findings.

[30] On the establishment of the Jawa Pos conglomerate, see Hill (1994). See also the company profile on <http://www.jawapos.co.id/cv/05_indonesia.htm>, accessed 6 May 2006.

[31] Quotation from NDI-FRI press release, "Bambang D.H. is projected to be returned as Surabaya Mayor with a low turnout rate", 27 June 2005, downloadable from <www.jurdil.org>, accessed 24 April 2006.

[32] Even *Jawa Pos* websites use the spellings "Arif Afandi" and "Arief Afandi" interchangeably (cf. <http://www.jpip.or.id/about.php?lang=en&id=3> and <http://www.jpip.or.id/newsdetail.php?lang=id&id=19>, both sighted 6 May 2006), while other sources use "Arief Affandi". For consistency I will use the former, used on the ballot materials and by NDI in its materials.

[33] The Institute's website is <http://www.jpip.or.id/>, accessed 6 May 2006.

[34] Jojo Raharjo and Jalil Hakim. "Pemimpin Redaksi Jawa Pos Ikut Pilkada

Surabaya". *Tempointeraktif*, 16 February 2005, located at <http://www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/nusa/jawamadura/2005/02/16/brk,20050216-54,id.html>, accessed 6 May 2006.

35 NDI-FRI press release, "Pemilih Kota Surabaya Mencari Walikota Penyelesai Masalah", 29 June 2005, downloaded from <www.jurdil.org>, accessed 24 April 2006.

36 The Indonesian Association of Commercial Radio Stations (PRSSNI) website provides a graph indicating the "time spent listening" for "all people" aged 10+ years, between 5 a.m. and midnight in Surabaya as 3 hours and 2 minutes. The source given is *Nielsen Media Research Radio Audience Measurement 2003*. See <www.radioprssni.com/Mitra%20Usaha/AboutRadioIndustryIndex.html>, accessed 9 May 2006.

37 On Berlusconi, see <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Silvio_Berlusconi>, accessed 8 May 2006.

38 For a critical perspective on Thaksin, see <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thaksin_Shinawatra>, accessed 26 April 2006.

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PART III

Conflict, Ethnicity, and Political Divisions

12

AUTONOMY, DEMOCRACY, AND INTERNAL CONFLICT
The 2006 Gubernatorial Elections in Papua

Marcus Mietzner

The first direct elections of local government chiefs in Indonesia, which began with a wave of 159 polls in June 2005, have highlighted the extraordinary complexity of post-Soeharto politics. The fall of the New Order regime in 1998 triggered an unprecedented process of deregulation and decentralization, ending more than three decades of enforced uniformity under Soeharto's rule. As most restrictions on political organization were gradually lifted during the democratic transition, Indonesia's inherent heterogeneity began to express itself in a myriad of diverse political constellations at the grassroots. The introduction of direct local ballots has marked the culmination of this process, with political coalitions, themes, and arrangements unthinkable at the centre turning into everyday reality in the regions.

Despite very specific local contexts, the majority of *pilkada* held between 2005 and 2008 nevertheless had distinctly Indonesian features. Most importantly, in nearly all of the areas in which elections were held, the existence of the unitary state of Indonesia formed the unquestioned political framework for the elections and their individual candidates. Instead of attracting votes with populist attacks on the centre, the overwhelming majority of candidates pledged their loyalty to the Indonesian state and its institutional

structures. Given the post-1998 centrifugal tendencies in territories like Riau, East Kalimantan, North Sulawesi, Maluku, or Bali, this was not necessarily the most expected outcome.

The direct elections in Papua, however, differed from the national trend in several ways.[1] Indonesia's easternmost province conducted the ballot for a new governor within the framework of special autonomy, which had been granted in 2001 to address the grievances held by many Papuans over their place in the unitary state. In contrast to most polls across the archipelago that focused on the internal problems of a particular province, district, or municipality, the elections in Papua took place amid protracted political disputes between Papuan politicians and the central government, particularly over the status of the province of West Irian Jaya. Carved out of Papua by successive Jakartan governments, West Irian Jaya had never been endorsed by the Jayapura-based Papuan elite, leading to a legal and political quagmire that ultimately required two separate elections for governor in March 2006. Papua held the gubernatorial polls for its territory on 10 March, while West Irian Jaya followed with its ballot for the area under its control one day later.

This chapter will discuss the Papuan gubernatorial elections against the background of that province's struggle to strengthen its political and economic position *vis-à-vis* the centre. It will argue that despite the disputes surrounding the West Irian issue, the introduction of direct local elections has led to a significant increase in the participation of native Papuans in political affairs. The chapter also demonstrates that the traditional focus on the sharp antagonism between Papua and the central government, which is frequently applied in foreign media reports, has missed important layers of the Papuan problem. The electoral competition in Papua has exposed internal divisions within Papuan society that, in the long term, could weaken the drive for secession of the province. Ultimately, the way in which these intra-Papuan differences marked and dominated the election campaign suggests that a further democratic opening of Papua's political system provides a better chance of keeping Papua in the Indonesian union than centralist intervention and an approach based on military control.

In developing these arguments, I will largely focus on the electoral process in Papua proper, i.e. the main province without the nine districts and municipalities under the authority of West Irian Jaya. Given that the two electoral processes were chaotically intertwined, however, occasional reference will also be made to the West Irian Jaya polls. The chapter begins with a short historical overview of the special autonomy legislation for Papua and an analytical description of the controversy over West Irian Jaya. Subsequently, the chapter introduces the candidates in the 2006 polls and, at the same time,

discusses the main ethnic, regional, and political fault-lines that shaped the Papuan campaign. Finally, I highlight the most important trends and patterns emerging from the election results, and explain the differences and similarities between the elections in Papua and polls in other parts of Indonesia.

SPECIAL AUTONOMY AND LOCAL ELECTIONS IN PAPUA

The special autonomy legislation for Papua, passed in 2001, was designed to overcome widespread dissatisfaction with Jakarta's rule since the gradual integration of the province into Indonesia that began in 1969.[2] Many Papuans had suffered under the tight grip of the New Order's military apparatus, and they had watched with frustration as the area's rich natural resources were extracted for the exclusive benefit of Jakarta's politico-economic elite and international investors (Chauvel and Bhakti 2004, p. 24). Since the 1960s, a small-scale guerrilla group named OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, Free Papua Organization) had launched sporadic attacks on military posts and other institutions associated with the central government, but its influence was concentrated in a few locations in the interior of Papua (or Irian Jaya, its official name at that time). After Soeharto's fall in 1998, a strong movement emerged that tried to use the temporary weakness of the central government to push for Papua's independence from Indonesia. This movement, which pledged to achieve its goal with non-violent methods, included not only human rights activists and *adat* leaders, but also many established politicians in Papua's local government.

In response, Jakarta's political elite agreed on an MPR decree in August 2000 that mandated the central government to offer Papua special autonomy status within the Indonesian republic. This offer, it was envisaged, would include wide-ranging concessions in terms of political rights, distribution of economic resources, and cultural freedoms. While some militant activists remained deeply opposed to any proposal coming out of Jakarta, a large number of Papuan intellectuals and politicians decided to seize the opportunity and produce a draft bill on Papua's special autonomy. Subsequently, they submitted this draft to the Indonesian legislature for deliberation. To the surprise of many, the Jakarta government endorsed most of the suggestions made by the Papuan drafters (Sumule 2003). In November 2001, the bill was passed into law.

The centrepiece of the special autonomy legislation was the Majelis Rakyat Papua (MRP, Papuan People's Council). The MRP was to consist only of native Papuans, who make up around 60 per cent of the province's 2.7 million inhabitants. The new council was tasked with protecting the

cultural rights of indigenous Papuans and, in the long term, improving their economic position *vis-à-vis* the more affluent immigrants, mostly from Sulawesi and Java (Tim ICS Papua 2005, pp. 10–13). Its authority included reviewing local government regulations that affected the indigenous population, and approving or rejecting any plans to divide the province of Papua into smaller units.

The latter stipulation was a direct response to a 1999 law issued by the Habibie government that had carved two additional provinces out of Irian Jaya. According to the law, West Irian Jaya was to have its capital in Manokwari, while Central Irian Jaya's planned seat was in Timika, the location of the giant gold and copper mine run by the U.S.-based company Freeport McMoRan. However, Habibie's move triggered fierce opposition from Papuan politicians, who suspected that Jakarta aimed at creating tensions within Papuan society to undermine its drive for independence. The protests across Papua led Abdurrahman Wahid to shelve the division plans after he assumed the presidency in October 1999, and the special autonomy legislation initiated under his rule was widely interpreted as superseding the 1999 law. In order to anticipate further attempts by the central government to split Papua, the special autonomy law granted the right to decide on such initiatives to the MRP.

The law on Papua also included special regulations on the election of its governor, introducing three major differences to the national legislation on local elections. First, candidates for the governorship had to be native Papuans. This was further defined to include those persons "of Melanesian race, comprising native tribes in the province of Papua" and/or those "accepted and acknowledged by the *adat* community as being native Papuan".[3] The right to establish whether a candidate was native Papuan was granted to the MRP.

The second special condition was that gubernatorial nominees needed to have at least a bachelor's degree, while equivalent candidates in the rest of the nation only had to present a high school degree. Finally, the law also regulated that persons who had been imprisoned for political reasons should be allowed to stand as candidates in the elections. This clause, which differed from the national law that excluded former convicts from electoral competition, was designed to accommodate former supporters of independence who had served sentences for "treason" and "subversion" charges. The new regulations on gubernatorial ballots only came into effect, however, one year after the Papuan legislature had elected a governor under existing national rules. In that contest, seasoned Golkar politician Jaap Solossa, a strong supporter of special autonomy, had beaten Abraham ("Bram") Atururi, a retired marines brigadier-general and former vice-governor of the province (International

Crisis Group 2003, p. 4). Thus the new electoral format was set to stage its premiere in the following gubernatorial elections, which had to take place before the expiration of Solossa's term in November 2005.

DELAYS, DIVISIONS, AND COMPLICATIONS: THE MRP AND THE WEST IRIAN JAYA DISPUTE

In the preparations for the elections, two major problems emerged that would not only delay the polls but also fuel tensions between Papua and the central government. First of all, the Megawati cabinet appeared unwilling to move forward with the creation of the MRP, which deprived the electoral process of the one institution that could confirm the eligibility of nominees. Megawati had inherited the initiative for Papuan special autonomy from her predecessor, and although she had allowed it to pass into law, the president made no secret of her deep suspicions toward the arrangement. Consequently, she allowed her Minister for Home Affairs, the retired lieutenant-general Hari Sabarno, to delay the establishment of the body throughout her term, citing technicalities and a general fear that the MRP might acquire a political role unintended by the authors of the law. Megawati's failure to implement the core element of the special autonomy law led to widespread frustration in Papua with the central government, and even turned political moderates into proponents of a more radical course towards Jakarta.[4]

Megawati's intransigence on the Papua issue offered her electoral opponents opportunities to mobilize Papuans against the incumbent administration. Consequently, Megawati's challenger in the 2004 presidential elections, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, toured Papua during his campaign and promised to implement special autonomy in a sincere and comprehensive manner. This included, of course, the speedy foundation of the MRP. As a result, Susilo took Papua in a landslide, and moved to fulfil his pledges shortly after his inauguration in October 2004. In December, he issued Government Regulation 54, which formally established the MRP and set broad guidelines for its operations.[5] The process of selecting the members for the MRP was only completed in late October 2005, however, shortly before the expiration of Solossa's term. Thus the gubernatorial elections, which had originally been scheduled for October, had to be postponed until the newly created institution could properly screen all candidates for the governorship. When the MRP began to examine the eligibility of nominees in November, the deadline for regularly scheduled elections had passed.

Given that Solossa no longer held a valid mandate, the government had to appoint an acting governor to fill the vacancy and organize the upcoming

polls. Instead of naming a neutral career bureaucrat, however, the central government asked Solossa, who was running for re-election, to stay in his job. This was in open violation of existing laws, which did not allow acting governors appointed by the government to participate in the polls. His opponents therefore boycotted the following stages of the electoral process, declaring they would only re-engage after Solossa had laid down the governorship. Tragically, this stalemate was resolved by Solossa's death of a reported heart attack in December 2005. The Jakarta government then installed an official from the Home Ministry as acting governor, and the Papuan KPUD (Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah, Local Elections Commission) scheduled the gubernatorial ballot for February 2006.

Many Papuans had viewed the delay in creating the MRP as an indication that the central government was backtracking on concessions made in the special autonomy law.[6] However, the controversy surrounding the MRP was not the main source of the political complications that obstructed the gubernatorial elections. The issue that emerged as the most eloquent symbol for Papuan grievances over their relationship with the centre, and that would cause the largest amount of confusion in the electoral process, was the establishment of West Irian Jaya province by presidential decree in January 2003. The decree revived the 1999 law on the division of the province, and called for the creation of government institutions in both West and Central Irian Jaya, despite the fact that the MRP had yet to be set up and thus was unable to give its verdict on the issue (Sugiono 2005, p. 207).

The establishment of Central Irian Jaya was quickly aborted, largely because the governor appointed for the "province" in 1999 had already retired and refused to cooperate with Jakarta. Bram Atururi, the caretaker for West Irian Jaya, on the other hand, seized the opportunity and established himself as acting governor in Manokwari. With the help of the central intelligence agency BIN (Badan Intelijen Negara, National Intelligence Agency), whose head Hendropriyono had been one of the driving forces behind the initiative to revive the 1999 split, Atururi succeeded in consolidating his authority over the disputed territory (McGibbon 2004*b*, p. 60). Against strong opposition from the "mother province" Papua, Atururi managed to hold legislative elections in West Irian Jaya in April 2004, leading to the establishment of a provincial legislature. When Megawati and Hendropriyono left office later that year, the infrastructure of the new province was so deeply entrenched that the incoming government under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono found it difficult to return West Irian Jaya to its pre-2003 status. Even the Constitutional Court, asked by the opponents of the split to revoke the 2003 presidential instruction, could not arrive at a clear-cut decision. In November

2004, it declared the government regulations underpinning the creation of West Irian Jaya unconstitutional, but explicitly acknowledged the *de facto* existence of the province.[7]

The dispute over West Irian Jaya had serious consequences for the Papuan gubernatorial elections. Since 2004, the new province had its own KPUD, which covered eight districts and one municipality. With the tacit approval of the central government, the KPUD of West Irian Jaya began to prepare separate gubernatorial polls for its territory, which were scheduled for July 2005. The Papuan KPUD in Jayapura thus could only make electoral preparations for the nineteen districts and one municipality under its own coordination.[8]

The issue of separate gubernatorial polls in West Irian Jaya and Papua became the dominating theme in the relationship between Jayapura and Jakarta on the one hand and Jayapura and Manokwari on the other. Jayapura-based politicians insisted that separate elections in West Irian Jaya constituted a blatant breach of the special autonomy law and other government regulations, which did not allow for elections in the territory before the MRP had ruled on the division itself.[9] Already scheduled ballots in Manokwari were postponed twice, in July and November 2005, after Jayapura threatened to disengage from special autonomy if the elections went ahead. Amid growing tensions on all sides, the MRP finally issued its ruling on the West Irian Jaya case in February 2006, saying that a public consultation it had conducted found overwhelming opposition to the split. It thus recommended that the gubernatorial elections be held for the whole territory of Papua, after which the issue of territorial divisions could be referred to the MRP again for further deliberation.[10] Manokwari, for its part, fiercely opposed the verdict, and encouraged the central government to stay its course.

By the time they were issued, the MRP recommendations had lost much of their relevance, both in political and practical terms. To begin with, the central government was determined to move ahead with the gubernatorial elections in West Irian Jaya. While declaring that it still studied the MRP recommendations, Jakarta encouraged the KPUD in West Irian Jaya to set a definitive election date. (The ballot was eventually held on 11 March 2006 and resulted in a compelling win for Atururi.) Moreover, by early 2006 most members of the political elite in Jayapura had already given up on the idea of a united Papuan election. The KPUD of Papua had finalized the preparations for the elections in the area under its control, and most politicians wanted them to move forward without waiting for the outcome of the West Irian Jaya dispute. Although they did not have a clear idea about how to deal with West Irian Jaya after the polls, political leaders in Papua proper agreed that a

governor equipped with a strong popular mandate would be better positioned to represent Papuan interests *vis-à-vis* the central government than a caretaker from the home ministry.[11] Moreover, candidates for the governorship became impatient with the numerous delays, having already spent billions of rupiah to maintain their network of supporters. Any further postponement would have added intolerably to their already stretched budgets. Accordingly, the date for the Papuan elections was set for 10 March 2006 (after an additional delay for logistical reasons), and the various campaign teams began to set their electoral machineries in motion.

The collective bitterness over the circumstances under which the Papuan polls took place tainted what otherwise could have constituted an impressive showcase for the increased participation of native Papuans in political life under special autonomy. The 2001 stipulations had made wide-ranging concessions, restricting the governorship to native Papuans and empowering an indigenous body to determine the candidates for the gubernatorial elections. Furthermore, changes to the national law on local elections in 2004 meant that it was no longer the Papuan legislature that elected the governor, but the people directly. In combination, these changes were very important steps towards addressing long-term concerns of Papuans over their democratic rights and their relations with Jakarta. In fact, the restriction of the governorship to native inhabitants was an extraordinary concession, which is rarely found in other autonomous regions anywhere in the world.

Against this background, the issue of West Irian Jaya unnecessarily diverted the attention away from potentially significant leaps in the democratic process in Papua. Instead, the conflict deepened the already existing gap between Papuans and the central government. Ironically, had the Jakarta government allowed the matter of dividing the province to proceed according to the regulations enshrined in the special autonomy law, it is likely that the MRP would not only have approved one or two new provinces, but probably six or seven. The MRP consultations in West Irian Jaya had concluded that while many societal leaders objected to the specific boundaries of the province, they were not generally opposed to dividing Papua into several territories. On the contrary, they demanded even smaller provinces for their home areas. In Fak Fak, for example, the MRP was told that the population there wanted its own province, which should be autonomous from Manokwari, Jayapura, and Sorong (Majelis Rakyat Papua 2006). This shows that there were several layers of intra-Papuan divisions that, if allowed to play out democratically, had the potential to stimulate what Jaap Timmer (2005, p. 2) called "a variety of Papuan nationalisms". Instead, the perceived intervention by Jakarta united most Papuans in the

campaign against West Irian Jaya, and conveniently papered over the conflicts within Papuan society itself. How significant these internal divisions were became evident in the campaign strategies of the various candidates for the governorship, which defined the demarcation lines between Papua's dominant ethnic, social, and political groups.

COAST VERSUS THE INTERIOR: THE CANDIDATES IN THE GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS

The nominations for the gubernatorial elections reflected broad divisions within the Papuan community beyond the obvious socio-ethnic fragmentation into tribes and clans.[12] Since the colonial period, Papuans from coastal areas had enjoyed significantly better educational opportunities, which enabled them to occupy key positions in the bureaucracy and the private sector. Consequently, Papuans from Biak, Serui, Sentani, Sorong, and Fak Fak have dominated political and social life in the province, with local government, churches, and non-governmental organizations typically run by figures from these coastal regions. People from the interior, on the other hand, have traditionally felt underprivileged. According to McGibbon (2004*a*, p. 34), "the socio-economic changes from the 1970s reinforced this basic cleavage and intensified the sense of disadvantage in the densely populated areas of the interior".

Therefore, many members of tribes from the interior — most notably the Lani and the Dani — have increasingly left their valleys in search of employment opportunities in the urban centres. In the cities, however, people from the interior find it hard to compete with immigrants from Sulawesi, Sumatra, and Java, accelerating their social and economic marginalization even further. On the other hand, many coastal Papuans have moved into the interior, filling the additional bureaucratic jobs that have become available since the drastic increase of districts in the province from nine to twenty-nine between 1998 and 2004. This two-way flow of intra-Papuan migration has intensified the sentiments between the two broad groups, and has also given rise to distinctly socio-ethnic tones in the political competition. In recent years, Papuans from the interior have complained that none of their own has ever obtained the governorship. Jaap Solossa had been the last in a series of coastal Papuans in that position and, like most of his predecessors, he had handed a large number of top bureaucratic positions to members of his clan or other influential figures from his home region.

The candidacy of Lukas Enembe, the deputy *bupati* of Puncak Jaya district, epitomized this challenge of the central highlands towards coastal

superiority in Papuan politics. Enembe drew his electoral strength from the powerful simplicity of his campaign message, which called on the tribes of the interior to break the monopolistic grip of coastal Papua on the governorship. Enembe, a lower-ranking civil servant before his appointment as deputy *bupati* in 2001, won the backing of a few smaller political parties that he had bankrolled while having access to the budget of the Puncak Jaya government. The most influential among these parties was the Christian-Protestant PDS (Partai Damai Sejahtera, Prosperous Peace Party), which had benefited from Enembe's monthly payments to chronically under-funded religious teachers in the remote areas of the district. While preparing his gubernatorial candidacy, Enembe made the acquaintance of Mohammad A. Musa'ad, a member of the provincial KPUD and a former participant in the drafting team for Papua's special autonomy law. In long discussions, Enembe and Musa'ad agreed that the best way to add an additional layer to Enembe's ethnically defined campaign would be to pair up with a Muslim running mate — Musa'ad himself. Musa'ad's major political partner was the puritan Muslim party PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Party of Justice and Prosperity), which was initially reluctant to endorse the idea of entering into a coalition with the Christian PDS. Finally the deal was sealed, however, and Enembe's campaign for the votes of the central highlands was complemented by Musa'ad's claim on the unanimous support of Muslim immigrants.

This campaign framework remained in place even after the MRP disqualified Musa'ad from the electoral race for allegedly not being a native Papuan. Despite initially violent protests by Enembe's supporters against this decision, Musa'ad eventually relented and appointed the Muslim banker Arobi Ahmad Aituaaruw to replace him. Declaring that it was a religious obligation for Muslims to vote for him, Arobi — as the only candidate of Islamic faith — was able to bind large sections of immigrants to Enembe's campaign.

Enembe's strong showing in the elections (he finished second with 29.6 per cent of the votes) highlighted the continued volatility of intra-Papuan tensions. Enembe's campaign slogan, which stressed that it was now time for a candidate from the interior to assume the governorship, resonated well with ethnic highlanders, and provided him with a fanatic and numerically significant support base.[13] In fact, despite poor performances in the televised debates with his rivals in the gubernatorial elections, Enembe's following grew steadily and by the end of the campaign he had overtaken several candidates with well-entrenched power networks and more sophisticated political programmes. Ultimately, he got within a hairbreadth of winning the elections. Preliminary results announced ten days after the ballot showed

him only 1,000 votes away from claiming the top spot, with a total of more than 1.1 million votes cast.[14] The final figures, however, saw Enembe around 20,000 votes behind, triggering allegations by his supporters that electoral fraud was responsible for the suddenly increased gap.[15] Claiming that there had been irregularities during the vote count in the district of Yahukimo, Enembe lodged a complaint at the Supreme Court and asked it to overturn the result. As in most other cases that involved complaints over local election results, however, the judges finally decided in May 2006 to reject the lawsuit and confirm the official KPUD figures.

The fact that Enembe lost the election despite his strong appeal to the large voting block of ethnic highlanders was due to two major factors, neither of which involved manipulations by his competitors. First, although at Enembe's final campaign event a prominent tribal leader claimed that approximately 750,000 votes from the interior had already been secured for his campaign, the reality was strikingly different. Each of Enembe's four competitors, who all originated from coastal regions, had posted candidates from the interior as their running mates. With these four vice-gubernatorial nominees laying claim to the support of their various tribes, Enembe failed to unite the entire central highlands behind his campaign.[16] This trend was aggravated by Enembe's relatively low name recognition both at the provincial level and in the highlands. Prior to the campaign, only 40 per cent of voters had heard of Enembe, the lowest figure for all gubernatorial nominees.[17] The second reason for Enembe's failure, however, was the cross-tribal popularity of Barnabas Suebu, the former governor of Irian Jaya and eventual winner of the 2006 elections. Suebu's success demonstrated that despite the persistence of ethnic and tribal motives in Papuan politics, more modern campaign strategies ultimately determined the outcome of the electoral race. In addition, it also provided interesting insights into the way nominees in Indonesia's first direct local elections had to engage in high-level political machinations in order to advance their candidacies.

The victory of Barnabas Suebu, who gathered 31.4 per cent of the votes, completed a remarkable political comeback. Suebu had been governor between 1988 and 1993, but had seen his career in politics foundering after a run-in with then President Soeharto. As a consequence, he had been denied a second term, and had subsequently focused on his business activities.[18] Between 1999 and 2002, he had been ambassador to Mexico, Honduras, and Panama and, after his return to Indonesia, he turned into an outspoken observer of Papuan affairs. Blasting Megawati's 2003 decision to order the split of the province as unconstitutional, he thought he had damaged his relationship to the PDI-P chairwoman irreparably.[19] In the same vein, he had criticized then

governor Solossa, a fellow Golkar cadre, for not doing enough to implement the special autonomy law to the letter.

Suebu's high public profile as a vocal, yet well-connected, critic of the central government led some Papuan activists to launch the idea of his nomination for another term as governor. The major obstacle to Suebu's candidacy, however, was the apparent lack of an electoral vehicle. Having spent most of his political life in Golkar, he was initially reluctant to consider other parties that could facilitate his nomination. Within Golkar, Solossa had all but secured his nomination for re-election, and even if he dropped out, around half a dozen other Golkar leaders stood ready to take his place. The second-largest party in Papua, PDI-P, also seemed like an unlikely partner. Megawati was not known for easily forgiving her critics, and Suebu's closeness to Papuan groups that demanded independence seemed to provide an additional disincentive for the nationalist-unitarian party to nominate him. Finally, a number of smaller parties took the initiative to approach Suebu.

Only when the news of a possible Suebu candidacy reached the headlines did provincial PDI-P leader Komaruddin Watubun also express interest in nominating him. Suspicious of the offer, Suebu demanded that Komaruddin get Megawati's approval and, after some negotiations, a meeting was arranged between Suebu and the former president in Bali. Suebu left for Bali without knowing what Megawati's verdict would be but, to his great surprise, he found her sympathetic. In a long conversation, she queried Suebu about rumours that he supported Papua's independence from Indonesia, but was satisfied with his explanation that such gossip was the result of unprofessional intelligence reporting.[20] At the end of the meeting, she stated that PDI-P's central board stood fully behind Suebu's nomination. In an additional twist, however, she insisted that Komaruddin not be his running mate — which had been the arrangement that Suebu and the local PDI-P chairman had agreed upon. Komaruddin belonged to a group of party dissidents within PDI-P, and had walked out of the last party congress in protest against Megawati's autocratic tendencies.[21] Furious over what she viewed as an act of insubordination, Megawati threatened to throw Komaruddin out of the party if he insisted on running alongside Suebu. She only suspended her threat after Suebu reminded her that the MRP was likely to disqualify Komaruddin anyway for his non-Papuan background.

Suebu's candidacy sent shock waves through the political establishment, particularly within Golkar. Solossa asked Suebu not to run, and Golkar chairman Yusuf Kalla sent his brother-in-law Aksa Mahmud to offer Suebu the chairmanship of a yet to be created Papua Development Board if he withdrew his nomination. Suebu did not change his decision, however. Both

the former governor and his opponents were well aware of his electoral advantages, which included high name recognition (86 per cent), an extraordinary likeability factor (73 per cent), and his non-involvement in the various corruption scandals of the Solossa government.[22]

His biggest asset, however, was his regular tours of Papuan villages during his time as governor, which had anchored his name and image deeply in the mindset of rural Papuans. Invoking the memory of these visits (named *turun desa* or *turdes* in Indonesian) formed the central goal of Suebu's campaign. In the late 1980s, all Papuan villages had received a set of books on professional community management, which featured Suebu's photograph on the front pages. In 2006, Suebu's campaign team submitted this very photograph to the Electoral Commission to be printed on the ballot sheets, despite the fact that there was little resemblance between the almost 20-year-old picture and the meanwhile matured candidate. Skilfully connecting his popularity in the past with his current campaign, Suebu promised to distribute Papua's special autonomy funds directly to the villages, with each community projected to receive between Rp 100–300 million (around US$10,000–30,000). This promise was an effective response to the allegations that, despite increased transfers from Jakarta under the special autonomy provisions, Papuans at the grass-roots had not benefited from the additional funds. Instead, it was alleged, the money had disappeared into the pockets of local government officials. Partly because of this pledge, opinion polls showed that Suebu had taken an early lead.[23]

Despite the programme-based nature of his campaign, however, Suebu was unable to neglect the coast–highland antagonism that had defined the candidacies of Enembe and his other competitors. As he had predicted, Komaruddin was disqualified from the elections by the MRP, and Suebu, a native of Sentani, replaced him with a candidate from the central highlands. His choice, Alex Hesegem, was a member of the Golkar faction in the national legislature. The decision of the MRP to exclude Komaruddin from the race had served Suebu's interests in several ways. To begin with, it helped to avoid open conflict with Megawati. Furthermore, it prevented any debate over Suebu's choice of a non-Papuan as his deputy, which had the potential of reducing Suebu's appeal to the electorate. Most importantly, however, the MRP verdict opened up a vacancy that Suebu could fill with a candidate from the highlands, partly neutralizing Enembe's powerful campaign slogans that pitched the disadvantaged highlanders against the politically dominant coast.

Suebu's popularity spelled defeat for Golkar's official candidate, John Ibo. After Solossa's death, Golkar had named Ibo to replace the incumbent governor as its nominee, but there was little enthusiasm in the party for his

candidacy. The chairman of both Golkar's provincial chapter and of Papua's legislature was a vocal critic of the central government, but he lacked the charisma that Solossa and Suebu commanded. When Jusuf Kalla visited Jayapura for Solossa's funeral, he inquired about the possibility of Suebu running as Golkar's candidate, but the campaign of the latter had progressed too far for him to switch sides. Shortly afterwards, Kalla again sent Aksa Mahmud to see Suebu and inform him that it was the opinion of Golkar's central board that Suebu would win the ballot.[24] It was thus not surprising that in the middle of the campaign, Golkar's advisory council appointed Suebu as one of its members, signalling that the party was determined to seek Suebu's return to the Golkar fold after the elections.

These machinations at the elite level also had a profound impact on Golkar cadres at the grass-roots. Most local Golkar officials on the ground had begun their careers when Suebu was governor, and some of them felt a greater loyalty to the latter than to the official party hierarchy. Against this background, many grass-roots functionaries read the apparent indifference of the central Golkar leadership towards its official nominee as a tacit endorsement of their support for Suebu. Moreover, Golkar politicians from Jakarta kept a noticeable distance to John Ibo. Jusuf Kalla, the only Golkar politician who had the potential to attract a significant number of additional votes for Ibo, stayed away from Papua throughout the campaign. John Ibo's frustration with his own party soon began to show in his public appearances. In the televised debates with his rivals, he lost his temper several times, unnecessarily accusing the moderators of partiality. His ratings dropped further after the debates, and he ultimately finished third in the elections with 22.9 per cent.[25]

From the very start of the electoral process, two other candidates in the gubernatorial race had little prospect of winning the contest: Constant Karma and Dick Henk Wabiser. Karma, the former vice-governor under Solossa, finished fourth with 9.9 per cent of the votes, only slightly ahead of last-placed Wabiser, a retired admiral from Biak.

Wabiser's campaign provided evidence that, despite the important role of ethnic, tribal, and religious loyalties in determining voting behaviour in Papua, the mass of swing voters, particularly among the immigrants, was sufficiently large to have a significant impact on the electoral outcome. Many immigrants had supported Wabiser at the beginning of the campaign, feeling attracted to his tough law-and-order approach to security issues. However, Wabiser's ratings in the opinion surveys dropped dramatically after a series of ill-advised campaign appearances. His most consequential lapse was his demand that newcomers to Papua should have at least Rp500 million (around US$50,000) in their bank accounts — a regulation that was intended as a

disincentive against fresh immigration into Papua. Designed to attract votes from native Papuans deeply suspicious of Wabiser's military background, the idea backfired and led many migrants to turn their backs on him.[26] The opinion polls showed a gradual week-by-week decline in his ratings, from a high of 17 per cent in February to the 6 per cent he ultimately received at the ballot box.[27] The performance of candidates in the campaign, it appeared, had a much greater influence on voting behaviour than many observers were prepared to admit.

ELECTORAL FAULT LINES: "PAPUANNESS", REGIONAL IDENTITY, AND FREEPORT

Beyond the electoral cleavage between coastal Papua and the central highlands, the gubernatorial polls exposed several other intra-Papuan fault lines. Most importantly, the difficult process of establishing the "Papuanness" of the various candidates suggested that the parameters of Papuan identity were not as clear-cut as previously thought. Brought before the MRP, the cases of Muhammad Musa'ad and Komaruddin Watubun revealed multiple layers in Papuan ethnicity that defied precise definitions. Musa'ad, for his part, had been born to a Papuan mother and a father of Arabic descent, whose family had arrived in the area of Fak Fak in the 1800s. His family had played a key role in developing the town, and formed part of an aristocratic elite that had wide networks among local tribes and clans. Despite these credentials, which fulfilled the conditions set out in the special autonomy legislation, the MRP voted in November that Musa'ad could not be considered a native Papuan.[28]

The MRP decision triggered violent protests by supporters of Enembe's campaign. Fanatic crowds, mostly from the central highlands, attacked the KPUD office in Jayapura and demanded that Musa'ad be allowed to stay on Enembe's ticket (International Crisis Group 2006, p. 9). They only gave up their protests after Musa'ad himself recommended to Enembe that another Muslim candidate replace him. Enembe agreed, and Musa'ad pledged to fight the MRP decision in the courts after the election campaign was over.

In the other case before the MRP, that of Komaruddin Watubun, the political implications were much less sensitive, but the basis for his exclusion was shaky nevertheless. As shown above, Suebu benefited from Komaruddin's removal and therefore did not protest against the MRP verdict, which was unanimous. Komaruddin pointed out, however, that the special autonomy law defined native Papuans as originating from the Melanesian race, and that he as a Keiese (from Southeast Maluku) fell under that definition.[29] Thus despite the politically motivated absence of protests, Komaruddin's exclusion

also raised serious questions about the way "Papuanness" was defined, and how existing regulations were applied.

The ethnically defined fault line was deepened by important regional divisions. Beyond West Irian Jaya, several regions in Papua had for long sought the establishment of their own province (Chauvel 2004, p. 77), and they viewed the election campaign as a good opportunity to promote their interests. Most importantly, politicians in Merauke believed that it was now the right time to launch their initiative for the creation of South Papua. The area around Merauke, which has a large Catholic population, has for decades felt marginalized by the largely Protestant capital of Jayapura, and demands for an administrative split from Papua proper had increased since the dispute over West Irian Jaya. The main initiator for creating South Papua had been John Gluba Gebze, the *bupati* of Merauke and chairman of the local Golkar branch.[30] In his ambition to accelerate the establishment of the province, he even provoked a conflict with his own provincial party chairman, John Ibo. When Ibo came to Merauke to campaign for his gubernatorial candidacy, Gebze informed the stunned nominee that the Golkar party in Merauke would only support him if he signed an agreement to facilitate the inauguration of South Papua by 2007 at the latest.[31] Trailing Suebu in the opinion polls, Ibo reluctantly agreed.

In response, Suebu also promised to grant the southern regions their own administrative unit, but refrained from committing to a new province. Instead, he offered the partition of Papua into Western Papua, Southern Papua, Northern Papua, and Central Highland Papua, with each region headed by a resident (following the administrative terminology of the Dutch colonial government).[32] If these areas insisted on having their own governors, however, then Papua could be renamed as a Special Autonomy Region led by a governor-general. These campaign pledges highlighted once again that had the central government abstained from imposing the establishment of West Irian Jaya by presidential instruction, intra-Papuan localisms would have emerged naturally, and with much less sensitive implications for Jakarta.

Adding to the "patrimonial" divisions described above, protracted political conflicts further complicated the situation. The most important among these political controversies was Papua's position towards the special autonomy law introduced in 2001. In August 2005, the Dewan Adat Papua (DAP, Council of Papuan Customary Leaders) had declared that it considered special autonomy a failure, and had subsequently "returned" the law to the central government in a large demonstration in Jayapura (International Crisis Group 2006, p. 6). The DAP, which is arguably Papua's most influential organization outside the formal political institutions, claimed that Jakarta had failed to live

up to its commitments made under the law, and called on Papuan politicians to seek alternative political formats for the province. While many Papuan government officials and local legislators privately shared that view, they were prepared to give the Susilo government more time to implement the law in a consistent manner (Zen 2006, p. 52).

This divide between opponents and supporters of special autonomy became an influential theme in the gubernatorial elections. The DAP, while not calling for a boycott of the polls, did not support any of the candidates as "it is unthinkable for us to have one of ours as subordinate of the Jakarta government".[33] The nominees, on the other hand, engaged in delicate balancing acts, trying to attract votes from both the critics and sympathizers of special autonomy. Most opted to declare their support for the concept, but were pointedly critical of its implementation. By all accounts, Suebu was the most adept strategist in this regard. On the one hand, he did not deny that he was close to groups that proposed the independence of Papua from Indonesia. On the other hand, however, he also expressed support for special autonomy as a satisfactory solution to the Papuan problem. Evidently, the majority of voters were attracted to this sensitive mixture between radicalism and pragmatism.

Another important political conflict involved the operations of Freeport McMoRan, which has faced constant accusations of causing environmental damage and ignoring the rights of local communities. These conflict patterns have led to regular clashes between locals and the security forces, which are provided with financial and logistical assistance by Freeport to guard the mining operations. In late February 2006, around three weeks before the elections, a fresh round of violence occurred, forcing the candidates in the elections to take a stand on the issue. John Ibo, aiming to reduce the gap to Suebu with populist slogans, suggested that the mine should be returned to "the people", without specifying how this could be achieved. Constant Karma, for his part, was exposed to attacks by his opponents because as vice-governor he had approved many of the contract reviews that allowed Freeport to continue operating. Suebu finally rejected the calls for Freeport's closure, but put pressure on the government and the company to renegotiate its working contract.

The conflict about Freeport reached another stage of escalation after the election was over. On 16 March 2006, four police officers and one member of the air force were killed during a violent anti-Freeport demonstration in front of the campus of Cendrawasih University. In combination with the other divisive issues that marked the election campaign, the divergent views on the Freeport problem have pointed to the widening gap between Papua's

diverse ethnic, social, political, and religious groups that Suebu, as governor, will find difficult to bridge.

LOCAL ELECTIONS IN PAPUA AND INDONESIA: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

While the gubernatorial elections in Papua highlighted important differences with local ballots in other parts of Indonesia, there were also striking similarities. To begin with, as in other Indonesian province and district elections, the field of candidates was dominated by entrenched politico-economic elites. In fact, the profiles of the nominees in Papua were almost a precise reflection of the national average. At the national level, 36 per cent of candidates were career bureaucrats, 24 per cent entrepreneurs, and 22 per cent party politicians (Mietzner 2006). Active or retired security officers made up 8 per cent of the candidates, followed by academics, grass-roots activists and media figures with 6 per cent. In Papua, five out of the ten nominees were bureaucrats, with two party politicians, one businessman, one retired military officer, and one civil society activist completing the field. This composition indicated that only affluent and well-connected elites were able to contest the elections, marginalizing potential candidates who lacked the funds to build up effective campaign machineries.

Corresponding with this, the role of political parties in the elections in Papua was as insignificant as in the rest of the archipelago. In most cases, parties had offered the nominations to non-party figures who had the cash to finance their campaigns and were sufficiently popular to stand a chance of winning them. Against this background, even Golkar's strong organizational structure proved incapable of securing victory for its official candidate, with its local functionaries supporting a variety of candidates nominated by rival political parties. PDI-P even insisted that its local chairman not run in the elections, and threatened him with expulsion from the party if he did. This weakness of the parties was also reflected in the almost arbitrary nature of the coalitions built between them. The alliance between PKS and PDS, in particular, signalled that politico-ideological considerations were of secondary concern for parties in determining their nominees. The clear priority was given to finding candidates with full war chests and powerful support networks.

Despite the narrow field of candidates, however, Indonesian voters — in Papua and elsewhere — were still able to make informed choices that reflected their particular interests. Often detracted as unsophisticated masses who cast their ballot for anybody offering them a meal, voters across Indonesia have generally made sound electoral choices; 40 per cent of incumbents have been

thrown out, punished for "sins" ranging from corruption to failure to deliver effective and affordable public services. In the same vein, most local elections in Indonesia, including Papua, were won by candidates who appealed to cross-cultural constituencies instead of relying on support by one ethnic, religious, or social group. Enembe's challenge was a strong one but, like the militant Dayak leader Professor Usop in Central Kalimantan, he ultimately failed to win the governorship by mobilizing exclusive ethnic loyalties. Finally, the Papuan election also followed the Indonesian trend of shunning nominees with a military background. Dick Henk Wabiser's defeat continued a series of unsuccessful bids by active and retired officers for local government office since the polls began in June 2005.

Beside the similarities in elite dominance and electoral behaviour, the polls in Papua also faced the same logistic and organizational problems as other territories in Indonesia. The main problem in carrying out the elections was voter registration. All across Indonesia, voters complained that they were not registered, had not received voting cards, or had not been invited to come to the polling stations. The problem mostly originated with outdated census and registration data, and the confusion over which institutions were responsible for maintaining them. In some areas, local election commissions used the lists provided by public registrars and the Ministry of Home Affairs; in others election officials simply used the lists left over from the 2004 legislative and presidential ballots. Whatever list was used, many voters had moved since they were last registered, and thus found themselves disenfranchised in their new residential areas. Election officials claimed that they did not have the staff and resources to revise and update the data, and that voters often failed to make sure that their names were on the lists.[34] There was indeed a tendency among voters to display indifference towards the local elections when voting day was still far away, and then suddenly demand voting cards shortly before the ballot when the deadline for registration had already passed. In most cases, election commissions handled such situations by improvising on voting day, i.e. by allowing voters to cast their ballots if they were able to show their identity papers or voting cards from previous elections. In the Papuan elections, such an instruction was issued two hours before the polling stations closed, allowing thousands of voters to participate who had previously not been registered.

Despite the deeply problematic nature of voter registration, however, these difficulties appear to have been largely due to genuine organizational problems, and were only rarely part of systematic electoral manipulations. While some nominees undoubtedly tried to rig the vote by mobilizing their supporters in local bureaucracies, it was close to impossible to sustain such

efforts across large electoral areas. In other words, while small-scale manipulations certainly occurred, they were insufficient to turn unfavourable results into victories. Against this background, most post-election claims of irregularities reflected the subjective frustration of unsuccessful candidates rather than altruistic concern for transparent democratic procedures.[35] Most losing nominees (both in Papua and nationwide) conveniently argued that the majority of non-registered voters had intended to vote for them, but courts found such arguments unconvincing and routinely threw out their requests to annul the results. After all, electoral participation averaged around 69 per cent across Indonesia, and in Papua it was even 79 per cent.

While many features of the Papuan elections were similar to those prevalent in other Indonesian polls, there were also important differences. These differences not only related to specific electoral regulations in the special autonomy law and the complexity of the West Irian Jaya issue, but were reflected in the content of the campaign as well. Unlike in other Indonesian ballots, candidates in the Papuan elections had to lead dual campaigns — one that tried to attract voters in their home province, and one that was directed towards the central government. John Ibo, for example, posted one-page advertisements in several local newspapers that underlined his commitment to the unitary state of Indonesia. Declaring that Indonesian unitarianism was the final political format for Papua, these advertisements did not address the Papuan electorate, but were designed to ease political concerns among Jakarta-based government officials. Ibo asserted that Papuan voters needed no further explanation of his political agenda, which he assumed was well known, but he deemed it necessary to convince Jakarta that he could cooperate well with the central government if elected.[36] This external component of the campaign set Papua apart from most other electoral contests, which were much more focused on details of local politics than on the position of a particular area *vis-à-vis* the Indonesian Republic.

CONCLUSION: AUTONOMY, CONFLICT, AND DEMOCRACY IN PAPUA

The analysis of the 2006 elections for the Papuan governorship has pointed to the crucial importance of democratic deregulation for containing the centrifugal tendencies of territories at the periphery of heterogeneous nation states. In the Papuan case, however, it was not so much the granting of previously denied democratic rights as such that had the potential of eroding secessionist demands. Instead, it was the political fall-out from the application of these rights that was most consequential. The first direct local elections in

Papua allowed the many divisions within Papuan society to come out in the open and, momentarily at least, take precedence over the discourse on the problematic relationship between Papua and the central government. The antagonism between the coast and the central highlands, the demand by several regions to establish separate provinces, the debate about "Papuanness", and many other controversial issues emerged as important elements of the democratic competition in Papua, weakening the very concept of pan-Papuan unity that had so far formed the backbone of the separatist agenda.

The fact that the level of dissatisfaction with Jakarta remained high despite this significant intensification of the intra-Papuan struggle over power and resources was due to the continued intervention of the central government in Papuan affairs. The creation of the province of West Irian Jaya by presidential decree, without following the strict procedure prescribed by the special autonomy legislation, provided a welcome platform for Papuans to set their differences aside and launch joint attacks on the central government. Without intervention by Jakarta, it is likely that the democratic competition in Papua would have resulted in the creation of at least five new provinces — products of the stark differences between Papua's ethnic, regional, social, and religious constituencies. Instead, the stigma of centralist imposition will remain on West Irian Jaya, and will continue to complicate future dealings between Papuan politicians and the Jakarta government. Accordingly, the most effective way for Jakarta's elite to approach the Papuan problem is to expand democratic liberties and economic opportunities in the province. This is not only likely to reduce local opposition against the central government, but is also set to encourage the manifold interests of Papua's diverse constituencies to express themselves in open democratic competition. Continued centralist interventionism, on the other hand, is certain to fuel the very secessionist sentiments it seeks to overcome.

Notes

Some material used in this chapter has previously appeared in the author's article "Local Elections and Autonomy in Papua and Aceh: Mitigating or Fueling Secessionism?", *Indonesia* 84, October 2007, pp. 1–39.

[1] The other special case in terms of holding direct local elections was, of course, Aceh. In Aceh, the local polls were an integral element of the peace agreement that the government had signed in August 2005 with the separatist movement GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Free Aceh Movement). Unlike in other Indonesian provinces, independent candidates were allowed to participate in the elections in Aceh, and the central government even created the necessary legal basis for the establishment of local political parties that will contest future polls.

[2] Under an agreement between the Dutch and Indonesia signed at the United Nations Headquarters in New York in August 1962, the Netherlands had to transfer authority over Papua, then West New Guinea, to a UN-led temporary executive authority in October 1962. The UN, for its part, then had to transfer the administration to Indonesia in May 1963. The agreement also stipulated that Indonesia had to organize an Act of Free Choice in 1969 to determine if Papuans wanted to remain within the Indonesian state or become independent. The Act of Free Choice was held in 1969, confirming the status of the province as a part of Indonesia. Although widely viewed as manipulated, the outcome of the Act of Free Choice was endorsed by the UN in November 1969.

[3] Undang-Undang Otonomi Khusus Papua, Paragraph 1 (t).

[4] "PP tentang MRP Harus Segera Diterbitkan". *Suara Pembaruan*, 6 September 2003.

[5] "Presiden Hadiahi PP MRP ke Rakyat Papua". *Bali Post*, 26 December 2004.

[6] Interview with Yan Ayomi, Chairman of the Golkar Faction in Papua's Provincial Legislature, Jayapura, 25 July 2005.

[7] "Meski UU Pemekaran Papua Gugur, Provinsi Irjabar Sah". *Kompas*, 12 November 2004.

[8] Interview with Yohanis Bonay, Member of the Papuan KPUD, Jayapura, 27 July 2005.

[9] "Akhirnya, Pilkada Gubernur IJB Ditunda, Tunggu Terbentuknya MRP". *Cendrawasih Pos*, 27 July 2005.

[10] Interview with Frans Wospakrik, Deputy Chairman of the MRP, Jayapura, 9 March 2006.

[11] Interview with John Ibo, Jayapura, 6 January 2006.

[12] Rodd McGibbon (2004*a*, p. 31) explained that "312 tribes exist in Papua from a total indigenous population of less than 1.5 million people. The largest tribes in Papua are the Dani and Dani/Ndani, inhabiting the densely populated regions of the interior and its fertile valleys, and the Biaks, who inhabit the coastal region of Biak-Numfor. These three broad tribal groupings each comprise approximately 150,000 people — double the population of the next largest tribes. The seven largest tribes have a combined population that amounts to 80 per cent of the total indigenous population. The remaining 20 per cent are divided into some 300 tribal groups, of which two-thirds have a population of less than 1,000 people. To make matters even more complex, each tribe is organized into subtribes, clans and subclans."

[13] 55 per cent of all voters were concentrated in the major central highland districts Pegunungan Bintang, Yahukimo, Tolikara, Jayawijaya, Puncak Jaya, Paniai, and Mimika, with additional central highlanders living in other districts.

[14] "Tinggal Beda Seribuan". *Cendrawasih Pos*, 20 March 2006.

[15] Enembe won the majority of votes in the central highland districts of Jayawijaya, Paniai, Puncak Jaya, and Boven Digul, but failed to carry Yahukimo, Pegunungan Bintang, Tolikara, and Mimika.

16 Members of Enembe's campaign team could not even reach agreement among themselves when asked about the ethnic affiliations of their nominee. Some claimed he was a Dani, but others suggested that the Enembe were too independent a tribe to be categorized as Dani. The heated debate that this question triggered among his own supporters indicated how difficult it was to establish a claim of representation for all highland tribes. Interview with Enembe supporters, Jayapura, 5 March 2006.

17 "Hasil Survey Pilkada Propinsi Papua 2006", Lingkaran Survei Indonesia.

18 "Sudah Dipersiapkan Jadi Pemimpin", *Suara Perempuan Papua*, 27 February 2006.

19 Interview with Barnabas Suebu, Jayapura, 8 March 2006.

20 Ibid.

21 Interview with Komaruddin Watubun, Deputy Chairman of Papua's Provincial Parliament, Jayapura, 8 March 2006.

22 "Hasil Survey Pilkada Propinsi Papua 2006", Lingkaran Survei Indonesia.

23 Ibid.

24 Interview with Barnabas Suebu, Jayapura, 8 March 2006.

25 According to a weekly poll conducted by Cendrawasih University, John Ibo's ratings dropped from 27.8 per cent in the first survey taken in early February to 25.7 per cent, 24.8 per cent, and 23.9 per cent in the subsequent weeks. Information provided by Hendri Mahulette, Jayapura, 10 March 2006.

26 I am grateful to Ikrar Nusa Bhakti for bringing this point to my attention.

27 "Hasil Survey Pilkada Propinsi Papua 2006", Lingkaran Survei Indonesia. In the Cendrawasih poll, Wabiser dropped from 20.1 per cent in the first survey to 19.0, 16.9, and 7.4 in the subsequent weeks. Information provided by Hendri Mahulette, Jayapura, 10 March 2006.

28 Out of 42 members, 8 voted for the acceptance of Musa'ad as native Papuan, 27 voted against, one abstained, and the rest walked out.

29 Interview with Komaruddin Watubun, Deputy Chairman of Papua's Provincial Parliament, Jayapura, 8 March 2006.

30 "Suara Pecah dari Selatan". *Suara Perempuan Papua*, 6 March 2006.

31 "John Ibo Ditawarin Pembentukan Provinsi Papua Selatan". *Cendrawasih Pos*, 9 February 2006.

32 Interview with Barnabas Suebu, Jayapura, 8 March 2006.

33 Interview with Fadhal ah Hamid, Secretary-General of the DAP, Jayapura, 7 March 2006.

34 Interview with Yohanis Bonay, Member of the Papuan KPUD, Jayapura, 5 January 2005.

35 There were, however, significant irregularities in the counting of votes in the interior of Papua. These seemed to have benefited (or damaged) the interests of all candidates in roughly equal terms. In the district of Tolikara, for example, Suebu received only 751 out of 49,287 votes cast (1.5 per cent). Given Suebu's provincial average of over 30 per cent, such an outcome seems highly unlikely.

In Yahukimo, on the other hand, Suebu received more than half of the votes, although the district was not counted among his strongholds.

[36] Interview with John Ibo, Jayapura, 6 January 2006.

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13

CONFLICT AND THE GROWTH OF DEMOCRACY IN MANGGARAI DISTRICT

Maribeth Erb and Wilhelmus Anggal[1]

> *"The essence of democracy is that the process itself is more important than the outcome of any single poll"*, Leigh 2005, p. 23.

On 12 April 2006 the National Court (Pengadilan Negeri) in the town of Ruteng, capital of Manggarai district, awarded a settlement of over 2 billion rupiah to two pairs of contestants from the 2005 electoral race for regent: Anton Bagul Dagur, who had been the incumbent, and his running mate, Pius Kandar, and Gabriel Thody Wajong and his running mate, Wilhelmus Nanggur. Their claim was that the results of the Manggarai local election for regent (*pilkada*), were invalid because the election process had been plagued with numerous irregularities; they made their claims both against the KPUD (the Local Electoral Commission), and the winning pair, Christian Rotok and Kamelus Deno, popularly referred to by the acronym "Credo", a very appealing appellation in the predominantly Catholic district. Although the district-level court awarded these damages, the provincial-level court ("The High Court" — Pengadilan Tinggi), had earlier, in July 2005, dismissed any claims of electoral irregularities. Thus the inauguration of the new regent had taken place in mid-2005. The losing candidates and several civil society organizations had continued to dispute the results, however, and had finally won a positive judgement in regard to their accusations from the local court.

This case in Manggarai was one of many examples of accusations of irregularities in the local electoral process across Indonesia, inaugurated in June 2005, when a large percentage of these first district head elections were held (see Pratikno, Chapter 3, this volume). What we find particularly interesting about the Manggaraian election, and the objections over the results that continued for at least a year after the installation of the new head, was that the civil society organizations that disputed the election results along with the incumbent regent from the 1999–2004 period, were the same groups who had been fiercely opposed to that same incumbent when he was in office. What we will argue, then, is that the situation in Manggarai is an interesting case of conflicting ideas about the meaning of democracy, and the role of the electoral process in its growth and consolidation. We suggest that the Manggarai election calls into question what the meaning of "free and fair" actually is in the context of an election.

There are two interesting interrelated issues that emerged in the Manggarai *pilkada* that have to do with emerging democracy. The first is the often-mentioned attitude that elites have towards common village folk in Indonesia (who still constitute the majority of the population) that they are ignorant of politics and should be "servile and obedient" (Antlov 2004, p. 6). During the New Order this was supported by a regulation which stated that the population was a "floating mass", which could not be directly involved in politics, except at election time (ibid). The only "political party" which had any access to them at the "grass-roots" level was the government party Golkar. We have found that even after the end of the New Order this attitude on the part of elites tended to remain, and was widely voiced in the early reform period by use of the expression "*SDM rendah*" (*sumber daya manusia rendah*), or "low human resource quality", as a way of denigrating the common folk. In conjunction with this, elite expectations of villagers during the election period were that they would be easily swayed by "tradition", both traditional relationships through kinship as well as traditional ways of assessing leadership through "aristocratic" ties, as well as wealth, partially demonstrated by the giving of material gifts, or "bribes" (see also Schiller, Chapter 7, this volume). This attitude towards village "ignorance" was summed up in the commonly held elite notion that the common folk are "not yet ready" for democracy. The irony, as we shall show in this paper (and as comes out in some of the other case studies in this collection), is that while elites tried to use these tactics of "tradition" to their advantage, when the common folk chose leaders who they judged would deliver on issues that were important to them, such as infrastructural development, education, and health improvements, there were always some elites who would belittle these decisions, and the candidates

who won the elections, as "populist". An additional twist is added to this scenario in the Manggarai case, since the choice that the people made — who won with a substantial margin — was declared null and void by some elites, even civil society organizations ostensibly concerned with the welfare of the village people, because it was not "democratic"; that is, the election was deemed not to have followed all of the proper procedures and upheld a "rule of law". What we hope to illustrate in this case is the different interpretations people have of "democracy", demonstrating why the democratization process is so complicated and full of twists, turns, and pitfalls.

This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the early Reform period, and the first person to be regent during that time. We want to illustrate his vision of "democracy" and "reform", and what made him quite unpopular, especially with villagers and civil society organizations. In the name of trying to resolve conflict, this regent caused more conflict than perhaps the regency had ever seen, and brought the regency into the public eye nationally with his contentious policies and draconian tactics. The second part looks at the campaigning for the 2004 and 2005 elections, when villagers had their first taste of choosing representatives and leaders at the district level, and how both campaigners and villagers attempted to manoeuvre a mixture of "traditional" and "modern" ideas about leadership. The third part looks at the results of 2005 local head election, and the conflicts which ensued afterwards over the procedures and the results.

MANGGARAI IN THE "REFORM PERIOD" (1999–2004): TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY?

In 1998, with the Asian financial crisis wreaking havoc on Indonesia's economy, demands for President Soeharto's resignation in the face of massive accusations of corruption, and violent protests, brought the New Order to an end (see Aspinall et al. 1999; Budiman et al. 1999; Forrester and May 1998). All over Indonesia this ushered in a period of "reform", where people criticized the suppression of political choice that had been extant during the New Order, notably illustrated by the demonization of certain political ideologies, especially communism, and the prohibition of political parties that specifically focused on religion. This was significant in Flores, where a majority of the population is Roman Catholic. With reform, then, the doors were opened for a new kind of freedom to think and talk about the past, the present, and the future in a political manner. "Reform" also included changes in the way the economy was organized, especially with the promises of decentralization. Potential new leaders were promised control on a scale unimagined during New Order

times, when the centre had fundamentally run everything. After the restraints of the New Order, politicians and government officials saw the key to the development of Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT — province of Eastern Indonesia, where Flores is located, see Figure 13.1), one of the poorest provinces in Indonesia, as "investment". The fight for the succession of regent in Manggarai, West Flores, for the period 1999–2004, was particularly intense because of the promises implied in the new reform era. At that time regents were chosen from among the candidates by members of the DPRD, the local representative assembly, and it was clear to everyone that a great deal of money was used in order to win that first reform election.

Anton Bagul, the man who won the election to regent after protracted nominations and eliminations, was certain of his suitability for the job in the unfolding era. As an individual proud of his cultural knowledge (he had been the Head of the Department of Education and Culture), he saw a revival of *adat* (traditional law and customs) as the necessary means to resolve the many conflicts that had emerged before and during the economic and political crises in Indonesia, and as a way to restore Manggarai to harmony and order.[2] Many violent conflicts over land had broken out in Manggarai in the 1990s (Lawang 1999). Bagul, like many other politicians in NTT at the time, saw the problem to be one of "low human resource potential". It could only be solved if investors came to Manggarai and opened up businesses, thus changing the social and economic landscape by cutting the dependence on agriculture. However, since investors would not come if Manggarai wasn't a peaceful place, Bagul's top priority was re-solving these land conflicts. Ostensibly, the fear of conflict was the reason that Bagul resisted the division of Manggarai regency into two parts. After the decentralization Laws No. 22 and 25 of 1999 on regional autonomy were passed, many regions in Indonesia started to fracture, creating new provinces and regencies, in line with the idea that regional government, closer to the people, was more effective government. The size of the Manggarai regency, by far the largest on Flores, made it a prime candidate for division,[3] and many in the most westerly sub-districts requested partition. In May 2000, the local assembly of Manggarai supported the "aspirations" of the local residents, and voted in agreement with the splitting of the regency (*Kompas*, 12 October 2000). Regent Bagul, however, refused to sign the letter of recommendation to divide the regency into two parts — West Manggarai and Manggarai — on the grounds that this division would result in deadly conflict, similar to that which had taken place in Ambon in 1999;[4] he continued to disagree despite recommendations from the provincial university team, and the strong support of the Department of



FIGURE 13.1
Map of Flores, West Manggarai and Manggarai Regencies. (Shaded areas was one regency before 2003).

Home Affairs for the division of the regency (*Kompas*, 12 October 2000). Despite resistance,[5] eventually legislation was passed in January 2003 and the President signed the Bill for the creation of the new regency of West Manggarai. Even so, Regent Bagul delayed the inauguration of the regency until July, and then put off the necessary assistance to pick a caretaker regent, insisting that the people would riot. It turned out his fears were unwarranted, but the installation of the caretaker regent was delayed until September, and left the new regency leaderless for two months.

In the opinion of his detractors, Anton Bagul's obstruction to the formation of West Manggarai had nothing to do with his ostensible concerns for harmony versus violence, but instead his own loss of revenue if the regency split. Bagul's critics claimed he was reluctant to lose control of the Komodo National Park, the "jewel" of Western Manggarai, and the most internationally renowned and potentially lucrative part of the entire regency. They said he had spent a great deal of money to secure the regent position in 1999, and that by letting go of the western part of Manggarai, he would find it impossible to pay back all the people who had supported him in his bid for the position.

In 2003 and 2004, there appeared to be contradictions in Regent Bagul's concerns over "peace", "harmony", and "*adat*" in Manggarai. He insisted, in the name of conservation, that land be reclaimed from several villages west of the capital Ruteng, which the regency government claimed was protected forest land,[6] and thus ordered the chain-sawing of thousands of the villagers' coffee trees. The arrest of several villagers who tried to return to their land brought matters to a boil. Local civil society groups which had been critical of many of Regent Bagul's policies in the previous years ran to Jakarta and brought the matter to the attention of national-level NGOs, who took great interest in the case (WALHI 2003). Together with local NGOs, a team of twenty-one national legal and social organizations formed a front to try to release the arrested men from jail and win the land back for the villagers. In October 2003, however, despite the outrage that the earlier operation had caused, the government continued the procedures in the east, causing far greater national controversy, especially when a number of women and an old man were arrested as "illegal forest cutters" (*perambah hutan*) on 9 March 2004; when their family went to protest the next day at the police station, six people were shot dead and twenty-eight others seriously maimed in what NGOs claimed was police brutality. The Human Rights Commission (KOMNAS HAM), the Franciscan Justice and Peace Commission, and multiple other external observers investigated (Aur 2004). Anton Bagul insisted that forcibly moving villagers off the land,

despite their claim to ancestral domain, was the only way to save Manggarai forests, preserve water for future use, and maintain peace in Manggarai. According to reports from the Indonesian Environmental Network (WALHI 2003), however, Regent Bagul had signed six contracts for industrial forest concessions with teak and mahogany plantation investors to whom he had promised the land; mono-cultural developments that were not likely to be more environmentally beneficial than the coffee trees that had belonged to the villagers (Prior 2003, 2004).

Ironically, Anton Bagul began his reign as regent claiming that he was the leader who, with his cultural sensitivity, would be able to bring peace and harmony to Manggarai and resolve its conflicts. He claimed to want to "make peace" in order to court foreign investors, but after five years of his leadership it could be claimed that much of the conflict that took place in that time period was directly or indirectly created by Regent Bagul himself. It was with these occurrences as part of his track record that Regent Bagul prepared to seek re-election in the first direct elections for regional head. He stepped down as *bupati* of the district in 2004, and a caretaker regent, his deputy, took over to prepare the district for the *pilkada* to take place in June 2005. Against this short history of the reform period, we now will discuss these elections and seek to understand the results.

QUESTIONING TRADITION AND LEARNING ABOUT DEMOCRACY

In 2004, as a precursor to the district head elections, there were direct elections for the first time of the DPRD (Local Assembly) representatives. Many stories were told about how the process of campaigning and voting had gone and the implications for understanding Manggaraian society and culture. After these elections, one political activist and sometime tour guide argued, "Manggaraian people are not ready for democracy." In his experience guiding groups of Western tourists, he was always amazed at how willingly they accepted the result of a "democratic vote". When individuals wanted to do different things at a particular location, the group would make a decision by taking a "vote". Whatever the majority chose, those in the minority always cheerfully accepted the decision and followed along. Manggaraians, he insisted, could never do that; mentally, people were not ready for democracy. The losers would always be "red-faced" (from shame and anger) and grumble for a long time. The expectations in "Manggaraian social values", he argued, were that a consensus must be reached and everyone must agree. This is particularly the case within kinship groupings and at the level of the village. This expectation

of consensus had implications for how people approached the elections, and how those who were campaigning dealt with them.

The anticipation of "consensus" derives from a "corporate-ness" traditionally found in village life in terms of use of land and resources, and in sacrificial offerings to the spiritual world. Ritual activities underscore the ties through which people are united to one another. While these offerings are made on behalf of all, there is not an expectation of "equality of decision-making", since only some people have the right to make these offerings, and to make decisions about them. The expectation of consensus, therefore, is based on the reality of village life; some people are "closer" to the ancestors, and have more influence than others, and if the group doesn't agree then they have disintegrated as a kinship group. With the rise of electoral democracy, however, and the individual right to vote, the unity of kinship groups is being put under stress. Candidates for local representatives attempted to manipulate ties to ancestors and kin groups by visiting the village grave sites (a gesture made at important rituals) of potential voters to try and coerce all of the members of a *wau* (clan) to vote for that candidate. However, when different members of a clan started to make offerings to their ancestors to support different candidates, conflicts broke out, and some villagers started to comment, "Maybe the ancestors are also splitting into parties".[7] Already in 2004 then, party politics started to undermine the ostensible consensus of kinship groups and gave people a taste of what the "vote" meant in a "democracy".

A "questioning" of the role of kinship and tradition also took place when potential candidates began to prepare for the district head elections. In Manggarai district only Golkar and PDI-P had the right to individually mount a candidate, because these parties had each won more than 15 per cent of the Assembly seats. In the case of the other parties, the number of Assembly seats they had was too few to stand alone. They had to group together with other small parties (*partai gabungan*) in order to reach the 15 per cent representative seats to mount a candidate. Not only the grouping of parties, but also the prospective candidates' search for a party vehicle, was often accomplished as if "wooing" a partner in marriage. The categories of Manggaraian marriage alliances, which form an important component of kinship relationships in Manggarai, became an important feature of both the process of politicking within parties and between parties and candidates, as well as between the candidates and the voters. *Anak rona* ("children of men") are the "superior" marriage relative, the family from which women are taken in marriage. The *anak wina* ("children of women"), as the "inferior" marriage relative, are expected to do the bidding of their *anak rona*. While *anak wina* owe bridewealth (often taking the form of money in modern times), *anak rona* owe protection to the descendants of their sisters and daughters. In late

2004, one of our acquaintances, deeply involved in a political party which had 7 per cent of the seats to offer to a prospective candidate, was approached by an "uncle", the member of a "*tim sukses*" ("victory team" or core campaign group) of one of the candidates, and an *anak rona* relative by marriage of this acquaintance. This uncle hoped to solicit the support of his nephew's party for his candidate in the 2005 elections. But the nephew began to question whether it was, in fact, "democracy" if he and his party were pressured into supporting a candidate because of marriage alliances; what happened to the questions of "equality" and individual choice, which were supposed to be the bedrock of democracy?

Because of the regulation that each candidate needed a party, or a cluster of parties, to support his candidacy, the parties were put in a position not dissimilar to the Local Assembly (DPRD) in the 1999 election of "harvesting" the candidates; that is, they could ask for considerable sums of money to become a candidate's "vehicle". This, therefore, continued to make standing for election an expensive enterprise. At the local level, as mentioned, finding a party was seen as analogous to seeking a wife, and giving bridewealth payments. But the more expensive part of becoming a candidate, which unlike the local wooing did not keep money within the local network and thus the local economy, was the necessity of getting the support of the party leaders in Kupang, the provincial capital, and in Jakarta, the national capital. In this sense, as other observers in this volume have made reference to, party politics at the local level in Indonesia is far from "autonomous".

The case of the PDI-P party's nomination of candidates in Manggarai showed how this dependence on multiple levels of approval could turn into a fiasco. Three pairs of candidates sought the PDI-P nomination and all had connections with influential party members in Kupang and Jakarta. In fact, all returned from Jakarta claiming to have a letter of support from the national party headquarters. However, back in Ruteng on the last day of nomination no potential candidate had registered at the election commission (KPUD) by the 6 p.m. deadline. The commission extended the deadline to midnight, and eventually one pair of potential candidates appeared with a letter of support from Jakarta, but no signature from the local PDI-P chairman. He had been missing all day, along with all of the necessary forms that had to be filled in. In the end, despite the extension, all the paperwork could not be submitted by midnight, and hence no candidate was nominated by PDI-P. Demonstrations by angry supporters and threats of suits against the commission and calls for a delay to the election resulted, but eventually PDI-P had to accept that they had no candidate in the Manggaraian *pilkada* elections.

In the end, the candidates who ran for the various parties were as shown in Table 13.1.

TABLE 13.1
Candidates in Manggarai District *Pilkada*

Nomor	*Candidates*	*Parties*	*Background*
1	Drs. Antony Bagul Dagur, Msi	Golkar	Incumbent, ex-teacher, ex-Head Department of Education and Culture, originated from West Manggarai
	Dr. Kandar Pius, MM		Head of Department of Health, originated from East Manggarai
2	Gabriel Wajong Thody, SH.MH	PKPI, PDS, PPD, PNI Marhaenisme; PPDK, PM	Policeman working in Java, originated from Central Manggarai
	Wilhelmus Nanggur, SH		Retired bureaucrat, originated from East Manggarai
3	Ir. Viktor Selamet, MM	Pelopor, PBSD, PPIB	Ministry of Husbandry, Jakarta, origins from East Manggarai, born in Ruteng
	Drs. Ambros Dandut		Still active bureaucrat, from East Manggarai
4	Drs. Christian Rotok	PKB, PD, PPDI, PNBK; PAN	Ex-Head of Acquisitions, Manggarai, district secretary West Manggarai, from East Manggarai
	Dr. Deno Kamelus SH.MH		Lecturer in Kupang, from East Manggarai

Source: Laporan Penyelenggaraan Pemilihan Kepala Daerah dan Wakil Kepala Daerah Kabupaten Manggarai Tahun 2005, Komisi Pemilihan Umum Kabupaten Manggarai.

An important part of the election preparations was the programmes to "socialize" the masses, that is educate them and familiarize them with the new electoral rules and regulations for direct elections. Interacting with the voters during these "socialization" exercises made it clear that the ideas that the candidates had about what the voters wanted and what the voters really wanted were often at variance. Many of the candidates assumed that the majority of the Manggarai populace would be easily swayed by factors of traditional culture. Was there a relationship of kinship or marriage with the candidate? Candidates tried to manipulate these ties as best as they could to win votes. Were the candidates of "aristocratic" lineage? "Aristocracy", or leadership qualities, were historically associated with foreign-ness in Manggarai.[8] Did they appear appropriate in this respect to hold a leadership position? Were the candidates wealthy? In discussions about elections, people in Manggarai always state that they prefer to see a wealthy person stand as a candidate,[9] instead of someone who has little wealth. If he is already wealthy, people say, he will not use his position to gain wealth. If he is not wealthy, he will see the position as an opportunity to accumulate wealth. In this regard, the publishing of figures about the wealth of candidates (done for the first time in the 2004 Presidential elections, and following suit in the *pilkada* elections beginning in 2005) would allow people to assess this particular characteristic of the candidates (see Table 13.2).

Wealth gives the impression of influence, power, and a considerable basis of support, factors which would have traditionally figured importantly in the assessment of an important leader.[10] During these "socialization" exercises

TABLE 13.2
Reported Wealth of the Candidates in Manggarai District *Pilkada*

No.	*Candidates' Name*	*Total Wealth (Rp.)*
1	Drs. Antony Bagul Dagur, MSi	10,162,728,000
2	Gabriel Wajong Thody, SH.MH	3,433,000,000
3	Dr. Kandar Pius, MM	1,277,550,000
4	Wilhelmus Nanggur, SH	1,226,100,000
5	Drs. Christian Rotok	495,999,967
6	Dr. Deno Kamelus SH.MH	394,212,000
7	Ir. Viktor Selamet, MM	329,300,890
8	Drs. Ambros Dandut	142,300,000
	TOTAL	**17,461,250,857**

Source: Laporan Penyelenggaraan Pemilihan Kepala Daerah dan Wakil Kepala Daerah Kabupaten Manggarai Tahun 2005, Komisi Pemilihan Umum Kabupaten Manggarai.

many of the discussions also centred on questions of "experience", another factor that would traditionally be important. Supporters of Anton Bagul, in particular, attempted to underscore his suitability for re-election because of his experience in the job. In fact, what people called a "black campaign" (a kind of "smear campaign") was carried out by the supporters of Anton Bagul, who attempted to paint a picture of his appropriateness to be regent because of his opponents' lack of experience; in traditional proverbial speech they said, "*tekur cai retuk, lawo cai bao*" ("the dove that has only appeared, the mouse that has just come"). This expression was meant to suggest that all the other candidates were too new to know what they were doing, and that Bagul was by far the superior candidate.[11] By virtue of his wealth, his experience, and his expertise in matters of tradition, he had many factors on his side going into a direct election.

Indeed, stories abounded about how Anton Bagul attempted to use his wealth, in one form of what people called "money politics", to create traditional ties of kinship and win voters' support. He visited many villages and gave five million rupiah (around US$600) to every *gendang* ("drum house", a term also for the clan group). Bagul, however, put himself in a rather contradictory position, according to critics. He claimed to be *anak rona* to every *gendang* community that he visited, in this way hoping to create feelings of allegiance since he claimed to be their "source of life". However, *anak rona* should always be the one to play host, and never give money to their "wife-takers"; instead, it is they who should be receiving money (as bridewealth). Hence, by claiming to be *anak rona*, but at the same time making a visit and giving money, Anton Bagul reversed and confused the norms for traditional kinship interactions. Critics claimed he was trying to "generalize" or "universalize" kinship relations, in the same way kinship gets "universalized" in the Church (everyone is a "brother" or "sister" and equally "children of God"). But in cultural terms, critics said, this cannot be done; kinship is specific, not general. They therefore claimed that Anton Bagul was ruining the culture in which he claimed to be an expert.

Ultimately, the questions people asked when teams were sent by the KPUD (electoral commission) to "socialize" voters showed that they were less interested in the characteristics of the candidates that were more "traditional". What was most important to them was, "is this a good person?" What kind of a character does he have? They were concerned with the programmes that the candidates proposed, and paid a great deal of attention to the issues being raised and discussed in the various media that helped educate the voters: newspapers, brochures, and especially radio, where candidates were interviewed and given a chance to explain their "*visi dan misi*" ("vision and mission") for

the district of Manggarai. It appeared that the populace were thinking of themselves as citizens first, and were not taken in by many of the attempts to woo and influence them along lines of tradition.

DEMOCRACY IN ACTION: THE CHOICE OF THE PEOPLE OR THE RULE OF LAW?

A number of important issues separated the candidates. We argue that if we look at these issues, and contrast them with the factors mentioned above, such as wealth, power, and kinship connections, we can see that the populace were not using traditional criteria to judge appropriateness for leadership, but instead more contemporary criteria of good governance (see Table 13.1 for background on the candidates). Firstly, one thing that distinguished the candidates was that two of them had been living and working in Java for many years. Traditionally this would have been an advantage, and some were still certain that associations with "distance" and "foreign-ness" would not only be more prestigious, as was the case in the past, but also be associated with being more knowledgeable. Instead, distance from Manggarai ended up being a drawback. This was particularly evident in the case of Viktor Selamet, who works in the Ministry of Husbandry. With his experience in agriculture and husbandry, he campaigned that he would strengthen Manggarai as a "rice basket", and build up food self-sufficiency. One sympathetic observer said that many people found his programme of interest, but his unfamiliarity to the voters, and his name and accent, made them think he was Javanese, so they did not want to vote for him. No longer does foreign-ness count for prestige; people are looking for closeness to the local issues and accountability to the voters. Additionally, many countered that though a food programme was good, Manggarai did not really have a problem with agriculture; it was the infrastructure to transport their products for sale that was lacking, and had fallen into considerable disrepair over the years of Anton Bagul's administration. Gabriel Wajong, also working in Java for many years, promised free education for all if he was elected. However, voters did not believe this promise; it sounded too good to be true, and this worked against him, in addition to also having been resident away from Manggarai for so many years.

The considerable inefficiency and inactivity in important areas during his time as regent worked very much against Anton Bagul's candidacy,[12] despite all of the factors mentioned above that were in his favour: wealth, connections, and power. Additionally, he had the cloud of the alleged human rights abuses, the destruction of the coffee trees, and shooting of the coffee

farmers that made many village people suspicious of him. All of these shortcomings of the other candidates worked in the favour of Christian Rotok, who used the issue of human rights as one of his campaign platforms. Rotok had worked as the Head of Acquisitions under Bagul, and had disagreed with many of his programmes; this had led to Rotok's dismissal by Bagul midway through his term. Subsequently, Rotok was appointed as secretary to the regent of newly formed West Manggarai district in 2003. The controversy over West Manggarai district also indirectly worked against Anton Bagul who, rather ironically, originally hailed from a sub-district of that newly formed regency. Chris Rotok actively campaigned that he would form a new district of East Manggarai if he was elected regent, a very popular and long-awaited move, ever since the original plans to form West Manggarai were seriously mooted in 2000.[13] As related above, Anton Bagul had consistently obstructed the division of the regency. Rotok positioned himself in opposition to Bagul by enthusiastically showing his support for further division. The creation of East Manggarai, long felt to be a neglected part of the district, was a major issue, since those residents felt a separate district would help give them access to more services. The origin of candidates figured quite importantly in this regard. All of the pairs had a vice-regent candidate originating from East Manggarai, but Rotok was the only candidate for regent who was born and raised in East Manggarai.

In the end, given the above considerations, the results were not entirely unexpected. The results did show, though, that the voters were concerned with the issues instead of more traditional values of kinship, lineage, and wealth. The results also showed that in the case of Manggarai (as was true in most of the other districts on Flores), the party machines themselves were mostly irrelevant.[14]

The election was held on 27 June 2005, and the results were released on 9 July 2005. Not surprisingly, the results of the election were not accepted by all of the candidates. Anton Bagul and Gabriel Wajong both accused the Election Commission (KPUD) of irregularities such as: contracting out the logistics of the election without tendering it, printing too many voting slips, and not properly locking and sealing the election boxes; they insisted that these irregularities nullified the results of the election. The High Court delegated the case to the provincial courts in Kupang, and on 27 July the Kupang courts rejected the claim of tainted election results. On 29 July 2005 the election results were declared valid and Christian Rotok confirmed as regent.

The complainants refused to accept the matter as final, and made further investigations and took their case to the National Court in Ruteng. The suit

TABLE 13.3
Results of the 2005 Manggarai District *Pilkada*

Number	*Candidates for Regent and Vice-Regent*	*Number and Percentage of Votes*
1	Antony Bagul Dagur Dr. Kandar Pius	64,845 (26.55%)
2	Gabriel Wajong Thody Wilhelmus Nanggur	42,726 (17.49%)
3	Viktor Selamet Ambros Dandut	22,284 (9.12%)
4	Christian Rotok Dr. Deno Kamelus	114,406 (46.84%)

Source: Laporan Penyelenggaraan Pemilihan Kepala Daerah dan Wakil Kepala Daerah Kabupaten Manggarai Tahun 2005, Komisi Pemilihan Umum Kabupaten Manggarai.

was filed against both the Election Commission and the elected regent, Christian Rotok. Anton Bagul, the incumbent who lost, claimed that Christian Rotok, when he had worked as Head of Acquisitions, had appropriated over 120 million rupiah. Bagul had reported this in October 2004, and claimed that since Christian Rotok owed this money to the government he was not eligible to run for regent in the first place, since one of the regulations is that a candidate must have no debts. There was also a claim that the letters of support of the parties that were behind Rotok were not in order, and some witnesses claimed that Partai Demokrat had never officially agreed to support Rotok. Additionally, claims were made that the forms for his nomination were only signed well after the deadline for the nominations had closed on 4 May 2005. This was a clear case of discrimination on the part of the KPUD (Rahalaka and Lathur 2006). The KPUD was accused of tendering out the printing of some of the forms used in the elections to a business in Surabaya, without proper permission or monitoring when they were being printed. Some of the forms used to tally the votes were also photocopies of the forms and not originals (Wayong 2006). Additionally, it was claimed the whole procedure to accept and report the results of the election by the Local Assembly (DPRD) and the governor was done in an invalid manner. The governor reported the results of the election to the Ministry of Home Affairs on 4 August but didn't receive the letter from the DPRD of Manggarai until 16 August. This letter was prepared by the head of the DPRD and sent to the

governor, without a full meeting of the Assembly (Rahalaka and Lathur 2006).[15] The National Court in Ruteng heard the evidence against Rotok and the KPUD and a decision was made on 12 April 2006 in favour of the complainants on various matters, such as the number of vote slips printed and some of the logistical procedures. A settlement of Rp 2.2 billion was to be paid by the Election Commission to the complainants. This decision was treated by Bagul and Wajong as proof of their claim that the election results should be declared void, and precipitated demonstrations on 18 April 2006 in front of the DPRD office, demanding that Rotok be removed from office. Protestors claimed that the elections had been a fraud and a political conspiracy, the new regent was in defiance of the law, and should be immediately replaced by a caretaker regent until new elections could be held. These demands provoked an immediate response from many quarters, not least the governor of NTT province, who were irritated that a suit won in local courts (quite likely still under the control of the old regent) about a minor matter, which they insisted would not have affected the outcome of the election, could be blown out of proportion and used to mislead the populace of Manggarai into thinking that the election was not legal (*Pos Kupang*, 24 April 2006). Subsequently, Regent Rotok and the KPUD appealled against the decision of the National Court in Ruteng at the High Court in the provincial capital of Kupang. There the decision of the lower court was overturned, and the complainants lost their case. Anton Bagul, however, has appealed further to the Supreme Court, in an appeal entitled "*memori kasasi*". This is based on the "memory" that a decision at a lower level had favoured his case. There has not been a final decision yet on this case.

Up to the present, various people in Ruteng continue to disagree with the results of the local elections of June 2005. Certainly the losers, especially the incumbent Anton Bagul Dagur, who had invested vast sums of money to attempt to win his position of regent for the second time, did not agree with the win of Christian Rotok and Kamelus Deno, "Credo", in the regional elections. However, somewhat surprisingly, civil society organizations continue to contest the election results, and claim them to be invalid. For them the whole process was fraudulent because the procedures were not followed to the letter of the law. For them the essence of democracy is not who won, but the procedures that were followed. Even more surprisingly, they uphold this belief even though personally we know that they would not have wanted Anton Bagul to have retained his position as regent, and actually think that Christian Rotok is doing a fairly reasonable job as regent. "It's not the matter of liking or not liking Credo," one activist acquaintance lamented, "the problem is the process." The discriminatory practices shown by the KPUD

towards Credo, and multiple infractions that the winning pair and the KPUD collaborated on together, led him to argue, "KPUD was Credo's *tim sukses*"; that is, the electoral commission, supposed to be neutral, was actually working on behalf of Christian Rotok so that he would win the election. This makes a mockery of the democratic process and nullifies the results of the election, no matter how preferable those results might be.

CONCLUSION: GROWING DEMOCRACY?

Indonesia is in a period of "democratic transition", and the masses have now been given the right to make their own choices about the people who will lead them. This ultimately gives the people power to hold their leaders accountable, something that in the past form of "democracy" in Indonesia did not exist. Will elites respect the choices of the masses, and see villagers as "ready" for democracy? We have suggested that in Indonesia there is a tendency to see the masses as "backward" and "not yet ready"; elites think they know best and that village people are mired in tradition. We have argued that the results of the *pilkada* in Western Flores indicate otherwise. Attempts on the part of candidates to manipulate kinship ties and woo voters with their wealth did not succeed. The person who had the most resources, both culturally and financially, who tried to embrace all Manggaraians into a traditional network of kinship and marriage alliance, did not win. People, instead, were interested in the issues and took the power that the direct elections gave them, and voted in the person they thought best suited for the job in the contemporary setting. On the other hand, irregularities in the election procedures have led some to argue that the results cannot be valid. The courts, as well as a majority of the people, find the infractions minor, and argue that they could not have had an effect on the actual outcome of the election. There has been no proof that in major matters Credo, or the KPUD, actually broke the law, or did anything to nullify the election procedures. But a small group of idealists remain dissatisfied and insist that democracy cannot grow until "the basics are gotten right". In the meantime, however, it appears that the choice of the people has prevailed. What, then, is the true essence of democracy?

Notes

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2 See Erb (2007) for a discussion of the multiple meanings of *adat* revival in Manggarai district at that time.

3 Western Manggarai had already received a "regent's assistant" (*pembantu bupati*) in 1982, meant to facilitate the governance of the large and difficult-to-negotiate regency. However in the 1990s this position had lost its effectiveness.

4 Indeed, there were quite a few who shared his fear that Manggarai might erupt into violence if forces from outside the regency saw this as an opportunity to sow strife. Labuan Bajo, the largest town in West Manggarai, was considered a particularly sensitive place; the composition of the population is about 50 per cent Catholic and 50 per cent Muslim, unlike other parts of the regency which are about 90 per cent Catholic.

5 For discussion of some of the symbolic expressions of this unity, in a massive ritual event held in 2001, and the controversies that surrounded it, see Erb (2003) and Erb, Beni, and Anggal (2005).

6 For further discussion of the conflicts over state-claimed forest land, see Erb and Jelahut (2007).

7 See also Erb (2005) for further discussion of these elections.

8 For example the clan from Todo village, from whom the King of Manggarai was chosen during the Dutch colonial period, claimed to have originated from Minangkabau; see Erb (1997) and (1999).

9 For example, head of the village (*kepala desa*), or members of the local legislature/assembly, positions they had had experience in voting for directly.

10 See also Vel (2005) on candidates and ideas of "big men" in Sumba.

11 Of course Bagul himself had had very little experience in government before he had been chosen as regent in 1999; detractors did not fail to point out that he had originally trained as a teacher.

12 Far too many cases of inefficiency and what many criticized as foolish policy decisions were made by Anton Bagul to be discussed here. Just to mention a few: he wanted the local government to buy an expensive second-hand ship from Japan to transport people from Manggarai to Surabaya, which so many people ridiculed that eventually the plans fell through; he received a large sum of money from the central government to build a stadium in Ruteng for the 2004 local "Olympics", which, as of 2007, still hasn't been completed; under his leadership the roads and bridges in Manggarai fell into major disrepair; what many saw as the crux of his poor and corrupt administration was that he built himself a luxurious "palace" overlooking the city of Ruteng, with materials entirely shipped in from Java; this eventually became the focus of corruption charges against him at the national level (Hargens 2005).

13 In fact, East Manggarai district was formed in 2007, and a caretaker regent

appointed to lead the district into the pilkada elections, scheduled for 2008 (NTT-Online.org., 2007).

[14] Unlike, for example, on Sumba, where Vel (2005, p. 106) states that it was the Golkar factor that won the election for the incumbent.

[15] According to procedures the DPRD does not have any role to play in validating the results; this role is in the hands of the KPUD. The signature of the DPRD is only a matter of formality, and this was probably why it was overlooked by the governor in the first place.

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14

THE RETURN OF THE SULTAN? POWER, PATRONAGE, AND POLITICAL MACHINES IN "POST"-CONFLICT NORTH MALUKU[1]

Claire Q. Smith

"The old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum there arises a great diversity of morbid symptoms." Antonio Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*

PROLOGUE

Let me start with a snapshot of the Ternate monarch, Sultan Haji Mudaffar Shah II, in July 2005. The Sultan sat in the cool yellow reception room of his fading tropical palace, perched on the slopes of Gamalama volcano, with a breeze flowing in from the Maluku Sea. Elderly male servants in sarongs approached silently on their knees, as is the style in an Indonesian *kraton* (palace), to serve tea and cakes on antique Dutch china. Outside, from the palace gardens, the cries from his wife's political campaign team at a rally boomed from huge loudspeakers to a gathered mob of supporters. In 1999, the Sultan launched an active campaign to return North Maluku to the pre-independence governance system of the Sultanate. Putting forward his wife to

run for mayor — a position too lowly for the Sultan himself — was the latest step in the *kraton*'s campaign. According to the Sultan,

> The Ternate Sultanate is over 1,000 years old. The problem here now is that the system of government has become so centralised, so Javanese. The Ternate community is very confused with that. They don't understand the terms of government. If we can return to traditional values this can unify the people, because the people understand these values, they are their values.[2]

As it approached midday, Boki (Queen) Nita, the Sultan's fifth and youngest wife, returned from her campaign rally to accompany the Sultan to lunch. The Queen was about to fly to Jakarta, where she had meetings with the national press to discuss alleged corruption in the Ternate elections. Although she had just lost the local elections by over 25 per cent of the vote to the popular incumbent, Syamsir Amas, a long-standing local bureaucrat, Boki Nita would not accept the result. This Javanese princess, now a North Malukan Queen, was determined to take up her seat in the Mayor's office by September 2005. As she departed, she said, "I am the Queen of Ternate and I will be Mayor, these are the true facts." Unfortunately for the Queen, this was not to be the case.

This chapter is based on fieldwork carried out in 2005 in North Maluku, Eastern Indonesia, home of the Ternate Sultanate. One of the aims of the study was to examine whether the local aristocracy in North Maluku had successfully relaunched themselves as a political force since the transition to democracy. In a series of articles entitled "The Return of the Sultans", to which the title of this paper alludes, van Klinken (2004, 2007) identified North Maluku as a key location in the post-New Order revival and reinvention of the old Indonesian sultanates. Van Klinken argued that the collapse of centralized one-party rule, combined with structural changes to local government and elections, had led to a revival of the old aristocracies in politics. In the late 1990s, a discourse on the revitalization of the Indonesian sultanates and other "traditional" local leaders, along with the demand for greater regional autonomy, sprouted across the country (Bowen 2003; van Klinken 2004). The devolution of government through the implementation of regional autonomy laws in 1999 and decentralization laws in 2001 was, in certain respects, the formal recognition of these regional political demands for local autonomy (Erb et al. 2005, pp. 6–8).

North Maluku was also one of five provinces in Eastern Indonesia consumed by communal violence following the fall of Soeharto in 1998. The combined rise in ethnic, "traditional", and religious politics — witnessed in

both violent conflicts and non-violent political movements — signalled significant transformations to the dynamics of local politics in Eastern Indonesia. The rise of "identity" politics and the emergence of apparently non-state actors into the political arena — including the former aristocracies — supposedly heralded a new era in Indonesian politics.

Freed from the political constraints of the New Order regime and with the fresh promise of regional autonomy, the Ternate Sultan has made at least four pushes to return to politics. However, in three out of these four attempts to gain political power — all those focused on local politics, including a role in communal conflict, and electoral contests for governor and mayor — the Sultanate has failed. This chapter proposes several linked arguments as to why the Sultanate has failed to "return" to power in its homeland, despite successes in national elections, and why, in contrast, bureaucrats connected to the Golkar party (Golongan Karya, the ruling party of the New Order regime) have so far held onto power. These bureaucrats, supported by local entrepreneurs and an entrenched political machine, have managed to secure their positions of power in local politics until the next local elections in 2009.

According to analysts of the 2005 local election results, the Golkar political machine, once strong all over Indonesia, was considerably weakened at the local level (Mietzner 2006). Why, then, has this machine survived, even entrenched itself, in local politics in Ternate? To explain the survival of the Golkar machine in Ternate we must account for the political and economic legacies of local communal violence between 1999 and 2000. This violent period affected local political dynamics through its social and economic impact on the Ternate community. In "post"-conflict North Maluku, with a damaged economy and fractured social relations, Golkar-based bureaucrats have effectively exploited their position as the sole mediators between limited state resources and the population. Their political machinery tightly links party leaders to local government and local business resources. Golkar members have also positioned themselves as the neutral harbingers of peace and stability, in direct contrast to their competitors.

The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section provides a brief history of the Sultanate and the Sultan's first attempt at political revival during the 1999–2000 conflict. The second section discusses the successes and failures of the Sultanate in national and local elections in 2002, 2004, and 2005. Section three contrasts the Sultanate's failure with the local Golkar candidate's strengths and successes in the 2005 local elections in Ternate. Theories of political machines from Chubb (1982) and Erie (1988) are used here to set out a framework for exploring the specific factors that enabled Golkar's electoral success. While these classic works on political machines are over

twenty years old, their theoretical relevance to local city politics in North Maluku is striking. Using the machine politics lens helps illuminate the processes behind the survival of the local branches of the New Order political machine in politics.

CONFLICT: THE SULTAN'S FIRST ATTEMPT AT POLITICAL REVIVAL

North Maluku is home to one of the oldest sultanates in Indonesia. According to the Ternate *kraton* records, it was founded in 1257.[3] The present Sultan's various attempts to "return" to political power have caused much local controversy. While to some of the Sultan's indigenous followers in Ternate he embodies a golden era of unity among all the ethnic and religious groups in North Maluku, to other groups, especially the migrant Muslim community in the south of Ternate Island, the Sultanate is a relic, irrelevant to their daily lives. To still others — even some of those who traditionally came under the Sultan's rule and protection — since the 1999–2000 violence the Sultanate has come to embody instability and chaos and should be kept out of politics at all costs. This fear of the rise of the sultanates was a problem not only in Ternate; across Indonesia the restoration of the sultanates has been associated with their occasional deployment of irregular armed forces (Cribb 2006).

Historically, Ternate was the most powerful of the four North Maluku sultanates of Tidore, Bacan, Jailolo, and Ternate, and the rivalry between Tidore and Ternate has been ongoing for over 500 years (Andaya 1993; Ricklefs 2001). At one time the Ternate Sultanate commanded great influence, particularly within the global spice trade.[4] However, under Dutch colonialism, the North Maluku sultanates were weakened, "pensioned off", and pacified with pay-offs from the clove trade (Taylor 2003, p. 336). Loyalty to the Dutch extended up to the Second World War when the Ternate Sultan was linked to the pro-Dutch forces and exiled to Australia. After returning from exile, the Ternate Sultan was based close to the Sukarno government in Jakarta, returning only rarely to the Ternate *kraton*.[5] Keeping the sultans close to the centre enabled Sukarno to control the threat of alternate sources of authority in the Outer Islands, whilst also maintaining ties to the indigenous rulers of the periphery.

Sukarno's policy of centralizing and thereby neutralizing alternative sources of power was deepened under Soeharto's New Order regime (1966–98). The Sultan's son Mudaffar Syah II inherited the role of Ternate Sultan in 1975, and continued to play a dual role for Jakarta. On the one hand, he maintained loyal, "traditional" support from the regions for the central government; on

the other, he benefited from plum positions in the central government.[6] Soeharto's policy staved off threats of regional independence movements, but also concentrated political power as part of a centralized state and economic development strategy.[7] Fifty years of centralized governance effectively strangled any political role in the regions that the sultans had held under indirect Dutch colonial rule. Although some local aristocrats absorbed themselves into local political elite structures under the New Order (Magenda 1989), the Ternate Sultan's political role was largely confined to Jakarta.

Following the fall of Soeharto, the Sultan launched his first attempt to regain political power in North Maluku during the 1999–2000 conflict. The violence in Ternate started as a spin-off from an ethnically divided communal conflict in the north of Halmahera Island, the largest island in North Maluku (Duncan 2005; Wilson 2005). There, a 25-year-long dispute over rights to and control over land in Kao sub-district — combined with other economic and social tensions — flared up between migrant Makian and indigenous Kao communities in August 1999. At first, senior figures from Ternate, including the Ternate Sultan, mediated between the two groups. Later, however, these same figures were distracted by political activities in Jakarta towards creating the new province of North Maluku, and the delicate situation in Halmahera was neglected. Finally, Kao villagers attacked Makian communities, razing them to the ground. The entire Makian community of over 10,000 people fled to Ternate. With thousands of Muslim Makian refugees arriving in a panic from their burned villages on Halmahera, the Muslim community in Ternate, together with the refugees, launched retaliatory attacks on local Christians. The next wave of conflict then spread out across Ternate and gradually engulfed the other islands.

The Ternate Sultan had strong cultural links to the Christian areas of North Halmahera dating back to the fifteenth century.[8] Indigenous clans are often mixed Christian and Muslim and during the early stages of the conflict, many mixed villages across North Halmahera and Ternate remained allied to the Sultan, although this became harder for them as the conflict escalated. As the conflict spread across Ternate Island, the Sultan protected the northern half — traditionally his stronghold — and Christian families also fled to the palace from the south of the city (Tomagola 2000). Choosing to defend indigenous Christian communities, who came under his traditional mandate, and migrant Christians, including the ethnic Chinese community, rather than defending local and migrant Muslims, later cost the Sultan dearly in terms of his local political standing.

The conflict in Ternate was eventually divided between pro- and anti-Sultanate forces, with Muslims fighting on both sides. Many locals — from both pro- and anti-Sultan groups — view the Ternate wave of the conflict

as an attempt by the Sultan to seize control of the town and thus widen his power base against other ethnic elites. There is a long history to the Sultan's frustration at the dominance of other local ethnic groups in politics in the region, namely the Makian group. The conflict, argue some observers, was the Sultan's chance to gain political ground (Rahmawati and Watson 2004, p. 13).

Eventually, however, the "white" Muslim forces overwhelmed the "yellow" forces of the Sultanate. Reports abound of *jihad* warriors flooding in from Java and other islands to support the white troops in Ternate and defend Muslim areas in Halmahera, Tidore, and other parts of North Maluku (Tomagola 2000).[9] By the end of the conflict, official records documented 2,083 deaths and 1,003 seriously wounded, with 166,318 displaced (UNDP 2001, p. 13). Unofficial sources put the fatality figure higher, between 2,794 (Varshney et al. 2004, p. 31) and 3,000–3,500 (Wilson 2005, p. 69). By 2002 many of those internally displaced from North Maluku had started to return, and by 2005 almost all internally displaced people had returned to the province, with only several thousand remaining displaced in the region.[10] By the end of the conflict the Sultan was temporarily exiled to Manado, in North Sulawesi, although he later returned. For the Sultan, the conflict was a huge political and personal blow.

In contrast to the Sultan, other senior members of the local Golkar political elite remained officially neutral during the conflict. Party and political elites also realized the political costs of close association with the Sultan. One local election observer commented, "During the conflict senior Golkar politicians were afraid: what would happen to them if the Sultan won? What would happen if he lost? So they stayed neutral at that time." In later elections, members of the Golkar political elite used their "neutrality" to their advantage, blaming the conflict on the Sultan, and positioning themselves as the peacemakers in the region.

ELECTIONS: THE SULTAN'S SECOND ATTEMPT AT POLITICAL REVIVAL

Despite the Sultan's failure to win the conflict, he then launched several attempts to gain political power through elections. He started with an unsuccessful bid to become Golkar candidate for the first gubernatorial contest of North Maluku in 2001.[11] Later, having left Golkar and positioned himself with another party, the PDK (Partai Demokrat Kebangsaan, or National Democratic Party), the Sultan managed to win election to the National Assembly in the 2004 legislative elections. His wife was also

successfully elected as one of four senators for North Maluku. The results (Table 14.1) show that in elections for national level political positions, the Sultan's traditional supporters continued to back the Sultanate. However, during elections for positions at the local level, over local issues, the situation was reversed.

TABLE 14.1
National Assembly (DPR) Election Results in Ternate (2004)

No.	*Successful DPR candidates (parties)*	*Voting results by sub-district (validated votes)*				*Final Result*
		South Ternate	*North Ternate*	*Ternate Island*	*Moti*	
6	Drs. H. Mudaffar Syah (PDK)	2,891	9,034	4,193	66	16,184
16	Abdul Gani Kasuba (PKS)	2,795	2,501	65	64	5,425
20	Dr. H. Abdul Gafur (Golkar)	3,266	1,992	244	168	5,670

Source: Commission for Regional Public Elections (KPUD), Ternate City, April 2004.

The 2001–02 Governor Elections

The North Maluku gubernatorial elections between 2001 and 2002 were directly influenced by national level political interventions and, as such, went beyond the confines of local politics. The results are, therefore, only partially useful for explaining local politics, so I will only mention them briefly. This particular election followed the New Order electoral style in a number of ways. First, the provincial legislature, not the population, was responsible for electing the governor. Second, the military intervened when the outcome ran against their interests. Third, Jakarta intervened when the results ran against President Megawati's interests.[12] Still, the election process and results show in part how the Sultan became marginalized from the local Golkar political elite.

A series of murky disputes between Abdul Gafur — a former minister under Soeharto, born in North Maluku — and the Sultan took place during the campaign period for the gubernatorial elections, with both hoping to

become the Golkar candidate. According to Gafur, following the conflict, the Sultan was rejected by both the community and national party players: "After the conflict, the Sultan was rejected by the whole community. The national level also rejected him, because he had protected the Christians."[13]

The Sultan did not relinquish his power within the party easily; after all, he was senior in the local party branch and had long been part of Jakarta's Golkar elite. But intervention from Jakarta in Gafur's favour, combined with local elite support within Golkar for Gafur, meant the Sultan was prevented from running as their party candidate. Shortly after this debacle, the Sultan left the party. Gafur then ran against Thaib Armayn, formerly a member of the local Golkar elite and a career bureaucrat, who had switched to PDI-P.

In the end, however, even Golkar's resources and connections at the local level could not compete against national politicians. Sources in the local legislature reported that Megawati's intervention in the provincial elections scuppered Gafur's chances:

> Abdul Gafur won the first-round governor election in 2001. But Megawati, who was then the President, resented Gafur and refused to authorise his selection. In 2002, a second election was held. So many troops were stationed here by Megawati at that time — it was back to New Order times. Thaib was set up to be the PDI-P candidate by Megawati and backed by the military.[14]

With this kind of central backing from the President and the military, interventions from Jakarta lifted the election results straight out of the hands of the North Maluku elite. This meant neither the Sultan nor Gafur, Golkar's preferred candidate, could win the gubernatorial elections of 2001 or 2002.

The 2004 Legislative and Senate Elections

After his failure to gain selection as Golkar's candidate for Governor, the Sultan then joined PDK and ran for the National Assembly (DPR) in the 2004 legislative elections against twenty-three other candidates in North Maluku. Table 14.1 shows the results from Ternate's four sub-districts for the three candidates who finally won the elections overall in North Maluku (the Sultan was candidate No. 6). As the Sultan expected, he did particularly well in North Ternate, the Sultanate's traditional stronghold. If we compare these results with those in South Ternate, the home of the migrant Muslim community (where the anti-Sultanate forces were based during the conflict), we can see that though the Sultan did not gain equal votes to Gafur (his

former rival), neither did he dramatically lose there. These figures stand in direct contrast to what would happen later, in the 2005 local elections.

Queen Nita ran at the same time in the national Senate elections. Table 14.2 shows the Ternate results for the four senators elected from the province overall (the Queen of Ternate, Boki Nita, was candidate No. 4). Nita, like the Sultan, did very well in North Ternate, the Sultan's old stronghold. But she was also successful in South Ternate, competing relatively equally with, if not more successfully than, the other winning candidates in the migrant areas.

TABLE 14.2
National Senate (DPD) Election Results in Ternate (2004)

No.	*Successful DPR candidates (parties)*	*Voting results by sub-district (validated votes)*				*Final Result*
		South Ternate	*North Ternate*	*Ternate Island*	*Moti*	
1	Drs. Juanda Bakar	4,171	2,670	188	702	7,731
4	Ny. Nita Budhi Susanti	5,701	12,999	7,823	146	26,669
6	Hi. Djafar Syah	5,636	3,609	367	210	9,822
12	Anthony Charles Sunarjo	283	347	237	14	881
	Total Number of Valid Votes	30,279	30,144	10,165	2,247	72,835

Source: Commission for Regional Public Elections (KPUD), Ternate City, April 2004.

The election results of the Senate and legislature inspired the Sultanate for the 2005 direct elections for regional heads: the *pemilihan langsung kepala daerah* (*pilkada*). Although the Queen now held a relatively prestigious position in the national Senate (DPD) and the Sultan had his National Assembly (DPR) seat, these positions did not directly determine politics or policy in Ternate. The Sultan decided that Nita should run to be mayor in the 2005 elections. As mayor, Nita would then hold the reins of power in Ternate and could determine local policy as head of the local government. The third section discusses how the Sultan's decision to select the Queen over other members of the Sultanate caused rifts in the palace that then damaged their position during the elections.

The 2005 Local Elections

In the local elections for mayor in Ternate, in 2005, Nita ran for PDK against the long-serving Golkar bureaucrat, Syamsir Amas. The election brought the Ternate Sultanate into direct competition with Golkar's popular "local son", Koh Syamsir.[15] The combination of the first-ever direct elections at the local level with the contest between the Queen and Syamsir created a huge level of excitement about the elections in the city. As Table 14.3 illustrates, the Queen eventually lost to Syamsir, who won over 50 per cent of the vote.

As the results were announced, the Queen's campaign team was horrified to see that even in North Ternate — the Sultanate's traditional stronghold — the majority of votes were cast for Syamsir and not the Queen. In North Ternate, Syamsir won almost 5,000 more votes than the Queen and gained around half the total votes. In South Ternate, where it had been expected that the Queen would lose to Syamsir, the incumbent mayor got almost 15,000 more votes than her and around two-thirds of the total vote. The Queen had only managed to beat Syamsir in one area, Ternate Island, but this could not

TABLE 14.3
Ternate City Mayor Election Results (2005)

No.	*Candidates for Mayor & Vice-Mayor (Parties)*	*Voting results by sub-district (validated votes)*				*Final Result*	*%*
		South Ternate	*North Ternate*	*Ternate Island*	*Moti*		
1	Drs. H. Syamsir Andili and Drs. H. Amas Dinsie (Golkar, PD, PBR)	18,858	15,610	2,715	1,180	38,363	52.84%
2	Sudjud Siradjuddin, SH, MH and Rustam Konoras, SH (PAN, PKPB)	6,138	3,423	718	1,186	11,465	15.79%
3	Nita Budhi Susanti and Drs. Sidik Dero Siokona, MPd. (PDK)	4,510	10,900	7,328	42	22,780	31.37%
	Total Number of Valid Votes					72,608	100.00%

Source: Commission for Regional Public Elections (KPUD), Ternate City, December 2005.

outweigh the overall damage. Overall, the Queen lost by over 20 per cent of the vote and Syamsir got more votes than his two competitors combined. So what went wrong for the Queen during the election?

One of the major factors that undermined the Queen's campaign was a crisis of legitimacy about the role of the Sultanate in local politics. While Ternate residents were content to elect the Sultan and his wife as their representatives to Jakarta, they were not willing to take the same risk when it came to local politics. The migrant Muslim community in Ternate had been opposed to the Sultanate since the conflict, and it was expected that the Queen would find it hard to win them over. Yet even among the Sultan's own community many voters abandoned the Sultanate for the incumbent Golkar mayor. Several issues of legitimacy were at stake. First, Ternate residents felt a general concern over the Sultan's involvement in local politics, given his partisan role in the conflict. Second, the indigenous Ternate community was worried about the role of the Queen in undermining traditional Ternate culture. These concerns combined with unwillingness among the local population to take unnecessary economic and political risks in the local elections.

Various sectors of the Ternate community expressed fears during the campaign period that the conflict would return if the Sultanate won the election.[16] Members of the Sultan's own community in northern Ternate feared further damage to the position of the Sultan they revered if they elected his Queen. Local politics was not deemed a suitable venue for the Sultan, whose reputation had been damaged by the conflict. In the city and surrounding villages of Ternate the memory of the conflict was still fresh. Voters wanted to maintain peace and stability, and the local Golkar bureaucrat, not the Sultanate, represented these aspirations. National politics, on the other hand, was a far removed and abstract idea. Electing the Ternate Sultan or his wife to represent North Maluku in Jakarta was a relatively uncomplicated decision, reflecting a continuation of his position over the last decades.

The idea of the Golkar candidate as the bearer of peace and stability was not entirely spontaneous. The party's local campaign team deliberately used the memory of the conflict during their campaign rallies to raise emotions and mobilize voters against the Sultan's wife. In the southern areas of the town, the Golkar team frequently referred to the conflict in election rallies. One local journalist reported,

> During the *pilkada*, Syamsir's *tim sukses* (electoral campaign team) used rumours that if Nita's team won they will implement *adat Ternate* (i.e. the Sultanate's traditional law) in the local government. This looked like

> a direct threat to the migrant community from the *kraton.* It also brought up trauma from the time of the conflict, from the time of the Sultan's yellow troops. So the people cannot accept Nita, if it will be like that again.

Another important local issue during the campaign period was the problems caused by the Queen's changes to traditional customs at the palace. Some members of the Ternate ethnic group did not trust the Sultan's wife, seeing her as an outsider who was changing local traditions with her own Javanese customs. The Queen had on several occasions over the year prior to the election infuriated members of the ethnic Ternate community by putting the palace dancers in Javanese costumes and re-organizing traditional events in an attempt to "re-vitalize" the Sultanate. Several of these schemes had appealed to youth groups in Ternate, who the Queen included in the palace festivals and later used as a central part of her campaign team. But for the older generation, these moves were heretic. A local NGO activist observed,

> For us, Queen Nita is quite modern and we don't have a problem with her. But others, especially the old people, think she is so ambitious, which they don't like. They run to Syamsir as a result, because they are afraid of her ambition. She is also too modern for them, I suppose, and they prefer the old ways.

Overall, then, questions about the role of the Sultan in the conflict and a local crisis over his youngest wife's role in altering Ternate traditions damaged the Queen at the polls. But there was another problem, one that would severely disable the Queen's campaign. The Sultanate lacked access to the local government and, therefore, to the financial and political advantages of the Golkar team. Despite organizing popular rallies and entertainment events, the Queen did not present clear financial benefits to the community. She relied too heavily on "traditional" loyalties that were not only based on a rocky foundation, but easily displaced in favour of the more concrete economic benefits offered by her main opponent. The following section discusses the Queen's opponent's advantages, drawing on several key works on political machines to help frame the discussion.

THE STRENGTHS OF GOLKAR: APPLYING A POLITICAL MACHINERY FRAMEWORK

Recent research conducted in Indonesia shows that incumbents can no longer necessarily rely on their control of state resources to bring them back

to power in local elections. After analysing fifty *pilkada* (direct local elections) held in 2005, Mietzner observed that despite their control of patronage and other government resources, incumbents did not automatically win. In fact, around 40 per cent of incumbents lost (Mietzner 2006, p. 18). Yet in Ternate, the incumbent was overwhelmingly re-elected. What makes local electoral politics in Ternate different from *pilkada* electoral patterns in other parts of Indonesia? The Sultanate's disastrous campaign of conflict, which led to several failed election attempts, forms the critical backdrop to the story. Local antagonism to the outsider Javanese Queen also affected the results. But a complete explanation must account for the superior political machinery behind the incumbent.

In order to contextualize the five factors affecting Ternate's political dynamics, this section first highlights central elements of two of the key theorists on urban political machines: Chubb (1982) and Erie (1988). From the theory I turn to the five factors contributing to the success of Ternate city's Golkar political machine in the 2005 elections: (i) the use of patronage, (ii) superior access to campaign financing, (iii) the role of political protection, (iv) campaign organization, and (v) candidate popularity. The workings of the Golkar political machine in Ternate are closely tied to the impact of the conflict, whose key effects were damage to the local economy and fear of further political instability. This two-fold conflict effect entrenched the Golkar machine's hold on local politics by enabling the machine to use its control of local government for electoral ends, which is the central feature of political machines.

Theory of Political Machines: Providing Rice and Circuses

The conflict in North Maluku caused a significant economic downturn across the province. In Ternate, the city economy was hit hard with the arrival of over 10,000 displaced people. This placed great pressure on the local community and the local government to provide shelter and food to the displaced population. At the same time, the city economy was hurt by the flight of the local Christian population, including the minority group of Indonesian Chinese. A government official in charge of managing the local economy explained why economic crisis followed the displacement of the local population:

> When the Muslim refugees arrived from Halmahera in late 1999, this caused great problems in Ternate. At that time the Christians started to run to North Sulawesi. Then the economy just went down as all the

> Chinese fled and they were the distributors and traders for the local economy. So we had two big problems here but Ternate is the capital of trade and transit, with the ports, for the whole province. So everything was shutting down. By 2000 the economy was in crisis and inflation was very high.[17]

As the economy slowed down, the local community, especially the business and trading sectors, became increasingly reliant on state resources. The state sector already dominated the local economy and the conflict only increased state control.[18] Despite all the economic and social problems faced by the local government after the conflict, these difficulties actually put local bureaucrats in a stronger position politically. With the private sector in tatters, the local government — and therefore the political machine that ran it — became the sole mediator between limited economic resources and the community.

Chubb's analysis of post-war local politics in Southern Italy highlights similar economic and political patterns to "post"-conflict Ternate. Chubb (1982) showed that, contrary to expectations, during the economic crisis in the Italian post-war period, the Christian Democrat political machine actually increased its share of the vote. Patron–client bonds endured during economic depression through the management of resource shortages. Chubb (1982, p. 5) argued,

> The essence of clientelism lies less in the distribution of plenty than in the skilful manipulation of scarcity. The key to understanding the patron-client bond is that it depends not on a continual stream of benefits, but rather on sustaining the expectation of rewards for the maximum number of people with the minimum payoff in concrete benefits.

Chubb's clientelist model shows that neither an exogenous crisis, such as the post-war depression, nor an internal crisis, such as exhaustion of the machine's resource base via patronage spending, will necessarily undermine an entrenched machine. In certain circumstances, economic hardships can actually strengthen the popular support base of the machine. Chubb showed how in a context of resource scarcity, when alternate political forces do not offer "concrete resources", people tend to choose immediate gains over the abstract possibility of long-term change (Chubb 1982, pp. 5–6). Chubb also argues that it is not *actual* spending or provision of jobs and other patronage benefits that matters during elections, but discretionary powers over these resources. In other words, it's not the quantity of available resources, but the ability of the machine to control access to political, bureaucratic, and economic resources that makes the difference.

Applying Chubb's model to "post"-conflict Ternate city politics helps explain why the majority of people were loath to make political changes in the local elections. Political change is risky, and the local community had already been through several major shocks that made further risk highly unappealing — first the physical and human devastation of the conflict, and then the economic crisis that followed it. The possibility of benefits from a political alternative to the incumbent Golkar candidate looked very slim. Even those who voted for Queen Nita observed that she was an unknown quantity in economic and patronage terms. Most people did not want the risk of ousting Syamsir, whose long-established patronage system they knew and trusted, even if few people in the population directly benefited from it.

A crucial aspect of Golkar's success in Ternate under Syamsir's leadership lay in their ability to control access to state resources for the local population. Erie's (1988) analysis of the longevity of Irish-American political machines in the United States between the late nineteenth and early twentieth century again helps to shed light on the Ternate situation. Erie explored the different tactics of various urban political machines to build support. Two of the most common tactics were to provide "bread" (that is, concrete economic benefits, usually patronage jobs) or "circuses" (symbolic, social or recreational services) to the local population. Providing bread and circuses helped the machines win elections and maintain domination of city politics. Erie's analysis of political machine tactics illuminates both the methods behind the Golkar political machine in Ternate and the rationale behind continued voter support for the local Golkar candidate.

In Erie's American case studies, city political machines chose whether to offer "bread" or "circuses" during elections depending on what they could get away with. Minimal expenditures on circuses were obviously preferable to real expenditures on patronage jobs in the local government or in businesses supported by the government. The local political machine in Ternate used the promise of "bread" — or, more appropriately for the local context, "rice" — and the provision of "circuses" throughout their local election campaign to appeal to voters. Golkar was not the only party to offer circuses to the masses; all the candidates in the local election campaigns provided "circuses" in the form of campaign rallies, with music, singers, actors, comedy shows, banners, and other forms of popular entertainment. However, Golkar was the only party with control of the local government. Through their machine, which linked the party to the local government and, through that, to local business, Golkar was the only party which could offer the "rice" in the campaign. Controlling access to state patronage is the first of five factors I have identified as enabling the survival of the Golkar machine in Ternate.

Factors Enabling Golkar's Success

Patronage as Policy

During the local election campaign, a student observed to me, "Syamsir acts like *tuan rumah* (chief, or wise and respected man) and he has a good position to do this. He has already had eight years in power so now he has a lot more money to buy people off than the other candidates." Throughout the campaign, Syamsir, the Golkar candidate for mayor, and his team, promised certain groups in Ternate favourable job and contractual arrangements. North Maluku entrepreneurs, who own agricultural, construction, and distribution companies based in Ternate, were the main beneficiaries of these deals. State employees in the local city government — one of the few sources of stable employment in Ternate — had long worked for Syamsir and would not risk losing such positions by voting for another candidate. To the wider population, state jobs and state contracts are seen as one of few routes to personal economic progress.

The Golkar candidate, with eight years in Ternate government behind him, looked far more likely to deliver these goods than a new candidate from the Sultanate, with no experience in local government. Political resources for the campaign were thus drawn from tight economic connection to the local state. The local Golkar party held the purse strings of local government in terms of both jobs and contracts. Erie (1988, p. 26) labels this control of the "output" dimensions of the local political system,

> By controlling voters and officeholders, the machine could control the output side of politics — patronage jobs, contracts, franchises, and services…. The machine sustained itself by exchanging material benefits for political support.

The local party machine in Ternate acted as dual intermediary for patronage. They mediated, first, between local businesses and the opportunity for government contracts, and, second, between the population seeking employment and the chance of jobs in local government or the private sector, which is in itself dependent on the state for contracts. Playing the role of economic intermediary, therefore entrenched, rather than damaged, Golkar's position. Patronage-based business deals funnelled benefits directly back to the party bosses and local businesses. It is for Golkar in Ternate as it was for the Christian Democrats (DC) in post-war Southern Italy. By means of its control of local government, the party weaves, "a network of clientelist bonds linking the party solidly to the leading sector of the local economy and

through it to a broad cross-section of the urban population" (Chubb 1982, p. 158). On balance, the average Ternate voter did not stand to gain more from an alternative candidate.

Campaign Financing

Campaign financing in the Ternate elections was skewed to the incumbent's favour from the beginning. Substantial amounts of financial capital are required for the three phases of the local election process in Indonesia: candidate selection, campaigning, and election day itself.[19] Due to holding almost total control of the local economy, at each stage Golkar's local political machine could raise funds beyond those available to their competitors. Local non-governmental organizations who monitor corruption in Ternate reported that local businesses were the biggest financiers of political campaigns during the *pilkada*. Without any significant outside investors in North Maluku, all local businesses were dependent on local government contracts for business. One local NGO reported that 80 per cent of government contracts went to two local businesses alone, "New government buildings, hospitals, and road construction contracts — all these big projects go to the same two companies run by two big local businessmen. So when it comes to direct elections, these businesses must finance the campaigns of the key people."[20]

The promise of long-term business contracts and security protection for their businesses were top priorities for local businessmen. Local businesses had always maintained close ties to the local government but, prior to the conflict, the Indonesian Chinese in Ternate were allied to the Sultan, as the traditional protector of the Christian community. However, after the conflict, their loyalties changed: the Sultan could no longer be relied on for protection. As such, the local Indonesian Chinese businesses switched allegiances to the incumbent Mayor, taking their financial support with them.

Political Protection

The issue of political protection builds on the issue of economic protection described above. Protection of both their economic interests and political backers was no small concern for local businesses. Few local businesses that existed in the region prior to the conflict survived it, although by 2005 some local businesses had reopened. During the conflict all foreign companies were shut down and most were destroyed. Aside from an Indonesian-Australian joint venture (Nusa Halmahera Mineral, a large gold mine located on Halmahera Island), which only temporarily closed during the conflict, no

foreign investors had returned to the region by 2005. Furthermore, most Christian-owned businesses in North Maluku were destroyed during the violence. Starting in 2002, some local Indonesian Chinese businesses returned and their businesses form the lifeline of the local economy in urban areas of North Maluku. To protect themselves from future "problems" these local businesses have built tight links with the local Golkar party elite.

In an area wracked by social, economic, and political upheaval during communal violence, the exchange of material benefits from the political machine to the community — ranging from jobs and contracts to the literal provision of security — is a powerful political tool. The memory of more or less thirty years of relative stability under Golkar's control served as a further tool during the local election campaign. The irony in Golkar's capture of the "security" message was that it was the *same* Golkar elites in power in Ternate during the conflict as those running in the 2005 local elections. But local voters held the Sultan's "yellow" troops responsible for the violence, rather than the local government, which had failed to control it. The Golkar campaign team successfully exploited these fears during their campaign.

Local Party Machine Organization

During the election campaign, the Golkar political machine in Ternate was not only flush with funds, and backed by local businesses, but also highly organized. The campaign team used a system of cadres from the hamlet to the city level that rallied supporters and encouraged people to vote. On the Golkar campaign tour, cash-filled envelopes were distributed to local government elites for "campaign" purposes.[21] The Golkar team ran a finely tuned logistical operation involving fleets of cars, boats, and trucks when campaign rallies required it. Golkar distributed satellite phones to its cadre system across the Ternate district archipelago to coordinate their activities and for them to call in results to the party headquarters. In the Ternate party headquarters, computer operators flashed up the results onto screens as they arrived. The local party machine also called in resources from Jakarta: the Vice-President and Golkar's national chairman, Jusuf Kalla, flew to Ternate as part of a regional Golkar pep-talk tour two days before the local elections. At the grass-roots level, hamlet-based party cadres organized village rallies.

In contrast, the Sultanate's team relied on traditional ethnic loyalties for support, but they did not have a comparable political network to call upon. Nita's team struggled to set up a single computer to monitor the vote counts on election day and volunteers tallied voting results with pencils on scraps of paper. The Queen's team was not only held back by a lack of resources, but

also by a lack of solidarity among her supporters. Rumours were rife that the palace community did not support the Queen internally and during the period of selection for the mayoral candidate, rifts split the palace, putting off potential business supporters. The Sultan officially proclaimed his support towards his wife, but insiders claimed the Sultan's sons by his earlier marriages did not support Nita's selection. Furthermore, some of the palace elders found the Queen threatening and, like some in the local population, they were afraid she would undermine ethnic Ternate customs with her "modern ways". The Queen's Javanese ethnicity also went against her in the inner circle of the ethnic Ternate Sultanate.

The Sultan's younger brother, Ismunandar Syah, the deputy head of the city legislature and the head of the Ternate branch of PDK, compounded the Queen's campaign problems. Ismunandar himself planned to run for mayor with PDK, but the Sultan chose the Queen instead. Although the PDK local elites officially supported Nita's candidacy — they had no choice as the Sultan had ordered it — according to members of Nita's campaign team, they remained loyal to Ismunandar and worked to undermine Nita.

Despite these setbacks, the Queen's campaign team managed to organize the "circuses" required in local elections, with huge campaign rallies and festivals during the election period. But the Queen relied too heavily on the vote of the Sultan's traditional community, and even they eventually abandoned her at the polls. The Queen's campaign team just did not have the finance, organization, protection, or political networks to offer any "rice" to the electorate. Worse, she was an outsider with the wrong ethnic background.

Popular Candidate Selection

> Everyone knows Syamsir from the 1980s when he was the head of KNPI (Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia, the National Committee for Indonesian Youth) for North Maluku. He brought a very popular footballer to visit and everyone remembers that. He's still very popular from those days. (Journalist, Ternate)

The electoral power of Syamsir did not come entirely from the party machine. The fifth factor working in Golkar's favour was their selection of a popular local candidate, who combined years of experience in local government with a friendly, familiar political style. Syamsir's support network came via his well-established patronage base developed over decades in local government, but also because he was a popular rather than faceless bureaucrat, with a smooth populist touch. He was well known and widely hailed as a dedicated local leader. For one election observer, this was Syamsir's winning card.

> People trusted Syamsir more than the others and he was too popular to beat — no matter that he is corrupt and made no improvement to public services in Ternate. Syamsir is friendly to everyone and everyone likes him for that. I don't think that most Syamsir supporters chose him because there was no other better candidate, but because they really loved him.

In addition to Syamsir's genuine personal skills, he was a local son from the right ethnic group. He wasn't an ethnic Ternatean — which would have put off those in southern Ternate, from the migrant Muslim groups. These groups, especially the Makian and Tidore ethnic groups, chose the candidate most likely to beat the Sultan's wife, who represented their former enemy. Furthermore, in the Sultan's heartland, northern Ternate, the Javanese Queen was rejected. Even on Hiri Island — where traditionally the Sultan is so revered that he is carried on the villagers' shoulders when he visits the island — the Queen lost the election to Syamsir.

CONCLUSION

"Better a known evil than an unknown good." *Sicilian proverb*[22]

The reasons for the failure of the Ternate Sultanate to "return" to local politics, and the successes of the Golkar party candidate and political machine, in contrast, are both linked to several key factors. The Sultanate's failures in local politics connect directly to the Sultan's involvement in the North Maluku conflict, and the devastating social and economic impact of the conflict, which entrenched Golkar's power over city politics. The deep-rooted strength of the Golkar political machine in Ternate also constrained the Sultanate's attempts at political revival. Thus, while the electoral rules and structures of local government had changed dramatically since 1998 through democratization and regional autonomy processes, those who played the local political game best in Ternate were the same group of people who dominated local politics under the New Order.

A crisis of legitimacy over the political role of the Sultanate caused by the Sultan's role in conflict and his wife's changes to local cultural traditions undermined the Sultanate. Simultaneously, the patronage, financial, protection, organizational, and popular resources of the local party machine strengthened Golkar's hand in the local elections. While the Sultan was a part of the Jakarta New Order elite, he was not a crucial part of *local* New Order politics. Without this grounding in the local government or business elite, and with

the backdrop of conflict and economic depression, the Sultan could not overcome the financial and political challenge posed by the local Golkar party machine. In Ternate, the party of the New Order survives, even thrives, in the post-Soeharto era. Their survival is rooted in particular local conditions linked to the impact of conflict and the ability of the Golkar machine to act as the sole intermediary between limited state resources and the community.

Extreme local community polarization during the conflict in Ternate could have heralded a more radical or religious form of politics, rather than the entrenchment of the local branch of a national secular party. The severe economic impacts of conflict on local businesses and trade, which showed the ineffectiveness of the local bureaucracy under Golkar's control to manage both crisis and recovery, might have triggered demand for change. However, the local Golkar machine used the social and economic impacts of conflict to its advantage. Political machinery theory developed from studies of the survival and success of political machines during economic crises in the US and southern Italy has helped illuminate the mechanisms behind the survival of the local Golkar machine in Ternate. At times of economic hardship and political crisis the machine comes to represent the only intermediary between the limited resources of the state and the community so in need of them.

In Ternate, the entrenchment of local New Order elites in politics through the Golkar party machine is thus explained by two factors: one, the entrenchment of the local government elites following the conflict due to their increased control of the economy and, two, increased risk aversion among the electorate following the social and economic impacts of conflict. There are very logical reasons for these patterns, as seen in mid-19th–early 20th-century America and post-war Italy during periods of economic depression and times of great social and political uncertainty. While in other parts of Indonesia local electorates are willing to throw out corrupt incumbents, in Ternate, the majority of voters are not ready to take these kinds of risks. Perhaps the relative prosperity and lack of severe local conflicts in places like Manado and Makassar mean that for the local electorate in those cities, getting rid of the "devils they know" for devils they don't isn't such a high stakes game.

Notes

[1] I would like to express my thanks for the excellent research assistance of M. Syahril Sangaji. I am also grateful to Ibu Gamar Effendi and Pak Munir Amal Tomagola and their families for their hospitality and assistance in Ternate between May and December 2005. The Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI)

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2 All quotes from the Ternate Sultan and his wife, Queen Nita, are taken from interviews conducted between July and December 2005. Translations from Indonesian into English in these and the other interviews referenced in the paper are my own.

3 Most historians put the founding date of the Sultanate much later. Andaya (1993) estimates that it was founded in the mid-15th century, as does Adnan Amal (2002). Taylor (2003, p. 134) estimates that the Ternate ruling family converted to Islam somewhere between the 1480s and 1490s.

4 For the most extensive history of the rise and fall of the four sultanates in North Maluku, see Leonard Y. Andaya, *The World of Maluku: Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993). M. Adnan Amal (2002), *Maluku Utara: Perjalanan Sejarah 1250–1800 (Jilid 1)*. Ternate: Universitas Khairun and M. Adnan Amal and Irza Arnyta Djafaar (2003), *Maluku Utara: Perjalanan Sejarah 1800–1950 (Jilid 2)*. Ternate: Universitas Khairun. On the history of the Ternate sultanate, in particular, see Syahril Muhammad (2004), *Kesultanan Ternate: Sejarah Sosial, Ekonomi dan Politik*. Yogyakarta: Ombak.

5 Interview with the Ternate Sultan and his sister, Ternate, North Maluku, 11 July and October 2005.

6 Interview with Tamrin Amal Tomagola, Universitas Indonesia, Depok, March 2005; and Ari Dwipayana, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, 20 May 2005.

7 See Erb et al. (2005) for a summary of the transition from decentralized to centralized rule over the Sukarno-Soeharto eras.

8 Interviews with Adnan Amal, historian, Ternate, May 2005. See also M. Adnan Amal (2002), pp. 135–48.

9 While some informants in Ternate reported the presence of Javanese warriors during the conflict, others denied it. Senior Javanese clerics from radical Islamic groups were recorded rallying crowds in mosques in Halmahera and Tidore in 2000 (International Crisis Group 2003; personal communication with ICG, September 2005); but it is not clear precisely how many Javanese warriors actually fought in the conflict.

10 Interviews with local government officials and Catholic priests in Ternate and Tobelo, May–July 2005. In 2005, a minority of displaced families was still unable to return to their original villages, and some had chosen to remain in their new locations. However, the majority had already returned to their original locations.

[11] Until around 2001, the Sultan was officially a member of the local Golkar party. Internal Golkar decisions at the national and local levels following the outbreak of communal violence meant the Sultan left the party.

[12] At the time of writing, the 2007 gubernatorial elections — the first ever direct elections for the governor's position in North Maluku — were ongoing. In contrast to the 2001–2002 gubernatorial elections, local politics dominates these elections, in terms of both process and candidates. In light of the arguments presented here, it will be interesting to see which candidate, and from which faction, wins.

[13] Interview with Abdul Gafur, Ternate, 17 October 2005.

[14] Interviews with a member of the North Maluku provincial legislature, Ternate, October 2005. According to this source, Megawati's intervention in the 2002 gubernatorial elections links historically to her resentment of student critics of her father when he was President. Student leaders accused Sukarno of links to the PKI in 1965; Abdul Gafur headed this group of student activists at the time.

[15] In North Maluku, the term Koh — a term of respect among ethnic Chinese men — is also used for non-ethnic Chinese and roughly means "brother" or "local son". By using the prefix Koh during the election campaign, Syamsir demonstrated his local roots and his closeness to the community, in contrast to his main competitor, the Javanese Queen.

[16] Interviews and focus groups held around Ternate on and after the city elections day, June 2005.

[17] Interview with senior official, Ternate city administration, 19 October 2005.

[18] The politics of the "post"-conflict economy in North Maluku is explored further in my PhD thesis (forthcoming).

[19] Thanks to Syarif Hidayat, political analyst at LIPI, Jakarta, for these insights.

[20] Interview with local corruption-monitoring NGO, Ternate, 30 September 2005.

[21] I witnessed this on several occasions during the campaign and it was also reported to me in interviews.

[22] Proverb as quoted in Chubb (1982, p. 210) in reference to why the poor of Palermo, in southern Italy, chose immediate concrete benefits from the Christian Democrats (DC) over political alternatives.

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15

ETHNIC POLITICS AND THE RISE OF THE DAYAK BUREAUCRACTS IN LOCAL ELECTIONS *Pilkada* in Six *Kabupaten* in West Kalimantan

Benny Subianto

INTRODUCTION

The province of West Kalimantan is one of the most ethnically and religiously heterogeneous provinces in Indonesia. Apart from the Dayaks, Malays, and Chinese, the Madurese is one of the main ethnic groups in West Kalimantan. The Madurese were never a significant migrant group in numerical terms; however, they were highly visible because they lived separately from other ethnic groups, building their own ghettos. It is quite interesting that the 2000 Population Census does not mention "Dayak" as an ethnic category in West Kalimantan. The reason might be because the Dayak people always identify their ethnicity with their "sub-ethnic" groups, such as Iban, Taman, Kanayatn, Mualang, Desa, Ribun, Pesaguan, Simpakng, Jalai, etc. In fact, as an ethnic grouping, "Dayak" is an invented category, created by Dutch anthropologists and colonial administrators during the Dutch colonial period to depict the indigenous people of Borneo who were neither Malay nor Muslim; it was used in the 1930 Population Census. The 2000 Population Census was the first census after the 1930 census which included ethnic categories, but since

it did not use the category "Dayak" in the demographic profile of West Kalimantan I refer to the data provided by military sources; in those sources the "Dayaks" count for 41 per cent of the population, while the Malays are 39 per cent, Chinese are 12 per cent, and the rest, labelled "Others" and including Javanese, Madurese, Buginese, make up 8 per cent of the population.[1]

Unlike most provinces in Indonesia, where certain ethnic and religious groups are dominant, there is no single dominant ethnic or religious group in West Kalimantan. The Muslim population counts for 57.62 per cent, followed by Catholics 24.05 per cent, Protestants 9.96 per cent, and Buddhists 6.41 per cent of the population.[2] This suggests that although Muslims count for more than half of the total population, they are not the real dominant religious group since the number of non-Muslims is quite substantial. Furthermore, the ethnic and religious profile of West Kalimantan very much reflects ethnicized Malaysian-type politics (*politik perkauman*), in which ethnicity and religion overlap. Being Malay in Malaysia is always Muslim; similarly, being Malay in West Kalimantan is always Muslim. Being Dayak is always either Christian or pagan. If a Dayak converts to Islam, he or she will be categorized as "Senganan", which is no longer considered Dayak. This kind of ethnicized politics is not found in most other Indonesian provinces.

While the demographic profile of West Kalimantan suggests that there is no dominant ethnic or religious group, the Dayaks have been economically and politically deprived since the New Order came to power. This is perhaps part of the reason why the demographic profile is quite fragile and has triggered ethnic and religious conflict. Bloody ethnic conflict broke out between the Dayaks and Madurese in Sanggau Ledo sub-district, *kabupaten* Sambas, in December 1996. The violence reeled from one set of horrific incidents to another through the first few months of 1997.[3] Two years later, in January 1999, another incident of ethnic violence of high magnitude broke out between the Malays and Madurese in Tebas sub-district, *kabupaten* Sambas. Attacks and counter-attacks involving the Malays and Madurese continued well into March. The situation worsened when a Dayak was killed in an incident; the violence then spread to involve the Dayaks, too. The bloodshed continued in successive waves for about three months. Reportedly, 186 people lost their lives, and at least 26,000 Madurese became IDP (internally displaced people). The untamed violence turned into a type of "ethnic cleansing", in the sense that the Malays strongly resisted the return of the Madurese to their long time home in *kabupaten* Sambas (Petebang and Sutisno 2000). The recurrent ethnic violence in West Kalimantan had already started in the early days of the New Order, from October 1967 to March

1968, when the Dayaks were instigated by the army to evict the remnants of leftist PGRS/Paraku (Pasukan Gerakan Rakyat Sarawak/Pasukan Rakyat Kalimantan Utara) guerrillas[4] in *kabupaten* Sambas and Pontianak. The Dayaks declared war against the leftist Chinese guerrillas in the hinterland of West Kalimantan. Reportedly, 3,000 Chinese were killed and approximately 60,000 Chinese were displaced.

THE BEGINNING OF DAYAK MARGINALIZATION AND EXCLUSION

The involvement of the Dayaks in the purge of the leftist guerrillas in 1967–68 was a political disaster for the Dayaks in the decades that followed. It is still an open question why the Dayaks were willing to take such hostile action to support the army in evicting and killing the Chinese of the hinterland,[5] as the earlier relations between the two ethnic groups had always been harmonious. One possible explanation of Dayak willingness to support the military in expelling the leftist PGRS/Paraku guerrillas was that it was a last-ditch effort for survival of Oevaang Oeray, an important Dayak leader, after he was sacked from his post as the Governor of West Kalimantan in June 1966. By lending his support to the army, Oevaang Oeray imagined that he and his fellow Dayak Partindo (Partai Indonesia) politicians could win political acceptance from the new regime under Soeharto.[6] In his state address before the Parliament (DPR) on 16 August 1968, President Soeharto expressed his gratitude to the Dayaks who had helped the army to expel the Communist guerrillas in West Kalimantan. Nevertheless, the New Order government launched a systematic policy of political marginalization and exclusion towards the Dayaks. The four existing Dayak *bupati* — M. Th. Djaman of Sanggau, G.P. Djaoeng of Sintang, J.R. Gielling of Kapuas Hulu, and Djelani of Pontianak — were soon sacked from their posts and replaced by non-Dayaks, mostly military officers. After that, Dayak politicians and bureaucratic elite were impeded from getting important political or bureaucratic positions.

Having manipulated the Dayaks into evicting the leftist guerrillas, the New Order soon represented a new institutional venture that systemically marginalized the Dayaks. Following the New Order power consolidation, the Dayaks lost almost all representation in government and legislative institutions, as well as access to the central government. The New Order regime labelled the Dayaks "primitive" and "backward", hence "incompatible with modern life and economic development". During the New Order, none of the West Kalimantan governors or deputy governors was a Dayak, nor did any Dayak gain a ministerial or high-ranking military position. Until 1995, no Dayak

was appointed to the position of *bupati* (Bertrand 2004, pp. 54–55). In addition to this, the Dayaks' local bureaucratic corps also suffered from lack of promotion. Even in the state universities, such as the Pontianak-based Tanjungpura University, which is considered a miniature representation of the local elite, the number of Dayak students and lecturers are underrepresented in comparison to the Malays.

Soon after coming to power in 1966, the New Order state initiated policies to accelerate economic development. The laws on foreign investment and forest exploitation were among the first laws enacted by the new government in 1967, enabling the large-scale exploitation of forest resources. The New Order government soon granted licences for forest concessions (Hak Pengusaha Hutan, HPH) to a number of big companies, mainly controlled by a handful of local Chinese and high-ranking military officers. The pattern of natural resource exploitation was disadvantageous to the Dayaks as the main stakeholders. Furthermore, the opening of forest exploitation curtailed the Dayak tradition of shifting cultivation. The study by Nancy Lee Peluso and Emily Harwell (2001, pp. 83–115) revealed that the Dayaks had no access to the New Order's policies of forest exploitation. The Dayaks were hence excluded from political and economic benefits of the New Order's lucrative economic development.

DAYAK-BASED NGOs AND THE REAWAKENING OF DAYAK POLITICS

The New Order systematically marginalized and excluded the Dayaks from political, cultural, and economic access. Since Oevaang Oeray, the prominent leader of the Dayaks, was labelled as a left-leaning nationalist, all Dayak people were politically stigmatized for being leftist, and therefore they were excluded from New Order politics. For almost three decades (1967–95), the position of sub-district head (*camat*) was the highest bureaucratic rank a Dayak could achieve. Therefore, young and intelligent Dayak college graduates had no promising future in joining the bureaucracy. In politics, many Dayak teachers and community leaders were co-opted by Golkar since they were needed as vote-getters during elections. However, very few Dayak Golkar politicians got strategic positions in politics. Meanwhile, some Dayak politicians who joined PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia) also could not make much headway as politicians, simply because that party had been emasculated by the New Order. For young Dayaks who wanted to embark on a career via university, the state-run Tanjungpura University was controlled by the Malay "mafia" who hindered their future career advancement.

Under such difficult circumstances, in the early 1980s, some young Dayak students and college graduates of various sub-ethnic groups from *kabupaten* Ketapang, who studied and worked in Pontianak, decided to change the destiny of the Dayaks. These young Dayaks endeavoured to eradicate the image of the Dayaks as "primitive", "backward", and "incompatible with modernity". Under the headship of A.R. Mecer, a university lecturer and prominent Dayak community leader, they founded a Dayak-based non-governmental organization (NGO) named the Pancur Kasih Foundation in 1981.[7] The main objective of the Pancur Kasih Foundation was to help the Dayak community progress. The foundation discovered the most strategic way to assist the Dayak people in 1987, when it decided to set up a credit union for Dayaks who were in financial difficulties. Within a few years the credit union grew promisingly and became the heart of the Pancur Kasih Foundation's activities. The credit union proved to be a successful channel for the "people's economic liberation". Later, the Pancur Kasih Foundation founded the Bank Perkreditan Rakyat (People's Credit Bank). According to the 2002 data, the credit union had a branch in every Dayak village in West Kalimantan, with more than 33,000 members, and the shared assets had grown to around Rp 50 billion. In addition to assisting the Dayak people in financial management, the credit union's main agenda was to change the Dayaks' mental attitude through education. The Pancur Kasih Foundation has been successful in building a sense of strong solidarity and togetherness among the members, particularly in solving their financial problems. It appears that the credit union's motto: "education, self-reliance, and solidarity" has been fulfilled.

Having achieved success in the financial sector, the Pancur Kasih Foundation established the Institute of Dayakology Research and Development (IDRD) in 1991. The institute, better known as Dayakology, aims at conducting research on and for the Dayaks, particularly in the revitalization and restoration of Dayak heritage. The Dayakology Institute, therefore, focuses its research on oral tradition. In 1993, the Pancur Kasih Foundation set up another NGO called Lembaga Bela Banua Talino (LBBT) that focuses on revitalization of customary laws, customary organization, and legal policy review, by providing legal training and advocacy to the Dayaks. To address the forestry management issues, the Pancur Kasih Foundation launched Program Pemberdayaan Sistem Hutan Kerakyatan (Program to Empower a People's Forestry System).

Under the flagship of the Pancur Kasih Foundation, a monthly news magazine, the *Kalimantan Review,* was set up. It specializes in reporting on Dayak social, economic, political, and cultural life and has become a very strategic media outlet to articulate the Dayaks' view and aspirations, especially

to voice Dayaks' sense of political and economic marginalization. The readers of *Kalimantan Review* are mainly the Dayaks in West Kalimantan and other Kalimantan provinces who belong to the various sub-ethnic groups, such as Kanayatn, Iban, Taman, Jalai, Ngaju, etc. These Dayak people live in various communities that are distant from one another, and they speak different local languages. In this regard, the *Kalimantan Review* has played an invaluable role in creating "an imagined community" (Anderson 1991) among the various sub-Dayak ethnic groups; the wide distribution of *Kalimantan Review* can be seen as the emergence of "print-capitalism", following Anderson's argument, which has enabled the Dayak people, through common printed reading materials, to imagine that they are members of the same ethnic group (the so-called Dayaks), who have been marginalized for a long time.

Amidst the Dayaks' frustration and grievances after being marginalized and excluded by the New Order, the presence of Pancur Kasih Foundation and the *Kalimantan Review* enhanced their feeling of solidarity and confidence, contributing also to their self-assertiveness (Davidson 2003). Perhaps it is in the light of their oppression and reasserted confidence that we need to understand the bloody ethnic conflict between the Dayaks and Madurese in 1996–97.

The accomplishments of the Pancur Kasih Foundation increased the political leverage of the Dayaks in the local political arena. Beginning in the mid-1990s, the Dayaks began voicing their demand to have Dayak *bupati* in provinces where the Dayak people form 41 per cent of the total population. This demand for fair political representation was accommodated by the governor. In 1994, Governor Aspar Aswin, an army major-general, agreed to endorse L.H. Kadir,[8] one of the highest-ranking Dayak bureaucrats, in the *bupati* elections in *kabupaten* Sintang. Even though the New Order DPRD (Local Assembly) usually just rubber-stamped government policy, surprisingly, the DPRD in Sintang did not follow the governor's endorsement, and instead were in favour of Abdillah Kamarullah, a Malay career bureaucrat, for *bupati*. Those Sintang *bupati* elections in 1994 triggered the Dayak people to run amok. They blocked the main road between Ngabang and Sintang, and attacked passing cars. It was a keenly felt political loss for the Dayaks, and spurred them to more forcefully aggregate and articulate their political interests, particularly in seeking public office in the local political arena. A few months later, Jacobus Layang, a Dayak career bureaucrat, won the *bupati* election in Kapuas Hulu. As the first New Order Dayak *bupati,* the appointment of Jacobus Layang was politically significant for the Dayaks as they then considered themselves eligible and viable to assume public office after being excluded for almost three decades.

The *reformasi* era, following the downfall of Soeharto's New Order in May 1998, was signified by the rise of ethnic politics all over the archipelago. Various politically deprived ethnic and religious groups voiced their demands to be politically accommodated in the new democratic era. The new political terrain provided more space for the Dayaks to strengthen their leverage, particularly in contesting for public office.

During the thirty-two-year New Order era, Jacobus Layang of Kapuas Hulu was the only Dayak appointed to the position of *bupati*. But within two years after the *reformasi* period began, by late 2000, four Dayak career bureaucrats and one Dayak military officer held the position of *bupati*. They were Cornelius Kimha of Pontianak, Cornelis of Landak, Elyakim Simon Djalil of Sintang, Jacobus Luna of Bengkayang, and Col. Michael Andjioe of Sanggau.[9] By any standards, the Dayaks have been successful in their endeavour to assume *bupati*-ships in West Kalimantan, particularly in the *kabupaten* which are predominantly Dayak and non-Muslim.[10]

THE BIRTH OF ETHNIC POLITICS IN WEST KALIMANTAN

The direct regional head elections (*pemilihan kepala daerah langsung*), as stipulated in Law 32/2004, are designed to guarantee a democratic political recruitment for the positions of governor, mayor, and *bupati.* The regional head elections by the Local Assembly (DPRD) in the past were considered undemocratic since members of DPRD could be easily manipulated by regional head candidates. In addition, DPRD members did not yet fully represent the interests and aspirations of their constituents. In order to enhance democratization processes at the local level, direct regional head elections (*pilkada*) are designed to promote an Indonesian democratic transition.

Aside from the rampant practices of "money politics" and the use of coercion before and during the elections, as well as the emergence of a "shadow state" and "informal economy" practices in the post-election period (a common feature in various cases of *pilkada* over the archipelago, see Hidayat, Chapter 6 this volume), the *pilkada* in six *kabupaten* in West Kalimantan in June 2005 were very marked by the strong inclination of the electorate to vote along their ethnic and religious lines, instead of considering the candidates' qualifications, track record, campaign programmes, and political and moral integrity. Even the political parties, under which the candidates received their tickets for running in *pilkada,* did not seem to affect the electorate. In the regional head direct elections it appears that the personality of candidates and their attributes, such as ethnicity, religion, region of origin,

local language, physical attractiveness, and rhetorical skill were key factors that determined a candidate's victory or loss.

The propensity of the West Kalimantan electorate to vote along ethnic and religious lines is evident for three reasons. First, as mentioned earlier, the demographic profile of West Kalimantan indicates that no single ethnic group or religion is dominant and fully in control of the region. Therefore, ethnic and religious rivalries affect their everyday life and political orientations. Second, the decades-old recurrent bloody ethnic violence has intensified the ethnic and religious identity of the people. Third, most of the people in West Kalimantan are not well-educated; hence, ethnic and religious identities can be easily manipulated for political purposes.

As indicated earlier, the Dayaks and the Malays are the main ethnic groups in West Kalimantan, comprising approximately 80 per cent of the total population. Coincidentally, these two ethnic groups are adherents of the two major religious streams in the region; the Dayaks are always Catholic or Protestant (often considered collectively to be "Christian"), while the Malays are always Muslims. The Dayaks, who, as mentioned above, suffered from political and economic deprivation during the New Order, are currently consolidating their political forces in order to regain public office positions. It is understandable that the 2005 *pilkada* in six *kabupaten* in West Kalimantan were marked by enormous enthusiasm of the Dayak elite to run for *bupati.* Unlike the Dayaks, the Malays had never been systematically marginalized and excluded by the New Order. However, they were quite intimidated by the influx of Madurese migrants who controlled various economic sectors. The Malay–Madurese violent ethnic clash in 1999, in which the Malays were successful in evicting the Madurese from *kabupaten* Sambas, marked the Malays' political reawakening. The Malays regained their confidence after quite a long period of being harassed by the Madurese. Thus, the two major ethnic groups of West Kalimantan both experienced political reawakening in an era of regional autonomy which saw the rise of identity politics. Both Malays and Dayaks, who claim to be the indigenous ethnic groups of West Kalimantan, geared up to mobilize their political forces. While the Dayaks already established various ethnic-based social organizations to enhance their political leverage back in the 1980s and early 1990s, the Malays only began to do so during and after the period of conflict with the Madurese. They set up various ethnic-based organizations, such as FKPM (Forum Komunikasi Pemuda Melayu or the Communication Forum of the Malay Youth), MABM (Majelis Adat dan Budaya Melayu or the Malay Customary and Cultural Council), and Lembayu (Lembaga Adat dan Kekerabatan Melayu or the Malay Customary and Kinship Council).[11]

The political reawakening of the Malays and Dayaks in the era of *reformasi,* a period when Jakarta's control of political appointments of local high-ranking pubic office positions is waning and the regions are becoming more or less politically autonomous, resulted, therefore, in tight rivalry between the Dayaks and Malays in their struggle for *bupati* positions. The use of ethnic and religious sentiments could be seen in the case of the post-New Order *bupati* elections (by the DPRD) in *kabupaten* Landak and Pontianak, in which the contesting candidates represented the interests of either the Dayaks or the Malays. The intensifying ethnic politics in West Kalimantan was very apparent in the process of dividing *kabupaten* Sambas into the hinterland Bengkayang and the coastal Sambas in late 1998. The split of *kabupaten,* known as *pemekaran,* has created a predominantly Dayak electorate of Bengkayang and a predominantly Malay electorate of Sambas. The Bengkayang local government is controlled by the Dayaks, while the neighbouring *kabupaten* Sambas is controlled by the Malays.

ETHNICITY AND RELIGION MATTER

As a post-conflict region, it is quite logical that ethnic and religious identity played a substantial role in shaping political behaviour in West Kalimantan (see also Brown and Diprose in this volume). Theoretical explanations of increased ethnic consciousness can be classified into two broad perspectives. First, the "primordialist" approach takes ethnic identity as its starting point, describing ethnic loyalty in terms of shared cultural values; social and political behaviour along these lines is generally considered as an expression of this identity. Second, the "situationalist" (or "circumstantialist") approach considers group identity to be a social construct, a resource for promoting cohesion and thus advocating group interests. Social and political behaviour is explained in terms of certain groups taking advantage of circumstances at particular historical moments to promote their interests (Brown 1994).

In recent years, the "situationalist" approach has attracted the most theoretical and empirical attention. In the case of ethnic studies in Indonesia, such a trend is evident. In the past, most analyses on ethnicity in Indonesia were very much in the "primordialist" vein, commonly arguing that since Indonesia is a plural society, competition between distinct communities flowed from efforts to defend and enhance primordial identities. More recent ethnic studies try to explain political and class alliances, rather than deep-seated ethnic resentment. The case of ethnic politics in West Kalimantan indicates that the rise of ethnic identity and consciousness is very much a result of certain circumstances and a long social process, such as feelings of

being politically marginalized, natural resource competition, and threats from migrant ethnic groups, rather than simply primordial sentiment.

The *pilkada* results in the six West Kalimantan *kabupaten*, at first glance, confirmed the "primordialist" approach that people voted according to their ethnic loyalty. However, having looked carefully at how political and class alliances intersect with broader community concerns and interests, it appeared that ethnic loyalty was socially constructed where certain ethnic groups were disadvantaged over time.

Kabupaten Ketapang

The contest for *bupati-ship* in Ketapang's *pilkada* was not that complicated. The contestants were the Malay incumbent *bupati* (Morkes Effendi) the Dayak incumbent vice-*bupati* (Laurentius Majun) and a Malay (Gusti Sofyan Afsier) (see Table 15.1). The success of Morkes Effendi, a career bureaucrat, was very much due to the support of the bureaucratic machine as well as financial support from local Chinese businessmen in the logging industry. This was despite alleged misdemeanours during his first term in office. His potential contender was his own deputy, a Dayak with a strong NGO background, but who lacked the bureaucratic machine support.

In the light of ethnic politics, the victory of Morkes Effendi in Ketapang's *pilkada* is quite understandable, since the major religion is Islam which accounts for 69 per cent of the population, while Catholics and Protestants form only about 25 per cent. Soon after the *pilkada* results were officially announced, on 11 July 2005, around 500 people staged a demonstration that was triggered by pamphlets issued on behalf of the MABM (Majelis Adat dan

TABLE 15.1
Kabupaten Ketapang *Pilkada* Results

Candidate	*Ethnicity*	*Party*	*Background*	*Votes*	*%*
Laurentius Majun Abul Ainin	D M	PDI-P	Incumbent vice-*bupati*, NGO activist, member of PPDK	69,274	32%
Gusti Sofyan Afsier Paulus Lukas Denggol	M D	PPP, PD, PPD	Information unavailable to author	55,885	25%
Morkes Effendi Hendrikus	M D	Partai Golkar	Incumbent *bupati* Career bureaucrat	94,380	43%

Source: Compiled from various sources.

Budaya Melayu or Malay Customary and Cultural Council) saying that voters should not vote for an infidel (*kafir*) candidate. Demonstrators also protested against the bulletin *Suara Santri Kabupaten Ketapang* (The Voice of the Santri of Ketapang District) which carried the appeal of Uztad Faizal Hamid prohibiting Muslims from voting for non-Muslim candidates.[12] This use of religious sentiments, charging Muslims not to vote for an infidel, appeared to be an effective manoeuvre for Morkes Effendi to gain more votes from the Muslim voters. His contender, Laurentius Majun, a Dayak-Catholic, was likely to have been disadvantaged by such a tactic. Surprisingly, there was no legal action taken by the Local Election Commission (KPUD), the police, or the public attorney.

Kabupaten Kapuas Hulu

The competition for the *bupati*-ship in *kabupaten* Kapuas Hulu took place between Abang Tambul Husin, the incumbent *bupati* who is a career bureaucrat of Dayak-Muslim origin[13] and the local Golkar Chair, and Baiduri Ahmad, a Malay businessman with a coherent vision. Both of them had Dayak running-mates. Abang Tambul Husin won the election with a considerable margin (51 per cent) (see Table 15.2), which is the highest percentage among the six winners of West Kalimantan *pilkada.* Abang Tambul Husin's victory had been widely predicted due to his position as incumbent, with vast support from

TABLE 15.2
Kabupaten Kapuas Hulu *Pilkada* Results

Candidate	*Ethnicity*	*Party*	*Background*	*Votes*	*%*
Abang Tambul Husin	D/M	Partai Golkar	Incumbent *bupati*, Golkar chair, career bureaucrat	58,768	51%
Josef Alexander	D		Career bureaucrat		
Zainuddin Isman	M	PKPI, PPP	Information unavailable to author	5,929	5%
Paulus Jimbau	D				
Baiduri Ahmad	M	PD, Partai Merdeka	Businessman	43,785	38%
Antonius Ain Pamero	D				
M. Kembing Kasmidi	D	PDI-P, PBB, PBR, PNBK, PNUI, PBSD	Information unavailable to author	7,457	6%
	M				

Source: Compiled from various sources.

the bureaucracy. To finance his campaign, reportedly he managed to accumulate huge funds from illegal logging practices in Kapuas Hulu.[14] As a *bupati,* he also maintained good relations with the underworld (*preman*), who became his political protectors. In addition, from his position as the local Golkar Chair, he managed to effortlessly mobilize his party members to vote for him, since Golkar in Kapuas Hulu is still an effective political machine.

From the perspective of ethnic politics, the victory of a Muslim candidate is very likely since the Muslim population in Kapuas Hulu accounts for 57.2 per cent.[15] His strong contender, Baiduri Ahmad, was also a Muslim. However, voters were still in favour of Abang Tambul Husin since he was believed to have delivered advantages for them. The only Dayak *bupati* candidate, M. Kembing, faired poorly. The Dayaks in Kapuas Hulu were unsuccessful in consolidating their political base after the performance of the first Dayak *bupati* of the reform era, Jacobus Layang, had left much to be desired.

Kabupaten Bengkayang

Bengkayang became a new *kabupaten* in late 1998; it was previously part of *kabupaten* Sambas. The process of dividing *kabupaten* Sambas into Bengkayang and Sambas was ethnically motivated. The new hinterland Bengkayang is predominantly Dayak and Chinese, where the Catholics account for 20 per cent and Protestants for 16 per cent of the population; while the new Sambas *kabupaten*, covering mainly coastal areas, is predominantly Malay, who account for approximately 60 per cent of the total population, which is around 85 per cent Muslim.

As a predominantly Dayak *kabupaten,* predictably, the strongest contenders in the Bengkayang *pilkada* were Dayaks. There were four prominent Dayak figures in the *pilkada* (see Table 15.3). Sebastian Kahpat, a politician of the original Catholic Party, which later merged into PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia) during the New Order; Moses Ahie, the incumbent vice-*bupati* and career bureaucrat; Michael Andjioe, an army colonel who formerly served as Sanggau *bupati;* and Yacobus Luna, the incumbent *bupati* who is a career bureaucrat. The incumbent *bupati* and vice-*bupati,* Yacobus Luna and Moses Ahie, gained the most votes, 34 and 28 per cent respectively. Those four candidates represented the New Order elite, both bureaucratic and military, showing that they still are politically grounded in local politics.

The victory of Yacobus Luna and his running-mate, Suryatman Gidot, was due to their strategy of luring both Catholic and Protestant voters, since Luna is Catholic and Gidot is Protestant.[16] The running-mates of Moses Ahie and Michael Andjioe, on the other hand, were Muslims. In

TABLE 15.3
Kabupaten Bengkayang *Pilkada* Results

Candidate	*Ethnicity*	*Party*	*Background*	*Votes*	*%*
Matheus Utan Goetarno Ibrahim	D M	PKPI, PAN, PBR	Information unavailable to author	5,190	6%
Sebastian M. Kahpat Alexander Simon	D D	PPP, PD, PPD	politician, former MPR Member	6,080	7%
Moses Ahie Uray Heriansyah	D M	Partai Golkar	Incumbent vice-*bupati*	26,225	28%
Michael Andjioe Edy Jacoub	D M	PPDK, Partai Pelopor, PBSD	Former Sanggau *bupati*, an army colonel	16,832	18%
Yacobus Luna Suryatman Gidot	D D	PDI-P	Incumbent *bupati,* Politician, DPRD member of PNBK	30,029	34%
Pertus Kasiyo	D J	Combination of small parties	Information unavailable to author	6,555	7%

Source: Compiled from various sources.

addition, Yacobus Luna was backed by an efficient campaign team and bureaucratic machinery at the lower levels. He took advantage of his position as a seasoned bureaucrat with long experience, and managed to mobilize funds for the election campaign. He won despite allegations of corruption during his first term as Bengkayang *bupati*.

Kabupaten Sintang

The Sintang *pilkada* was the tightest political race in 2005 West Kalimantan's *pilkada.* The strongest among all the candidates were the Dayak career bureaucrats: Elyakim Simon Djalil, the incumbent *bupati* who was accused of corruption;[17] Milton Crosby, a career bureaucrat; and Mikail Abeng, the Golkar Chair and DPRD Speaker. Elyakim Simon Djalil and Mikail Abeng's running-mates were Malays, while Milton Crosby's running-mate was a Javanese, a practising medical doctor with an ICMI (Ikatatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia — Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association) background (see Table 15.4).

TABLE 15.4
Kabupaten Sintang *Pilkada* Results

Candidate	*Ethnicity*	*Party*	*Background*	*Votes*	*%*
Elyakim Simon Djalil	D	PDI-P	Incumbent *bupati*	39,791	24%
Ade Kartawijya	M		Incumbent vice-*bupati*		
Milton Crosby	D	PDS, P	Career bureaucrat	42,323	25%
Jarot Winarno	J	Pelopor	Doctor, ICMI affiliated		
Murjadi	M	PD, PKS,	Information unavailable	17,537	10%
Nicodemus Taun	D	PAN, PBR	to author		
Mikail Abeng	D	Partai Golkar	DPRD Speaker and	34,225	20%
Ade M. Jusuf	M		Golkar Chair		
Harry Syamsuddin	M	PPP, PBB,	Information unavailable	28,530	17%
Handriantus Mentili	D	Partai Pelopor, PPDK	to author		
Heri Jamri	D	Partai Merdeka,	Politician	6.343	4%
Theresia Jita	D	PPD			

Source: Compiled from various sources.

Despite Elyakim Simon Djalil and his running-mate being the incumbents, the allegation that Elyakim Simon Djalil was implicated in illegal logging diminished his popular support. Mikail Abeng was fully supported by the Golkar political machinery. However, his popular support was also quite weak because he was considered arrogant and paid little attention to the people's interests and aspirations.

Apparently, the victory of Milton Crosby and his running-mate Jarot Winarno was due to their success in luring both Malay-Muslim and Dayak-Christian voters. Jarot Winarno, who is a smart young medical doctor-cum-politician, managed to mobilize support from Malays, Buginese, and Javanese business communities in Sintang. In addition, Jarot Winarno was successful in making use of his ICMI network to attract more Muslim voters. As a Protestant, Milton Crosby was supported by the Protestant Church and Christian voters. However, Crosby and Winarno won the election with a very tiny margin, only 2,532 votes or 1 per cent. Reportedly, after being installed as *bupati,* Milton Crosby is still under the shadow of his deputy, who is the virtual *bupati.*

Kabupaten Sekadau

Sekadau is a new *kabupaten,* which was previously part of *kabupaten* Sanggau. The formation of *kabupaten* Sekadau was supported by *kabupaten* Sanggau, which reportedly provided a sum of Rp 4.8 billion to speed up the legal process in the DPR (National Legislature) in 2003. As a newly established *kabupaten,* many figures who hailed from Sekadau were interested in running for *bupati.* The Sekadau *pilkada* was one of the most interesting political races in West Kalimantan. The five pairs of candidates fared quite well; none gained less than 15 per cent of the votes (see Table 15.5). In comparison to other *pilkada* in West Kalimantan, there were quite a few businessmen running for *bupati.*

The two strongest candidates in Sekadau's *pilkada* were Dayak career bureaucrats and Dayak NGO activists. Simon Petrus, a Dayak career bureaucrat was appointed by the governor of West Kalimantan as acting *bupati* soon after Sekadau officially became a *kabupaten*; he is also the local Golkar Chair. His running-mate was Abun Ediyanto, a Chinese businessman who is also a

TABLE 15.5
Kabupaten Sekadau *Pilkada* Results

Candidate	*Ethnicity*	*Party*	*Background*	*Votes*	*%*
Simon Petrus	D	PPD, PPDI, PPDK, PDS	Acting *bupati* and Golkar Chair	25,157	28%
Abun Ediyanto	C		Businessman, nephew of *bupati* Sanggau		
Benny Pensong	M	PBR, PKPI, PBB, PSI, PKS,	Jakarta-based businessman	18,127	20%
Hugo Agato	D	PAN, PIB, PP	DPRD member of PKPB		
Mulyadi Yamin	M	Partai Golkar	Businessman-cum-politician	13,357	15%
Susanna Regina	D		Civil servant		
Stephanus Masiun	D	PNBK, PD	NGO activist	19,218	21%
Petrus Langsang	D		Civil servant		
Aloysius Alexander	D	PDI-P	Businessman	13,938	16%
Norbertus	D		Career bureaucrat		

Source: Compiled from various sources.

nephew of Sanggau *bupati* Jansen Akun Effendi. Stephanus Masiun was a young and promising NGO activist, who is affiliated to the Pancur Kasih Foundation, and his running-mate was a fellow Dayak civil servant who is also close to the Pancur Kasih Foundation. Both the pairs of Simon Petrus-Abun Ediyanto and Stephanus Masiun-Petrus Langsang struggled to garner votes from the Dayaks and Chinese electorate. While the pair of Benny Pensong-Hugo Agato and Mulyadi Yamin-Susanna Regina apparently tried to lure the Malay voters who account for around 30 per cent of total voters.

Simon Petrus' campaign fund was fully provided by his running-mate, Abun Ediyanto, a Chinese businessman who is widely known for being politically well-connected. In addition, Simon Petrus was supported by Usman Jafar, the current governor of West Kalimantan, who needed his political support for the 2007 gubernatorial election. During the election campaign period, the camp of Simon Petrus-Abun Ediyanto launched a "black campaign" against Stephanus Masiun-Petrus Langsang by raising the issue that Masiun is an anti-illegal logging and anti-palm oil plantation activist.[18] Such negative campaigns effectively discouraged the business community and the business-friendly electorate from voting for Stephanus Masiun-Petrus Langsang.

The Masiun-Langsang campaign strategy was still considered an NGO-type campaign, which might be effective to make people aware of certain issues, but not enough to make people take their side and vote for them. Furthermore, the Masiun-Langsang camp very much relied on the Pancur Kasih Foundation.[19] They envisaged that the Pancur Kasih Foundation would be able to mobilize a block-vote from all Dayak voters. In fact, the Dayak electorate voted along their sub-ethnic lines or according to their region of origin.

On 27 June, a few days after the voting day, the pairs of Benny Pensong-Hugo Agato, Mulyadi Yamin-Susanna Regina, Stephanus Masiun-Petrus Langsang, and Aloysius Alexander-Norbertus protested the *pilkada* results, which brought the victory of Simon Petrus-Abun Ediyanto. The defeated candidates accused the winners of committing election fraud, such as offering Rp 10,000–20,000 to each voter in the early morning of voting day; also, many voters did not receive their voting cards, which prevented them from voting. In addition, the local military in Belitang Hulu Sub-district reportedly intimidated the electorate to vote for Simon Petrus-Abun Ediyanto.

The Sekadau *pilkada* indicates that ethnic politics prevailed, since the electorate voted along their ethnic lines. The fact that the two strongest contenders are Dayaks means the ethnic line was necessary, but not sufficient to ensure the victory of a candidate. This suggests that ethnicity intersects with economic variables, meaning that candidates can make use of ethnic

sentiments, but at the same time need to convince the electorate that they would get benefits from voting for them. The contest between Simon Petrus and Stephanus Masiun indicates the stiff competition between Dayak bureaucratic elite versus the Dayak NGO elite. It turned out that the bureaucratic elite, who were cultivated by the New Order state, fared better, particularly in manipulating the electorate.

Kabupaten Melawi

Melawi is also a newly established *kabupaten,* which was previously part of *kabupaten* Sintang. The legislation process in the formation of *kabupaten* Melawi at the DPR in 2003 had been accused of corruption.[20] Following the enactment of the formation of Melawi *kabupaten,* in early 2004, the governor of West Kalimantan appointed Suman Kurik, a Dayak career bureaucrat, as the acting *bupati.*

The Melawi *pilkada* was marked by the contest of Kurik with Rahmat Katilah, a Malay career bureaucrat, and Hamzah, a Malay politician who is a member of the DPRD from PBR (Partai Bintang Reformasi) (see Table 15.6). As the only potential Dayak candidate, it appeared that Suman Kurik's main contender was Rahmat Katilah, his fellow career bureaucrat. Since

TABLE 15.6
Kabupaten Melawi *Pilkada* Results

Candidate	*Ethnicity*	*Party*	*Background*	*Votes*	*%*
Hamzah Triwiyasti	M M		Politician, DPRD member	20,110	23%
Rahmat Katilah Sofian Hadi	M M		Career bureaucrat	24,277	27%
John Budimas Aidi Suryadharma	D M		Information unavailable to author	5,716	6%
Suman Kurik Firman Muntako	D M	PD	Career bureaucrat, acting *bupati* Academician	34,056	39%
Uray Husnul Asmara Darwis	M M		Information unavailable to author	4,171	5%

Source: Compiled from various sources.

Rahmat Katilah's running-mate was also a Malay, apparently the pair failed to attract the non-Malay voters. Suman Kurik seemed to realize that a Malay running-mate might be effective to garner a Malay electorate whose votes are quite substantial.[21] His decision to run with Firman Muntako, a Malay academician, was very strategic for getting votes from both the Dayaks and Malays. In addition to ethnic politics, the network of bureaucratic elite was an indispensable factor. The victory of Suman Kurik was also supported by Elyakim Simon Djalil, a Dayak career bureaucrat who had formerly served as Sintang *bupati*. The reason Elyakim Simon Djalil backed Suman Kurik was to secure his business interests in Melawi.

CONCLUSIONS: WHITHER DEMOCRACY?

Two important matters of interest can be discerned from the results of the six local elections that I have discussed in this paper, and neither of these point to a positive transition to a democratic system in West Kalimantan. The first is about the emergence of ethnicity and religion as important factors in local elections in the reform period, perhaps most particularly in areas where there have been religious and ethnic conflicts. The second has to do with the continuing role of New Order elites in the reform period.

As we have seen, ethnic and religious politics were instrumental in the 2005 *pilkada* elections of six *bupati* in West Kalimantan. In the two *kabupaten* with a Muslim population of more than 50 per cent (Ketapang and Kapuas Hulu) the elected *bupati* were Muslims. In Bengkayang, which is considered a Dayak *kabupaten,* the victory of Yacobus Luna and Suryatman Gidot was very much determined by that pair of candidates manoeuvring the Catholic and Protestant electorate. The case of *kabupaten* Sintang is quite similar; the pair of Milton Crosby and Jarot Winarno was successful in attracting both Dayak-Catholic/Protestants and Malay/Buginese/Javanese-Muslims; particularly noteworthy was the achievement of Jarot Winarno to garner votes from Muslim voters through his ICMI network. The pair of candidates from two ethnic groups, the Dayak Simon Petrus and the Chinese Abun Ediyanto, managed to defeat the pair of Stephanus Masiun and Petrus Langsang, who are both Dayaks. A similar case happened in Melawi where the pair of Suman Kurik and Firman Muntako, who are Dayak and Malay, won over the pair Rahmat Katilah and Sofian Hadi, who are both Malays.

The process of *pilkada* in the six *kabupaten* confirms that ethnic and religious groups do matter in determining the victorious candidates. All pairs of victorious candidates consisted of two ethnic groups, either Dayaks and Malays or Dayaks and Chinese; there was one exception in the case of

Bengkayang, in which the pair of elected candidates were both Dayaks,[22] but they were successful in manoeuvring religious sentiments. Yacobus Luna, who is a Catholic, and his running-mate Suryatman Gidot, who is a Protestant, were able to attract both the Catholic and Protestant electorate which count for almost 50 per cent of the population. In addition, the considerable number of Chinese in the population of Bengkayang were likely to be in favour of the Dayak-Christian candidates rather than the Malay-Muslim ones. Ethnic and religious categories, then, were relevant in relation to other variables as they were utilized for political goals.

As the title of this paper suggests, the 2005 West Kalimantan *pilkada* were marked by the rise of Dayak bureaucratic elites. Four out of six of the elected *bupati* are Dayak career bureaucrats. The cases of *pilkada* in Sekadau and Ketapang revealed that there were stiff intra-Dayak contestations, particularly between the Dayak bureaucrats versus the Dayak-NGO activists. Stephanus Masiun is a young and promising Dayak NGO activist with a very impressive career track in NGOs. He was supported by the Pancur Kasih Foundation, an umbrella organization of various Dayak-based NGOs. Based on his long experience in community development, Stephanus Masiun's vision and mission as a *bupati* candidate was commendable. Unfortunately, he was not a seasoned politician, especially in his campaign strategy. Another similar case was the defeat of Laurentius Majun by Morkes Effendi in Ketapang's *pilkada.* Laurentius Majun was an experienced Dayak NGO activist before he became vice-*bupati* under Morkes Effendi in 2000. His experience and accumulation of resources in local politics during the previous five years, however, did not surpass Morkes Effendi, who is a career bureaucrat. In fact, the victory of Morkes Effendi was quite scandalous, since he was accused of making use of ethnic and religious sentiments in order to defeat Laurentius Majun, his strongest contender. The defeat of both Stephanus Masiun and Laurentius Majun indicates that Dayak-NGO elite activists, who have contributed much to the community during the New Order, were not politically well equipped to compete in *pilkada.*

Aside from the Dayak bureaucratic elite and NGO elite activists, the other Dayak elite are the party politicians who have been working for their political goals and personal ambitions. Only a few of these Dayak party politicians ran in the *pilkada.* One such was Sebastian Kahpat of PPDI, a veteran politician who was formerly active in the Catholic Party, PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia), and later PPDI (Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia); he ran for the *bupati*-ship in Bengkayang, but he did not fare well in it. Akin to Sebastian Kahpat's case was Mikail Abeng, the Golkar chairman of Sintang; he only garnered the third position in the Sintang *pilkada.* He gained fewer

votes than Milton Crosby and Elyakim Simon Djalil, who are both Dayak career bureaucrats.

Unlike the trends in various *pilkada* where businessmen were elected as *bupati* or vice-*bupati,* in the 2005 West Kalimantan *pilkada*, the only elected businessman was Abun Ediyanto, a Chinese, who was elected as the vice-*bupati* of Sekadau. The number of candidates with business backgrounds was very small. Apparently, the prominent businessmen in West Kalimantan still preferred not to be involved officially in politics. The victory of Abun Ediyanto, a Chinese businessman, can be seen as a new political phenomenon of Chinese official participation in politics. Given the fact that the Chinese population in West Kalimantan is quite substantial, it was not surprising for a Chinese to run for *bupati.*[23]

While ethnic and religious affiliation unmistakably mattered in the 2005 West Kalimantan *pilkada*, this study, nevertheless, attempts not to be trapped into ethnic and religious determinism. It is apparent that social and economic factors also had an impact on the success or failure of candidates running in the *pilkada.* Aside from examining ethnic and religious groupings, it is necessary to take into account the social origins and economic power relations of the elected *bupati*.

Table 15.7 reveals that all of the six democratically elected *bupatis* in the 2005 West Kalimantan are members of the local bureaucratic elite who were raised and cultivated under the New Order bureaucratic system.[24] Their political survival in the direct and democratic *pilkada* was due to the fact that five out six elected *bupatis* were incumbents. As incumbents, they could effortlessly mobilize lucrative financial support from the local business communities and make use of all levels of the bureaucracy to garner votes for themselves on Election Day. Having served as *bupati* in the previous five years, they were widely known to the voters. However, this alone does not explain the win, since 40 per cent of all incumbents were voted out in the various *pilkada* across Indonesia held in 2005 (Mietzner 2006). This suggests that the networks of power and the statecraft capability of the New Order local bureaucratic elite are still intact and unchallenged, an argument also voiced by Robison and Hadiz (2004). The transition to democracy and regional autonomy in the *reformasi* era has not yet challenged the dominance of the local bureaucratic elite. The New Order bureaucracy cannot be characterized as a formal organization that was highly differentiated and professionally organized by means of formal rules, with bureaus of highly-trained experts whose activities were coordinated by a hierarchical chain of command, and more importantly, free from any political interests. Rather the New Order bureaucracy had become a power in itself, lacking highly trained

TABLE 15.7
Winners of West Kalimantan 2005 *Pilkada*

Kabupaten	*Elected* Bupati *and Vice*-Bupati	*Ethnicity/Religion*	*Background*
Ketapang	Morkes Effendi Hendrikus	Malay/Muslim Dayak/Catholic	Career bureaucrat Career bureaucrat
Kapuas Hulu	Abang Tambul Husin Josef Alexander	Dayak/Muslim Dayak/Catholic	Career bureaucrat Career bureaucrat
Bengkayang	Yacobus Luna Suryatman Gidot	Dayak/Catholic Dayak/Protestant	Career bureaucrat Party politician
Sintang	Milton Crosby Jarot Winarno	Dayak/Catholic Javanese/Muslim	Career bureaucrat Professional
Sekadau	Simon Petrus Abun Ediyanto	Dayak/Catholic Chinese/Catholic	Career bureaucrat Businessman
Melawi	Suman Kurik Firman Muntako	Dayak/Catholic Malay/Muslim	Career bureaucrat Academician

Source: Compiled from various sources.

experts who work in a rational manner. The New Order bureaucracy was quite notorious for being power corrupt and providing lucrative benefits for the bureaucrats themselves at the expense of the state and people's interests. The *reformasi* movement has not been successful in reforming and improving the performance of the bureaucracy. For all intents and purposes, the existing local and national bureaucracy still consists of, and is controlled by, the same individuals and their peculiar logic. The fact that the New Order bureaucratic elite are the winners of the 2005 West Kalimantan *pilkada* might be a bad omen, then, for democracy at the local level.

Notes

[1] Data based on Semdam, *Tandjungpura Berdjuang: Sedjarah Kodam XII/ Tandjungpura, Kalimantan Barat*, 1970, p. 15. The 2000 Population Census categorizes ethnic groups in West Kalimantan as: Sambas, Chinese, Javanese, Kendayan/Kenyan, Pontianak Malay, Darat, Madurese, Pasaguan, and Others. Oddly enough, the "Others" category counts for 31.12 per cent, because it includes many who, according to the military census, would have fallen into

other categories; the second biggest ethnic category is Sambas, which accounts for 11.92 per cent of the total population. Results of the 2000 Population Census data on ethnic groups in West Kalimantan sparked strong criticism from Dayak intellectuals and community leaders, who accused the Central Board of Statistics (BPS) of manipulating the data on the Dayaks, and making them "disappear". See "Menghilangkan Identitas Dayak Melalui Statistik", *Kalimantan Review*, June 2003.

[2] Data based on the 2000 Population Census.

[3] See Human Rights Watch, *Indonesia: Communal Conflict in West Kalimantan, a Human Rights Watch Report*. New York/London: Human Rights Watch, 1997.

[4] The PGRS/Paraku guerrillas were previously allies of the Indonesian army during the Konfrontasi era (1963–65), when President Sukarno was against the British initiative to establish the Federation of Malaysia, where Sabah and Sarawak were to become part of the Federation of Malaysia. President Sukarno believed that Sarawak was a natural geographical part of Indonesia, and not of the pending Federation of Malaysia. Soon after the Federation of Malaysia was officially inaugurated on 16 September 1963, Soekarno launched the *ganyang Malaysia* (crush Malaysia) campaign. Accordingly, West Kalimantan became the battleground for Indonesian army and leftist Sarawak guerrillas to fight against the Federation of Malaysia. See J.A.C. Mackie, *Konfrontasi: the Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963–1966*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974.

[5] The best elucidation of this subject is in Herbert Feith, "Dayak Legacy", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 25 January 1968. The official target of the army was to evict the PGRS/Paraku guerrillas. However, in practice, the Dayaks were assigned to an area roughly 80 miles square to evict the Chinese leftist guerrillas. The evidence of guerrillas actually infiltrating groups of Chinese, who were mainly peasants, is slight. But there were numerous instances in which the guerrillas obtained their food from these Chinese, and it was a reasonable supposition that this group of the local population would be more vulnerable to Communist appeals than any other. An apparently dominant group of staff officers at the military headquarters in Pontianak took the view that the "guerrilla fish" could best be caught if the water (or the people, in this case the Chinese people) in which they might swim be drained off.

[6] Oevaang Oeray was a shrewd politician who is considered the most prominent leader the Dayaks in West Kalimantan ever had. He went to a Catholic Seminary in Nyarungkop, and later was trained to become a local administrator in Makassar. He helped to set up the United Party, a local party based on the Dayaks' "primordial sentiments", which gained 9 out of 29 seats in the Provincial Council in the 1955 elections. In 1959, Sukarno banned political parties that were formed along ethnic lines; hence the Partai Persatuan Dayak was abolished. Oevaang Oeray, however, swiftly moved to join the left-leaning nationalist party, Partindo (Partai Indonesia). His switch to Partindo obviously increased his political leverage, since Indonesian politics in the early 1960s was swinging to

the left. In his interview with David Jenkins in the late 1970s, Oevaang Oeray admitted that the initiative to evict the Chinese in the hinterland came from him, after a discussion between the government security forces and the Dayak leaders. See David Jenkins, "The Last Headhunt", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 30 June 1978.

7 This elaboration of the Pancur Kasih Foundation and its subsidiaries is based on Julan Thung, Yekti Maunati, and Peter Mulok Kedit, *The (Re)construction of the "Pan-Dayak" Identity in Kalimantan and Sarawak*. Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian dan Kebudayaan LIPI, 2004, pp. 101–31.

8 L.H. Kadir was elected Vice-governor by the Provincial Council (DPRD) in 2002. The Governor is Djafar Usman, a Jakarta-based Malay businessman. L.H. Kadir is the highest-ranking Dayak official since Oevaang Oeray was sacked in 1966.

9 Bengkayang is a new *kabupaten*, which was previously part of *kabupaten* Sambas' hinterland. The split took place in late 1998, but the implementation of the new district was only after the 1999 election. The split (*pemekaran*) was an apparent effort to separate the Bengkayang *kabupaten*, which is predominantly Christian-Dayak, from Sambas kabupaten, which is predominantly Muslim-Malay.

10 The three predominantly Malay and Muslim *kabupaten* are Sambas, Ketapang, and Kapuas Hulu.

11 FKPM is a kind of militia-type organization which gains its strength mainly from the urban Malay underworld (*preman*); MAMB was set up to counter the growing influential Dayak-based organization promoting customary rights, and Lembayu was set up to counter Dayak endeavours to gain high-ranking local bureaucratic positions. See Davidson (2003).

12 See "Demo Anarkis Mengancam Kalbar: Catatan Paska Pilkada", *Equator*, 30 Juni 2005. See also "Dari Pilkada ke SARA", *Kalimanatan Review*, 120/XIV/ Agustus 2005.

13 As mentioned earlier, in West Kalimantan, a Dayak is always either Catholic/ Protestant or pagan. If a Dayak converts to Islam, he/she will be classified as "Senganan", which implies that he/she is no longer a Dayak.

14 West Kalimantan NGOs suspect that Abang Tambul Husin owns and controls PT Bumi Unah Kapuas, a logging company, which is believed to be his lucrative money machine.

15 Kapuas Hulu and Ketapang are the two *kabupaten*, out of the six that held *pilkada* in 2005, with a Muslim population of more than 50 per cent.

16 Interview with Maria Goreti, a DPD (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah) of West Kalimantan, Jakarta, 21 March 2006.

17 Elyakim Simon Djalil was named a suspect and arrested in connection with an illegal logging case in August 2005. See "Pembalakan Liar, Mantan Bupati Sintang Ditahan Polisi", *Kompas*, 12 August 2005.

18 It is true that Stephanus Masiun represents the interest of the Dayakology Institute in anti-palm oil plantation activities.

[19] The Pancur Kasih Foundation donated around Rp 1 billion (US$110,000) for the campaign of Masiun-Langsang. Interview with Luky Djani of the Indonesia Corruption Watch, Jakarta, 4 April 2006.

[20] Two prominent NGOs, Fitra (Forum Indonesia untuk Transparansi Anggaran) and ICW (Indonesian Corruption Watch) alleged that Akil Mochtar, Golkar DPR member from West Kalimantan electoral district, received a sum of Rp 680 million for facilitating deliberation of the draft bill in the formation of Melawi *kabupaten*.

[21] As a new *kabupaten*, there are no data on religious and ethnic groups of Melawi.

[22] Kapuas Hulu had what appears to be a pair of Dayaks running for *bupati* and vice-*bupati*, but one of them was a Muslim. In West Kalimantan, a Dayak who converts to Islam is categorized as a Muslim.

[23] A Chinese professional was elected *bupati* of West Belitung in 2005.

[24] This is reminiscent of how the *pamong praja*, the bureaucratic-elite under the Dutch colonial administration, managed to retain their position as *bupati* in Java until the late 1950s.

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16

BARE-CHESTED POLITICS IN CENTRAL SULAWESI
The Dynamics of Local Elections in a Post-conflict Region

Graham Brown and Rachael Diprose

INTRODUCTION

The 2005 *pilkada* (*pilihan kepala daerah*, or local head election) for the positions of *bupati* (regent) and *wakil bupati* (deputy regent) in the troubled Indonesian district of Poso were of vital importance for the future stability of the region and the reconciliation processes under way. Given the instrumental role of political and electoral mobilization as one of the features underpinning violence in the post-Soeharto period, there were many fears that the elections could see a return to violence. From a social scientific perspective, the elections were also important as they allow us a snapshot of the status and dynamics of the broad peace that has endured since 2001 despite many incidences of provocation.

Using a two-level conceptualization of peace at the elite and the grass-roots level, this paper examines how far the *pilkada* elections are indicative of a move towards a more "positive" peace at the elite and grass-roots level. Examining various formal and informal interventions in the campaigning for the election, we argue that at the elite level, a strong negative peace is in place to prevent a return to conflict, but with little positive engagement to address some of the underlying problems or construct a mutual vision for the future

for all groups involved. At the grass-roots level, we argue that voting patterns suggest a similar lack of positive peace at this level and an even weaker form of negative peace.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Cross-country evidence has shown that democracies are less likely to experience civil war than authoritarian states (Hegre et al. 2001). While democracies may be more likely to channel conflict in peaceful ways, *democratizing* countries — those in transition, such as Indonesia — are more prone to conflict, and social tensions in these nations are more likely to escalate into violence (Gurr 2000; Gurr 2001; Snyder 2000). In addition, Tilly (2003) argues that regime types themselves will affect the character and nature of collective violence, which is evident in the discussion of the New Order regime below.

Given the increased likelihood of violent conflict in states in transition, this research focuses on the period in Indonesia where "transition" is at the fore of contemporary popular discourse, using the case of Poso in Central Sulawesi. That is not to say that transition is the root cause of violence in democratizing countries, but rather that it may create a space for pre-existing grievances to surface. In times of political, social, and economic transition as experienced by Indonesia since 1998, the very processes and products of change and "development", and the consequent injection or withdrawal of resources in communities, can challenge value systems, decision-making responsibilities, power relations, and patron–client relations. In turn, there is a greater likelihood of an intensification of the means, motives, and opportunities for local conflict (Barron et al. 2004; Bates 2000). However, violent local conflict does not always result, which is evident in the analysis below of the dynamics of the Poso *pilkada*.

Brass (1997), Diprose (2004), Tadjoeddin (2002), Varshney et al. (2004), and Wilkinson (2004), amongst others, identify the localized nature of violence and local dynamics as key factors explaining why violent conflicts occur in some regions and not others. Wilkinson (2004), for example, highlights local level electoral incentives for political elites to mobilize in seeking to explain violent outcomes in India, an important consideration in our understanding of the *pilkada* dynamics in Poso. Mustapha (2000) also identifies the role of elites in mobilizing for violence in nations such as Nigeria. Yet Wilkinson makes the important point that most studies which identify instrumentalist elite mobilization strategies as explanations of violent outcomes only focus on national actors, which does not explain why violence

occurs in some regions and not others at the local level. That is the focus of this study — why did the *pilkada* in Poso not result in violence?

In examining the elections within the post-conflict context, we propose a modified version of the "positive peace–negative peace" framework developed by Johan Galtung (1969, 1975). Galtung observed a difference between the simple absence of "personal" violence — which he termed "negative peace" — and the absence of "structural" violence — which he termed "positive peace". In the conflict resolution context, "positive peace" has come to be understood as the existence of processes of engagement and reconciliation between contending parties, with the aim of eradicating underlying causes of conflict, or "structural violence" (see Aklaev 1999 for an example of this framework applied to ethnic conflict resolution). In employing this distinction in our analysis of the *pilkada* dynamics in Poso, we make two modifications to this framework. Firstly, we distinguish between elite level interactions and the "grass-roots" level, as depicted schematically in Table 16.1. Secondly, we distinguish between a "strong" and a "weak" form of negative peace. "Strong" negative peace pertains to situations in which strong informal or formal institutions are in place to avoid a return to conflict, but which do not constitute sufficient proactive engagement to lead to positive peace. "Weak" negative peace is where such institutions are not in place, or only weakly so.

TABLE 16.1
Negative and Positive Peace at Two Levels

		ELITE LEVEL	
		Negative Peace	*Positive Peace*
GRASS-ROOTS LEVEL	*Negative Peace*	Neither elites nor grass roots engaged in positive peace-building; risk of return to conflict high, particularly in case of provocation	Elites engaged in positive peace-building; grass roots remain ostracized from each other. Likelihood of return to violence low to medium, depending on elites' ability to respond to provocation to prevent escalation
	Positive Peace	"Organic" reconciliation at the grass-roots level not matched by elite integration; likelihood of return to violence low, even in the event of provocation	Both elites and grass roots engaged in positive peace-building; likelihood of return to violence negligible

SOCIO-POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN POSO

Since the fall of Soeharto and his authoritarian New Order regime, violent conflict has become more widespread in Indonesia. In the literature on Indonesia, it is now commonplace to link the transition of 1998 to the outburst of violent conflicts that occurred across the archipelago, although in many cases violent conflict had already broken out in these regions (Bertrand 2004; Tadjoeddin 2002; Varshney et al. 2004). For more than thirty years, potential inter-group tensions were systematically controlled in Indonesia via the security forces, government hegemony over the media, the use of legislation which regulated and controlled ethnic, religious, race, and inter-group relations (Suku, Agama, Ras, Antar-Golongan — SARA), and sometimes the violent use of force.[1] Furthermore, legislation on Village Governance (Law No. 5/1979) homogenized village administrative structures, split the local power bases, forced these new units to compete for scarce development resources, and eroded the "traditional" or informal forms of governance (Guinness 1994). However, to replace informal systems, there was no robust legal justice system where conflicts could be systematically adjudicated by impartial third parties, perpetrators duly punished, or civil liberties maintained.

The processes of democratization and transition have stimulated dynamic local environments where tensions surface, and in some cases violence results. The end of the regime saw grievances surface and the effects of a weak conflict resolution system culminate in communal tensions without adequate mediation and intervention mechanisms available to help reduce the violent impacts of conflict. It also left different groups with a number of grievances, particularly in relation to differential access to the state (Bertrand 2004). Between 1999 and 2004, and reaching a peak in 2000–02, large-scale communal violence ensued in Central and West Kalimantan, Ambon and North Maluku, and Central Sulawesi amongst other places. Varshney et al. (2004) put the estimated death toll from collective violence at over 10,700 between 1990 and 2003, with the majority occurring in the later part of the period.

While Indonesia is approximately 85 per cent Muslim and 10 per cent Christian, traversing some 300 larger ethnic groups, in many (but not all) of the conflict areas which are usually limited to particular districts, the size of the ethno-religious groups is relatively balanced. Such is the case of the widespread communal violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi. Many of these conflicts involve competing claims of indigeneity and grievances of political, economic, and social marginalization of one or the other group involved. The conflicts in these areas have not been completely removed from national

politics and national elite interests, but at the same time have not been purely instrumentalized, with the long-standing grievances pervading poverty stricken communities surfacing during the conflicts.

The implementation of decentralization and regional autonomy in 2001 has allowed for diversity in the regions to flourish. Regional autonomy has allowed for significant powers and responsibilities to be devolved to district and municipal (*kabupaten/kota*) governments rather than the provincial governments (once representatives of the central government in the regions), which has also changed the nature of local politics. Prior to and during this transition there has been the increased assertion by minority ethnic groups of their interests and separate identities, which they claim of parallel importance to their national identity as Indonesian. There is no better situation in which to examine these dynamics than during the *pilkada* (district head elections) in Indonesia, where local interests, power struggles, competition for resource control, and grievances come to the fore.

The local population of Poso is ethnically heterogeneous, with migrants from all over Sulawesi (mainly Muslim), other islands, as well as the local Pamona people of whom the majority profess the Christian faith. The ethnic Pekurehua, Bada, and Besoa, who respectively inhabit the regions of North Lore, Central Lore, and South Lore, give their own colour to the diversity of Poso, with ancestral and traditional *adat* (local custom and tradition) values still existing in many villages. The Lore and Pamona regions have also become a destination for many IDPs (internally displaced persons) from the conflict that has taken place in the district. In the legislative branch of government, the 25-member district legislature (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah — DPRD) is dominated by Partai Damai Sejahtera (PDS), Golkar, Partai Patriot, and PBR.[2]

Over the past seven years, much of the communal violence in Central Sulawesi has been concentrated in the Poso district, where the aggregate Muslim and Christian groupings were almost equal in size prior to the outbreak of communal conflict in 1997, although more recent figures show a post-conflict population of 30 per cent Muslim and 65 per cent Christian in 2004 (BPS 1998; BPS 2005). The triggers of some of the major incidents of violence between 2000 and 2002, which resulted in the loss of some 2,000 lives and widespread property destruction, were youth clashes and seemingly small incidents between individuals.[3] However, local grievances form the backdrop to the clashes between local groups organized around their Muslim and Christian identities, both claiming indigeneity in the region. Thus the tensions leading to the recent communal clashes, with groups mobilizing around religious identity, have been underpinned by socio-economic and

political grievances rather than religious ideology itself (e.g. Aragon 2000; Aragon 2001; Brown et al. 2005; Cote 2005).

Historically, local peoples in Central Sulawesi have organized (and been organized) loosely around religious identity. Christianity was introduced by the Dutch missionaries to many of the indigenous animist communities, and there have been Muslim and Chinese migrant traders who also sought the alliance of other groups of local peoples. However, Lorraine Aragon (2001, p. 75) reports "the routine existence of small-scale warfare, but no persistent division" between the mainly animist highlanders and mainly Muslim lowlanders. Thus, while the conflicts often pitted Christians against Muslims, the dynamics of the tensions are more complex, reflecting dynamic political agendas that were not exclusively defined by religious cleavages.

These conflicts, while local, have linkages to the national sphere of politics, patronage, and change. Cote (2005, p. 4) argues that from 1970 until the 1990s, New Order development policies were often based on local patronage of the different groups in Central Sulawesi, including assertions *against* the GKST (Gereja Kristen Sulawesi Tengah — Central Sulawesi Christian Church) synod. Throughout the New Order regime, outbreaks of violence were not uncommon between Muslims and Christians as well as some between migrant and indigenous groups in Palu (the capital) and Poso, but these episodes were promptly repressed by the government (Human Rights Watch 2002). However, Cote contends that during the early 1990s, patronage from Jakarta shifted *towards* GKST, partially stimulating the Islamic claims to power during the violence between 1998 and 2004. In the final days of the New Order, Islam was increasingly privileged over other religions at the national, provincial, and sometimes local level, leading to resentment within the Christian communities (Aragon 2001, p. 54). The situation was compounded by migration dynamics where mostly Muslim migrants were increasingly viewed as demographic threats to the historically Christian domination of the highlands.

RECENT CONFLICT HISTORY

A brief overview of the chronology of the recent conflict in Poso is important for understanding how social relations and trust have broken down in the region, as have local institutions, including those which facilitate and provide justice and conflict resolution services. The impact of the conflict in the Poso Pesisir sub-district is just one example of how devastating the conflict has been for the citizens of the region. Poso Pesisir suffered the worst of the damage from the conflict, with over 6,000 buildings destroyed, including

58 places of worship.[4] Many were killed, injured and some 10,000 people were displaced. Scattered through the violence and serving to fuel further phases in the conflict, were poorly resolved incidents in the conflict, and few arrests of perpetrators of the violence, as well as outside interest in sustaining the violence and national intervention mechanisms. During the interviews conducted for this research on the potential for conflict during the *pilkada*, frustration with unresolved incidents pertaining to the conflict continued to dominate public discourse and raised the potential for further conflict.

It is evident from the chronology in Table 16.2 and the discussion above, why many who were the interviewed on the *pilkada* dynamics feared that communal conflict would result. We have identified six inter-linked phases in the recent conflict history of Poso since the end of the New Order. These phases are underpinned by trigger incidents between youths, mass mobilization, and violence around religious identity in Poso, claims to indigeneity and resources in the region, district politics, shifting allegiances, broken-down informal power sharing agreements between Muslim and Christian leaders, local and supra-local elite interests, the prevailing national climate, as well as local and supra-local intervention mechanisms.

TABLE 16.2
Chronology of Communal Conflict and Violence in Poso since 1998

Phase 1: December 1998 — Outbreak of Violence	
24 December 1998, during Christmas Eve and Ramadan	A brawl between a Protestant youth and Muslim youth broke out in Poso. The incident quickly took on religious overtones; religious leaders from both groups joined to ban alcohol during Ramadan. Some Muslims began their own vigilante seizures, leading to clashes between Protestant youths defending shops selling alcohol (HRW 2002: 14).
27 December 1998	On a wave of rumours of church burnings, the conflict escalated. On 27 December Christian district assembly member Herman Parimo from Tentena trucked in his militia, the Central Sulawesi Youth Movement (GPST), armed with machetes. Hundreds of Muslims from other parts of Central Sulawesi arrived by truck, clashing with Christians in Poso near the police barracks. After a week, the violence subsided, leaving 200 people (mostly Protestants) injured, approximately 400 Protestant and Catholic homes burned and scores of Protestant and Catholic stores destroyed. Parimo was rumoured by Muslim accounts to be dissatisfied that Protestant politician Patiro was not nominated for the position of *bupati* (district head); instead, a Muslim was nominated. He was later imprisoned along with seven

	other Protestants, while no Muslims were prosecuted. This seemingly one-sided application of the law would fuel anger among Protestants in the future phases.
Phase 2: 16 April–3 May 2000 — Second Outbreak of Violence	
16 April 2000	In response to the knifing of a Muslim youth, a mob of Muslims searched for the Protestant youth deemed responsible and began to destroy Protestant and Chinese homes, causing many to flee to the hills. Brimob, the riot control police unit (mobile brigade), was summoned by the Poso police to stop the burning of Protestant homes and churches. In the process of temporarily halting the burnings, Brimob shot and killed three Muslims, further incensing Muslims and leading to their recall back to Palu.
End April–early May	After the Brimob left Poso, house burnings resumed and the violence escalated further. Ultimately, the violence was stopped by the mobilization of 600 soldiers sent from Makassar. The second phase of the conflict left at least seven killed, 38 injured, roughly 700 Protestant and Catholic homes destroyed and four churches burned. No one was prosecuted during the violence in Phase 2.
Phase 3: 23 May 2000–July 2000 — Christian Retaliation	
Beginning May 2000	Two successive phases of Muslim-dominated violence and the lack of even-handed and effective justice were followed shortly after by the third phase in which many more Muslims were killed by Christians to avenge previous bouts of violence. In this phase roughly a dozen Christian "ninjas" attacked Muslims in a targeted raid against those they attributed with much of the previous violence. Three Muslims were killed by the group and the church to which the group fled was burned down. Various episodes of violence broke out between Christians and Muslims, including an incident at a transmigration village near Kilo Sembilan (which was a site of migrant Muslim vs. indigenous Christian tensions because of transmigration). In this incident, many Muslim men from the village were killed (even after surrendering) and women subjected to sexual violence and held for several days with the children. Various other attacks on Muslims occurred throughout this period, ultimately leading to the deaths of between 300 and 800, mostly Muslims. The fighting was brought under control after the military sent 1,500 additional soldiers, ten tanks and a combat unit to the area in addition to Brimob forces from Java. Soldiers secured hotspots, built barracks for IDPs, and confiscated weapons.
August 2000	In August 2000, after the violence had subsided, top-down attempts at reconciliation were imposed through an agreement by the governors of Central, South, and North Sulawesi to safely return IDPs with government aid. With President Wahid's participation, a peace

continued on next page

TABLE 16.2 — *cont'd*

	ceremony was performed to reconcile both sides. However, these efforts did not emerge from the initiatives of the key local communities and their leaders, undermining the robustness of any peace attempts.
Phase 4: July 2001–December 2001	
July 2001	The lack of an earnest reconciliation effort contributed to ongoing low levels of violence, until members of the militant Muslim group Laskar Jihad arrived from outside the region. Fighting became increasingly well organized with more potent weapons involved, reportedly including automatic weapons. The entrance of Laskar Jihad led to more Christian deaths and many IDPs. In the beginning, the government did nothing to prevent Laskar Jihad from becoming involved in the violence, even meeting with provincial and district officials after they had arrived. Laskar Jihad coordinated with local Muslims to burn Christian villages to the ground one at a time. The violence was ended by a new infusion of police and military troops. This phase saw increased violence that pitted the police and military against Laskar Jihad and Muslim fighters. Two incidents in Mapane and Toyado occurred in which the security forces were accused of retaliatory human rights violations, rather than upholding the rule of law. During this phase, at least 141 were left dead, 90 injured and over 2,400 houses razed.
Phase 5: The Malino Declaration, December 2001–end 2004	
December 2001	In December 2001, then Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono initiated the joint military-police Security Restoration Operation (Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan), which had three stages of 1) ending the violence, 2) expelling outsiders, confiscating weapons, carrying out legal actions, and 3) rehabilitating damaged infrastructure and reconciling communities (HRW 2002, pp. 28–29). At the same time, the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) with top security and Cabinet officials began initiating the Malino peace process on 19–20 December 2001. Representatives of both religious communities were chosen by leaders of each side, reflecting the geographic, ethnic, professional, and thematic complexity of the conflict. The agreement that emerged from the process consisted of ten key points which were intended to address mostly the proximate causes of the violence by deferring to legal procedures, recognizing pre-conflict rights and ownership, returning IDPs, and rehabilitating infrastructure. Following the declaration, a period of weapons confiscation and security deployments, in addition to the overall weariness of the violence, helped to maintain basic security. An emphasis on follow-up

led to the creation of the Pokja Malino, the working groups that would monitor and help implement various aspects of the Malino Declaration. Working groups were created at the provincial, district, and sub-district levels on areas such as security, law, mental and spiritual rehabilitation, economic rehabilitation, physical rehabilitation, IDP repatriation, and education and health. These were later reduced to the following thematic working groups: peace and reconciliation, economic rehabilitation, education, and spiritual welfare.

After the declaration, the greater presence of security forces and conflict fatigue changed the nature of violence, forcing it underground. Instead of pitched battles among communities, violence tactics shifted to targeted terror methods. Many outsiders left (following the dissolution of Laskar Jihad). However, mysterious bombings and shootings were ongoing. In October 2003, thirteen were killed in Poso and Morowali by masked gunmen and in March 2004 an attack on a church left a reverend dead (ICG 2004; *Jakarta Post*, 31 March 2004). The October attacks were followed quickly by the arrest of eighteen local men with ties to the regional Southeast Asia terror group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) through a local militia called Mujahidin KOMPAK.

Phase 6: 2005 to elections, ongoing tensions and relocation of IDPs

Throughout 2005, efforts were made to rebuild some of the burnt-down areas, and evidence of this can be seen at the famous *kilo sembilan* site. There have been significant meetings between Christian and Muslim leaders, particularly prior to the district head elections in June 2005. These meetings took place at the community level, rather than as a part of an elite peace accord. However, bombs and other attacks continued sporadically in Poso, but this was increasingly related not to communal tensions but to corruption in the funds for IDPs. Thus, for instance, the beheading of the village chief of Pinedapa in October 2004 has been related to his refusal to sign for IDP funds that his village had not received. Similarly, the bombs outside two major NGOs in Poso in April 2005 occurred after the NGOs' attempts to organize a public accusation of civil servants and legislators involved in corruption. Whilst these attacks have not provoked further violence or displacement — an indication of increasing confidence in the peacebuilding process — there remains substantial disquiet in the district, not least over the frequent failure to bring those responsible for such attacks to justice.[1] Of concern, however, was the large bomb in May 2005 which went off in the Christian market of Tentena, in the Lore area far from where previous incidents of violence had taken place in or near the district capital. Local leaders were able to calm fears and contain reprisals and vengeance seeking.

Note: [1] Interviews with community leaders, Poso, May 2005.

THE *PILKADA* ELECTION

The conflict dynamics explored in the previous section suggest a "strong" negative peace, in which certain conflict-avoidance institutions are in place, but there is little proactive engagement in search of a positive peace. On the one hand, conflict has not returned to the region despite regular, often gruesome, provocations. On the other hand, however, tensions continue to simmer. The greatest opportunity for such a positive peace to emerge — the Malino accords and, particularly, the subsequent formation of the "Pokja Malino" working groups — are almost universally viewed as a disappointing failure by all sides in the conflict.[5]

In examining the *pilkada* elections in this context, we look first at the campaign period, particularly identifying different formal and informal "interventions" from the elite level to ensure a peaceful campaign. We interpret this as evidence of the type of peace existent at the elite level. We then turn to the voting patterns themselves, taking this as evidence of the type of peace at the grass-roots level. Before discussing the campaign, however, we briefly introduce the candidates, slates, and parties contesting the election.

Altogether, five slates of candidates stood for the *bupati*/deputy *bupati* elections in Poso, as detailed in Table 16.3 — the numberings given are the official ballot paper numbers, which were attributed randomly by the Election Commission (KPU, Komisi Pemilihan Umum). As we shall explore further below, each pairing comprised a Muslim and a Christian; in three out of the five pairings, the Christian candidate was for the *bupati* with a Muslim as his deputy; in the other two, vice versa.

Broadly speaking, the candidate slates can be broken down into three groups within the framework elaborated above. Firstly, there were two slates with strong religious links, nos. 2 and 3. Although these pairings had a Muslim and a Christian candidate, they were nominated by parties with very strong religious affiliations, and in each case the candidate for the *bupati* position was from the religious community of the nominating party or coalition. Ingkiriwang/Muthalib were nominated by the Partai Damai Sejahtera (PDS, Prosperous Peace Party), which is a Christian party, while Muin/Walenta were nominated by a coalition of Islamic parties. Muin Pusadan had been the (appointed) *bupati* when the conflict originally broke out, and many reports implicate him in the religious mobilization that led to the violence (e.g. Human Rights Watch 2002). Widespread support for these two slates would suggest that at the grass-roots level, a weak negative peace continues to prevail, with voters still relying on their "own" parties to protect their interests.

TABLE 16.3
Candidates for the Poso *Pilkada* Election

	Bupati Candidate	*Background*	*Deputy Bupati Candidate*	*Background*	*Nominating Parties*
1	Dede K Atmawijaya	Army officer, Muslim, Sundanese	Lis Sigilipu	Reverend, Christian, Pamona	Koalisi Poso Bersatu: PDI-P; Partai Democrat; Pelopor
2	Piet Ingkiriwang	Retired police officer, Christian, Pamona	Muthalib Rimi	Businessman, Muslim, Bugis	Partai Damai Sejahtera
3	Muin Pusadan	Former *bupati*, Muslim, Bungku	Osbert Walenta	Retired civil servant, Christian, Pamona	Koalisi Sintuwu Maroso: Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia; Partai Amanat Nasional; Partai Bintang Reformasi
4	Frans Sowolino	Businessman, Christian, Pamona	Kahar Latjare	Politician, Muslim, Bugis	Partai Patriot Pancasila
5	Edi Bungkundapu	Bureaucrat, Christian, Pamona	Awad Alamri	Bureaucrat, Muslim, Arab	Partai Golkar

Source: Seputar Rakyat, 5:2; interviews with community leaders, Poso, May 2005.

The second group of slates, nos. 4 and 5, were much more secular, with no strong religious institutional links either on the part of the individuals themselves or the parties backing them. These two slates — Sowolino/Latjare and Bungkundapu/Alamri — were respectively nominated by Partai Patriot Pancasila and Golkar. Given that Partai Patriot Pancasila was itself formed as an offshoot of the Golkar youth organization, these two slates were very much representative of the old "New Order" politics, particularly the Bungkundapu/Alamri pairing, where both contenders were from the bureaucracy, Bungkundapu being the secretary of the DPRD.[6] This is important because in other regions affected by conflict, such as North Maluku and West Kalimantan, former New Order elites did very well in the *pilkada* elections (Smith, Chapter 14, and Subianto, Chapter 15, this volume).Voter support for these candidates would be indicative of a stronger, but still negative, grass-roots peace; none of these parties or candidates were overtly religiously-biased, but their New Order linkages would suggest that support was based on some nostalgia for the kind of coercive negative peace that prevailed under Soeharto, as epitomized by the SARA regulations.

Support for the remaining slate — no. 1, Atmawijaya/Sigilipu — could be taken as stronger evidence of the emergence of a more positive peace at the grass-roots level. This slate appears to have been more based on the individual, cross-religious appeal of both candidates rather than any strong political or party affiliation. The candidate for *bupati*, Dede Atmawijaya, was a high-ranking police officer in Poso who was widely credited with having protected Muslims from Christian attacks during the violence, but was also seen by both sides as fair and neutral. A Sundanese Muslim without strong religious convictions, he is known locally for his shirtless karaoke carousing and his active involvement in youth forums and other reconciliation activities. His running partner, Lis Sigilipu, is a senior member of the Central Sulawesi Church synod, and was a delegate at the original Malino discussions and claimed wide respect among Muslims. Although Sigilipu herself was a long-time Golkar activist, the parties backing this slate — Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's Partai Demokrat, Megawati Sukarnoputri's PDI-P and the smaller Partai Pelopor — were broadly linked to the post-New Order elite at the national level.

The campaign period saw a range of formal and informal interventions by state, political, and civil elites, which allow us to judge the extent and nature of the peace predominating between the different communities at the elite level. Clearly, one of the most important actors here was the local branch of the Election Commission (KPUD), charged with implementing and overseeing the election. In the 2004 parliamentary elections, the Poso District

KPUD was given special recognition by the national headquarters for its success in implementing violence-free elections, particularly given predictions about elections-based violence in the hotspots throughout the archipelago. KPUD officials were determined to maintain the track record, but were all the while concerned about conducting the local elections where local issues were at the forefront of the campaign and local grievances would potentially trigger new episodes of violence.

However, the KPUD was active at every stage of the process and conscious of responding quickly to complaints, as well as engaging with candidates and coordinating with security forces and local leaders to ameliorate potential triggers that could undermine the election process. When interviewed shortly before the official campaign period began, the chairman of the Poso KPUD was clearly of the view that the most important task facing the organization was not just to implement a fair election, but to be widely *seen* as doing such: "The excesses of the KPU were very worrying before, especially the central [i.e. national-level] KPU."[7] The KPUD of Poso thus undertook a number of programmes to ensure that such activities as the verification of candidates' nominations were conducted with full transparency: "At every level of the process, we disseminate to the press, changes at any level: from the beginning, result and the end will all be distributed to the media."[8] Political observers confirmed that the KPUD was broadly effective in reaching the grass-roots and conducting an open and fair election.[9]

As already mentioned, one of the most important interventions in ensuring a peaceful election was the pairing of Muslim and Christian candidates on each slate. Our informants differ on how this came about. One of the candidates who we interviewed asserted that it had been in response to grass-roots demands, but the KPUD chairman claimed the proposal for such pairings had come from the KPUD itself, although acknowledging that "all of society wanted such combinations".[10] Other informants suggested that motivation for such pairing came from basic political considerations on the part of the political parties and the recognition that even a Christian candidate would find it hard to win in the predominantly Christian areas without any Muslim backing. Whatever the origins, the cross-religious pairings were widely interpreted as a necessary, although not necessarily sufficient, condition for ensuring that contentious and potentially violent religious mobilization did not emerge during the campaign period.

Another important aspect of the candidates themselves was the strong political and personal links between many candidates of different slates, although not as strong as was observed in other areas of Indonesia such as Bandar Lampung.[11] The Golkar candidate for *bupati*, Edy Bungkundapu, for

instance, was related to the husband of Lis Sigilipu; Sigilipu herself was the cousin of Piet Ingkiriwang. Although perhaps representing a degree of "elite capture" of local politics (cf. Hadiz 2003), all with their own big business backings originating from within and outside the region, this personal interlinking of candidates was also presented as an important factor in keeping the campaign and election peaceful — as one candidate told us, "we let society understand that we are related, so there aren't quarrels".[12] Even the head of the local Election Commission had strong political links; his father and sister were both Golkar members of, respectively, the DPR and DPRD.[13] Each of the candidates attempted to present themselves in the best possible light in terms of their past performance in both the conflict and local politics. However, one respondent contended that the leader of the winning slate, Piet Ingkiriwang, who had only engaged in local politics in the six months preceding the elections, was able to win the election due to his "newness", seemingly "clean slate" in terms of corruption, claims to indigeneity, and lack of previous political involvement.[14]

Beyond the election machinery and the candidates themselves, civil society and community leaders also developed interventions to ensure the peaceful conduct of the election, and to at least publicly support the implementation of violence-free elections. Most important here was probably the series of meetings and forums set up by Ustaz Adnan Arsal, an influential Islamic cleric, and Rinaldy Damanik, a Christian pastor who had been imprisoned after a dubious trial in 2003 for possession of weapons, but later released after a campaign led by a number of Islamic clerics. Highly influential within their own communities — Damanik has since been elected president of the Central Sulawesi synod — the Adnan-Damanik meetings were intended to set up a cross-religious forum to discuss issues of concern to both communities and to develop an agenda for the future of Poso.[15] This was also backed by a public embrace of the two leaders, who had previously had somewhat frosty relations. Arguably the strongest evidence of an emerging "positive" peace in Poso, the forum established by the leaders never came to fruition. We have been unable to ascertain quite why this was the case, but two apposite points are worth noting. Firstly, the date on which the public announcement of the forum was meant to be held coincided with the Tentena bomb; it may be that the parties involved decided that this was an inappropriate time to launch the forum. Secondly, there may have been irresolvable disagreement on the core issue of the status of Kota Poso, the main city in Poso district. Despite the Christian majority in Poso district, Kota Poso is mainly Muslim, and Adnan was a strong advocate for its separation as a district in its own right; given its position as the main

economic hub of Poso district, however, the Christian community was strongly opposed to this proposal.[16]

At the elite level, then, the election campaign saw the institutionalization or development of a wide range of strong institutions aimed at preventing a return to religious mobilization during the election. Yet there was little evidence of more positive engagement for the future; even the candidate pairing strategy was seen primarily as a conflict prevention mechanism rather than the harbinger of greater cross-religious cooperation and integration. Such moves towards positive peace that did come emanated largely from civil society, such as the Adnan-Damanik meetings and the activities of Yayasan Tanah Merdeka — the NGO whose offices were bombed shortly before the election.

To evaluate the grass-roots' perspective, we turn to the election results themselves (see Table 16.4). The elections were won convincingly by the pairing of Piet Ingkiriwang and Muthalib Rimi on the PDS-nominated slate. Although they did not win an absolute majority of the vote, their share of the vote — 42.6 per cent — was twenty points higher than the second-placed candidates and they came first in every sub-district except Poso Kota and Poso Pesisir (two areas where there is a higher concentration of Muslim residents), where they came third.

Despite the various interventions to prevent or reduce ethnic and religious tensions during the election, candidates nominated by religion-based parties — which we took to be representative of a "weak" negative peace — garnered more than half the votes cast. Indeed, in *every* sub-district, such candidates came first. The PDS-backed Ingkiriwang-Rimi slate won in all the Christian majority sub-districts; the Muin-Walenta slate backed by the coalition of Islamic parties won in the two Muslim majority sub-districts of Poso Kota and Poso Pesisir. There was, however, a noticeable difference in the margin of victory. In many of the Christian areas, Ingkiriwang won an absolute majority of the votes, taking more-or-less exactly half the votes overall. By contrast, while Muin-Walenta won both the Muslim-majority sub-districts, it was only as the largest minority, with less than 30 per cent overall in the two sub-districts. In addition, Ingkiriwang-Rimi did much better in the Muslim areas than Muin-Walenta did in the Christian areas.

The bloc of former New Order parties and their nominees — slates nos. 4 and 5 — which we took to be representative of a stronger but still negative grass-roots peace, won just over a third of the vote in combination. Surprisingly, however, each of the slates' share of the vote differed markedly in the Muslim and Christian areas — the Partai Patriot-backed Sowolino/Latjare slate performed much better in the Christian-majority sub-districts, coming in

TABLE 16.4
Poso *Pilkada* Election Results by Sub-district

	1. Dede/Lies		*2. Piet/Thalib*		*3. Muin/Osbet*		*4. Frans/Kahar*		*5. Edy/Awad*	
	Vote	*Rank*	*Vote*	*Rank*	*Vote*	*Rank*	*Vote*	*Rank*	*Vote*	*Rank*
Lage	9.6%	4	47.3%	1	9.6%	3	25.4%	2	8.2%	5
Poso Kota	14.6%	4	18.9%	3	31.2%	1	11.2%	5	24.1%	2
Poso Pesisir	10.9%	5	22.9%	3	25.9%	1	16.0%	4	24.3%	2
Poso Pesisir Selatan	7.0%	4	66.0%	1	4.6%	5	8.2%	3	14.3%	2
Poso Pesisir Utara	16.5%	4	26.8%	1	19.7%	3	21.8%	2	15.2%	5
Pamona Utara	6.9%	4	56.1%	1	2.8%	5	22.9%	2	11.3%	3
Pamona Selatan	10.6%	3	38.2%	1	9.7%	4	35.3%	2	6.2%	5
Pamona Timur	1.7%	5	60.8%	1	4.6%	4	24.5%	2	8.4%	3
Pamona Barat	3.7%	4	61.8%	1	2.6%	5	22.5%	2	9.4%	3
Lore Utara	18.9%	3	40.5%	1	12.3%	4	21.0%	2	7.3%	5
Lore Selatan	4.8%	4	65.3%	1	2.4%	5	16.0%	2	11.4%	3
Lore Tengah	5.9%	5	63.8%	1	7.2%	4	12.8%	2	10.3%	3
POSO	**10.3%**	**5**	**42.6%**	**1**	**12.9%**	**4**	**20.8%**	**2**	**13.3%**	**3**
Christian-maj. kec.	*9.4%*	*4*	*49.8%*	*1*	*7.6%*	*5*	*23.4%*	*2*	*9.8%*	*3*
Muslim-maj. kec.	*13.4%*	*4*	*20.2%*	*3*	*29.4%*	*1*	*12.8%*	*5*	*24.2%*	*2*

Source: Seputar Rakyat, 5:2.

second to the Ingkirinwang slate in all but one; in contrast, the Golkar-backed Bungkundapu/Alamri performed much better in the Muslim sub-districts, coming second to the Islamic coalition in both. This religious bias in the votes for both of these slates suggests that our original assumptions about the secular nature of these slates may have been misconceived, but these slates were clearly less overtly religious. Indeed, it is worth noting that the Golkar slate, which came second in the Muslim areas, was led by a Christian nominee for regent, who outperformed the alternative Muslim candidate, Dede Atmawijaya.

Finally, the Atmawijaya/Sigilipu pairing, which we took to be most representative of an agenda for positive peace, came in fifth overall, garnering barely a tenth of the vote. In one sub-district — Pamona Timur — they won less than 2 per cent of the vote, the lowest of any of the candidates in any of the sub-districts. In contrast to all the other slates, however, there was considerably less variation in their results between Christian and Muslim areas, suggesting indeed that they were broadly perceived as non-biased by both sides.

Despite several tense moments during the elections, with protests staged at the KPUD office and threats of mass mobilization, civil society did not engage in collective violence during the election period. The results of the election, however, suggest an overwhelmingly negative peace at the grass-roots level, with more than half the population voting for religious party-backed slates representative of a "weak" negative peace, and another third voting for the "strong" negative candidates from the old New Order elites, again with some apparent religious bias. Only around one in ten voters opted for the slate most associated with a positive peace agenda at the elite level.

CONCLUSIONS

In explaining the emergence and decline of inter-communal conflict in Poso, there is a relatively clear and coherent narrative that can be — and often is — told which revolves around the manipulation of local political elites and the response of the broader population. In this narrative, one of the origins of the conflict can be found in the contests between religiously divided elites for control over key positions of power and their successful mobilization of militia groups, and subsequently the broader population, to stake these claims. Of course such discourse partially, but not wholly, explains the genesis of more recent episodes of communal violence in Poso. However, it somewhat disguises other problems pertaining to poor access to and provision of justice services in the region, and the long history of communal tensions and local

grievances. The recent period of broad peace, however, despite numerous often gruesome provocations, can then be explained by the efforts of the population not to respond — they are, in the all-too-oft quoted cliché, "tired of violence".

This narrative appeals to somewhat romantic, reified notions of "the people versus the elites". In this account, the "elites" are primarily responsible for the violence; the "people" are primarily responsible for the current peace. It has resonances with similar accounts of the violence elsewhere in Indonesia. In Ambon, for instance, some analysts counterpoint the activities of national and local elites against the decline in traditional "*pela-gandong*" communal institutions;[17] this decline is itself usually linked to the administrative reorganizations of the New Order period (e.g. Aditjondro 2001; Aditjondro 2002). It is also resonant with a widespread dissatisfaction with "top-down" peace-making, evident both in interviews in the district and in the shift towards participatory peace-building processes by donor agencies working in Indonesia, including the UNDP's "Peace and Development Assessment", which was carried out in a number of troubled provinces, including Central Sulawesi.

This narrative undoubtedly carries more than an element of truth, but the analysis of the Poso *pilkada* election in this paper, a critical moment when a return to violence was widely feared, suggests some important nuances. Put simply, it is by no means clear that "the people" are the single primary agents preventing a return to violence in the district. While it is clear that the failure of the justice system to pursue an even-handed and thorough approach to conflict-resolution continues to cause tension, responses to incidents of provocation and the development of institutions of mediation have largely been a product of local elite-based interaction, rather than "grass-roots" initiatives. Short of giving a strong political mandate to elites engaged in on-going peace-building activities, voting patterns instead suggest a continuing "bunker mentality" in which religious parties are seen as the best option for the protection of group interests.

Notes

[1] Sen and Hill demonstrate that under the New Order, any text that might inflame SARA tensions was banned, limiting the news reporting of ethno-religious tensions and controlling the public interpretation of all socio-political conflicts, as well as excluding and restricting languages used in the media in various ways. See Sen and Hill (2000, p. 12).

[2] Interview with chairman of DPRD commission D, 11 March 2005.

[3] Interviews with Muslim and Christian leaders in Poso, May 2005.
[4] Dampak Konflik Horizontal di Kabupaten Poso, BPS.
[5] Interviews with community leaders, May 2005. See also Brown et al. (2005).
[6] Interview, *pilkada* candidate, May 2005.
[7] "*Kemudian ekses KPU memang sangat menggangu kemarin, ekses KPU Pusat*", interview Yasin Mangun, Palu, 19 May 2005.
[8] "*Setiap tahapan, setiap proses, kita lansir [diangkat di media] terus, setiap perubahan tahapan: memulai, hasil, dan akhir semua dilansir media*", interview, Yasin.
[9] Interview, Poso-based journalist, 17 May 2006.
[10] "*Semua ke masyarakat yang ingin kombinasi*", interview, Yasin.
[11] Interviews with community leaders, Bandar Lampung, May 2005. In Bandar Lampung, where there were also five slates, virtually all the candidates had a close familial relationship, with the notable exception of the PKS slate.
[12] "*Kita beri pemahaman kepada masyarakat bahwa kita bersaudara, jangan berkelah*"; interview with candidate, May 2005.
[13] Interview, KPU representative, May 2005.
[14] Interview, Poso activist, May 2006.
[15] Interview, Adnan Arsal, Poso, May 2005.
[16] The issue of a separate district of Kota Poso is also connected with the ongoing political manoeuvrings associated with the formation of a new province of East Sulawesi (Sulawesi Timur), but space does not permit a discussion of this.
[17] "Pela-gandong" are traditional cross-village alliances.

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DEEPENING DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA?

Direct Elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada)

Since the fall of long-reigning President Soeharto, in 1998, Indonesia has been in an era of transition, away from an authoritarian regime, and on a "quest for democracy". This quest started with decentralization laws implemented in 2001, which gave greater autonomy to the regions, and continued with the direct elections for the national and local legislatures and the President in 2004. The latest development in this democratization process is the implementation of a system for the direct election of regional leaders, which began in 2005; the first round of elections across the nation for all governors, mayors and district heads will be completed in 2008. Authors of the chapters in this volume, the result of a workshop in Singapore in 2006, present data from across the archipelago for these first direct elections for local leaders and give their assessment as to how far these elections have contributed to a "deepening democracy".

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Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
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